M'CLELLAN 


JAMES  HAVEIOCK  CAMPBELL 


McCLELLAN 


m 

N 


McCLELLAN 

A  VINDICATION  OF  THE  MILITARY 

CAREER  OF 
GENERAL  GEORGE   B.  McCLELLAN 

A   LAWYER'S  BRIEF 


BY 

JAMES  HAVELOCK  CAMPBELL 

DEAN    OF    THE    INSTITUTE    OF    LAW 

UNIVERSITY     OF     SANTA     CLARA 

C  A  L'l  F'O  R  N  I*A 


"Who,  in  your  opinion,  was  the  ablest  Northern  general 
of  the  war?" 

"McClellan,  by  all  odds."— General  Robert  E.  Lee." 


THE  NEALE   PUBLISHING  COMPANY 

440  FOURTH  AVENUE          :        :         NEW  YORK 

MCMXVI 


COPYRIGHT,  1916,  BY 
JAMES  H.  CAMPBELL 


"1. 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.    ANCESTRY — NATIVITY — BOYHOOD 9 

II.    ADIEU  TO  WEST  POINT — FORT  DELAWARE — TOURS  OF  EX 
PLORATION — THE  CRIMEA 13 

III.  CIVIL  ENGINEER  AND  RAILROAD  OFFICIAL 18 

IV.  THE  CALL  TO  ARMS 23 

V.    CREATING  AN  ARMY  AND  DEFENDING  A  CITY  ....  28 

VI.    NECESSITY  FOR  PREPARATION  AND  ORGANIZATION  .     .     .  33 

VII.    THE  FAVORITE  OF  FORTUNE 40 

VIII.    THE  LINCOLN  OF  1861   .     . ^    . 44 

IX.    A  TALLEYRAND  AND  A  MACHIAVELLI 50 

___X.    STANTON  COURTS  MCCLELLAN— His  CONTEMPT  FOR  LIN 
COLN        55 

XI.    STANTON'S  TIMIDITY,  AND  LOVE  OF  POWER     ....  59 

XII.    ALL  QUIET  ON  THE  POTOMAC 64 

XIII.  FALSE  CONSIDERATIONS — FOOLISH   HASTE   .....  68 

XIV.  THE  PLAN  OF  CAMPAIGN 79 

XV.    FEVER  AIDS  THE  ENEMY — ENTER  STANTON     ....  82 

XVI.    PRESSURE  UPON   MCCLELLAN — NEED   OF   SECRECY — THE 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 87 

XVII.    MCCLELLAN  REVEALS  His  PLAN 91 

XVIII.    THE  WAY  TO  POWER — A  NEW  COMMANDER  ....  100 
XIX.    THE  AUTOCRAT  OF  THE  WAR — THE  FIGHT  AGAINST  THE 

COAST  ROUTE — AMAZING  TREACHERY 106 

XX.    THE    COAST    ROUTE   APPROVED — UNDERGROUND    OPPOSI 
TION  no 

XXI.    THE  HIDDEN  HAND 116 

XXII.    INTO  THE  MIRE 120 

XXIII.  MADDENING  CONDITIONS — STANTON'S  REVENGE     ...  125 

XXIV.  THE  DEFENSE  OF  WASHINGTON 133 

XXV.    THE  DEFENSE  OF  WASHINGTON,  CONTINUED  ....  137 

XXVI.    APPALLING  OBSTACLES 141 

XXVII.    THE  STRENGTH  OF  THE  ENEMY 145 

XXVIII.    EXASPERATING  TREATMENT 154 

XXIX.      McCLELLAN's    APPEAL — THE    SlEGE    OF    YoRKTOWN     .       .  l6o 

XXX.     UP  THE  PENINSULA 166 

XXXI.    THE  FIRST   ENCOUNTER — WILLIAMSBURG 170 

XXXII.    STRADDLING  THE  CHICKAHCMINY 174 

XXXIII.  JACKSON'S   RUSE — BASELESS   PANIC — MCDOWELL   STILL 

COMING        178 

XXXIV.  MCCLELLAN  CLEARS  THE  WAY  FOR  MCDOWELL — HAN 

OVER  COURT  HOUSE 182 

XXXV.    FAIR  OAKS 187 

XXXVI.    FAIR  OAKS— THE  SECOND  DAY 191 

XXXVII.    THE   POLICY  OF   STANTON— SPEEDY   SUCCESS    NOT  DE 
SIRED — THE  WAR  MUST  BE  PROLONGED 197 

XXXVIII.    FIVE  MILES  FROM  RICHMOND 202 

XXXIX.    THE   WEEK  OF   BATTLE — BEAVER   DAM — OFF  FOR  THE 

JAMES — GAINES'S  MILL 210 

XL.    GAINES'S  MILL — THE  UNITED  ARMY 215 

5 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

XLI.     ONE   DAY'S    RESPITE— THE    FOE    MISLED— MCCLELLAN 

DENOUNCES   STANTON 219 

XLII.     ALLEN'S    FIELD — SAVAGE   STATION — GLENDALE   OR   FRA- 

ZIER'S  FARM 228 

XLIII.     MALVERN  HILL — THE  FINAL  STRUGGLE 232 

XLIV.    A  GLORIOUS  FIGHT 235 

XLV.     THE  MEED  OF  PRAISE 241 

XLVI.    WHERE  Is   MCCLELLAN? 246 

XLVII.    WAS  A  DASH  ON  RICHMOND  POSSIBLE? 255 

XLVIII.    THE  FATAL  LETTER 261 

XLIX.    ON  THE  JAMES — THE  PRIZE  AT  HAND 268 

L.    THE  TRUE  BASE  OF  OPERATIONS — FALSE  HOPES  OF  AID  279 

LI.    THE  CLOUDS  GATHER — THE  CONSPIRATORS  AT  WORK     .  282 

LII.    THE  STRUGGLE  TO  REMAIN 297 

LIII.     THE  STRUGGLE  CONTINUES — HALLECK  COMES       .     .     .  306 

LIV.    THE  SITUATION — A  FIERCE  TEMPTATION 320 

LV.    VIEWS  OF  THE  ENEMY  AND  OTHERS 330 

LVI.  A  CRAFTY  SCHEME — How  THE  PROMISE  WAS  KEPT — 
DESPOILED  OF  His  ARMY — POPE'S  CAMPAIGN — MC 
CLELLAN  's  TORTURE 335 

LVII.    THE  DISCOMFITURE  OF  STANTON 343 

LVIII.    STANTON  RESISTS  IN  VAIN — Two  DRAMATIC  SCENES     .  347 
LIX.    THE  ARMY  AND  ITS  IDOL — A  SCENE  WHICH  HAS  No 

PARALLEL — THE  MAGIC  WAND — THE  RESCUED   CITY  354 
LX.    THE   PURSUIT  OF  LEE — CRAFTY   PLOTTING — SORE   NEED 

OF  TIME 359 

LXI.    HARPER'S  FERRY — HALLECK'S  BLUNDER 366 

LXII.    HARPER'S  FERRY,  CONTINUED — FRANKLIN'S  ADVANCE     .  373 

LXIII.    THE  LOST  ORDER — SOUTH  MOUNTAIN 379 

LXIV.    ANTIETAM 383 

LXV.    REORGANIZATION   OF  THE  ARMY— ILLUSIVE   PROMISES — 

THE  CONSPIRACY  IN  FULL  BLAST 395 

LXVI.    A   SWIFT   MARCH — THE   REBELS   ASTONISHED — LEE   IN 
DANGER — THE    CLOSING    SCENE — TRIUMPH    OF    THE 

CONSPIRACY 399 

LXVII.    SHOULD  HE  HAVE  RESISTED? 405 

LXVIII.    THE  DISMISSAL  CONDEMNED 408 

LXIX.    RESULT  OF  THE  DISMISSAL 412 

LXX.    A  GREAT  COMMANDER 416 

LXXI.    THE  TEST  OF  COMPARISON 423 

LXXII.    THE  QUALITIES  OF  A  GREAT  COMMANDER 430 

LXXIII.    THE  INCONSISTENCY  OF  THE  CRITICS 436 

LXXIV.    THE  SOLDIER  AT   HOME — Civic   HONORS — THE   END     .  440 

INDEX      «... 443 


PREFACE 

The  purpose  of  this  book  is  to  set  forth  clearly  the  services 
of  General  McClellan  in  the  Civil  War.  Only  a  brief  sketch 
of  his  earlier  and  later  life  is  here  given.  More  has  been 
written  about  this  subject  than  about  any  other  within  the 
realm  of  war  except  the  campaigns  of  Napoleon ;  and  a 
comparison  of  what  has  been  written  with  the  facts  will  show 
that  never  before  was  any  subject  so  little  understood  by 
those  who  undertook  to  discuss  it.  From  what  has  been 
said  by  the  majority  of  these  authors  one  would  conclude 
that  McClellan  was  wholly  devoid  of  military  capacity.  Yet 
General  Lee,  the  most  renowned  leader  of  the  South,  em 
phatically  proclaimed  McClellan  the  ablest  Northern  General 
of  the  war;  and  von  Moltke,  the  foremost  chieftain  of  the 
nineteenth  century,  asserted  that  the  war  would  have  ended 
two  years  earlier  than  it  did,  if  McClellan  had  been  properly 
supported  by  the  Government.  It  is  a  most  interesting  and 
potent  fact  that  in  a  life  of  fifty-nine  years  only  ten  months 
covers  the  whole  period  to  which  criticism  has  ever  been 
directed;  yet  this  same  ten  months  has  justly  received  from 
many  unbiased  writers  greater  praise  than  any  other  period 
of  his  life.  Certain  facts  hitherto  ignored  or  insufficiently 
appreciated  are  iterated  and  reiterated  for  a  purpose;  but  not 
often  enough,  I  fear,  in  many  instances,  to  penetrate  the 
impervious  armor  of  prejudice. 

J.  H.  C 


McCLELLAN 

CHAPTER    I 

ANCESTRY NATIVITY — BOYHOOD 

Early  in  the  eighteenth  century  there  came  to  America 
from  the  county  of  Kirkcudbright,  Scotland,  three  brothers 
of  the  name  of  McClellan.  Their  forefathers,  under  the 
name  of  Maclellan,  had  long  before  been  sheriffs  of  Galloway 
and  barons  of  Bombie,  and  the  family  lineage  could  be  traced 
back  to  the  thirteenth  century.  The  eldest  of  the  three  broth 
ers  mentioned  made  his  home  in  Massachusetts,  not  far  from 
Worcester,  and  there  Samuel  McClellan  was  born.  Nearly 
to  middle  age  Samuel  led  the  life  of  a  farmer;  but  he  was 
imbued  with  the  military  and  patriotic  spirit,  and  served  with 
distinction  as  a  lieutenant  throughout  the  French  and  Indian 
war,  which  lasted  from  1755  to  1763.  Having  made  his 
home  at  Woodstock,  Connecticut,  he  organized  a  troop  of 
horse,  of  which  he  was  made  the  captain.  At  the  outset  of 
the  revolutionary  struggle  his  troop  was  invited  to  join 
the  Continental  army,  but,  although  the  rank  of  colonel  would 
have  been  the  reward  of  acceptance,  he  continued  to  serve 
throughout  the  war  as  a  part  of  the  Connecticut  militia,  and 
rose  steadily  from  the  post  of  captain  to  that  of  brigadier- 
general.  At  the  end  of  the  war  he  returned  to  his  farm, 
and  did  not  again  forsake  the  bucolic  life,  except  that  he 
served  for  several  terms  in  the  state  assembly. 

The  first-born  of  Samuel  McClellan  was  James,  who  had 
two  sons, — George  and  Samuel.  From  Samuel  also  sprang 
two  sons,  one  of  whom,  Henry,  espoused  the  cause  of  the 
South,  and  served  as  a  cavalry  officer  in  the  army  of  Northern 

9 


io  McCLELLAN 

Virginia.  The  other,  Carswell  McClellan,  became  an  officer 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  George  and  Samuel  McClellan 
were  both  physicians.  George  was  a  graduate  of  Yale  Col 
lege,  and,  having  pursued  his  medical  studies  in  the  Univer 
sity  of  Pennsylvania,  he  took  up  the  practice  of  his  profession 
in  Philadelphia,  where  he  rapidly  advanced  in  reputation  until 
he  became  one  of  the  most  famous  American  surgeons  of 
his  day.  He  was  a  medical  lecturer,  first  in  the  Jefferson 
Medical  College,  and  afterward  in  the  University  of  Penn 
sylvania;  and  he  was  a  medical  writer  of  high  repute. 

George  Brinton  McClellan,  the  subject  of  this  work,  was 
the  son  of  Dr.  George  McClellan,  whose  life  we  have  briefly 
sketched,  and  was  born  in  the  city  of  Philadelphia  on  the 
third  day  of  December,  1826.  After  having  received  a  good 
preliminary  education,  he  entered  the  University  of  Penn 
sylvania,  where  he  remained  for  two  years.  At  this  time  he 
was  appointed  to  the  Military  Academy  at  West  Point. 

It  is  characteristic  of  General  Michie's  life  of  McClellan 
that  the  author  at  this  point  says :  "Up  to  this  time  he  had 
not  exhibited  any  unusual  talents,"  and  "He  was  neither 
brilliant  nor  precocious,  but  was  rated  rather  as  a  good  stu 
dent  making  steady  progress";  yet  he  admits  that  McClellan 
had  attained  high  class  rank  and  that  the  rules  of  the  Military 
Academy,  which  fixed  the  minimum  age  of  entrance  at  sixteen 
years,  were  suspended  to  admit  this  youth  at  the  age  of  fifteen 
years  and  seven  months, — because  of  the  impression  he  had 
made  upon  his  examiners.  The  impression  he  then  created 
was  steadily  retained,  for  he  held  a  high  place  during  the 
four  years  of  his  stay  at  the  Academy  and,  although  the 
youngest  of  the  class  of  sixty,  came  out  second  in  general 
standing  on  final  graduation.  The  man  of  first  rank  was 
Charles  S.  Stewart,  who  afterward  served  as  major  of  engi 
neers  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  Stewart  said  of  McClel- 
lan's  school-days  at  West  Point,  among  many  flattering 
things :  "He  was  well  educated  and,  when  he  chose  to  be, 
brilliant."  At  that  time  there  were  in  West  Point  many 
young  men  who  became  famous  later  as  participants  in  the 
great  civil  struggle,  on  one  side  or  the  other.  In  various 


McCLELLAN  n 

classes  of  the  Academy  were :  Grant,  Stonewall  Jackson,  Fitz 
John  Porter,  Franklin,  Hancock,  A.  P.  Hill,  Davis,  Reno, 
Stoneman,  Pickett,  Pleasanton,  and  many  others  almost 
equally  notable. 

Upon  his  graduation,  McClellan  was  made  a  brevet  second 
lieutenant  of  engineers.     A  company  of  sappers  and  miners 
was   formed  at  West  Point,  and  he  did  valuable  service  in 
drilling  the  men  in  the  details  of  their  work.  The  war  with 
Mexico  was  now  in  full  progress,  and  after  some  prelimi 
nary  work  the  company  joined  General  Scott's  army  before 
Vera  Cruz  on  March  gth,  1847.     There  were  only  ten  engi 
neer  officers  in  the  army  at  the  time,  of  whom  McClellan 
was  the  youngest;  yet  his  skill  and  ability  fitted  him  to  take 
an   active  part  with  his  colleagues   in  the  preparations   for 
the  investment  of  the  city,  which  greatly  aided  in  bringing 
about  the  speedy  success  of  the  siege.     In  the  stoutly  con 
tested  advance  from  Vera  Cruz  to  the  City  of  Mexico  the 
young  lieutenant  won  laurels  at  every  step,  and  drew  forth 
lavish  commendations* from  his  superior  officers.     His  skill, 
coolness,   bravery,   aggressiveness,   energy,    and   good    judg 
ment  at  Cerro  Gordo,  Contreras,  San  Antonio,  Churubusco, 
San  Pablo,  and  Chapultepec  were  so  extraordinary  as  to  win 
the  warmest  praise  from  General  Twiggs,  General  Per  si  for  F. 
Smith,  and  the  Commander  in  Chief,  General  Scott;  and  he 
was   repeatedly   recommended    for   promotion.      On   August 
20th,    1847,   ne  was  made  first  lieutenant   "for  gallant  and 
meritorious  conduct"  at  Contreras  and  Churubusco ;  and  Cha 
pultepec  secured  for  him  a  captain's  commission  on  Septem 
ber  1 3th.     He  remained  with  the  army  in  the  City  of  Mexico 
until   May  28th,    1848,   and   reached   West   Point   again  on 
June  22d,  1848. 

It  will  be  observed  that  when  the  last  battle  of  the  Mexican 
war  was  fought  this  plucky  and  brilliant  young  soldier  still 
lacked  two  and  a  half  months  of  the  age  of  majority. 

For  three  years  after  the  close  of  the  Mexican  war 
McClellan  taught  military  engineering  at  West  Point.  In 
this  line  of  work  his  practical  experience  was  a  great  aid.  He 
was  an  admirer  of  Napoleon,  and  as  a  member  of  the  Na- 


12  McCLELLAN 

poleon  Club  devoted  much  time  to  an  analytical  survey  of 
the  famous  campaigns  of  the  Little  Corporal. 

An  essay  on  the  campaign  of  1812  won  for  him  much 
praise  for  its  thoroughness,  style,  and  diction.  About  the 
same  time  he  displayed  great  aptness  in  linguistic  studies, 
and  spent  a  large  portion  of  his  leisure  hours  in  familiarizing 
himself  with  the  standard  literature  of  the  world.  He  also 
found  practical  experience  in  supervising  the  erection  of  gov 
ernment  buildings,  and  especially  of  new  structures  for  the 
Military  Academy.  All  this  was  done  with  painstaking  skill 
and  consummate  ability. 

In  1850,  being  then  at  the  head  of  the  engineering  com 
pany,  he  put  his  knowledge  of  French  to  good  use  by  trans 
lating  Gomard  on  Bayonet  Exercise,  and  later  Gomard's  work 
on  tactics.  These  books,  adapted  by  McClellan  to  the  needs 
of  American  soldiers,  were  adopted  as  a  part  of  the  cur 
riculum  at  West  Point,  on  the  recommendation  of  General 
Scott. 


CHAPTER    II 

ADIEU  TO   WEST   POINT FORT   DELAWARE TOURS   OF 

EXPLORATION — THE  CRIMEA 

Captain  McClellan's  connection  with  the  Military  Acad 
emy  ended  on  June  2ist,  1851.  He  was  then  assigned  to 
the  position  of  assistant  in  the  Corps  of  Engineers  engaged 
in  the  construction  of  Fort  Delaware,  under  the  general  direc 
tion  of  Brevet-Major  Saunders,  and  he  prosecuted  this  work 
until  March  5th,  1852. 

He  now  became  a  member  of  the  expedition  which  had 
already  been  engaged  for  three  years  in  the  exploration  of 
the  sources  of  the  Red  River  of  Arkansas,  under  the  com 
mand  of  Captain  Marcy.  McClellan's  service  in  this  line 
lasted  only  until  June  27th,  1852. 

After  a  pleasant  tour  of  inspection  as  one  of  the  staff 
of  General  P.  F.  Smith,  his  next  important  work  was  a  series 
of  surveys  for  the  improvement  of  the  harbors  of  Texas 
from  Indianola  to  the  Rio  Grande.  This  involved  a  vast 
amount  of  detail,  but  we  are  told  that  such  was  his  inde 
fatigable  industry  that  the  commission  was  executed  and 
his  report  handed  to  General  Totten,  Chief  of  Engineers,  on 
the  1 8th  of  April,  1853. 

As  the  project  of  a  railroad  to  the  Pacific  was  now 
occupying  public  attention,  Congress  had  passed  an  act  au 
thorizing  such  surveys  as  the  War  Department  might  approve 
to  fix  upon  the  best  route  from  the  Mississippi  to  the  Golden 
Gate.  A  corps  of  engineers  was  placed  under  the  command 
of  Governor  Stevens,  of  Washington  Territory,  at  one  time  a 
member  of  the  National  Corps  of  Engineers,  with  the  proviso 
that  Captain  McClellan  be  put  in  charge  of  the  western  part 
of  the  line. 

His  orders  were  dated  May  9,  1853,  an(^  after  having 

13 


14  McCLELLAN 

gone  to  San  Francisco  to  organize  the  expedition,  he  reached 
Fort  Vancouver  on  June  27th.  It  required  almost  a  month 
more  before  all  the  preparations  for  the  journey  into  the 
wilderness  could  be  completed.  It  was  necessary  to  bring 
everything  required  to  sustain  the  party  and  to  be  ready  for 
attacks  by  hostile  Indians.  The  force  comprised  sixty-six 
persons  and  one  hundred  and  seventy-eight  animals. 

Although  it  was  a  late  and  unfavorable  time  for  the  prose 
cution  of  such  a  series  of  explorations  in  a  snowy  mountain 
range,  McClellan's  mission  was  pushed  forward  with  great 
assiduity,  with  the  result  that  he  reported  that  there  were 
two  available  mountain  passes  through  which  the  road 
might  go. 

Governor  Stevens  in  his  report  said,  "To  Captain  Mc- 
Clellan,  his  officers,  and  men  too  much  credit  cannot  be 
ascribed  for  their  indefatigable  exertions,  and  the  great  ability 
of  all  kinds  brought  to  their  division  of  the  work."  He  also 
commended  "the  unsurpassed  skill  and  devotion  which  has 
characterized  the  chief  of  the  division  and  all  of  his  asso 
ciates." 

It  is  said  that  Mr.  Davis,  then  Secretary  of  War  and  later 
the  President  of  the  Confederacy,  "was  very  complimentary  to 
McClellan,"  and,  at  the  direction  of  Mr.  Davis,  McClellan 
was  engaged  for  a  time  in  the  collection  of  data  as  to  the 
construction  and  operation  of  railroads,  and  as  to  the  prac 
ticability  of  a  trans-continental  road.  This  mission  was  so 
well  accomplished  that  the  Secretary  rewarded  the  young 
captain  by  sending  him  to  report  upon  the  advisability  of 
selecting  the  harbor  of  Samana,  in  San  Domingo,  as  a  naval 
station.  McClellan  reached  the  Bay  of  Samana  on  the  25th 
of  July,  1854,  and  "notwithstanding  the  oppressive  tempera 
ture  proceeded  with  alacrity  to  carry  out  his  instructions." 
The  first  of  his  reports  of  the  expedition  was  completed  on 
September  3Oth,  1854.  These  reports  demonstrated  the  great 
importance  to  the  United  States  of  acquiring  the  contemplated 
station.  Long  afterward  General  Grant  strongly  concurred 
in  this  view  and  did  everything  in  his  power  to  prevail  upon 
Congress  to  act  favorably  upon  it,  but  without  avail. 


McCLELLAN  15 

For  a  time  McClellan  was  now  at  Washington,  engaged 
with  matters  of  no  great  moment. 

Early  in  the  following  year  he  was  made  a  captain  in 
the  Eirst  Cavalry,  but  his  standing  in  the  regard  of  his 
superiors  was  still  more  clearly  evidenced  when  the  President 
chose  him  as  a  member  of  the  military  commission  sent  to 
study  the  art  of  war  in  the  Crimea.  The  other  members 
were  Major  Delafield  and  Major  Mordecai,  both  very  much 
older  men  than  our  young  captain.  The  object  of  this  com 
mission  was  to  observe  the  organization  of  armies  and  the 
furnishing  and  distribution  of  supplies;  the  transportation 
of  horses  and  men  by  land  and  sea;  medical  and  hospital  ar 
rangements  and  appliances  of  every  kind;  uniforms  and  camp 
ing  outfits  for  actual  service  in  the  field;  the  arms,  ammuni 
tion,  and  accouterments  used  for  all  troops,  especially  cavalry ; 
the  merits  and  demerits  of  the  rifles  recently  introduced ;  the 
guns  and  powder  used  in  field  and  siege-work,  especially  in 
the  French  division  of  the  artillery  corps;  the  construction 
and  armament  of  land  and  sea  fortifications  and  the  merits 
of  the  guns  used  therein;  the  details  of  siege  operations  and 
engineering  features  of  siege,  in  attack  and  defense;  the  mak 
ing  up  of  bridge  trains ;  the  building  of  casemated  forts  and 
their  efficiency  in  attacks  by  land  and  water;  the  use  of 
camels  and  their  availability  in  cold  and  mountainous 
countries. 

The  commission  left  Boston  on  April  nth,  1855,  and 
went  to  London  to  get  the  necessary  credentials.  Every 
courtesy  wras  accorded  to  them  by  the  proper  authorities  in 
the  way  of  letters  and  instructions  to  the  British  naval  and 
military  officers  in  the  Crimea.  The  same  treatment  was 
confidently  expected  from  the  French  authorities,  but  they 
found  an  insurmountable  barrier  to  their  wishes  because  of 
a  rigid  rule  which  had  been  adopted  prohibiting  any  foreign 
officer  who  had  enjoyed  the  favor  of  admittance  into  the 
French  lines  from  thereafter  accepting  a  similar  courtesy  from 
the  Russian  officers,  which  was  a  necessary  part  of  their 
plan. 

From  Paris  they  went  to  Berlin  to  see  the  Russian  min- 


16  McCLELLAN 

ister  there,  but  found  that  it  was  a  matter  outside  of  his 
jurisdiction  and  that  they  must  go  to  St.  Petersburg.  The 
Prussian  government  was  friendly,  and  they  were  promised 
every  opportunity  to  observe  and  examine  the  military  de 
fenses  of  the  country  on  their  return. 

At  St.  Petersburg  to  their  chagrin  they  met  with  the  same 
reception  as  at  Paris,  and  a  great  deal  of  delay  resulted. 
They  utilized  the  time,  however,  in  inspecting  the  defensive 
works  of  Russia  and  Prussia. 

It  was  not  until  the  i6th  of  October  that  they  arrived  at 
Balaklava.  Quarters  were  assigned  to  them  by  General 
Simpson,  the  British  commander,  in  the  camp  of  the  Fourth 
Division,  at  a  point  which  overlooked  a  great  part  of  the 
scene  of  war.  They  were  supplied  with  everything  that  could 
secure  their  comfort  and  every  possible  aid,  facility,  and 
courtesy  were  extended  to  them  by  the  British  officers.  The 
Turkish  and  Sardinian  officers  also  gave  all  the  assistance  in 
their  power.  The  work  of  the  commission  at  the  seat  of  war 
was  therefore  confined  to  the  territory  occupied  by  these  three 
armies.  They  left  Balaklava  on  an  English  vessel  on  the  2d 
day  of  November,  1855,  and  after  a  short  stay  in  Constanti 
nople  and  Scutari,  where  the  hospitals  of  the  allied  armies 
were  established,  they  repaired  first  to  Vienna  and  then  to 
every  strongly  fortified  point  in  Europe,  for  the  purpose  of 
examining  the  military  establishments  and  inspecting  the  de 
fenses.  In  France  they  were  given  up  to  the  guidance  of 
subordinate  officers,  from  whom  little  data  was  secured,  be 
cause  of  the  limited  knowledge  of  the  officers.  On  their 
return  to  England  they  were  again  the  recipients  of  every 
attention,  courtesy,  and  assistance  desired  by  them.  On  the 
1 9th  day  of  April,  1856,  they  left  England  for  home. 

McClellan's  reports  were  promptly  submitted,  have  been 
greatly  commended  for  their  fullness  and  ability,  and  were 
found  to  be  of  much  use  to  the  war  department  of  the  United 
States.  They  included  reports  upon  the  Austrian,  Prussian, 
French,  English,  and  Sardinian  cavalry  and  infantry,  upon 
the  composition  and  strength  of  the  Russian  army  and  the 
Russian,  Austrian,  French,  and  English  engineer  corps,  and 


McCLELLAN  17 

a  report  was  appended  upon  the  needs  of  the  United  States 
cavalry  and  the  necessary  steps  to  be  taken  to  supply  them. 

These  reports  constituted  a  treasury  of  information  to 
military  students,  which  was  at  once  utilized  with  great 
avidity  throughout  the  United  States.  McClellan's  linguistic 
skill  enabled  him  to  make  use  of  much  valuable  material  in 
the  shape  of  foreign  publications.  He  also  translated  and 
adapted  a  Russian  work  on  cavalry  tactics  and  gave  it  to  the 
war  department.  Many  illuminating  illustrations  accompa 
nied  this,  and  a  number  of  them  were  incorporated  in  the 
lectures  and  text-books  of  the  Military  Academy.  He  also 
devised  a  new  cavalry  saber  and  a  modification  of  the  Hun 
garian  saddle,  which  went  into  general  use.  The  reports  are 
rilled  with  comments  and  suggestions  of  evident  value.  He 
gives  hearty  praise  to  Todleben,  the  engineer  who  constructed 
the  Russian  fortifications,  and  to  the  valor  of  the  soldiers  who 
defended  them. 

No  one  can  deny,  not  even  General  Michie,  that  McClellan 
won  for  himself  fresh  laurels  by  the  successful  and  even 
brilliant  manner  in  which  his  Crimean  commission  was 
executed. 


CHAPTER    III 

CIVIL    ENGINEER    AND    RAILROAD    OFFICIAL 

The  general  recognition  of  McClellan's  capacity  receives 
its  most  convincing  assurance  in  the  fact  that  in  January/ 
J857,  when  he  was  barely  thirty  years  old,  the  position  of 
chief  engineer  of  the  Illinois  Central  Railroad  was  tendered 
to  him,  and  he  withdrew  from  the  army  to  accept  it.  As  was 
usual  in  his  life,  he  at  once  devoted  himself  to  a  thorough 
mastery  of  this  new  field  of  activity  and  with  such  success 
that  in  the  beginning  of  the  next  year  he  became  vice-presi 
dent  of  the  company.  His  industry  and  his  ability  to  master 
and  attend  to  a  great  mass  of  detail  were  now  signally  ex 
hibited.  But  above  all  other  gifts  of  his  finely  equipped  mind 
was  his  power  of  handling  men  and  winning  the  esteem  and 
love  of  all  who  came  in  contact  with  him.  His  just  and 
considerate  treatment  of  those  beneath  him  in  the  service  of 
the  company  and  his  readiness  to  observe  and  reward  efficient 
work  were  especially  notable  and  endearing  traits.  His  home 
was  in  Chicago  and  he  kept  open  house,  especially  for  all 
his  former  comrades  of  the  army.  Among  those  who  en 
joyed  his  hospitality  were  many  who  afterward  became 
famous  in  the  ranks  of  the  Confederacy.  Joe  Johnston, 
Buckner,  Beauregard,  and  many  other  Southerners  were  his 
cordial  friends  and  welcome  visitors. 

His  schoolmate,  Lieutenant  Ambrose  E.  Burnside,  who 
had  served  with  McClellan  throughout  the  Mexican  War, 
had  left  the  army  in  1853  to  go  into  the  business  of  making 
a  kind  of  rifle  of  which  he  was  the  inventor;  and  the  prose 
cution  of  this  enterprise  he  continued  until  1858,  at  which 
time  he  was  in  the  Slough  of  Despond  because  of  the  failure 
of  his  plans.  McClellan  played  the  part  of  the  good  Samari 
tan.  He  not  only  secured  the  position  of  cashier  in  a  bank 

18 


McCLELLAN  19 

for  his  friend,  with  a  lucrative  salary,  but  installed  him  and 
Mrs.  Burnside  in  his  luxurious  home,  of  which  she  took 
charge.  The  large  measure  of  success  which  McClellan  met 
with  in  the  management  of  the  road  in  Illinois  was  so  evident 
that  he  was  not  permitted  to  stay  long  undisturbed  in  the 
discharge  of  his  present  duties.  The  circle  of  his  friends 
was  large  and  many  of  them  were  interested  in  the  eastern 
division  of  the  Ohio  and  Mississippi  Railroad  Company; 
therefore  in  September,  1860,  he  was  offered  the  presidency 
of  that  road,  with  a  salary  of  ten  thousand  dollars  a  year. 
The  acceptance  of  this  position  necessarily  transferred  his 
residence  to  Cincinnati.  His  previous  railroad  experience  had 
qualified  him  to  win  new  honors  in  this  enlarged  field. 

It  was  a  highly  enviable  and  responsible  position  in  which 
this  young  man  of  thirty- three  found  himself.  He  was  now 
a  married  man.  This  was  another  result  of  the  Red  River 
expedition,  for  he  met  his  affinity  in  the  charming  person  of 
Ellen  Mary  Marcy,  the  daughter  of  Captain  Marcy,  the  leader 
of  the  expedition.  They  were  married  on  May  22,  1860,  and 
the  union  proved  to  be  an  exceptionally  happy  one.  McClellan 
then  stood  on  the  threshold  apparently  of  a  life  of  rare  re 
sponsibility,  honor,  and  prosperity.  He  was  honored  and 
beloved  by  all  about  him,  and  now  the  joys  of  a  blissful  home 
life  came  to  make  his  existence  one  of  almost  ideal  delight. 
The  young  couple  were  both  of  a  strongly  religious  tendency 
and  viewed  marriage  as  a  sacred  relation,  and  no  cloud  ever 
arose  to  dim  their  perfect  devotion,  love,  and  confidence. 
No  more  practical  example  of  actual  soul-mates  can  the  his 
tory  of  humanity  afford,  and  the  happiness  of  the  honeymoon 
was  but  the  beginning  of  the  equal  happiness  of  their  life-long 
companionship. 

But  the  uninterrupted  continuance  of  such  perfect  joy  is 
too  much  to  expect  in  this  world,  and  the  young  couple  had 
hardly  fixed  a  residence  when  their  plans  were  blasted,  their 
home  despoiled  of  its  head,  and  the  young  bride  robbed  of  her 
mate  by  the  rough  and  bloody  hand  of  war. 

The  existence  of  slavery  in  a  minority  of  the  states,  against 
the  moral  convictions  and  earnest  protests  of  the  rest  of  the 


20  McCLELLAN 

country,  made  war  inevitable,  unless  a  peaceful  means  could 
be  found  of  abolishing  the  evil,  and  no  satisfactory  means  had 
been  found.  The  simplest  and  most  obvious  method  of  solving 
the  problem  was  to  compensate  the  owners  equitably  and 
emancipate  the  slaves.  But  the  owners  were  opposed  to 
emancipation  and  the  abolitionists  were  opposed  to  compensa 
tion.  There  could  be  no  property  in  human  beings,  the  latter 
declared,  and  therefore  no  recompense  for  their  release  could 
in  conscience  be  considered  necessary.  This  was  a  narrow 
and  senseless  view,  for  it  might  easily  have  been  seen  that 
there  was  a  cost  to  be  met,  directly  or  indirectly.  Those  who 
knew  the  spirit  of  the  South  surely  knew  that  property  so 
valuable,  in  which  so  vast  an  amount  of  money  was  invested, 
would  not  be  given  up  without  compensation  and  without  a 
struggle.  It  was  clear  to  the  South  that  the  plan  of  the  agita 
tors  was  to  ruin  the  slaveholders,  by  putting  an  end  to  slavery 
without  paying  the  owners  for  their  slaves.  To  them  the 
election  of  Mr.  Lincoln  in  the  fall  of  1860  and  the  consequent 
triumph  of  the  Republican  party  meant  that  this  hard  and 
inequitable  policy  would  be  carried  out.  To  the  opponents 
of  slavery  also  this  was  undoubtedly  the  vital  significance  of 
the  victory,  and  from  it  they  confidently  expected  would  flow, 
as  a  natural  consequence,  the  extirpation  of  slavery,  without 
expense  to  the  nation. 

Many  conservative  men  were  in  favor  of  emancipation 
attended  with  a  fair  compensation.  But  they  were  not  nu 
merous  enough.  The  avoidance  of  a  direct  expense  is  some 
times  found  to  entail  the  incurring  of  an  indirect  expense  in 
finitely  greater.  Of  this  the  civil  war  affords  the  most  lumi 
nous  example  to  be  seen  in  history. 

The  purpose  of  the  opponents  of  slavery  being  clear  and 
apparently  on  the  eve  of  full  fruition,  the  slaveholding  South 
saw  directly  before  it  the  disagreeable  prospect  of  being  de 
spoiled  of  its  most  cherished  asset  without  reimbursement, 
unless  a  desperate  struggle  was  made  for  its  protection  and 
defense. 

And  so  came  the  war — a  war  which  cost  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  lives,  the  destruction  of  a  vast  amount  of  prop- 


McCLELLAN  21 

erty  of  historic  as  well  as  monetary  value  which  could  not  be 
replaced,  and  the  burdening  of  the  country  with  a  colossal 
debt,  probably  more  than  quadrupling  the  amount  needed  to 
make  good  to  the  owners  the  loss  of  their  slaves. 

The  first  overt  act  of  resistance  occurred  on  December 
2oth,  1860,  when  South  Carolina  seceded  from  the  Union. 
Virginia,  North  Carolina,  Georgia,  Florida,  Alabama,  Missis 
sippi,  Louisiana,  Texas,  Arkansas,  and  Tennessee  followed  the 
lead  of  their  sister  state,  and  Maryland,  Missouri,  and  Ken 
tucky  rendered  very  substantial  aid  to  the  cause.  The  first 
act  of  war  of  special  importance  was  the  capture  of  a  con 
siderable  Federal  force  under  General  Twiggs  at  Indianola, 
Texas,  and  the  appropriation  of  government  stores  to  the 
value  of  $1,500,000.  The  small  bodies  of  soldiers  guarding 
the  Indian  and  Mexican  frontiers  were  likewise  taken  with 
their  arms  and  supplies.  The  subtreasury  at  New  Orleans 
with  $500,000  stored  therein  was  seized,  as  were  also  many 
vessels  and  fortifications.  Fort  Sumter  in  Charleston  harbor, 
held  by  a  Federal  force  under  Major  Robert  Anderson,  did 
not  surrender  until  it  had  been  subjected  to  thirty-six  hours 
of  bombardment.  The  seventy  men  who  held  it  marched  out 
with  flying  colors  and  were  given  safe  passage  to  the  North. 

The  claims  of  the  various  states  of  the  South  to  the  right 
of  withdrawing  at  will  from  the  Union  did  not  stand  upon 
equal  ground.  The  claim  most  easily  defensible  was  that  of 
Virginia.  The  author  is  a  New  Englander  and  neither  he  nor 
any  of  his  kin  has  ever  lived  in  the  South,  but  candor  compels 
the  statement  that  the  claim  of  Virginia  to  sever  her  connec 
tion  with  the  other  states  was  legally,  logically,  and  morally 
unanswerable  and  irresistible.  Let  us  imagine  the  common 
wealth  of  Mexico  now  determining  to  become  one  of  the 
United  States,  yet  mindful  that  she  might  repent,  therefore 
coupling  her  action  with  every  safeguard  that  the  most  bril 
liant  and  sagacious  lawyers  could  devise,  to  reserve  and  pro 
tect  her  full  and  free  right  of  withdrawal  whenever  she  might 
become  dissatisfied,  thus  making  this  privilege  a  condition 
precedent  to  her  action  and  making  her  admission  an  acknowl 
edgment  of  such  right  and  an  agreement  that  she  might  exer- 


22  McCLELLAN 

cise  it  at  will.  If  we  accepted  her  under  such  circumstances, 
we  could  not  honorably  resist  her  withdrawal,  if  she  chose  to 
leave  us.  That  was  precisely  the  position  of  Virginia.  Every 
conceivable  precaution  was  taken  to  preserve,  beyond  cavil  or 
doubt,  her  absolute  freedom  to  sever  her  connection  with  the 
Union  at  her  own  pleasure,  and  whatever  might  now  be  done 
to  secure  such  an  end  was  in  her  case  ably  and  convincingly 
done  under  the  direction  of  the  most  famous  advocates  of 
the  time. 


CHAPTER   IV 

THE    CALL    TO    ARMS 

McClellan,  shortly  after  his  marriage,  had  rented  a  house 
in  Cincinnati  for  a  term  of  three  years,  and  foreseeing  the 
approaching  tempest,  he  had  a  proviso  inserted  in  the  lease 
that  in  case  of  war  he  might  terminate  it. 

Actual  hostilities  were  begun  by  the  bombardment  of  Fort 
Sumter  in  Charleston  Harbor  on  the  twelfth  day  of  April, 
1 86 1.  McClellan  was  at  once  in  demand.  He  received  tele 
grams  from  friends  in  New  York  informing  him  that  the 
governor  of  that  state  desired  to  avail  himself  of  his  services; 
one  from  General  Robert  Patterson  offering  him  the  position 
of  chief  engineer  of  the  state  militia  then  being  organized; 
and  one  from  Governor  Curtin,  of  Pennsylvania,  tendering 
him  the  command  of  the  Pennsylvania  Reserves,  a  position 
which  afterward  fell  to  General  McCall.  McClellan  promptly 
started  for  Pennsylvania  to  confer  with  Governor  Curtin,  but 
stopped  over  at  Columbus,  Ohio,  to  give  Governor  Dennison 
some  information  about  the  condition  of  affairs  in  Cincinnati. 

He  expected  to  remain  only  a  few  hours  and  then  go  on 
to  Harrisburg.  The  laws  of  Ohio  at  that  time  provided  that 
the  command  of  the  militia  and  volunteers  called  out  must 
be  given  to  general  officers  then  in  the  militia.  The  legislature 
was  in  session,  however,  and  the  Governor  within  a  few  hours 
procured  the  passage  of  a  bill  allowing  him  to  appoint  as 
commander  any  resident  of  the  state.  The  appointment  was 
immediately  offered  to  McClellan,  and  it  was  accepted  by  him ; 
on  the  same  day, — the  23d  of  April,  1861, — he  entered  upon 
the  performance  of  his  duties.  Therefore  he  gave  up  his  con 
templated  trip  to  Harrisburg. 

The  fifty  counties  of  Virginia  lying  westward  of  the  Alle 
gheny  Mountains  were  opposed  to  secession,  and  a  Confederate 

23 


24  McCLELLAN 

force  was  sent  from  Richmond  under  General  Lee,  to  bring 
this  section  into  line  with  the  remainder  of  the  state.  General 
McClellan,  upon  his  own  responsibility  and  without  orders,  led 
a  force  into  Western  Virginia  and  dislodged  the  enemy  in 
swift  order  from  Philippi  on  the  second  of  June,  and  shortly 
thereafter,  successively,  from  Rich  Mountain,  Laurel  Hill, 
and  finally,  on  the  i2th  of  July,  from  Carrick's  Ford,  driving 
the  routed  Southerners  in  disorderly  flight  into  Eastern  Vir 
ginia. 

His  rapid  action  and  its  results  were  characterized  as 
"aggressive,  swift,  and  permanent/'  and  a  telegram  was  sent 
to  him  by  General  Scott,  who  was  then  at  the  head  of  the 
army,  saying,  "The  General-in-Chief  and,  what  is  more,  the 
Cabinet,  including  the  President,  are  charmed  with  your 
activity,  valor,  and  consequent  success." 

General  Lee  was  severely  criticized  by  the  Southern  press 
for  his  inability  to  maintain  his  position. 

We  are  told  that  the  campaign  in  Western  Virginia  was 
"a  brilliant  campaign  .  .  .  conducted  agreeably  to  mili 
tary  principles,  and  its  execution,  as  well  as  the  fact  that  it  was 
undertaken  by  General  McClellan  of  his  own  motion,  and 
without  countenance  from  Washington,  stamped  him  as  a  man 
of  superior  ability."  *  But  before  his  exploits  in  West  Vir 
ginia  and  before  its  occupation  by  General  Lee,  General  Mc 
Clellan  had  urgently,  but  vainly,  requested  permission  to 
hasten  with  his  troops  into  the  Shenandoah  Valley.  He  would 
thus  not  only  have  forestalled  Lee's  action,  but  also,  as  he  says, 
he  would  have  prevented  the  possibility  of  "Bull  Run  No.  i."  2 

On  the  22d  day  of  July,  1861,  that  being  the  day  after  the 
battle  of  Bull  Run,  and  as  the  result  of  that  disgraceful  rout, 
General  McClellan  was  called  to  Washington,  and  on  the  26th 
day  of  the  same  month  was  placed  in  command  of  all  the 
forces  at  the  capital. 

The  Comte  de  Paris  gives  us  the  following  attractive  pic 
ture  of  the  young  commander  at  this  time  :3  "Surrounded 


1  Swinton,  Campaigns  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  39. 

2  McClellan,  Own  Story,  47. 

3  Battles  and  Leaders,  II,  112. 


McCLELLAN  25 

for  the  most  part  by  young  officers,  he  was  himself  the  most 
youthful  of  us  all,  not  only  by  reason  of  his  fine  vigor,  the 
noble  candor  of  his  character,  and  his  glowing  patriotism,  but 
also,  I  may  add,  by  reason  of  his  inexperience  of  men.  His 
military  bearing  breathed  a  spirit  of  frankness,  benevolence, 
and  firmness.  His  look  was  piercing,  his  voice  gentle,  his 
word  of  command  clear  and  definite.  His  encouragement  was 
most  affectionate,  his  reprimand  couched  in  terms  of  perfect 
politeness.  Discreet  as  a  military  chieftain  should  be,  he  was 
slow  in  bestowing  his  confidence,  but  once  given  it  was  never 
withdrawn." 

He  had  won  distinction  in  the  Mexican  War.  He  had  won 
distinction  in  civil  life.  He  had  a  happy  home,  an  enviable 
position,  and  a  salary  of  $10,000  a  year.  The  Civil  War  was 
less  than  three  months  old  and  again  he  had  won  renown  and 
the  warm  praise  of  the  head  of  the  army, — his  former  chief 
in  Mexico, — for  "his  activity,  valor,  and  success."  The  na 
tion  wanted  him.  His  civil  employers  wanted  him,  and  were 
holding  his  position  open  in  the  hope  that  the  war  might  end 
and  leave  him  free  to  return  to  them.  And  now  he  was  the 
recipient  of  still  higher  honors  and  responsibilities,  and,  over 
the  heads  of  a  multitude  of  officers  much  older  than  himself 
and  longer  in  the  service,  he  was  made  general  in  chief  of 
all  the  armies  of  the  nation,  and  that  not  by  a  slight  prefer 
ence  but,  it  might  be  said,  by  unanimous  acclaim. 

Truly  he  seemed  to  be  the  special  favorite  of  fortune. 

Thus  far  he  had  found  himself  advanced  and  applauded 
in  every  turn  of  effort  to  the  full  measure  of  his  deserts.  He 
was  now  to  learn  that  the  admiration  due  to  merit  and  achieve 
ment  may,  in  a  certain  environment  and  under  certain  condi 
tions,  be  swallowed  up  in  alarm  and  invite  destruction.  He 
was  now  to  learn  that  a  blameless  life,  a  winning  and  lovable 
disposition,  splendid  talents,  and  conscientious  and  untiring 
industry,  instead  of  rapidly  multiplying  devoted  friends, — as 
had  been  the  case  formerly, — were  now  to  be  regarded  in  highly 
influential  quarters  as  qualities  inimical  to  certain  interests 
struggling  for  supremacy  and  were  about  to  create  for  him 
powerful,  implacable,  and  relentless  foes. 


26  McCLELLAN 

He  was  fearless  when  a  stripling.  His  dash  and  bravery 
had  secured  the  warmest  encomiums  of  his  generals;  and 
the  evidence,  as  we  shall  see,  is  abundant  and  convincing  that 
he  continued  to  the  end  to  merit  and  receive  similar  praise 
for  his  cool,  unperturbed,  unostentatious,  and  unflinching 
courage. 

He  had  constantly  given  proof  of  his  energy  in  prior 
campaigns,  and  in  the  organization  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac  he  continued  to  give  it,  even  to  the  extent  of  endangering 
his  life. 

Courage  and  energy  combined  constitute  aggressiveness. 
McClellan's  aggressiveness  had  won  for  him  all  his  military 
honors.  It  had  made  him  commander  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  and  now  General  in  Chief. 

So  we  find  the  hero  of  our  story  at  the  age  of  thirty-six 
a  brave,  patriotic,  conscientious,  and  energetic  officer. 

Yet,  we  are  asked  to  believe  that  at  the  beginning  of  his 
thirty-seventh  year  this  man,  distinguished  alike  for  his  learn 
ing,  capacity,  energy,  courage,  and  piety,  without  any  super 
vening  cause  and  when  everything  about  him  was  calculated 
to  stimulate  all  these  qualities  to  the  utmost,  was  suddenly 
and  marvelously  transformed  into  a  hesitating,  irresolute, 
timid  being,  uncertain  of  himself,  afflicted  with  "the  slows," 
lethargic,  and  almost  incapable  of  action. 

Such  a  change,  in  such  a  man,  at  such  a  time  of  life,  is  so 
contrary  to  human  experience  that  it  lies  close  to  the  verge  of 
practical  impossibility,  and  can  be  established  only  by  evidence 
that  excludes  every  other  reasonable  conclusion. 

It  will  be  seen  that  not  only  is  such  conclusive  evidence 
or  any  atom  of  such  evidence  entirely  lacking,  but  also  that 
there  is  abundant  evidence  of  the  most  satisfactory  character 
to  prove  that  the  McClellan  of  the  Peninsula  was  the  brave, 
active,  and  aggressive  McClellan  of  Contreras  and  Churubusco 
and  West  Virginia,  but  hemmed  in  and  balked  and  beset  with 
opposition,  denuded  of  the  indispensable  factors  of  success,, 
and  forced  to  contend  against  paralyzing  obstacles  of  field  and 
flood,  of  season  and  conditions,  against  his  judgment  and 
advice  and  in  spite  of  his  most  earnest  protests. 


McCLELLAN  27 

The  Ohio  and  Mississippi  Railroad  Company  was  so  well 
pleased  with  its  President  and  so  eager  to  retain  his  services 
that  they  refused  to  accept  his  resignation  for  several  months 
after  he  had  withdrawn  from  the  actual  performance  of  his 
duties  and  until,  as  McClellan  says,  it  was  certain  that  he  was 
inextricably  involved  in  military  affairs;  but  from  the  mo 
ment  of  his  withdrawal  he  refused  to  accept  any  part  of  his 
yearly  salary  of  ten  thousand  dollars. 


CHAPTER   V 

CREATING  AN  ARMY  AND  DEFENDING  A  CITY 

The  North  was  unprepared  for  war.  The  capital  of  the 
nation  was  practically  an  unfortified  city,  and  the  District  of 
Columbia,  in  which  it  was  located,  was  carved  from  the  South 
ern  edge  of  Maryland, — a  Southern  state.  The  army  at  the 
capital  amounted  to  only  forty-two  thousand  men,  and  the  first 
great  duty  thrown  upon  the  new  commander  was  the  creation 
of  an  adequate  army  and  the  construction  of  such  defenses  as 
would  make  the  capital  of  the  nation  entirely  secure.  It  may 
be  said,  in  brief,  that  this  latter  work  was  so  thoroughly  exe 
cuted  that  the  thought  of  attacking  Washington  was  never 
afterward  seriously  entertained  by  the  Confederates,  and  there 
is  not  the  slightest  doubt  that  this  appearance  of  strength  saved 
it  from  attack  and  capture  in  the  summer  of  1864,  when  it 
was  insufficiently  garrisoned. 

The  creation  of  that  splendid  force  that  on  the  25th  day  of 
August,  1861,  was  christened  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, — 
a  name  to  become  illustrious  in  the  annals  of  the  war, — was 
the  first  concern  of  General  McClellan.  The  organization  was 
pushed  along  as  rapidly  as  the  coming  in  of  new  recruits  would 
permit,  but  this  gathering  of  forces  in  Washington  was  much 
too  slow,  as  we  shall  see,  to  please  the  energetic  McClellan; 
and  not  only  were  sufficient  men  wanting,  but  there  was  also 
a  disappointing  lack  of  necessary  materials  and  equipment. 
McClellan  says  r1  "Up  to  the  beginning  of  November,  and 
still  later,  many  of  the  infantry  were  insufficiently  drilled  and 
disciplined,  and  they  were  to  a  considerable  extent  armed  with 
unserviceable  weapons.  Few  of  the  cavalry  were  completely 
armed,  and  most  of  the  volunteer  cavalry  were  still  very  in- 


1  McClellan,  Own  Story,  78. 

28 


McCLELLAN  29 

efficient.  The  artillery  numbered  228  guns,  but  many  of  the 
batteries  were  still  unfit  to  take  the  field.  Transportation  was 
still  lacking  for  any  extended  movements." 

And  again  he  says  :2  "But  it  was  not  until  the  close  of 
1861,  too  late  for  active  operations,  that  the  infantry  were 
reasonably  well  provided  with  serviceable  arms ;  and  even 
after  that  the  calibers  were  too  numerous,  and  many  arms 
really  unfit  for  service.  The  artillery  material,  likewise,  ar 
rived  in  insufficient  quantities  until  the  early  part  of  1862." 

General  McClellan  strongly  favored  a  heavy  force  of  cav 
alry,  to  the  extent  of  one-eighth  to  one-sixth  of  the  infantry 
force ;  and,  like  his  favorite  exemplar, — the  great  Napoleon, — 
he  relied  strongly  upon  efficient  and  numerous  batteries  of 
artillery.  If  ample  material  had  been  at  hand  and  the  new 
troops  had  been  gathered  with  sufficient  swiftness,  a  few 
months  would  have  sufficed  to  bring  McClellan's  plans  to  com 
pletion,  but  the  levies  came  in  with  exasperating  slowness. 
Even  on  the  first  day  of  April,  1862,  notwithstanding  every 
effort  of  McClellan,  the  goal  was  yet  far  distant,  and  the  re 
cruits  who  came  in  September  or  October,  1861,  or  still  later, 
needed  a  few  months  of  drill,  discipline,  and  instruction  to  put 
them  on  the  same  footing  in  some  measure  with  the  earlier 
arrivals. 

We  are  told  that  on  August  iQth,  1861,  there  were  present 
for  duty  42,000  effectives;  on  October  I5th,  101,000;  on  De 
cember  ist,  136,852;  on  March  i5th,  1862,  203,213. 

McClellan  possessed  the  administrative  faculty  in  the  high 
est  degree,  and  his  education  and  experience  fitted  him  pecu 
liarly  for  the  work.  He  was  a  master  of  detail, — that  char 
acteristic  of  all  famous  commanders  that  Napoleon  places  as 
the  first  requisite  of  generalship. 

The  energy,  swiftness,  and  masterly  perfection  with  which 
McClellan  carried  on  the  great  work  of  organizing  the  new 
army  has  been  eulogized  most  warmly,  even  by  his  least 
friendly  critics.  Many  of  the  best  judges  have  given  him 
unstinted  praise.  Lord  Wolseley  says : 3  "The  more  one 

3  Ibid.,  132. 

9  North  American  Review,  CXLIX,  35. 


30  McCLELLAN 

studies  the  nature  of  this  force  as  it  marched  and  fought  in 
the  Peninsula,  and  as  despite  all  its  subsequent  disasters  it  sub 
stantially  remained  throughout  the  war,  the  more  marvelous 
does  the  ability,  as  well  as  the  rapidity,  with  which  General 
McClellan  organized  it,  appeal  to  soldiers,  who  understand 
the  magnitude  and  difficulty  of  the  task  he  undertook." 

Mr.  Swinton  has  this  to  say  of  McClellan's  achievement  :4 
"It  was  a  season  of  faithful,  fruitful  work  amid  which  that 
army  grew  into  shape  and  substance ;  and  with  such  surprising 
energy  was  the  work  of  organization  pushed  forward,  that 
whereas  General  McClellan  in  July  came  into  command  of  a 
collection  of  raw,  dispirited,  and  disorganized  regiments,  with 
out  commissariat  or  quarter-master's  departments  and  unfit 
either  to  march  or  fight,  he  had  around  him  at  the  end  of 
three  months  a  hundred  thousand  men,  trained  and  disci 
plined,  organized  and  equipped,  animated  by  the  highest  spirit 
and  deserving  of  the  fond  name  of  The  Grand  Army  of  the 
Potomac.  History  will  not  refuse  to  affirm  of  this  work  the 
judgment  pronounced  by  General  McClellan  himself :  'The 
creation  of  such  an  army  in  so  short  a  time  from  nothing, 
will  hereafter  be  regarded  as  one  of  the  highest  glories  of 
the  administration  and  the  nation.'  'Had  there  been  no  Mc 
Clellan,'  I  have  often  heard  General  Meade  say,  'there  could 
have  been  no  Grant,  for  the  army  made  no  essential  improve 
ment  under  his  successors.'  ' 

General  Alexander  Webb  says  :5  "McClellan  proceeded  to 
equip  and  discipline  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  with  a  skill 
and  persistence  which  will  be  the  admiration  of  military  stu 
dents  for  all  time.  He  inspired  the  army  with  confidence; 
it  believed  him  to  be  right  in  all  his  measures,  because  it  loved 
and  respected  him.  .  .  .  The  Army  of  the  Potomac  never 
lost  the  reputation  of  being  the  best  equipped  and  most  efficient 
army  on  this  continent;  and  this  reputation  was  due  solely 
to  General  McClellan's  system  of  organization." 

Mr.   Ropes  bears  equal  tribute  to  McClellan's  capacity,6 

*  Campaigns  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  66. 
5  The  Peninsula,  i6g. 

*  Story  of  the  Civil  War,  164. 


McCLELLAN  31 

"McClellan  had  a  genius  for  work  of  this  kind.  The  army 
soon  felt  that  in  him  it  had  a  master  and  also  a  devoted  and 
intelligent  master, — in  fact,  a  friend  as  well  as  a  master. 

.     .     He  knew  just  how  everything  ought  to  be  done." 

Mr.  Elson  says  :7  "When  he  took  control  of  the  army  it 
was  a  great  disorganized  mass,  untried  and  discouraged,  but 
possessing  the  one  supreme  virtue  of  patriotism.  In  four 
months  McClellan  had  made  of  this  crude  mass  a  trained, 
disciplined,  and  organized  army,  equal  to  any  that  ever  trod 
American  soil." 

Mr.  Eggleston,  a  Southern  writer,  also  bears  testimony  :8 
"McClellan's  difficult  problem  was  to  organize  the  army  anew ; 
to  create  it  out  of  chaotic  elements,  and  in  the  face  of  the  dif 
ficulties  that  were  thrown  in  his  way  by  its  experience  in  bat 
tle.  He  must  give  it  morale.  ...  In  the  meanwhile  Mc 
Clellan  was  diligently  strengthening  himself.  He  was  daily 
adding  to  his  forces  those  new  levies  of  volunteers  which  came 
freely  from  the  North  in  spite  of  the  disaster  at  Manassas. 
He  was  also  strengthening  the  fortifications  at  Washington  in 
a  way  that  made  the  conquest  of  the  city  forever  afterward  a 
hopeless  enterprise." 

Rhodes,  Paris,  Michie,  Dodge,  de  Joinville,  Johnson, 
Pennypacker,  Prime,  and  Whittier  speak  in  terms  of  equal 
commendation. 

The  right  to  the  lavish  credit  that  has  been  given  to  McClel 
lan  by  friend  and  foe  alike  in  this  particular  was  earned  by  al 
most  incredible  diligence  and  unceasing  toil.  On  November 
ist,  1 86 1,  he  was  made  General  in  Chief  of  the  Northern 
armies,  and  this  brought  a  great  additional  burden  upon  him. 
In  the  midst  of  his  work,  and  while  with  all  his  tireless  and  un 
sparing  labor  it  was  still  far  from  finished,  there  came  on  the 
phenomenally  severe  winter  of  1861-2.  Deep  snows  and  arctic 
cold  for  many  months,  beginning  on  November  25th,  were  suc 
ceeded  by  an  almost  incessant  deluge  of  rain,  which  continued 
until  the  following  July. 

McClellan  was  an  exceptionally  hardy,  strong,  and  robust 

1  History  of  the  United  States,  III,  691. 
9  History  of  the  Confederate  War,  I,  245. 


32  McCLELLAN 

man,  but  no  constitution  could  stand  the  strain  to  which  he  was 
subjected  after  the  first  of  November,  1861.  On  December 
2Oth  he  was  stricken  down  with  typhoid  fever.  In  a  few  days 
his  recovery  seemed  uncertain ;  but  his  regular  and  simple  life 
and  his  freedom  from  excesses  now  aided  him,  and  on  the 
1 2th  day  of  January,  1862,  though  still  feeble,  he  again  ap 
peared  upon  the  streets  of  Washington. 


CHAPTER   VI 

NECESSITY  FOR  PREPARATION  AND  ORGANIZATION 

When  actual  hostilities  began,  the  South  was  in  a  measure 
prepared  for  war.  We  are  told  that,  without  even  awaiting 
the  organization  of  the  new  Confederate  government,  the  se 
ceding  states  seized  all  of  the  unprotected  United  States  ar 
senals  and  fortifications  within  their  limits,  together  with  all 
the  arms,  stores,  and  munitions  of  war  they  contained.  From 
the  beginning  of  January,  1861,  and  probably  in  many  cases 
still  earlier,  the  work  of  organizing,  arming,  and  instructing 
troops  began  throughout  the  seceded  states. 

To  us  who  have  the  great  advantage  of  looking  backward 
at  the  events  of  the  time  it  is  almost  inconceivable  that  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war  so  mistaken  a  view  was  generally  en 
tertained  in  the  North  of  the  magnitude  of  the  struggle  on 
hand.  Almost  at  the  outset  a  secret  service  bureau  was  es 
tablished,  for  the  purpose  of  securing  as  reliable  information  as 
possible  of  the  strength  of  the  enemy.  It  was  in  charge  of 
Allan  Pinkerton,  the  noted  detective,  and  more  than  twenty 
years  later  he  stoutly,  and  with  much  warmth  and  even  indig 
nation,  vindicated  the  substantial  accuracy  of  his  reports 
against  the  belittling  conclusions  of  writers  who  knew  not 
whereof  they  spoke.  Upon  these  reports  McClellan  relied. 
So  did  the  President,  the  Secretary  of  War,  Congress,  and 
the  whole  North,  for  this  was  the  official  and  sole  source  of 
information  which  could  serve  as  the  basis  of  action.  Certain 
writers  accuse  General  McClellan  of  having  had  hallucinations 
on  this  subject  and  of  having  grossly  overestimated  the  num 
bers  of  the  opposing  forces;  but  he  had  no  hallucination;  he 
neither  overestimated  nor  did  he  estimate  at  all.  The  work 
of  gathering  information  was  in  the  hands  of  a  skilled  special 
ist  and  he,  like  the  Administration,  acted  upon  the  result.  As 

33 


34  McCLELLAN 

these  reports  were  official,  he  was  bound  to  recognize  them 
and  to  conform  his  actions  to  them. 

In  the  fall  of  1861  and  in  the  spring  of  1862  the  South 
was  fresh,  vigorous,  and  unexhausted.  It  had  begun  the  war 
and  had  gone  into  it  with  a  unanimity  of  enthusiasm  unfelt 
in  the  North.  Collegians  had  dropped  their  books,  judges 
had  left  the  bench,  lawyers  had  closed  their  offices,  and  pro 
fessors  had  abandoned  the  quiet  of  the  academic  groves  to 
fill  the  Confederate  ranks  and  mingle  in  the  carnage  of  war. 
But  as  nearly  all  the  available  strength  of  the  South  was  util 
ized  at  once  there  was  no  reserve  force  sufficient  to  maintain 
the  original  strength  of  her  armies,  which  were  consequently 
greatly  depleted,  in  victory  as  well  as  in  defeat,  as  the  war 
progressed. 

At  the  time  mentioned,  however,  all  the  surrounding  cir 
cumstances,  as  well  as  events  that  occurred  afterward,  con 
firm  the  report  that  the  Southern  Army  of  Virginia  had  a 
total  strength  of  150,000  that  could  be  concentrated  at  Manas- 
sas  in  a  few  hours.  Washington,  it  must  not  be  forgotten, 
was  a  Southern  city,  hardly  less  the  pride  of  the  Southern 
people  than  Richmond  itself.  It  was  the  city  of  their  own 
Washington,  and  Jefferson,  and  Madison,  and  Monroe,  and 
Calhoun,  and  Taylor,  and  Polk.  It  was  filled  with  Southern 
ers,  and  so  it  is  not  surprising  that, — as  Lord  Wolseley,  who 
was  in  Richmond  at  the  time,  directly  bears  witness, — a  de 
cision  was  hardly  reached  in  the  national  capital  before  it 
was  known  to  the  leaders  of  the  Confederacy.  So  it  is  idle 
to  inform  us  just  how  few  men  were  at  Manassas  at  any  given 
moment.  The  vital  question  is,  how  many  men  could  be 
massed  at  Manassas  before  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  could 
get  there?  A  careful  study  of  the  existing  conditions  makes 
it  reasonably  sure  that  every  soldier  of  Virginia  would  have 
been  at  Manassas  before  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  could  have 
actually  started  on  its  march. 

Another  fact  touching  the  strength  of  the  Army  of  North 
ern  Virginia,  and  generally  overlooked,  is  the  frequent  transfer 
of  Southern  forces  from  West  to  East.  One  day  a  Southern 
general  is  confronting  a  Union  army  in  Kentucky  or  Ten- 


McCLELLAN  35 

nessee ;  a  few  days  later  we  find  his  command  swelling  the 
forces  of  Johnston  or  Lee.  That  the  Southern  Army  of  Vir 
ginia  received  great  accessions  a  few  months  later  is  easily 
established. 

That  the  people  of  the  North  greatly  misunderstood  and 
undervalued  both  the  numerical  strength  of  the  Virginian  army 
and  the  fiery  valor  of  the  Southern  soldiers  is  certain.  They 
had  never  seen  the  impetuous  onset  of  the  Virginians.  Their 
hearts  had  never  lost  a  beat  at  the  sound  of  the  rebel  yell. 
Bull  Run  was  to  them  a  disgraceful  accident  for  which  swift 
retribution  should  be  meted  out.  The  whole  responsibility 
was  thrown  upon  the  commander,  and  many  supposed  in  good 
faith  that,  brought  back  again  to  the  field  the  next  day  by  an 
abler  leader,  the  Union  troops  would  achieve  a  victory. 

Colonel  Dodge  thus  sets  forth  approvingly  a  comparison 
quoted  from  Palfrey  of  the  soldier  of  the  North  with  the 
soldier  of  the  South.1  "There  can  be  no  doubt  about  the 
proposition  that  greater  results  wrere  habitually  achieved  by  a 
certain  number  of  thousands  or  tens  of  thousands  of  Lee's 
army  than  by  an  equal  number  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 
The  reason  for  this  is  not  to  be  found  in  any  difference  in 
patriotic  zeal  in  the  two  armies.  The  first  reason  probably 
was  that  the  different  modes  of  life  at  the  South  and  at  the 
North  made  the  Southern  soldiers  more  fond  of  fighting  than 
the  Northern  men.  Not  to  mention  the  intense  and  more  pas 
sionate  character  of  the  Southerner  as  compared  with  that 
of  the  Northerner,  the  comparatively  lawless  (not  to  speak 
invidiously)  life  at  the  South,  where  the  population  was  scat 
tered  and  the  gun  came  ready  to  the  hand,  made  the  Southern 
man  an  apter  soldier  than  the  peaceful,  prosperous,  steady- 
going  recruit  from  the  North.  The  Southerners  showed  that 
they  felt  the  gamiium  certaminis.  With  the  Northerners  it 
was  different.  They  were  ready  to  obey  orders,  they  were 
ready  to  do  the  work  to  which  they  had  set  their  hands,  they 
were  ready  to  die  in  their  tracks  if  need  be,  but  they  did  not 
go  to  a  battle  as  to  a  feast.  They  did  not  like  fighting.  Sheri- 

1  Bird's-eye  View  of  Our  Civil  War,  116. 


36  McCLELLAN 

dan,  Hancock,  Humphries,  Kearny,  Custer,  Barlow,  and  such 
as  they  were  exceptions ;  but  the  rule  was  otherwise." 

General  Whittier  says:2  "The  Army  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia  was  composed  of  the  best  men  of  the  South,  who  rushed 
to  what  they  considered  the  defense  of  their  country  against 
a  bitter  invader.  The  North  sent  no  such  army  to  the  field ; 
its  patriotism  was  of  the  easier  kind.  There  was  no  rallying 
cry  which  drove  the  best,  the  rich,  and  the  educated  to  join 
the  fighting  army.  From  William  and  Mary  College  thirty- 
two  out  of  thirty-five  professors  enlisted ;  from  Harvard  one." 

Mr.  Russell,  of  the  London  Times,  who  was  in  Washing 
ton  in  the  fall  of  1861,  gave  it  as  his  opinion  that  if  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  of  that  time  met  the  Army  of  Virginia  with 
anything  like  equal  forces  there  would  be  grave  danger  of 
defeat.  The  Richmond  Examiner  of  September  2oth,  1861, 
expressed  the  view  that  McClellan's  army  could  be  defeated  by 
twenty-five  thousand  Southern  soldiers.  General  McClellan 
had  a  higher  opinion,  however,  of  the  fighting  stock  of  the 
North.  He  says  :3  "Given  good  officers,  there  are  no  men 
in  the  world  who  admit  of  a  more  thorough  and  effective  dis 
cipline  than  the  native-born  Americans  of  the  North.  Their 
intelligence  soon  shows  them  the  absolute  necessity  of  disci 
pline  in  an  army  and  its  advantages  to  all  concerned ;  but  the 
kind  of  discipline  best  adapted  to  them  differs  materially  from 
that  required  by  other  races.  Their  fighting  qualities  are  sec 
ond  to  none  in  the  world." 

By  the  North  in  general  the  war  seems  to  have  been  re 
garded  as  a  three  months'  frolic.  The  first  call  for  troops  was 
only  for  75,000  men  and  for  three  months'  time.  Upon  the 
eve  of  the  battle  of  Bull  Run  4,000  men  returned  home — their 
enlistments  had  expired.  Speaking  of  this,  Mr.  Eggleston 
says  :4  "At  the  North  personal  courage  was  not  held  to  be  the 
one  supreme  test  of  manhood  as  it  was  at  the  South.  If  any 
man  in  Beauregard's  army  had  gone  home  because  his  enlist 
ment  had  expired  while  the  battle  was  pending,  he  could  never- 

3  Monograph,  221. 

8  McClellan,  Own  Story,  40. 

4  History  of  the  Confederate  War,  I,  235,  236. 


McCLELLAN  37 

more  have  visited  any  neighbor  or  aspired  to  any  woman's 
hand;  he  would  be  everywhere  treated  with  contempt  and 
measureless  scorn.  His  neighbors  would  not  have  sat  on  the 
same  bench  with  him  in  church.  He  would  have  been  in 
stantly  rejected  as  a  juryman  by  both  sides  in  every  case.  No 
other  crime  that  he  might  commit  could  have  added  in  the 
least  degree  to  the  depths  of  his  degradation." 

The  surprise  and  panic  of  Bull  Run  can  hardly  be  over 
estimated.  Mr.  Eggleston,  continuing,  says  that  the  Union 
army  was  "before  nightfall  a  wild-eyed  and  unconscious  mob 
of  irresponsible  fugitives,  intent  only  upon  seeking  safety, 
without  any  regard  whatever  to  any  obligation  or  impulse  of 
honor  or  duty  or  shame  or  any  impulse  except  the  instinct  of 
self-preservation."  The  taste  lingered.  The  soothing  balm 
of  time  was  necessary  to  restore  confidence  and  courage, — 
much  more  time  than  intervened  between  the  heart-crushing 
defeat  of  Bull  Run  and  the  piling  up  of  snows,  which  made 
military  operations  highly  imprudent  and  full  of  perilous  risk. 
It  is  a  marvel  that  any  space  of  time  or  any  course  of  training 
or  discipline  could  have  transformed  the  quaking  fugitives  of 
Manassas  into  the  unflinching  soldiers  of  Beaver  Dam  and 
Malvern  Hill. 

After  Bull  Run,  the  necessity  of  a  large  army  was  so  ap 
parent  that  a  call  was  at  once  issued  for  300,000  men,  to  serve 
for  three  years  or  during  the  war. 

General  McClellan  in  his  memorandum  submitted  to  the 
President  on  August  2d,  1861,  at  the  latter's  request,  sets 
out  his  view  of  the  proper  manner  of  conducting  the  war, — 
namely,  not  only  to  defeat  their  armed  and  organized  forces 
in  the  field,  but  to  display  such  strength  as  would  convince 
the  enemy,  especially  those  of  the  governing,  aristocratic  class, 
of  the  impossibility  of  resistance.  And  to  accomplish  this  he 
points  out  that  the  authority  of  the  government  would  have 
to  be  supported  by  an  overwhelming  physical  force.  His 
view  was  that  the  invading  army  should  consist  of  from 
273,000  to  300,000  men.  The  war  had  been  theretofore  con 
ducted  upon  what  was  afterward  aptly  designated  "The  pep 
per-box  policy."  The  pepper-box  policy  consisted  in  sending 


38  McCLELLAN 

forces  into  all  quarters  at  once;  in  defending  large  and  small 
positions  equally,  and  thus  scattering  an  army  which,  if  con 
centrated  upon  a  single  point,  might  have  achieved  decisive 
results.  If  the  whole  force  available  for  Eastern  service 
had  been  brought  at  once  to  Washington  and  pushed  thence 
toward  Richmond,  it  seemingly  might  have  enveloped  its  ad 
versary  in  superior  numbers.5  This  designation  of  the  Federal 
policy  appears  first  in  a  letter  from  General  Halleck  to  General 
McClellan  of  January  2Oth,  i862.6 

The  army  which  McClellan  regarded  as  adequate  was  not 
as  large  in  proportion  as  that  afterward  commanded  by  Gen 
eral  Hooker  and  still  later  by  General  Grant. 

In  the  advance  upon  Richmond  in  1864,  General  Grant 
had  immediately  under  him  122,000  effectives  as  against  62,000 
effectives  under  General  Lee.  General  Grant  had  also  com 
mand  of  another  force  of  30,000  under  General  Butler,  which 
met  him  upon  the  Rappahannock  and  formed  a  part  of  his 
army  in  its  further  advance  to  Richmond. 

If  the  Administration  did  not  assent  to  General  McClellan's 
views  as  to  the  necessary  force  to  be  raised,  this  dissent  should 
have  been  expressed  promptly  after  his  memorandum  of  Au 
gust  2d  was  received.  But  there  was  apparently  entire  ac 
quiescence  in  his  plans  until  about  December  ist, — in  other 
words,  until  about  the  time  of  the  convening  of  Congress. 

By  our  luxurious  and  expensive  American  method  of  be 
ginning  with  the  smallest  conceivable  force  which  might  pos 
sibly  accomplish  a  desired  result,  and  gradually  and  by  minute 
advances  using  stronger  and  stronger  means  until  at  last  the 
purpose  is  attained,  we  are  inevitably  led  to  the  maximum 
expenditure  of  money,  the  maximum  loss  of  time,  and  the 
maximum  loss  of  life. 

We  Americans  are  much  given  to  this  method,  which  may 
be  called  the  duelling  system.  If  an  insane  person  is  to  be 
apprehended,  we  send  one  or  two  officers  when  four  or  five 
would  be  necessary  to  make  sure  of  avoiding  unnecessary  in 
jury  both  to  the  officers  and  to  the  person  to  be  apprehended. 

5  History  of  the  Confederate  War,  209. 

8  Nicolay  and  Hay,  Abraham  Lincoln,  V,  109. 


McCLELLAN  39 

If  a  band  of  thieves  escapes  into  the  hills,  a  posse  is  sent  after 
it  exceeding  very  little  in  number  those  of  whom  they  are  in 
pursuit.  If  a  mob  is  to  be  suppressed,  we  try  successively  a 
squad  of  policemen,  the  available  force  of  the  city,  and  then 
perhaps  of  the  county,  and  finally  we  are  often  forced, — by 
the  very  temptation  which  we  offer, — to  call  upon  the  aid  of 
the  state,  and  occasionally  even  of  the  nation.  This  manner 
of  procedure  is  a  premium  upon  resistance, — an  invitation  to 
a  struggle.  It  involves  always  a  waste  of  time  and  often  of 
money  and  of  blood.  An  example  of  this  upon  a  larger  scale 
was  seen  in  our  military  operations  in  the  Philippines.  If  a 
sufficiently  overawing  force  had  been  sent  there  at  the  outset, 
as  soon  as  it  was  evident  that  a  considerable  army  was  neces 
sary,  the  insurrection  would  have  been  speedily  suppressed, 
with  comparatively  little  cost  and  loss  of  life;  but  we  fol 
lowed  our  favorite  method,  and  so  suffered  the  largest  expendi 
ture  of  time,  money,  and  life. 

McClellan's  idea  was  to  secure  the  ends  of  economy  of 
time,  money,  and  life  by  invading  the  South  with  an  army 
so  large  and  well  organized  as  to  banish  all  hope  of  successful 
opposition. 

If  the  power  had  rested  in  McClellan  at  the  beginning  of 
the  war,  he  would  have  gathered  a  force  of  300,000  men  to 
operate  in  the  East  and  one  of  equal  size  to  take  action,  if 
necessary,  in  Eastern  Tennessee  and  elsewhere  in  the  West, 
But  it  probably  would  not  have  been  necessary,  for  the  natural 
tendency  of  the  march  from  Washington  would  have  been 
to  transfer  the  whole  scene  of  conflict  to  the  territory  East 
of  the  Alleghenies,  and  there  is  no  reason  to  doubt  that  the 
year  1861  would  have  seen  the  end  of  the  war.  What  priva 
tions,  what  loss  of  property  and  life,  what  agony  in  hundreds 
of  thousands  of  hearts  that  course  would  have  saved! 

But  McClellan's  view  was  soon  abandoned  by  the  admin 
istration  ;  and  the  result  was  the  enlistment  of  3,700,000  men 
by  the  North  during  the  war,  the  loss  of  three  years'  time,  and 
incalculable  expense  and  injury  and  waste  of  life. 


CHAPTER   VII 

THE    FAVORITE   OF    FORTUNE 

As  we  are  now  approaching  the  critical  point  of  McClel- 
lan's  life,  it  will  be  interesting  to  take  a  general  view  of  the 
chief  performers  in  events  so  full  of  intrigue  as  strongly  to 
resemble  a  mediaeval  drama  of  dark  conspiracies  and  under 
ground  plots. 

McClellan  is  universally  presented  to  us  as  a  man  of  rare 
piety  and  of  the  highest  ideals.  Mr.  Prime  says  of  him : 
"His  religion  was  deep,  earnest,  practical;  not  vague  or  ill- 
defined  to  himself  or  others,  not  obtrusive,  but  outspoken  when 
occasion  required,  and  when  outspoken  frank  and  hearty.  For 
it  was  part  and  parcel  of  his  soul.  ...  In  all  his  life,  pub 
lic  and.  private,  every  purpose  was  formed,  every  act  was  done, 
in  the  light  of  that  faith.  It  was  this  which  not  only  pro 
duced  in  him  that  stainless  purity  of  walk  and  conversation 
which  all  who  knew  him  recognized,  but  also  gave  him  strength 
for  all  the  great  works  of  a  great  life.  It  was  this  which 
created  that  magnetic  power  so  often  spoken  of,  which  won  to 
him  that  marvelous  devotion  of  his  soldiers,  made  all  who 
knew  him  regard  him  with  affection,  and  those  who  knew 
him  best  love  him  most." 

His  own  letters  to  his  wife  are  the  best  proof  of  this.  A 
few  extracts  will  suffice.  "I  know  how  weak  I  am,  but  I  know 
that  I  mean  to  do  right  and  I  believe  that  God  will  help  me 
and  give  me  the  wisdom  I  do  not  possess.  Pray  for  me  that 
I  may  be  able  to  accomplish  my  task."  1  "I  pray  every  night 
and  every  morning  that  I  may  become  neither  vain  nor  am 
bitious,  that  I  may  be  neither  depressed  by  disaster  nor  elated 
by  success,  and  that  I  may  keep  one  single  object  in  view— •- 

1  McClellan,  Own  Story,  85. 

40 


McCLELLAN  41 

the  good  of  my  country."  "I  still  hope  that  the  God  who  has 
been  so  good  to  me  will  continue  to  smile  upon  our  cause  and 
enable  us  to  bring  this  war  to  a  speedy  close  so  that  I  may 
have  the  rest  that  I  want  so  much  .  .  .  but  the  will  of 
God  be  done."  3  "I  do  not  see  how  anyone  can  fill  such  a 
position  as  I  do  without  being  constantly  forced  to  think  of 
higher  things  and  the  Supreme  Being.  The  great  responsi 
bility,  the  feeling  of  personal  weakness  and  incompetency,  of 
entire  dependence  upon  the  will  of  God,  the  thousand  circum 
stances  entirely  beyond  our  control  that  may  defeat  our  best 
laid  plans,  the  sight  of  poor  human  suffering — all  these  things 
will  force  the  mind  to  seek  rest  above."  4 

"God  has  disposed  of  events  as  to  Him  seemed  best.  I 
submit  to  his  decrees  with  perfect  cheerfulness,  and  as  sure 
as  he  rules  I  believe  that  all  will  yet  be  for  the  best."  5  "I 
hope  and  trust  that  God  will  watch  over,  guide,  and  protect 
me."  6 

It  is  hard  to  imagine  a  man  of  McClellan's  capacity  of 
mind, — one  who  had  advanced  so  rapidly  as  he, — so  entirely 
free  from  political  ambition  or  the  desire  of  being  in  the  public 
eye.  A  few  passages  from  his  letters  will  make  this  evi 
dent. 

"I  receive  letter  after  letter,  .  .  .  alluding  to  the 
presidency,  dictatorship,  etc.  As  I  hope  one  day  to  be  united 
with  you  forever  in  heaven,  I  have  no  such  aspiration."  7 
"How  I  wish  that  God  had  permitted  me  to  live  quietly  and 
unknown  with  you!"  8  "I  shall  be  only  too  glad  when  all  is 
over  and  I  can  return  where  I  best  love  to  be."  9  "That  is  my 
idea  of  happiness  now — rest  with  you  and  the  baby."  10  "Oh, 
how  ardently  I  pray  for  rest — rest  with  you.  I  care  not 
where,  only  that  I  may  be  alone  with  you."  n 

At  a  time  when  certain  politicians  imagined  that  he  was 
wondering  how  he  might  oust  Mr.  Lincoln  from  the  presi 
dency  and  take  possession  of  it  this  passage  in  a  letter  to  his 

'Ibid.,  173,  174.  J Ibid.,  85. 

•Ibid.,  356.  *Ibid.,  175- 

'Ibid.,  402,  403.  "Ibid.,  398. 

5  Ibid.,  445.  10  Ibid.,  408. 

'/Wa.,450.  u/Wrf.,  445- 


42  McCLELLAN 

wife  will  show  what  kind  of  political  ambition  was  occupying 
his  mind :  "I  wonder  whether  the  baby  will  know  me.  I  fear 
that  she  will  be  afraid  of  rrie  and  won't  come  to  me.  Would 
not  that  be  mortifying?  I  hope  the  dear  little  thing  will  take 
to  me  kindly.  I  should  feel  terribly  if  she  should  refuse  to 
have  anything  to  do  with  me.  Bless  her  sweet  little  ladyship ! 
She  must  be  a  great  comfort  to  you ;  and  we  will  be  happier 
than  any  kings  and  queens  on  earth  if  we  three  are  permitted 
to  be  together  again,  before  May  changes  much."  12 

On  the  6th  day  of  September,  1861,  General  McClellan 
issued  an  order  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  urging  the  proper 
observance  of  the  Sabbath,  which  begins  with  these  words : 
"We  are  fighting  in  a  holy  cause,  and  should  endeavor  to  de 
serve  the  benign  favor  of  the  Creator,"  and  ends  as  follows, 
"The  observance  of  the  holy  day  of  the  God  of  Mercy  and 
of  Battles  is  our  sacred  duty." 

The  innermost  sanctuary  of  the  heart  of  the  general  has 
been  exposed  to  the  gaze  of  the  world  by  the  publication  of 
these  letters  to  his  wife.  Even  among  the  best  of  men  very 
few  could  go  unhurt  through  such  an  ordeal.  Not  all  men 
will  understand  this.  But  every  man  who  tenderly  loves  his 
wife  and  feels  that  in  her  devoted  heart  he  is  idealized,  and 
that  he  longs  to  maintain  that  innocent  worship,  will  under 
stand  it.  Mr.  Rhodes  has  had  the  manhood  to  see  this  and 
the  honesty  to  call  attention  to  it.  Other  writers  are  unmindful 
of  it  and  have  ungraciously  used  these  private  letters  to  injure 
General  McClellan;  for  instance,  to  prove  that  he  was  con 
ceited.  In  such  heart  revelations  to  his  wife  there  is  hardly 
one  man  in  ten  thousand  of  actual  power  and  efficiency  who 
would  not  appear  conceited.  Can  we  imagine  a  man  of  rare 
capacity  who  is  unaware  of  his  gifts  or  puts  no  value  upon 
them,  or  who  would  not  glorify  them  to  an  affectionate  wife? 
But  that  is  not  the  worst  feature.  The  worst  feature  is  the 
concealment,  the  uncandid  silence  as  to  the  conclusive  proof 
which  these  letters  afford  of  McClellan's  kindness  of  heart, 
sincerity  of  purpose,  unflinching  courage,  forgiving  spirit,  de 
votion  to  country,  piety,  and  love  of  home  and  wife  and  his 

12  McClellan,  Own  Story,  452. 


McCLELLAN  43 

little  May  and  the  charms  of  a  quiet  life.  I  feel  sure  that 
no  man  who  is  happy  in  his  domestic  circle  or  in  whom  the 
domestic  instinct  is  lively  can  read  these  letters  without  having 
his  heart  warm  to  the  writer. 

"General  McClellan's  reputation  in  the  army  was  of  the 
highest.  He  was  known  as  one  of  the  most  accomplished 
officers  in  the  service.  He  had  heen  graduated  \vith  the  high 
est  rank  at  the  military  academy.  In  the  Mexican  war  he 
had  been  twice  brevetted  for  gallantry  and  had  attracted  the 
favorable  notice  of  his  superiors.  The  only  service  which  he 
had  had  an  opportunity  to  render  in  the  Civil  War  had  been 
brilliantly  performed  and  had  resulted  in  permanent  success. 
He  possessed  most  engaging  manners;  and  few  people  could 
resist  the  charm  of  his  address,  so  that  he  soon  became  the 
idol  of  his  soldiers."  13 


18  Ropes,  Story  of  the  Civil  War,  I,  163. 


CHAPTER   VIII 

THE  LINCOLN  OF    l86l 

Abraham  Lincoln  was  at  this  time  in  his  fifty-third  year. 
He  was  born  on  Nolin  Creek,  three  miles  west  of  Hodgdens- 
ville,  Kentucky,  on  February  I2th,  1809.  It  was  a  forest 
region,  with  many  bears  and  other  wild  animals  in  the  soli 
tudes  around.  His  mother  died  nine  years  later.  In  the  fol 
lowing  year  his  father  married  Sally  Bush  Johnston.  She  was 
an  intelligent,  good  woman,  and  she  stimulated  him  to  study. 
The  Lincolns  then  lived  a  short  distance  east  of  Gentry  ville, 
Kentucky.  When  a  youth  Abraham  worked  as  a  farm  hand 
and  was  a  clerk  in  a  store  at  Gentryville. 

He  was  athletic,  fond  of  speaking  and  argument,  and 
gathered  up  a  great  fund  of  anecdote.  In  1830  the  family 
moved  into  Sangamon  County,  Illinois.  Here  he  split  rails 
for  a  time  to  make  fences  for  the  farm. 

In  1831  he  helped  to  build  a  flat  boat  and  went  to  New 
Orleans  in  it.  While  there  he  saw  slaves  chained  and  flogged. 
For  several  years  after  that  he  resided  in  New  Salem,  Illinois, 
where  he  was  in  turn  clerk,  grocer,  surveyor  and  postmaster; 
and  he  was  also  pilot  of  the  first  boat  which  ascended  the 
Sangamon.  "Abe,"  as  he  was  familiarly  called,  next  turned 
his  attention  to  the  study  of  the  law  and  went  into  politics 
and  stump-speaking.  He  took  a  nominal  part  in  the  Black 
Hawk  War.  In  1832  he  ran  for  the  legislature,  was  success 
ful  on  a  second  trial  in  1834,  and  thereafter  was  twice  re- 
elected. 

He  was  admitted  to  the  bar  in  1837,  and  he  opened  an 
office  at  Springfield,  which  became  the  capital  in  that  year, 
largely  through  his  efforts.  For  a  time  he  struggled  along 
at  the  bar.  Lincoln  was  always,  but  especially  at  this  time, 
astonishingly  susceptible  to  the  charms  of  the  fair  sex.  In 

44 


McCLELLAN  45 

1842  he  married  Mary  Todd,  a  bright,  vivacious  girl  of  ex 
cellent  family,  for  whose  hand  Stephen  A.  Douglas  was  also 
a  suitor.  In  1846  Lincoln  went  to  Congress  for  one  term,  but 
gained  no  new  distinction  there.  His  experience,  however, 
made  him  realize  his  meager  equipment  of  learning  and  incited 
him  to  study  for  a  time.  He  plunged  into  Euclid  with  a  per 
sistence  and  assiduity  that  knew  no  relaxation  until  he  had 
mastered  as  much  of  it  as  he  desired. 

In  1854  his  interest  and  activity  in  politics  were  resumed. 
His  speeches  against  Douglas  that  fall  secured  his  candidacy 
for  the  United  States  Senate,  but  Trumbull  was  chosen.  In 
1856  he  first  spoke  out  against  slavery.  At  this  time  the  Re 
publican  party  had  its  origin.  Lincoln  was  one  of  those 
spoken  of  for  the  vice-presidency,  but  Dray  ton  won  the  nomi 
nation.  In  1858  Lincoln  was  nominated  against  Douglas.  In 
their  joint  debates  the  question  devised  by  Lincoln  to 
entrap  Douglas  finally  ruined  Douglas  and  made  Lincoln 
president.  .  It  was  this  :  Can  the  people  of  a  territory  lawfully 
exclude  slavery  against  the  protest  of  any  citizen  of  the  United 
States?  If  Douglas  should  say,  no,  he  would  lose  Illinois  and 
the  election.  If  he  should  say,  yes,  he  would  enrage  the  South. 
The  nearer  magnet  drew  him.  He  said  yes,  as  Lincoln  hoped 
and  expected.  Douglas  won  that  election,  but  lost  the  presi 
dency.  That  question  split  the  Democracy  into  adherents  and 
opponents  of  Douglas,  led  to  the  election  of  Lincoln,  and 
thereby  to  the  Civil  War.  As  the  result,  Lincoln  was  the 
Republican  candidate  for  the  presidency  two  years  later. 
Among  his  rivals  for  the  honor  were  Seward,  Chase,  and 
Bates.  In  the  election  Lincoln  received  950,000  votes  less 
than  a  majority,  but  having  more  votes  than  any  other  candi 
date  in  the  electoral  college,  he  was  elected.  His  cabinet  at  the 
outset  was  not  the  expression  of  his  own  free  preference,  but 
was  selected  under  the  pressure  of  inexorable  necessity,  for 
the  purpose  of  putting  strength  and  vigor  and  a  hope  of  further 
life  into  the  new  party.  If  in  the  next  election  the  Democracy 
should  become  harmonized  and  reunited,  the  administration 
seemed  doomed  to  inevitable  defeat.  So  he  saw  that  there 
must  be  no  dissension  or  jealousy  in  the  infant  phalanx  of 


46  McCLELLAN 

Republicanism.  That  politics  makes  strange  bedfellows  was 
never  so  well  exemplified.  William  H.  Seward  was  Secretary 
of  State;  Salmon  P.  Chase,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury;  Simon 
Cameron,  Secretary  of  War;  Gideon  Welles,  Secretary  of  the 
Navy;  Edward  Bates,  Attorney  General,  and  Montgomery 
Blair,  Postmaster  General.  A  warm  admirer  says :  "Lin 
coln  used  the  patronage  of  his  office  to  feed  the  hunger  of  the 
various  factions.  Therefore  he  would  always  give  more  to 
his  enemies  than  he  would  to  his  friends.  .  .  .  Adhesion 
was  what  he  wanted;  if  he  got  it  gratuitously,  he  never  wasted 
his  substance  paying  for  it." 

In  his  stories,  "It  \vas  the  wit  he  was  after,  the  pure  jewel, 
and  he  would  pick  it  out  of  the  mud  or  dirt  as  readily  as  he 
would  from  a  parlor  table."  l  Lincoln  was  never  continuously 
studious,  so  he  did  not  become  learned,  even  in  the  law.  His 
habits  were  unfavorable  to  this.  He  had  no  love  of  method,  no 
capacity  for  detail.  The  lore  of  books  was  difficult  for  him, 
but  what  he  acquired  he  kept  in  use,  constantly  burnished, 
always  at  hand.  His  love  of  debate,  and  his  practice  in  it 
almost  from  childhood,  gave  him  in  maturer  years  a  force 
and  felicity  of  diction  which  the  most  cultured  academician 
might  well  envy.  Many  of  his  letters  are  speeches  of  high 
merit  in  expression  and  construction.  At  least  twenty  of  these 
letters  seem  to  me  higher  examples  of  oratory  in  method,  style, 
and  conclusion  than  the  famous  Gettysburg  Address,  which 
presents  no  line  of  reasoning,  no  development  of  a  novel  con 
ception,  and,  although  it  has  a  single  admirable  sentence,  ends 
with  a  marring  and  undignified  platitude, — namely,  the  phrase 
"Government  of  the  people,  for  the  people,  and  by  the  people." 
Mr.  Lincoln  probably  heard  that  phrase  in  the  very  first 
political  speech  he  ever  attended,  for  from  time  immemorial 
our  people  have  loved  to  hear  this  trite  but  swelling  expression, 
and  it  has  not  been  withheld  from  them.  In  April,  1858,  he 
saw  and  marked  a  similar  phrase  in  a  speech  of  Theodore 
Parker.  As  good  illustrations  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  reasoning  and 
fertility  of  resource,  see  his  letter  to  Mr.  O.  H.  Browning  of 
September  22d,  i86i,2  in  which  he  triumphantly  flouts  the 

1  Herndon,  Abraham  Lincoln,  II,  243,  244. 
'Letters,  Centenary  edition,  I,  81. 


McCLELLAN  47 

notion  that  the  President  could  emancipate  the  slaves,  and 
then  see  his  letter  to  the  Hon.  J.  C.  Conkling  of  August  26th, 
1863,  in  which  he  triumphantly  vindicates  the  right  of  the 
president  to  emancipate  the  slaves  under  existing  circum 
stances/5  The  commencement  of  his  letter  to  Carl  Schurz, 
dated  November  24th,  1862,  is  so  characteristic  that  I  insert  a 
passage  from  it  here :  "You  think  1  could  do  better;  therefore 
you  blame  me.  I  think  I  could  not  do  better;  therefore  I  blame 
you  for  blaming  me."  4 

In  their  pungency  and  directness  many  of  his  letters  re 
mind  us  strongly  of  Junius,  but  his  exemplar  was  Calhoun. 

It  is  astonishing  that  a  man  to  whom  culture  gave  so  little 
should  have  acquired  such  a  clear,  neat,  and  even  dainty  style. 
It  draws  us  strongly  and  makes  us  feel  that,  in  his  case,  nature 
encased  a  gem  in  a  plain  and  inartistic  setting,  and  inclines 
us  to  reject  many  criticisms  as  the  offspring  of  misunder 
standing  or  malevolence.  Lincoln  was  abstemious  and  self- 
denying  in  his  habits,  and  when  we  consider  his  life  and  its 
environment  it  is  a  marvel  that  there  is  so  little  to  cavil  at. 
We  learn  from  the  biography  of  Lincoln  by  Mr.  Herndon,  his 
former  partner  and  loving  friend,  that  Lincoln  was  "inordi 
nately  ambitious."  5  He  knew  all  the  wires  of  politics  and 
used  them,  yet  he  was  distrustful  of  his  own  ability,  save 
where  his  feet  were  firmly  set  on  familiar  ground.6  These 
traits  made  him  highly  susceptible  to  the  influence  of  the  more 
learned,  more  polished,  and  better  equipped  men  who  sur 
rounded  him  in  the  chief  magistracy  and  with  whom  he  now 
came  into  daily  contact. 

Seward,  Chase,  Stanton,  and  later  Bates  all  felt  that  the 
motive  of  their  appointment  was  to  foster  the  new  party, 
which  was  still  a  weakling,  and  the  emotion  of  gratitude  was 
not  ardent  in  them. 

"To  Chase's  mind  and  that  of  most  of  the  old  Republi 
cans,  Lincoln  was  an  accidental  president.  Congress  pulled 


slbid.,  180. 

4  Ibid.,  Ill,  100. 

5  Herndon,  Abraham  Lincoln,  I,  191. 

"Diary  of  Gideon  Welles,  Atlantic,  CHI,  364,  367. 


48  McCLELLAN 

against  him — and  Seward,  Chase,  and  Stanton,  each  in  his 
own  way,  tested  the  President's  mastery.  Stanton's  practice 
was  to  defy  the  President  in  minute  matters  by  refusing  to 
carry  out  his  orders  or  by  returning  a  commission  with  the  curt 
endorsement,  'The  President  may  get  another  Secretary  of 
War,  but  this  Secretary  of  War  will  not  sign  that  paper.'  "  7 

The  members  of  the  cabinet  were  willing,  for  the  sake 
of  their  own  political  future,  to  aid  in  building  up  the  party, 
but  each  sought  to  manage  his  own  department  as  if  in  that 
realm  he  were  president.  This  purpose  was  carried  out  to 
such  an  extent  that  the  President  practically  lost  the  aid  of  his 
cabinet  as  the  deliberative  and  advisory  body  intended  by  the 
constitution,  and,  as  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  of  that  period 
informs  us,  "cabinet  discussions  became  almost  unknown,"- 
just  when  they  were  most  necessary, — and  the  government 
became  a  government  by  department,  which  means  that,  ex 
cept  in  very  rare  instances,  each  member  had  untrammeled 
sway  in  his  own  special  province.8 

In  June,  1863,  a  meeting  of  the  Cabinet  was  held  to  discuss 
the  question  of  General  Hooker's  successor,  but  it  was  quickly 
evident  that  a  successor  had  already  been  selected  by  the  War 
Department.9 

Lincoln  and  McClellan  had  known  each  other  previously;10 
their  relations  were  very  pleasant  and  their  meetings  almost 
daily  from  the  time  of  the  arrival  of  McClellan  in  July,  1861, 
until  he  was  prostrated  with  typhus  in  the  middle  of  Decem 
ber.  Then  the  daily  consultations  ceased,  and  from  the  de 
spondent  reports  it  seemed  certain  for  a  time  that  a  new  com 
mander  must  be  found.  Sinister  influences  were  at  once  set 
in  motion,  and  the  period  of  plots  and  underground  opera 
tions  was  soon  entered  upon.11 

That  illness  was  a  national  calamity  in  its  results,  for  it 
separated  two  men,  each  of  whom  could  have  admirably  sup- 

7  "Life  of  Salmon  P.  Chase/'  American  Statesmen  Series,  133. 
*  Atlantic,  CIII,  156,  364,  365,  659,  761. 

8  Atlantic,  CIII,  763;  Harper's,  XLV,  741. 

10  McClellan,  Own  Story,  162. 

11  Ibid.,  160,  162,  170,  195. 


McCLELLAN  49 

plemented  the  other  for  the  general  good,  one  by  his  learning, 
military  genius,  and  administrative  skill,  and  the  other  by  his 
practical  shrewdness  and  thorough  knowledge  of  the  world 
of  politics. 


CHAPTER    IX       • 

A     TALLEYRAND    AND    A     MACHIAVELLI 

To  many  people  Edwin  M.  Stanton  is  known  only  as  the 
great  War  Secretary;  as  a  model  of  patriotism,  enthusiastic 
zeal,  and  tireless  energy,  who  at  a  great  loss  to  his  personal 
interests  abandoned  a  lucrative  and  rapidly  increasing  prac 
tice  for  his  country's  good  and  who  wore  himself  out  and 
hastened  his  death  by  his  labors  in  her  service. 

But,  unless  the  evidence  grossly  misrepresents  him,  this 
is  not  a  picture  of  the  true  Stanton.  Tros  Tyriusque  mihi 
nullo  discrimine  agetiir.  Democrat  or  Republican  were  alike 
to  him,  if  he  could  but  keep  in  power.  Buchanan,  Lincoln, 
Johnson,  Grant ;  he  served  under  three  of  them  and  was  under 
appointment  to  serve  under  the  fourth  when  death  intercepted 
the  purpose. 

He  possessed  all  the  astuteness  of  the  French  diplomat 
and  all  the  plotting  brain  of  the  Florentine.  He  could  be  as 
affable  and  smiling  as  either  when  it  served  his  purpose.  He 
lacked  only  their  suavity  in  his  official  contact  with  the  public. 

Such  mountains  of  imprecation  were  piled  upon  his  head 
and  even  upon  his  memory  that  it  is  fortunate  indeed  that 
we  have  the  testimony  of  many  warm,  sincere,  and  devoted 
admirers  to  inform  us  of  what  he  really  was. 

Mr.  T.  B.  Thorpe  says  i1  "At  the  time  Mr.  Stanton  died  he 
was  probably  the  object  of  more  bitter  personal  hatred  and 
therefore  the  victim  of  grosser  misrepresentation  as  regards 
his  real  character  than  any  of  his  contemporaries.  Nor  has 
death,  which  proverbially  tempers  and  finally  destroys  per 
sonal  animosities,  up  to  this  time  (1872)  materially  softened 
this  intense  dislike  on  the  part  of  his  enemies,  for  his  memory 
has  been  pursued  with  ruthless  cruelty  beyond  the  grave.  It 

1  Harper's,  XLV,  737- 

50 


McCLELLAN  51 

has  been  published  and  by  some  believed  that  Mr.  Stanton, 
borne  down  by  the  remorse  of  conscience,  found  life  unendur 
able  and,  to  escape  its  torments,  filled  a  suicide's  grave." 

Mr.  Thorpe  sets  forth,2  without  realizing  the  effect  upon 
a  disinterested  reader,  the  rough  and  indeed  brutal  manner  in 
which  Stanton  with  few  exceptions  treated  those  who  were 
forced  to  call  upon  him.  An  officer  in  uniform  filled  him  with 
furious  rage.  Without  waiting  to  learn  how  urgent  and  neces 
sary  his  business  might  be,  Stanton  "would  turn  upon  him  like 
a  tiger  at  bay  and  roar  out :  'Come,  sir ;  what  are  you  doing 
in  Washington?  If  you  are  not  needed  at  the  front,  I'll  see 
about  mustering  you  out.'  Except  as  to  a  few  he  disregarded 
all  the  usual  amenities  of  life." 

Edwin  M.  Stanton  was  born  at  Steubenville,  Ohio,  on 
December  iQth,  1814.  In  his  earlier  years  poverty  claimed 
him  for  her  own  and  cut  off  the  completion  of  his  schooling. 
Like  Lincoln,  he  had  a  long  struggle  against  adversity;  but 
while  in  Lincoln  adversity  created  a  kindliness  and  sympathy 
for  the  distress  of  others;  in  Stanton  it  seems  to  have  fostered 
only  a  spirit  of  cynicism,  save  as  to  those  far  beneath  him  in 
position, — a  cynicism  which  was  aggravated  by  his  lack  of 
robust  health.  He  attended  Kenyon  College  for  a  time,  but 
from  want  of  means  was  prevented  from  concluding  the 
course.  He  was  admitted  to  the  bar  in  1836.  From  1842  to 
1845  ne  was  tne  official  reporter  of  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Ohio. 

He  gained  fame  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  in  the  case  of  Pennsylvania  against  the  Wheeling  Bridge 
Company.  This  brought  him  so  much  business  before  the 
court  that  in  1856  he  took  up  his  residence  in  Washington. 
In  1858  he  spent  nearly  a  year  in  California  as  counsel  for 
the  United  States  in  litigation  connected  with  the  New  Al- 
maden  Mine,  near  San  Jose.  While  in  California  he  discov 
ered  a  vast  amount  of  fraud  in  Mexican  land  titles.  In  De 
cember,  1860,  he  was  appointed  Attorney  General  by  James 
Buchanan  and  went  out  of  office  with  him  in  the  following 
March ;  then  he  resumed  his  legal  practice.  His  entry  into 
'Ibid.,  740,  741, 


52  McCLELLAN 

office  was  a  new  era  in  his  life.  While  he  was  on  terms  ap 
parently  of  the  warmest  personal  friendship  with  Buchanan 
the  surrounding  conditions  and  the  election  of  Lincoln  brought 
to  his  notice  the  birth  of  a  new  party,  which  he  sagely  fore 
saw  was  likely  to  become  powerful;  and  he  at  once  began  to 
ingratiate  himself  with  its  leaders,  one  of  the  most  prominent 
of  whom  was  Charles  Sumner.  At  Stanton's  suggestion  a 
meeting  was  held  at  Sumner's  house,  as  we  learn  from  the 
latter,  at  one  A.  M.,3  wherein  Stanton  unfolded  to^  Sumner 
"the  plan  of  the  traitors  to  obtain  possession  of  the  Capital 
and  the  national  archives," — a  plan  which  careful  historians 
now  think  had  no  existence. 

We  are  told  in  the  same  article  that  about  the  same  time 
he  was  in  communication  with  the  leading  Republicans  "to 
serve  his  imperiled  country  menaced  by  a  foul  and  wicked 
revolt."  It  appears  that  these  conferences,  like  the  first  above 
mentioned,  were  not  proud  and  open  displays  of  patriotism, 
but  furtive  affairs  of  darkness  and  secrecy.  "There  is  direct 
and  indirect  testimony  from  Republican  leaders  that  during 
this  period  Stanton,  a  stubborn  and  prejudiced  Buchanan 
Democrat,  was  in  secret  communication  and  concert  with 
the  leading  spirits  of  the  opposition."  4  After  the  new  admin 
istration  was  installed  in  March,  1861,  Mr.  Stanton  expressed 
his  scorn  of  it  in  the  most  violent  terms  in  confidential  letters 
to  Mr.  Buchanan.  On  April  nth,  1861,  he  wrote:  "The 
administration  has  not  acquired  the  confidence  and  respect  of 
the  people  here."  Again,  "The  feeling  of  loyalty  to  the  gov 
ernment  has  greatly  diminished  in  this  city."  And  again, 
"They  all  act  as  though  they  meant  to  be  ready  to  cut  and 
run  at  a  minute's  notice.  Their  tenure  is  like  that  of  a 
Bedouin  on  the  sands  of  the  desert.  This  is  sensibly  felt  and 
talked  of  by  the  people  of  the  city,  and  they  feel  no  confidence 
in  an  administration  that  betrays  so  much  insecurity.  And 
besides  a  strange  feeling  of  distrust  in  the  candor  and  sin 
cerity  of  Lincoln  personally  and  of  his  cabinet  has  sprung  up. 
No  one  speaks  of  Lincoln  or  any  member  of  his  cab- 

*  Atlantic,  XXVI,  466;  Nicolay  and  Hay,  Abraham  Lincoln,  V,  133,  n. 
4  Nicolay  and  Hay,  Abraham  Lincoln,  V,  132. 


McCLELLAN  53 

inet  with  respect  or  regard."  5  On  the  next  day  he  writes : 
"The  impression  here  is  held  by  many  that  the  effort 
to  reinforce  [Anderson]  will  be  a  failure;  second,  that 
in  less  than  twenty-four  hours  from  this  time  Anderson 
will  have  surrendered ;  third,  that  in  less  than  thirty 
days  Davis  will  be  in  possession  of  Washington."  6  "No  de 
scription  could  convey  the  panic  that  prevailed  here  after  the 
Baltimore  riot  and  before  communications  were  reopened. 
This  was  increased  by  reports  of  the  trepidation  of  Lincoln 
that  were  circulated  through  the  streets,  and  every  family 
packed  up  their  effects.  Women  and  children  were  sent  away 
in  great  numbers;  provisions  advanced  to  famine  prices.  In 
a  great  measure  the  alarm  has  passed  away,  but  there  is  still 
a  deep  apprehension  that  before  long  this  city  is  doomed  to  be 
the  scene  of  battle  and  carnage."7  On  June  8th,  1861,  he 
wrote :  "Indeed  the  course  of  things  for  the  last  four  weeks 
has  been  such  as  to  excite  distrust  in  every  department  of  the 
government."  8  On  July  26th,  1861,  he  wrote:  "The  dread 
ful  disaster  of  Sunday  [Bull  Run]  can  scarcely  be  mentioned. 
The  imbecility  of  this  administration  culminated  in  that  catas 
trophe.  An  irretrievable  misfortune  and  national  disgrace 
never  to  be  forgotten  are  to  be  admitted  to  the  ruin  of  all 
peaceful  pursuits  and  national  bankruptcy  as  the  result  of 
Lincoln's  running  the  machine  for  five  months.  It  is  not  un 
likely  that  some  changes  in  the  War  and  Navy  department 
may  take  place,  but  none  beyond  these  two  departments  until 
Jeff  Davis  turns  out  the  whole  concern.  The  capture  of  Wash 
ington  seems  now  to  be  inevitable.  During  the  whole  of  Mon 
day  and  Tuesday  it  might  have  been  taken  without  any  re 
sistance.  The  rout,  overthrow,  and  utter  demoralization  of  the 
whole  army  is  complete.  General  McClellan  reached  here  last 
evening.  But  if  he  had  the  ability  of  Caesar,  Alexander,  or 
Napoleon,  what  can  be  accomplished?  Will  not  Scott's  jeal 
ousy,  cabinet  intrigues,  and  Republican  interference  thwart 
him  at  every  step?"  9 

8  Curtis,  Life  of  James  Buchanan,  II,  540. 

9  Ibid.,  541-  *Ibid.,  552. 

,  548.  'Ibid.,  559- 


54  McCLELLAN 

On  July  23d,  1861,  he  wrote  to  General  Dix:  "The  state 
of  affairs  here  is  desperate  beyond  any  conception,  and  if 
there  be  any  remedy  and  any  shadow  of  hope  to  prevent  this 
government  from  utter  extinction  it  must  come  from  New 
York  without  delay."  10 

^  Rhodes,  History  of  the  United  States,  III,  376. 


CHAPTER    X 

STANTON    COURTS    JVl'CLELLAN HIS    CONTEMPT    FOR    LINCOLN 

General  McClellan  says  :*  "I  had  never  seen  Mr.  Stanton, 
and  probably  had  not  even  heard  of  him,  before  reaching 
Washington  in  1861.  Not  many  weeks  after  arriving,  I  was 
introduced  to  him  as  a  safe  adviser  on  legal  points.  From 
that  moment,  he  did  his  best  to  ingratiate  himself  with  me, 
and  professed  the  warmest  friendship  and  devotion.  I  had 
no  reason  to  suspect  his  sincerity  and  therefore  believed  him 
to  be  what  he  professed.  The  most  disagreeable  thing  about 
him  was  the  extreme  virulence  with  which  he  abused  the 
President,  the  administration,  and  the  Republican  party.  He 
carried  this  to  such  an  extent  that  I  was  often  shocked  by  it. 
He  never  spoke  of  the  President  in  any  other  way  than  as 
the  'Original  gorilla,'  and  often  said  that  Du  Chaillu  was  a 
fool  to  wander  all  the  way  to  Africa  in  search  of  what  he 
could  so  easily  have  found  in  Springfield,  Illinois.  Nothing 
could  be  more  bitter  than  his  words  and  manner  always  were 
when  speaking  of  the  administration  and  the  Republican  party. 
He  never  gave  them  credit  for  honesty  or  patriotism,  and 
very  seldom  for  any  ability."  Mr.  Stanton's  first  meeting 
with  Mr.  Lincoln  seemed  to  impress  him  with  an  intense  con 
tempt,  and  I  have  looked  in  vain  for  any  indication  that  grati 
tude,  affection,  and  admiration  ever  supplanted  it. 

Mr.  Thorpe  2  is  in  error  in  his  belief  that  their  first  meeting 
was  in  Washington  in  1861,  and  that  it  was  entirely  cordial. 
It  took  place  in  Cincinnati  in  the  summer  of  1857  and  left 
so  unpleasant  an  impression  in  the  mind  of  Mr.  Lincoln  that 
he  disliked  to  visit  Cincinnati  forever  afterward. 

Mr.  Herndon  tells  us  3  that  Mr.  Lincoln  was  engaged  by 

1  McClellan,  Own  Story,  131,  152. 

1  Harper's,  XLV,  737. 

3  Herndon,  Abraham  I  *ncoln,  II,  22. 

55 


56  McCLELLAN 

the  defendant  in  the  case  of  McCormick  vs.  Manny,  brought 
for  an  alleged  infringement  of  the  patent  for  the  famous 
reaper.  It  was  to  be  tried  in  the  U.  S.  Circuit  Court  at  Cincin 
nati.  Reverdy  Johnson,  a  noted  Baltimore  lawyer,  was  on 
the  other  side;  and  Lincoln  was  ambitious  to  cross  swords 
with  him.  Accordingly,  he  prepared  himself  with  great  care. 
On  reaching  Cincinnati  he  found  that  fear  of  Johnson's  skill 
had  induced  his  client  to  retain  Mr.  Stanton  also.  But  no 
special  arrangement  to  the  contrary  having  been  made  with 
Mr.  Lincoln,  he  still  had  control  of  the  case,  and  by  the  tradi 
tions  and  customs  of  the  bar  was  the  counsel  of  all  others  who 
should  have  spoken  in  the  argument.  Only  one  of  them  could 
speak,  however;  and  Mr.  Stanton  wished  to  speak,  and  craftily 
laid  his  plan.  He  suggested  to  Mr.  Lincoln  that  Lincoln 
should  speak.  As  Mr.  Lincoln  was  already  in  charge,  this 
was  more  than  superfluous.  Stanton  should  have  awaited  a 
suggestion  from  Lincoln.  Mr.  Lincoln,  obviously  out  of 
courtesy  only,  said :  "No.  You  speak."  Stanton  instantly 
replied,  "I  will,"  and  started  off.  Mr.  Lincoln  was  greatly 
grieved  and  mortified;  he  took  but  little  more  interest  in  the 
case,  though  he  remained  until  the  conclusion  of  the  trial.  He 
seemed  to  be  greatly  depressed.  Stanton,  in  his  brusque  and 
abrupt  way,  it  is  said,  described  him  as  "a  long,  lank  creature 
from  Illinois,  wearing  a  dirty  linen  duster  for  a  coat,  on  the 
back  of  which  the  perspiration  had  splotched  wide  stains  that 
resembled  a  map  of  the  continent."  On  his  return,  Lincoln 
said  that  "he  had  been  roughly  handled  by  that  man  Stanton ; 
that  he  heard  Stanton  saying  'where  did  that  long-armed  crea 
ture  come  from,  and  what  can  he  expect  to  do  in  this  case  ?' ' 
Messrs.  Nicolay  and  Hay  4  treat  this  incident  as  trivial,  but 
they  are  obviously  mistaken,  or  Lincoln,  who  was  a  fair  and 
just  man  by  nature,  would  not  have  been  so  grieved  and  angry 
about  it. 

The  incident  throws  light  on  Stanton's  attitude  toward 
the  President  as  shown  in  the  Buchanan  letters. 

Yet,  in  spite  of  his  heartfelt  enmity  toward  Mr.  Lincoln 
and  in  spite  of  the  antipathy  which  he  had  inspired  in  the 

4  Nicolay  and  Hay,  Abraham  Lincoln,  V,  133,  134. 


McCLELLAN  57 

mind  of  the  President,  it  is  evident  that  Mr.  Stanton  soon 
made  up  his  mind  to  regain  a  place  in  the  Cabinet.  He  felt 
no  doubt  that  his  place  was  there.  It  was  not  his  fault  that 
this  uncouth  and  unfit  man  had  somehow  got  into  power. 
He  regretted  it,  but  his  destiny  was  not  to  be  stayed  or  diverted 
by  it.  He  won  the  good-will  of  General  McClellan.  The  Gen 
eral  knew  no  more  of  the  methods  of  politicians  of  that  type 
than  a  bee  does  of  buttermilk.  He  was  so  completely  ensnared 
and  befooled  that  one  day,  worn  out  with  his  heartbreaking 
task,  and  shortly  before  his  collapse,  he  wrote  to  his  wife 
that  "he  was  concealed  at  Stanton's  to  dodge  all  enemies  in 
the  shape  of  browsing  Presidents,  etc."  Stanton  sought  the 
favor  not  only  of  the  leading  Republicans  generally,  as  we 
have  seen,  but  especially  of  Seward  and  Chase,  who  more 
than  any  others  secured  his  selection  as  Secretary  of  War. 
"Many  patriotic  citizens  and  eminent  capitalists"  urged  Mr. 
Lincoln  to  appoint  him,  and  the  latter  at  last  yielded  to  the 
pressure,  feeling  assured  among  other  motives  of  action  that 
he  was  conferring  a  great  favor  on  General  McClellan, — a 
fact  which  in  itself  demonstrated  the  fine  machiavellian  hand 
of  Mr.  Stanton. 

We  think  that  a  man  is  to  be  judged  not  so  much  by  the 
execration  of  his  enemies  as  by  the  admissions  of  his  friends. 

Mr.  Stanton  has  had  many  zealous  champions,  but  alas! 
for  their  defense ;  it  virtually  admits  the  most  vital  counts  of 
the  indictment. 

We  have  heard  from  Mr.  Thorpe.  We  will  now  hear 
from  the  Hon.  H.  L.  Dawes,  an  equally  fond  advocate,  who 
designates  Mr.  Stanton  as  "one  of  the  greatest  men  of  his 
time."  Mr.  Dawes  says,  "Mr.  Stanton  was  too  intense  to 
make  a  good  judge."  5  Again :  "Prejudice  sometimes  led  him 
to  do  injustice.  Suspicion  and  uncharitableness  were  too  often 
present  blinding  his  eyes."  c 

Men  who  are  timid  are  therefore  usually  retiring  also;  but 
Mr.  Stanton,  as  we  shall  see,  was  one  of  the  most  timid  of  men, 
and  yet  eagerly  fond  of  the  center  of  the  stage  and  the  exercise 

6  Atlantic,  LXXIII,  168. 
9  Ibid.,  169. 


58  McCLELLAN 

of  power.  General  Grant,  a  man  of  calm  and  kindly  disposi 
tion  and  disinclined  to  censure,  says  of  him :  "The  Secretary 
was  very  timid.  He  could  see  our  danger,  not  the  enemy's."  7 
General  Grant  presses  the  point  further  by  adding  wittily, 
"The  enemy  would  not  have  been  in  danger  if  Mr.  Stanton 
had  been  in  the  field." 

Mr.  Rhodes,  who  vies  with  Mr.  Dawes  and  Mr.  Thorpe 
in  his  admiration  for  Mr.  Stanton,  informs  us  that  "when 
Richmond  was  occupied  by  Federal  forces,  Stanton  was 
against  allowing  services  in  the  Richmond  churches  unless 
accompanied  with  prayer  for  the  President  of  the  United 
States."  8  "Stanton  was  incapable  of  generosity  to  a  fallen 
foe.  ...  A  petition  was  sent  to  Lincoln  which  he  prob 
ably  never  saw.  It  was  endorsed  'Disapproved,  by  order  of 
the  Secretary  of  War.'  The  churches  were  closed  two  Sun 
days  in  consequence.  Stanton's  impetuosity  put  him  fre 
quently  in  the  wrong,  but  he  could  never  bring  himself  to 
admit  it.  His  overbearing  desire  when  he  had  once  taken  a 
stand  was  to  prevail.  He  gained  an  easy  victory  over  the 
Richmond  clergymen,  but  his  persistence  in  the  wrong  was  a 
different  matter  when  he  encountered  a  sturdy  antagonist  like 
Sherman.  At  times  he  chafed  under  the  position  of  subordi 
nate  officer."  9  Mr.  Rhodes  shows  conclusively,  though  with 
evident  regret,  Mr.  Stanton's  manipulation  of  the  press  to  ruin 
General  Sherman  in  reference  to  Johnston's  surrender.  Mr. 
Stanton's  characteristic  duplicity  and  effrontery  were  exhib 
ited  on  the  platform  in  Washington  at  the  Grand  Review 
just  after  the  close  of  the  Wrar.  He  advanced  smilingly,  ex 
tending  his  hand  to  General  Sherman,  as  if  to  a  very  dear 
friend.  But  the  General  refused  to  see  either  the  smile  or 
the  hand.  The  injury  done  was  too  deadly  to  be  so  lightly 
ignored. 

T  Grant's  Memoirs,  II,  537. 

8  Rhodes,  History  of  the  United  States,  V,  179. 

•Ibid.,  180,  181. 


CHAPTER    XI 
STANTON'S  TIMIDITY,  AND  LOVE  OF  POWER 

As  to  his  insatiable  love  of  power,  General  Grant  says: 
"Owing  to  his  natural  disposition  to  assume  all  power  and 
control  in  all  matters  that  he  had  anything  to  do  with,  he 
boldly  took  command  of  the  army."  1 

This  was  after  the  war,  when  Grant  was  Lieutenant- 
general  of  the  army. 

"He  prohibited  any  order  from  me  going  out  of  the  Ad 
jutant-General's  office  before  he  had  approved  it.  He  never 
disturbed  himself,  either,  in  examining  my  orders  until  it  was 
entirely  convenient  for  him.  So  the  orders  which  I  had  pre 
pared  would  often  lie  there  three  or  four  days  before  he 
sanctioned  them."  The  General  finally  remonstrated  and  the 
Secretary  apologized.  "But  he  soon  lapsed  again  and  took 
control  as  before." 

Referring  to  the  Virginia  Campaign,  General  Grant  says : 
"I  knew  it  was  impossible  for  me  to  get  orders  through  to 
Sheridan  to  make  a  movement  because  they  would  be  stopped 
there,  and  such  orders  as  Halleck's  caution  (and  that  of  the 
Secretary  of  War)  would  suggest  would  be  given  instead, 
and  would  no  doubt  be  contradictory  to  mine." 

Again,  the  General  tells  us :  "Stanton  cared  nothing  for 
the  feelings  of  others.  In  fact  it  seemed  to  be  pleasanter  to 
him  to  disappoint  than  to  gratify.  He  felt  no  hesitation  in 
assuming  the  functions  of  the  Executive  or  in  acting  without 
advising  with  him.  If  his  action  was  not  sustained,  he  would 
change  it,  if  he  saw  the  matter  would  be  followed  up  until  he 
did  so."  3 


1  Grant,  Memoirs,  II,  105. 
'Ibid.,  327- 


59 


60  McCLELLAN 

Mr.  Ropes  is  more  vehement  in  his  censure :  "Stanton 
was  utterly  ignorant  of  military  matters ;  he  despised  from 
the  bottom  of  his  soul  what  is  known  as  military  science ;  mak 
ing  no  secret  of  his  general  distrust  of  educated  officers ;  rarely 
if  ever  lending  an  intelligent  support  to  any  general  in  the 
service.  .  .  .  Arrogant,  impatient,  irascible,  Stanton  was 
a  terror  and  a  marplot  in  the  conduct  of  the  war."  4 

It  is  interesting  to  note  the  value  of  a  woman's  intuition  as 
revealed  in  a  letter  of  General  McClellan  to  his  wife,  dated 
July  13,  1861 :  "I  ever  will  hereafter  trust  your  judgment 
about  men.  ...  I  remember  what  you  thought  of  Stan- 
ton  when  you  first  saw  him.  I  thought  you  were  wrong.  I 
now  know  you  were  right."  5 

To  the  weak,  if  they  were  obnoxious  to  him,  he  was  rough 
to  brutality.  To  a  powerful  enemy  he  was  the  Prince  of 
Smoothness  and  Duplicity, — like  a  Borgia  who  presents  the 
envenomed  cup,  with  the  smile  of  a  friend,  or  like  a  bravo 
who  creeps  behind  an  enemy  in  the  darkness  and  stabs  him 
in  the  back. 

Of  his  timidity  his  co-secretary,  Mr.  Gideon  Welles,  says: 
"He  is  by  nature  a  sensationalist  and  has  from  the  first  been 
filled  with  panics  and  alarms  in  which  I  have  not  partici 
pated."  °  "Stanton  has  energy  and  application,  is  industrious 
and  driving,  but  devises  nothing,  shuns  responsibility,  and  I 
doubt  his  sincerity  always.  He  wants  no  general  to  overtop 
him  and  is  jealous  of  others  in  any  position  who  have  influence 
and  popular  regard;  but  he  has  cunning  and  skill,  dissembles 
his  feelings,  and  to  a  certain  extent  is  brusque,  and  over- 
valiant  in  words. 

"He  is  impulsive,  not  administrative;  has  quickness,  often 
rashness,  when  he  has  nothing  to  apprehend;  is  more  violent 
than  vigorous ;  more  demonstrative  than  discriminative ;  more 
vain  than  wise;  is  rude,  arrogant,  and  domineering  towards 
those  in  subordinate  positions  if  they  will  submit  to  his  rude- 

*  Ropes,  Story  of  the  Civil  War,  I,  225. 
"•McClellan,  Own  Story,  447. 

*  Atlantic,  CIII,  362. 


McCLELLAN  61 

ness;  but  is  a  dissembler  in  deportment  and  language  with 
those  that  he  fears."  Mr.  Welles  thought  him  "an  unfit  man 
in  many  respects  for  the  War  department.  .  .  .  Stanton 
is  by  nature  an  intriguer,  courts  favor,  is  not  faithful  in  his 
friendships,  and  is  given  to  secret,  underhand  combinations. 
His  obligations  to  Seward  are  great,  but  would  not  deter 
him  from  raising  a  breeze  against  Seward  to  favor  himself."  7 

" Stanton  is  actually  hated  by  many  officers;  and  is  more 
intimate  with  certain  extreme  partisans  in  Congress,  the  com 
mittee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  and  others,  than  with  the 
Executive,  administration,  and  military  men.8  .  .  ."  His 
relations  with  the  President  were  privately  conducted,  as  Mr. 
Welles  might  easily  have  observed.  The  latter  again  says : 
"Stanton  does  not  attend  one  half  of  the  Cabinet  meetings. 
When  he  comes  he  communicates  little  of  importance.  Not 
infrequently  he  has  a  private  conference  with  the  President 
in  the  corner  of  the  room." 

But  it  is  Mr.  Stanton's  latest  and  most  enthusiastic  advo 
cate  who  unwittingly  supplies  the  greatest  mass  of  evidence 
against  him,  while  emphatically  denying  every  adverse  criti 
cism  of  every  nature. 

From  a  perusal  of  the  "Life  of  Edwin  McMasters  Stan- 
ton,"  by  Mr.  Frank  Abial  Flower,  we  may  learn  that  Mr. 
Stanton  was  indeed,  as  Mr.  Flower  styles  him  on  the  title 
page,  "The  Autocrat  of  Rebellion,  Emancipation,  and  Recon 
struction."  We  may  learn  of  his  "cheek"  in  appearing  in  court 
as  an  attorney  before  he  was  twenty-one  and  without  any 
license  to  practice  law; 10  that  he  took  unjust  causes  and  made 
hard  terms  because  thereof;11  that  he  always  carried  a  dagger 
seven  inches  long  inside  of  his  vest ; 12  that  he  was  very  insolent 
to  an  attorney  named  Moodey,  who  at  the  next  recess  "flew 
at  him  like  a  panther,"  and  thereby  won  his  respect  for  life; 13 

Ibid.,  I,  203. 
Ibid.,  I,  324. 
Ibid.,  I  546. 

0  Flower,  Life  of  Edwin  McMasters  Stanton,  31. 
llbid.,  37,  47,  52. 
2  Ibid.,  34- 
"Ibid.,  48. 


62  McCLELLAN 

that  he  had  no  aptitude  for  accounts; 14  that  after  the  inaugu 
ration  of  President  Lincoln,  Stanton  held  him  and  his  admin 
istration  in  the  utmost  contempt,15  in  which  view  Mr.  Flower 
cordially  joins;  that  regardless  of  what  a  man  of  his  intelli 
gence  must  have  noted, — namely,  that  the  officers  in  the  front 
rank  of  efficiency  on  both  sides,  like  Grant,  Sherman,  Sheridan, 
Meade,  Thomas,  Lee,  and  Johnston,  were  all  men  of  military 
education, — he  had  an  inveterate  prejudice  against  West  Point 
ers;16  that  he  pressed  the  President  to  exercise  the  functions 
of  Commander  in  Chief,  but  only  for  six  weeks,  and  then 
became  himself  the  successor  both  of  Lincoln  and  McClellan 
in  supreme  military  authority;17  that  Stanton  at  the  moment 
of  his  entry  into  office  was  hostile  to  McClellan,18  and  yet  that 
four  months  later  he  wrote:  "When  I  entered  the  cabinet 
I  was  and  had  been  for  months  the  sincere  and  devoted  friend 
of  General  McClellan,  and  to  support  him  and,  so  far  as  I 
might,  aid  and  assist  him  in  bringing  the  war  to  a  close,  was 
a  chief  inducement  for  me  to  sacrifice  my  personal  happiness 
td  a  sense  of  public  duty,"  19  that  he  did  his  best  to  usurp  the 
functions  of  the  Navy  Department,20  and  indeed,  as  Mr. 
Flower  with  glowing  admiration  assures  us,  endeavored  to 
make  himself,  and  in  effect  was,  the  center  of  all  authority, 
the  possessor  of  all  power,  the  Great  Autocrat  of  the  War; 
that  he  spurned  the  most  common  decencies  of  official  inter 
course,  for  if  he  wanted  to  confer  with  the  Lieutenant-Gen- 
eral  of  the  Army  he  would  send  his  colored  messenger,  saying, 
"Tell  General  Grant  to  come  over  here."  He  sent  his  clerk  in 
the  same  way  for  Secretaries  Chase,  Seward,  and  others,  and 
Mr.  Flower  seems  delighted  to  record  that,  though  they  did 
not  like  it,  "they  always  came."  We  learn  from  Mr.  Flower 
that  the  list  of  the  foremost  men  of  the  country  who  disliked 
him  is  very  long  and  includes  nearly  all  those  who  knew  him 
best.  All  his  co-secretaries  Mr.  Flower  assures  us  "hated 
him,"  21  and  a  large  part  of  his  work  is  given  to  a  defense 

14  Flower,  Life  of  Edwin  McMasters  Stanton,  54. 

15  Ibid.,  105,  113.  "Ibid.,  157- 
™Ibid.,  358.,  366.  "Ibid.,  154,  162-165, 

17  Ibid.,  138-141.  Z1  Ibid.,  424. 

18  Ibid.,  124,  125,  130,  131. 


McCLELLAN  63 

against  the  denunciations  of  such  men  as  James  G.  Elaine, 
Generals  Schofield,  Gibbon,  Badeau,  McClellan,  and  Sherman, 
and  against  the  highly  adverse  opinions  found  in  General 
Grant's  "Memoirs,"  to  which  we  have  already  called  atten 
tion. 

In  an  able  review  of  the  Diary  of  Gideon  Welles,  in  the 
New  York  Times  of  January  28,  1912,  appear  the  following 
remarks : 

"But  Stanton,  the  snarling  Stanton,  is  shown  here  in  an 
unpitying  light.  As  John  T.  Morse,  Jr.,  who  supplies  the 
introduction,  says,  no  man  can  regret  the  application  of  the 
lash  to  Stanton's  back.  We  have  all  had  our  minds  made  up 
about  him.  Still,  even  to  those  who  have  felt  most  revolted  by 
the  bumptious  and  brutal  War  Secretary's  assumption  of  su 
periority  to  Lincoln,  even  to  those  who  have  felt  unable  to 
forgive  him  his  attitude  toward  the  Union  generals,  good  and 
bad,  from  McClellan  to  Sherman,  a  new  light  and  a  better 
reason  for  their  opinion  will  come  if  they  read  Welles's  piti 
less  day-by-day  account  of  the  foolish  activities  and  the  sense 
less  brutalities  and  the  crafty  politics  of  this  misnamed  and 
overestimated  'Carnot.'  ' 

We  will  have  frequent  occasion  to  illustrate  Mr.  Stanton's 
peculiar  views  and  methods  in  the  progress  of  our  narrative. 


CHAPTER    XII 

ALL    QUIET    ON    THE  POTOMAC 

As  all  writers  testify,  the  undertaking  of  creating  an  army 
commensurate  with  the  work  to  be  done  proceeded  with  un 
exampled  rapidity,  and  yet, — as  its  completion  depended  on 
the  coming  in  of  the  necessary  men  and  materials,  a  branch 
of  activity  which  was  not  in  his  hands, — its  impeded  progress 
was  vexatious  to  its  commander.  In  October  he  writes  to  his 
wife,  "This  getting  ready  is  slow  work  with  such  an  admin 
istration."  l  "Preparations  are  slow."  2  On  the  3ist  of  Octo 
ber  he  alludes  to  "The  gross  neglect  that  has  occurred  in  ob 
taining  arms,  clothing,  etc."  3  In  November  he  wrote :  "I 
cannot  move  without  more  means,  and  I  do  not  possess  the 
power  to  control  those  means.  I  am  doing  all  I  can  to  move 
before  winter  sets  in,  but  it  now  begins  to  look  as  if  we  were 
condemned  to  a  winter  of  inactivity.  If  it  is  so,  the  fault  will 
not  be  mine ;  there  will  be  that  consolation  for  my  conscience, 
even  if  the  world  at  large  never  knows  it."  4  It  is  evident 
from  these  confidential  messages  to  his  wife  that  he  was  fret 
ting  under  delay,  which  he  thought  could  have  been  easily 
avoided  if  he  had  had  control. 

He  was  eager,  and  at  first  hopeful,  that  his  plans  could 
be  sufficiently  matured  to  enable  him  to  take  the  field  early  in 
November.  There  was  a  strong  desire  that  the  enemy  should 
be  driven  from  his  position  at  Manassas,  where  he  had  re 
mained  strongly  intrenched  and  had  been  reported  to  be  100,- 
ooo  strong. 

McClellan  was  in  a  position  similar  to  that  of  a  contractor 
who  is  engaged  to  construct  a  building  for  the  government  suf- 

1  McClellan,  Own  Story,  167. 
a  Ibid.,  168. 
•Ibid.,  172. 
'Ibid.,  177. 

64 


McCLELLAN  65 

fkiently  large  for  a  given  purpose,  upon  plans  made  by  himself, 
the  materials  for  which  are  to  be  supplied  by  the  government. 
The  contractor,  eager  to  complete  the  work,  pushes  it  along 
as  rapidly  as  possible,  and  fumes  and  worries  because  he  is 
prevented  from  bringing  it  to  an  end  by  the  slowness  of  the 
government  in  providing  material ;  and  yet,  to  his  amazement, 
he  finds  a  little  later  that  the  delay  which  so  exasperated  him  is 
charged  by  the  government  entirely  to  himself. 

The  failure  of  the  Government  to  hasten  troops  with  suf 
ficient  diligence  and  speed  into  Washington  left  him  still 
struggling  with  the  colossal  undertaking  of  creating  an  ade 
quate  army, — with  the  end  not  yet  in  sight  when  the  heavy 
winter  came  on,  as  we  have  seen, — and  barred  the  doors  to 
an  enterprise  of  such  magnitude  until  the  winter  was  over. 

In  an  address  to  the  officers  of  the  army  on  January  2oth, 
1862,  Mr.  Stanton  said,  "It  is  my  work  to  furnish  the  means, 
the  instruments,  for  prosecuting  the  war  for  the  Union  and 
putting  down  the  Rebellion  against  it."  5  It  was  a  work 
that  was  long  drawn  out  and  inadequately  accomplished  long 
afterward. 

As  indicating  the  alleged  lethargy  of  the  new  commander, 
Vlessrs.  Nicolay  and  Hay  6  quote  from  Pollard's  First  Yea, 
of  the  War,  as  follows :  "An  inauspicious  quiet  for  many 
months  was  maintained  on  the  lines  of  the  Potomac.  A  long, 
lingering  Indian  summer,  with  roads  more  hard  and  skies 
more  beautiful  than  Virginia  had  seen  for  many  a  year,  in 
vited  the  enemy  to  advance."  There  is  no  doubt  that  the 
weather  invited  the  Northerners  to  advance,  and  there  is  no 
doubt  that  Johnston  would  have  been  delighted  to  have  them 
advance, — but  to  what?  Probably  that  captivating  quotation 
has  convinced  many  thousands  of  readers  that  McClellan  was 
derelict  and  lacking  in  energy,  without  a  thought  as  to  whether 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  fit  for  the  task  either  in  num 
bers  or  in  discipline.  In  fact,  it  was  entirely  inadequate  in 
numbers.  It  was  even  more  unfit  in  discipline,  for  the  terror 
of  Bull  Run  had  not  yet  left  it. 

6  Flower,  Life  of  Edwin  McMasters  Stanton,  125. 
e  Abraham  Lincoln,  V,  176,  n. 


66  McCLELLAN 

Speaking  of  encounters  near  the  end  of  October,  Mr. 
Eggleston  tells  us :  "In  the  little  engagements  at  Drainsville, 
the  Yanks  ran  precipitately  to  cover.  The  Rebels  thought 
they  had  no  stability,  no  soldierly  qualities  whatever."  7  And 
a  little  earlier  in  his  able  work  he  admits  that  "McClellan's 
problem  was  to  organize  the  army  anew;  to  create  it  out  of 
chaotic  conditions — in  the  face  of  the  difficulties  which  were 
thrown  in  his  way  by  its  experience  in  battle.  He  must  give 
it  morale."  8 

Obviously,  that  lovely  Indian  summer  did  not  extend  be 
yond  the  heavy  snows  of  November  the  25th,  and  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  was  then  still  in  the  midst  of  the  throes  of 
formation. 

Mr.  Elson  notes,  as  we  have  said,  that  "when  he  took 
control  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  it  was  a  great  disorgan 
ized  mass,  untrustworthy,  discouraged,  but  possessing  the  one 
supreme  virtue  of  patriotism.  In  four  months  McClellan  had 
made  of  this  crude  mass,  a  tried,  disciplined,  organized  army, 
equal  to  any  that  ever  trod  American  soil."  9  But  the  Indian 
summer  was  then  over.  A  little  later  the  same  author  in 
forms  us  that  "at  length  McClellan  decided  that  it  would  be 
unwise  to  undertake  a  winter  campaign  in  the  Virginia 
mud."  10 

In  a  communication  to  Mr.  Stanton,  dated  February  3, 
1862,  the  General  notes  "the  unprecedented  and  impassable 
condition  of  the  roads"  n  south  of  Manassas,  and  the  swamps 
of  the  Warwick  and  the  Chickahominy  were  surely  no  better. 
As  to  beginning  operations  before  winter  set  in  General  Mc 
Clellan  tells  us :  "Even  if  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had 
been  in  condition  to  undertake  a  campaign  in  the  Autumn  of 
1 86 1,  the  backward  state  of  affairs  in  the  West  would  have 
made  it  unwise  to  do  so;  for  on  no  sound  military  principle 
could  it  be  regarded  as  proper  to  operate  on  one  line  alone 
while  all  was  quiescent  on  the  others,  as  such  a  course  would 

7  History  of  the  Confederate  War,  I,  247. 

8  Ibid.,  246. 

9  History  of  the  United  States,  III,  691. 
10Ibid.,  692. 

11  McClellan,  Own  Story,  233. 


McCLELLAN  67 

have  enabled  the  enemy  to  concentrate  everything  on  the  one 
active  army.  Again,  if,  within  a  week  or  two  of  the  first  Bull 
Run,  it  had  been  possible  to  advance  and  defeat  the  Confed 
erate  army  at  Manassas,  the  moral  effect  might  have  justified 
the  attempt,  even  were  it  impossible  to  follow  up  the  victory ; 
but  after  the  lapse  of  some  months  it  would  have  been  foolish 
to  advance  unless  prepared  to  follow  up  a  victory  and  enter 
upon  a  campaign  productive  of  definite  results."  12 

™  Ibid.,  200,  201. 


CHAPTER    XIII 

FALSE    CONSIDERATIONS^ — FOOLISH    HASTE 

The  trouble  with  many  in  arriving  at  a  just  conclusion  as 
to  General  McClellan's  energy  and  capacity  at  a  later  time  has 
arisen  from  irrelevant  considerations,  maliciously  and  cun 
ningly  introduced  to  confuse  and  obscure  the  view. 

Whether  a  sculptor  or  painter  or  architect  is  doing  certain 
work  in  his  line  with  commendable  diligence  and  artistic  skill 
is  not  determined  by  the  fact  that  the  patron  is  standing  by, 
complaining  of  his  slowness  and  urging  him  to  greater  speed. 
It  is  irrational  to  bring  such  a  circumstance  into  the  considera 
tion.  It  has  no  more  bearing  upon  the  industry  of  the  work 
man  or  the  excellence  of  his  work  than  the  claim  that  there  are 
canals  on  Mars,  or  that  the  constellation  of  Orion  is  peopled 
by  a  branch  of  the  Irish  race. 

When  we  think  of  the  skill  and  activity  with  which  Mc- 
Clellan  organized  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  the  permanency 
and  perfection  of  his  work,  and  the  universal  and  enthusiastic 
praise  which  he  received,  we  are  filled  with  admiration;  but  if 
we  turn  our  backs  on  all  this  to  inquire  what  number  of  the 
bystanders  (press  and  people),  without  knowledge  of  condi 
tions  or  capacity  for  judging,  were  clamorous  for  a  battle, 
whether  the  Army  was  ready  or  not,  and  what  number,  with 
sounder  wisdom,  desired  adequate  numbers  and  thorough 
preparation  and  organization  in  order  to  lessen  bloodshed  and 
ensure  success,  we  are  at  once  lost  in  a  fog  of  irrelevancy. 

With  writers  honestly  desirous  of  reaching  the  truth,  the 
chief  source  of  confusion  and  contention  as  to  McClellan's 
military  career  has  been  a  tendency  to  argue  over  non-vital 
matters,  and  the  inevitable  result  as  usual  has  been  to  lose 
sight  of  the  real  and  only  substantial  issues,  if  there  ar§  any ; 

68 


McCLELLAN  69 

but  I  think  it  will  be  seen  that  when  the  irrelevant  matters 
disappear,  the  controversies  disappear  with  them. 

The  situation  at  the  time  of  which  we  speak  has  been 
very  aptly  and  forcibly  expressed  in  a  single  sentence :  "It 
may  be  said  .  .  .  that  coming  to  Washington  in  mid 
summer,  McClellan  had  done  everything  that  could  be  reason 
ably  expected  of  him  in  the  few  months  before  the  season 
of  bad  roads  set  in,  and  that  thereafter  nothing  could  be  un 
dertaken  with  any  chance  of  success  until  the  roads  had  again 
become  passable."  * 

"All  quiet  on  the  Potomac"  became  a  byword;  but  not 
only  on  the  Potomac  was  there  quiet.  We  are  told  that 
"the  armies  everywhere  remained  inactive."  2  But  only  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  was  blamed  for  it.  A  very  sensible 
course  it  was  for  the  armies  to  pursue  under  such  conditions ; 
a  course  which  every  army  pursues,  or  pays  the  penalty  for  not 
doing  so,  as  was  the  case  in  Napoleon's  Russian  campaign. 

It  should  not  be  lost  sight  of  in  passing  that  the  victorious 
and  usually  very  active  Southern  Army  of  Virginia  was  at 
this  time  also  inactive.  Inactivity  in  winter  is  a  universal 
characteristic  of  armies,  and  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
possessed  it  was  not  a  subject  of  reproach  in  any  subsequent 
winter.  General  Michie  devotes  seventy-five  pages  of  his 
subtle  work  to  the  "Inactivity  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac." 
No  one  devotes  seven  lines  to  its  inactivity  during  the  winters 
which  followed. 

Was  there  any  delay?  Was  General  McClellan  idling 
his  time  away?  The  evidence  of  friend  and  foe  alike  dispels 
such  a  thought.  He  came  very  near  killing  himself  by  the 
unresting  diligence  and  vigor  of  his  work.  His  most  virulent 
critics  admit  that  the  swiftness  of  so  splendid  an  achievement 
was  marvelous.  He  built  up  the  army,  which  all  agree  was 
the  chief  glory  of  the  North.  He  should  have  been  given  a 
larger  aggregate  army  than  General  Grant  had  later,  for  the 
Southern  army  was  twice  as  large  in  the  spring  of  1862  as  it 
was  in  the  spring  of  1864.  In  the  Department  of  the  Poto- 


ial,  XXXI,  319. 
2  Battles  and  Leaders,  II,  436. 


70  McCLELLAN 

mac,  General  Grant  had  under  his  command  a  total  of  310,- 
ooo  men.  If  McClellan  had  been  cordially  supported  in  his 
eminently  wise  views  of  the  necessities  of  the  situation,  he 
would  have  had  at  his  command  on  May  ist,  1862,  a  larger 
army  than  he  had  asked  for,  completely  and  superbly  equipped 
and  thoroughly  disciplined,  in  addition  to  as  ample  a  force 
at  Washington  as  the  most  timorous  could  desire.  But  in 
that  phenomenal  season  even  the  beginning  of  May  was  far 
too  early  to  set  out,  for  the  fiercest  fighting  of  the  Peninsula 
was  done  at  the  end  of  June,  on  flooded  battlefields  and  in  the 
midst  of  drenching  rains.  The  powers  of  Heaven  were  not 
ready  until  July.  What  was  the  rush  for?  There  was  none 
the  next  year,  nor  the  year  following.  Although  those  springs 
were  much  drier  than  was  that  of  1862,  the  first  of  May 
was  thought  early  enough,  and  there  was  no  clamor  of  the 
people.  Why  ?  Obviously  because  the  National  Press  Agent, 
Mr.  Stanton,  did  not  start  any  in  those  years. 

Mr.  Ropes  says,  "McClellan  was  perfectly  right  in  de 
ferring  operations  until  spring."  3  There  was  never  any  ques 
tion  in  the  three  succeeding  winters  of  the  propriety  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  remaining  quiet  in  winter  until  the 
elements  were  favorable  and  there  was  no  clamor  of  people 
or  pressure  from  any  quarter  to  conduct  war  under  such 
hazardous  circumstances. 

General  Grant  is  charged  with  ignoring  the  elements  in  his 
military  operations,  but  all  who  have  read  his  Memoirs  know 
the  contrary.  He  delayed  the  opening  of  his  Virginia  cam 
paign  until  May  the  4th  because  of  the  weather.  After  the 
passage  of  the  Wilderness  he  halted  for  several  days  because 
of  the  weather.  The  finest  and  most  lucid  description  of  a 
battle  ever  written  is  found  in  Les  Miserables.  It  is  Hugo's 
account  of  Waterloo.  Never  was  there  such  another  illus 
tration  of  the  part  which  the  elements  play  in  war.  He  says : 

"Had  it  not  rained  on  the  night  of  the  I7th  of  June,  1815, 
the  destiny  of  Europe  would  have  been  changed.  .  .  . 
The  battle  of  Waterloo  could  not  be  commenced  before  n  :3O 
o'clock.  Why?  Because  the  ground  was  too  soft.  It  was 

8  Story  of  the  Civil  War,  I,  261. 


McCLELLAN  71 

necessary  to  wait  for  it  to  acquire  some  firmness  so  that  the 
artillery  could  maneuver.  Had  the  ground  been  dry  and  the 
artillery  able  to  move,  the  action  would  have  begun  at  six 
o'clock  in  the  morning.  It  was  delayed  five  and  a  half  hours 
and  that  gave  Blucher  time  to  come  up." 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  not  strong  enough  to  move 
in  January,  1862,  as  appears  from  the  testimony  of  General 
Porter  before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War.4 

But  regardless  of  the  state  of  preparation,  and  even  if 
McClellan's  desires  had  been  fully  carried  out  by  the  2Oth 
of  December,  1861,  still  the  army  should  not  have  been  sent 
out  into  the  mud;  and  on  that  day,  for  a  time,  the  typhus 
robbed  the  army  of  its  commander.  In  1863  and  1864,  as  we 
have  said,  the  operations  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  began 
about  May  the  ist,  and  the  winters  were  much  milder  than 
was  the  first  winter  of  the  war.  In  1862  they  should  not 
have  begun  at  the  earliest  before  the  first  or  middle  of  June, 
as  the  heavy  rains  did  not  slacken  until  the  second  of  July. 

On  the  2d  of  August,  1861,  General  McClellan  had  com 
municated  to  the  Government  his  views  as  to  the  magnitude 
of  the  force  which  should  be  organized  as  an  active  army  of 
invasion,  putting  it  at  273,000,  in  addition  to  such  forces  as 
might  be  considered  necessary  to  leave  behind  at  Washington 
and  in  Northern  Virginia.  The  wisdom  and  the  feasibility  of 
carrying  out  these  views  have  been  already  discussed  in  Chap 
ter  VI. 

About  the  middle  of  November  the  Administration  brought 
a  new  factor  into  the  situation.  The  desired  army  had  not 
been  collected.  McClellan  was  eager  to  act.  As  we  have  seen, 
he  was  chafing  to  act  before  winter,  but  the  means  of  action 
had  not  been  given  to  him ;  the  tools  had  not  been  furnished. 

In  a  letter  to  his  wife  dated  only  "Nov.,"  written  between 
November  the  I7th  and  November  the  25th,  1861,  he  speaks 
of  a  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  adds :  "The  paper  is 
a  very  important  one,  as  it  is  intended  to  place  on  record  that 
I  have  left  nothing  undone  to  make  this  army  what  it  ought 

*  Gorham,  Life  and  Public  Services  of  Edwin  M.  Stanton,  I,  236. 


72  McCLELLAN 

to  be,  and  that  the  necessity  for  delay  has  not  been  my  fault."  5 
From  the  communication  spoken  of  we  see  that  the  Civil 
War  officials  were  now,  in  spite  of  their  own  default  in  pro 
viding  adequate  numbers,  urging  upon  the  General  that  polit 
ical  considerations  required  an  advance  before  winter  closed  in. 
In  view  of  this,  and  as  an  inducement  to  more  vigorous 
action,  he  now  names  a  lesser  army  to  be  completed  and  set 
in  motion  at  once.  But  he  might  as  well  have  adhered  firmly 
to  his  first  requisition,  for  the  lethargic  enlisting  mill  of  the 
Government  was  not  hurried  in  the  least  thereby,  and  the 
number  he  named  merely  to  get  swift  action  became  fixed  as 
the  utmost  he  could  ever  get. 

The  main  portion  of  his  letter,  after  reminding  the  Secre 
tary  of  the  force  he  had  recommended  and  deemed  necessary, 
is  as  follows : 

"So  much  time  has  passed  and  the  winter  is  approaching 
so  rapidly  that  but  two  courses  are  left  to  the  Government : 
viz.,  either  to  go  into  winter  quarters,  or  to  assume  the  offen 
sive  with  forces  greatly  inferior  in  numbers  to  the  army  I  re 
garded  as  desirable  and  necessary.  If  political  considerations 
render  the  first  course  unadvisable,  the  second  alone  remains. 
While  I  regret  that  it  has  not  been  deemed  expedient,  or  per 
haps  possible,  to  concentrate  the  forces  of  the  nation  in  this 
vicinity  (remaining  on  the  defensive  elsewhere),  keeping  the 
attention  and  efforts  of  the  Government  fixed  upon  this  as  the 
vital  point  where  the  issue  of  the  great  contest  is  to  be  de 
cided,  it  may  still  be  that,  by  introducing  unity  of  action  and 
design  among  the  various  armies  of  the  land,  by  determining 
the  courses  to  be  pursued  by  the  various  commanders  under 
one  general  plan,  transferring  from  the  other  armies  the 
superfluous  strength  not  required  for  the  purpose  in  view, 
and  thus  re-enforcing  this  main  army,  whose  destiny  it  is  to 
decide  the  controversy,  we  may  yet  be  able  to  move  with  a 
reasonable  prospect  before  the  winter  is  fairly  upon  us. 

"The  nation  feels,  and  I  share  that  feeling,  that  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  holds  the  fate  of  the  country  in  its  hands. 

6  McClellan,  Own  Story,  176,  177. 


McCLELLAN  73 

The  stake  is  so  vast,  the  issue  so  momentous,  and  the  effect 
of  the  next  battle  will  be  so  important  throughout  the  future 
as  well  as  the  present,  that  I  continue  to  urge,  as  I  have  ever 
done  since  I  entered  upon  the  command  of  this  army,  upon 
the  Government  to  devote  its  energies  and  its  available  re 
sources  toward  increasing  the  numbers  and  efficiency  of  the 
army  on  which  its  salvation  depends. 

"As  you  are  aware,  all  the  information  we  have  from  spies, 
prisoners,  etc.,  agrees  in  showing  that  the  enemy  have  a  force 
on  the  Potomac  not  less  than  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand 
strong,  well  drilled  and  equipped,  ably  commanded,  and 
strongly  intrenched.  It  is  plain,  therefore,  that  to  insure  suc 
cess,  or  to  render  it  reasonably  certain,  the  active  army  should 
not  number  less  than  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  efficient 
troops,  with  four  hundred  guns,  unless  some  material  change 
occurs  in  front  of  us. 

"The  requisite  force  for  an  advance  movement  by  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  may  be  thus  estimated : 

Men  Guns 

Column  of  active  operations 150,000  400 

Garrison  of  the  city  of  Washington 35,ooo  40 

To  guard  the  Potomac  to  Harper's  Ferry 5,ooo  12 

To  guard  the  lower  Potomac , 8,000  24 

Garrison  for  Baltimore  and  Annapolis 10,000  12 


Total  effective  force  required 208,000  488 

or  an  aggregate,  present  and  absent,  of  about  two  hundred 
and  forty  thousand  men,  should  the  losses  by  sickness,  etc., 
not  rise  to  a  higher  percentage  than  at  present. 

"Having  stated  what  I  regard  as  the  requisite  force  to 
enable  this  army  to  advance,  I  now  proceed  to  give  the  actual 
strength  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  The  aggregate 
strength  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  by  the  official  report 
on  the  morning  of  the  27th  instant,  was  one  hundred  and 
sixty-eight  thousand  three  hundred  and  eighteen  officers  and 
men  of  all  grades  and  arms.  This  includes  the  troops  at 
Baltimore  and  Annapolis,  on  the  upper  and  lower  Potomac, 
the  sick,  absent,  etc.  The  force  present  for  duty  was  one  hun- 


74  McCLELLAN 

dred  and  forty-seven  thousand  six  hundred  and  ninety-five. 
Of  this  number  forty-two  hundred  and  sixty-eight  cavalry 
were  completely  unarmed,  thirty-one  hundred  and  sixty-three 
cavalry  only  partially  armed,  fifty-nine  hundred  and  seventy- 
nine  infantry  unequipped,  making  thirteen  thousand  four 
hundred  and  ten  unfit  for  the  field  (irrespective  of  those  not 
yet  sufficiently  drilled),  and  reducing  the  effective  force  to  one 
hundred  and  thirty- four  thousand  two  hundred  and  eighty- 
five,  and  the  number  disposable  for  an  advance  to  seventy-six 
thousand  two  hundred  and  eighty-five.  The  infantry  regi 
ments  are,  to  a  considerable  extent,  armed  with  unserviceable 
weapons.  Quite  a  large  number  of  good  arms,  which  had 
been  intended  for  this  army,  were  ordered  elsewhere,  leaving 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  insufficiently  and  in  some  cases 
badly  armed.  On  the  3Oth  of  September  there  were  with  this 
army  two  hundred  and  twenty-eight  field  guns  ready  for  the 
field.  So  far  as  arms  and  equipments  are  concerned,  some 
of  the  batteries  are  still  quite  raw  and  unfit  to  go  into  action. 
I  have  intelligence  that  eight  New  York  batteries  are  en  route 
hither;  two  others  are  ready  for  the  field.  I  will  still  (if  the 
New  York  batteries  have  six  guns  each)  be  one  hundred  and 
twelve  guns  short  of  the  number  required  for  the  active  col 
umn,  saying  nothing  for  the  present  of  those  necessary  for 
the  garrisons  and  corps  on  the  Potomac,  which  would  make 
a  total  deficiency  of  two  hundred  guns. 

"I  have  thus  briefly  stated  our  present  condition  and  wants. 
It  remains  to  suggest  the  means  of  supplying  the  deficiencies : 

"First.  That  all  the  cavalry  and  infantry  arms,  as  fast 
as  procured,  whether  manufactured  in  this  country  or  pur 
chased  abroad,  be  sent  to  this  army  until  it  is  fully  prepared 
for  the  field. 

"Second.  That  the  two  companies  of  the  Fourth  Artil 
lery,  now  understood  to  be  en  route  from  Fort  Randall  to 
Fort  Monroe,  be  ordered  to  this  army,  to  be  mounted  at  once ; 
also  that  the  companies  of  the  Third  Artillery,  en  route  from 
California,  be  sent  here.  Had  not  the  order  for  Smead's  bat 
tery  to  come  here  from  Harrisburg  to  replace  the  battery 


McCLELLAN  75 

1  gave  General  Sherman  been  so  often  countermanded,  I 
would  again  ask  for  it. 

"Third.  That  a  more  effective  regulation  may  be  made 
authorizing  the  transfer  of  men  from  the  volunteers  to  the 
regular  batteries,  infantry,  and  cavalry,  that  we  may  make 
the  best  possible  use  of  the  invaluable  regular  'skeletons.' 

"Fourth.  I  have  no  official  information  as  to  the  United 
States  forces  elsewhere,  but  from  the  best  information  I  can 
obtain  from  the  War  Department  and  other  sources  I  am  led 
to  believe  that  the  United  States  troops  are : 

In  Western  Virginia  about 30,000 

In  Kentucky    40,000 

In  Missouri  80,000 

In  Fortress  Monroe 1 1,000 


Total   161,000 

"Besides  these,  I  am  informed  that  more  than  one  hundred 
thousand  are  in  progress  of  organization  in  other  Northern 
and  Western  States. 

"I  would  therefore  recommend  that,  not  interfering  with 
Kentucky,  there  should  be  retained  in  Western  Virginia  and 
Missouri  a  sufficient  force  for  defensive  purposes,  and  that 
the  surplus  troops  be  sent  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to 
enable  it  to  assume  the  offensive;  that  the  same  course  be 
pursued  in  respect  to  Fortress  Monroe,  and  that  no  further 
outside  expeditions  be  attempted  until  we  have  fought  the 
great  battle  in  front  of  us. 

"Fifth.  That  every  nerve  be  strained  to  hasten  the  en 
rollment,  organization,  and  armament  of  new  batteries  and 
regiments  of  infantry. 

"Sixth.  That  all  the  battalions  now  raised  for  new  regi 
ments  of  regular  infantry  be  at  once  ordered  to  this  army,  and 
that  the  old  infantry  and  cavalry  en  route  from  California 
be  ordered  to  this  army  immediately  on  their  arrival  in  New 
York. 

"I  have  thus  indicated  in  a  general  manner  the  objects  to 
be  accomplished  and  the  means  by  which  we  may  gain  our 
ends.  A  vigorous  employment  of  these  means  will,  in  my 


76  McCLELLAN 

opinion,  enable  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  assume  success 
fully  this  season  the  offensive  operations  which,  ever  since  en 
tering  upon  the  command,  it  has  been  my  anxious  desire  and 
diligent  effort  to  prepare  to  prosecute.  The  advance  should 
not  be  postponed  beyond  the  25th  of  November,  if  possible  to 
avoid  it. 

"Unity  in  councils,  the  utmost  vigor  and  energy  in  action, 
are  indispensable.  The  entire  military  field  should  be  grasped 
as  a  whole  and  not  in  detached  parts.  One  plan  should  be 
agreed  upon  and  pursued ;  a  single  will  should  direct  and  carry 
out  these  plans. 

"The  great  object  to  be  accomplished,  the  crushing  defeat 
of  the  rebel  army  now  at  Manassas,  should  never  for  one  in 
stant  be  lost  sight  of,  but  all  the  intellect  and  means  and  men 
of  the  Government  poured  upon  that  point.  The  loyal  states 
possess  ample  force  to  effect  all  this  and  more.  The  rebels 
have  displayed  energy,  unanimity,  and  wisdom  worthy  of  the 
most  desperate  days  of  the  French  Revolution.  Should  we 
do  less? 

"The  unity  of  this  nation,  the  preservation  of  our  institu 
tions,  are  so  dear  to  me  that  I  have  willingly  sacrificed  my 
private  happiness  with  the  single  object  of  doing  my  duty  to 
my  country.  When  the  task  is  accomplished  I  shall  be  glad 
to  return  to  the  obscurity  from  which  events  have  drawn  me. 
Whatever  the  determination  of  the  Government  may  be,  I 
will  do  the  best  I  can  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  will 
share  its  fate,  whatever  may  be  the  task  imposed  upon  me. 

"Permit  me  to  add  on  this  occasion,  as  heretofore,  it  has 
been  my  aim  neither  to  exaggerate  nor  underrate  the  power  of 
the  enemy,  nor  fail  to  express  clearly  the  means  by  which,  in 
my  judgment,  that  power  may  be  broken. 

"Urging  the  energy  of  preparation  and  action,  which  has 
ever  been  my  choice,  but  with  the  fixed  purpose  by  no  act  of 
mine  to  expose  the  Government  to  hazard  by  premature  move 
ment,  and  requesting  that  this  communication  may  be  laid 
before  the  President,  I  have  the  honor  to  be,  very  respectfully, 
vour  obedient  servant."  6 


0  Official  Record,  V,  9. 


McCLELLAN  77 

It  will  he  noted  that  the  number, — 150,000  men, — was  to 
be  of  effectives.  It  did  not  include  teamsters  and  other  non- 
combatants,  and  then  too  this  number  was  assented  to  by  the 
commander  only  in  case  the  army  was  to  assume  the  offensive 
before  winter.  If  the  army  had  gone  into  winter  quarters, 
there  was  no  reason  for  reducing  the  number  originally  sug 
gested.  He  points  out  the  total  effective  number  at  Baltimore, 
Annapolis,  on  the  Potomac,  and  at  Washington  as  134,285, 
and  those  available  for  an  advance  as  76,285.  The  letter  shows 
that  he  had  only  half  the  lessened  number  of  men  and  half 
the  lessened  number  of  guns  now  named  by  him.  According 
to  the  best  information  obtainable,  the  Southern  Army  of  Vir 
ginia  numbered  at  this  time  150,000  men  in  the  Old  Dominion. 

The  Government,  as  appears  in  Chapter  VI,  had  not  before 
the  severe  winter  set  in  or  up  to  January  i,  1862,  secured 
even  two-thirds  of  the  reduced  force  now  suggested. 

It  is  a  very  weak  point  in  our  system  of  government  that 
the  man  who,  because  of  his  military  capacity,  is  placed  at  the 
head  of  the  army  has  no  control  over  the  enlistment  of  men 
or  over  their  disposition  when  enlisted. 

A  man  like  General  McClellan  or  General  Grant  would 
surely  know  best  how  many  men  were  needed  and  where  they 
could  be  of  the  greatest  use,  but  this  power  is  vested  entirely 
in  the  hands  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  during  the  Civil 
War  this  official  was,  and  usually  is,  a  civilian  entirely  ignorant 
of  military  science. 

On  January  2oth,  1862,  as  already  stated,  in  the  address 
to  the  officers  of  the  army  Mr.  Stanton  said,  "It  is  my  work 
to  furnish  the  means,  the  instruments,  for  prosecuting  the  war 
for  the  Union  and  putting  down  the  rebellion  against  it." 

So  with  the  gathering  of  the  army  McClellan  had  nothing 
to  do.  The  plan  of  government  committed  that  vitally  im 
portant  function  to  other  hands.  He  was  there  to  transform 
the  newly  arrived  men  into  soldiers  as  rapidly  as  possible,  but 
the  assembling  of  the  new  recruits  rested  entirely  with  the  War 
Department.  As  Mr.  Stanton  had  said,  it  was  his  work  to 
furnish  the  means ;  and  such  effective  steps  should  have  been 
taken  as  would  have  secured  the  presence  in  Washington  of  the. 


78  McCLELLAN 

whole  force  originally  required  by  October  ist.  This  was 
readily  feasible,  but  it  was  not  done.  The  new  levies  were 
brought  in  with  a  slowness  which  must  have  been  maddening 
to  a  man  of  McClellan's  energy  and  executive  ability,  and  this 
was  the  reason  why  the  army  was  not  ready  to  move  before 
winter. 

The  army  of  invasion  which  McClellan  had  proposed,  300,- 
ooo  men,7  was,  as  has  been  pointed  out,  none  too  large  to 
ensure  success. 

On  December  ist  the  total  force  at  Washington  was  136,- 
852.  Deducting  from  these  figures  the  force  retained  by  the 
War  Department  when  McClellan  set  out,  practically  nothing 
was  left  for  offensive  operations  at  that  date. 

The  Administration  was  therefore  manifestly  derelict  and 
culpable  in  its  lack  of  energy  in  carrying  out  the  plans  of  the 
general  in  chief,  for  not  only  were  the  required  troops  and 
material  not  rushed  into  Washington  at  once,  but  even  on 
March  I5th,  1862,  there  was  only  one-third  of  the  originally 
suggested  and  necessary  force  available  for  an  advance.  Gen 
eral  Whittier  in  his  forceful  essay  on  the  Peninsular  Campaign 
writes :  "McClellan,  recognizing  as  he  did  the  earnestness  of 
the  South  and  the  duel  to  the  death  which  must  follow,  could 
not  yield  at  once  to  the  wicked  and  ignorant  clamor,  which 
soon  succeeded  in  wrecking  his  plans,  appointing  his  subordi 
nates  against  his  views  and  wishes,  and  eventually  taking 
charge  of  the  war  in  Virginia."  8 

T  McClellan,  Own  Story,  107. 

*  Historical  Society  of  Massachusetts,  I,  224,  225. 


CHAPTER    XIV 

THE     PLAN     OF     CAMPAIGN 

Now  came  to  the  surface  the  first  serious  menace  of  a 
total  overthrow  of  McClellan's  scheme  of  invasion  in  the  shape 
of  a  communication  from  the  President,  which  meant  that, — 
regardless  of  snows;  regardless  of  inadequacy  of  numbers; 
regardless  of  the  fact  that  more  than  half  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  was  still  insufficiently  drilled,  instructed,  and  disci 
plined,  and  regardless  of  its  incomplete  equipment, — the  ad 
ministration  contemplated  driving  it  forth,  at  once,  to  give 
battle  to  the  enemy. 

This  impulsive  resolution  was  needless  and  irrational,  for 
as  Mr.  Headley  points  out,  though  congress  was  getting  restive, 
the  feeling  was  not  one  of  insistence  that  the  army  should 
go  forth  in  the  depth  of  winter, — for  the  impassable  condi 
tion  of  the  roads,  it  seemed  to  be  admitted  on  all  hands,  ren 
dered  a  winter  campaign  out  of  the  question, — "but  one  of  dis 
content  that  no  forward  movement  had  been  made  before  they 
became  so,"  a  course  which,  in  the  army's  state  of  unreadiness, 
would  probably  have  ensured  another  Bull  Run.1 

It  is  from  the  same  author  that  we  learn  that  probably  a 
day  or  two  after  Congress  met  on  December  ist,  1861,  Mr. 
Lincoln  urged  an  immediate  movement  of  the  army  and  gave 
General  McClellan  a  memorandum  of  his  plan,  with  queries 
and  blanks  for  answers.  The  General,  after  keeping  the  paper 
for  ten  days,  filled  in  the  blanks  in  pencil  and  returned  the 
memorandum  to  the  President.  It  began:  "If  it  were  de 
termined  to  make  a  forward  movement  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  without  awaiting  further  increase  of  numbers  or 
better  drilling  or  discipline,  how  long  would  it  require  to  actu 
ally  get  in  motion?"  2 

1  The  Great  Rebellion,  I,  229. 
1  Official  Record,  XI,  3,  6,  7. 

79 


8o  McCLELLAN 

This  indicates  that  the  President,  doubtless  under  pressure, 
thought  of  forcing  the  army  out  at  once,  ignoring  the  season, 
the  insufficient  numbers,  and  the  general  state  of  unreadiness. 
The  total  troops  on  the  roll  (not  all  effectives  or  fighters),  it 
seems,  then  amounted  to  about  104,000. 

On  this  memorandum  the  General  in  Chief  wrote:  "In 
formation  received  recently  leads  me  to  believe  that  the  enemy 
could  meet  us  in  front  with  equal  forces  nearly,  and  I  have  now 
my  mind  actively  turned  toward  another  plan  of  campaign, 
that  I  do  not  think  is  at  all  anticipated  by  the  enemy  nor  by 
many  of  our  own  people." 

This  was  the  first  intimation  to  the  Government  of  what 
has  since  been  known  as  "the  coast  route." 

That  the  General  had  thought  of  it  earlier  appears  from 
this  passage  in  his  letter  of  October  6th,  1861,  to  Mrs.  Mc- 
Clellan:  "I  do  not  expect  to  fight  a  battle  near  Washington. 
.  .  .  So  soon  as  I  feel  that  my  army  is  well  organized  and 
well  disciplined,  and  strong  enough,  I  will  advance  and  force 
the  rebels  to  a  battle  in  a  field  of  my  own  selection.  A  long 
time  must  yet  elapse  before  I  can  do  this,  and  I  expect  all  the 
papers  will  abuse  me  for  delay;  but  I  will  not  mind  that."  3 

Upon  this  news  of  a  new  plan  of  campaign  further  action 
was  for  the  time  suspended  by  the  Administration,  but  the 
germ  of  the  notion  of  disregarding  suitable  preparation,  ade 
quacy  of  force,  and  progress  of  equipment  grew  and  strength 
ened  until  it  destroyed  all  McClellan' s  calculations  and  utterly 
blocked  his  path.  From  the  almost  criminal  determination 
of  pushing  him  forth  so  handicapped  in  the  particulars  men 
tioned  as  to  court  disaster  it  was  an  easy  step  to  a  recklessness 
which  thwarted  every  plan. 

The  great  importance  of  this  incident  seems  to  be  generally 
overlooked.  This  was  the  turning  point  in  the  career  of  Gen 
eral  McClellan.  Here  it  was  that  Fortune  deserted  her  favor 
ite,  for  the  idea  conveyed  in  Mr.  Lincoln's  words,  "If  it  were 
determined  to  make  a  forward  movement  without  awaiting, 
etc.,"  bore  to  the  commander  the  official  death  knell  of  all  his 
hopes  and  plans  and  calculations,  and  presented  to  him  at  best 

'McClellan,  Own  Story,  168. 


McCLELLAN  81 

the  prospect  of  an  extremely  hazardous  venture  in  the  place  of 
an  assured  success. 

It  seems  possible  that  he  might  have  escaped  this  imminent 
peril  but  for  his  own  oncoming  illness  and  the  appearance  of 
Mr.  Stanton  upon  the  scene. 

Early  in  the  winter  McClellan  was  stricken  with  typhoid 
fever.  Stanton  succeeded  Cameron  as  Secretary  of  War,  and 
the  attitude  of  the  department  changed  from  one  of  cordial 
support  to  one  of  hostility  to  the  army  commander.  "The 
Congressional  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  of  which 
Wade  and  Chandler  were  the  leading  spirits, — a  committee 
whose  star  chamber  proceedings,  indictments,  one-sided  trials, 
and  convictions  of  prominent  officers  it  is  difficult  to  condemn 
in  terms  of  moderation, — was  aggressively  hostile  to  McClel 
lan.  The  pressure  of  the  politicians  was  for  an  immediate  ad 
vance  of  the  army,  fit  or  unfit;  and  during  the  period  of  Mc- 
Clellan's  illness  in  the  early  winter,  the  President  by  consulta 
tion  with  several  of  McClellan's  subordinates,  in  the  presence 
of  cabinet  officers,  tried  to  formulate  by  committee  a  plan  of 
campaign  at  a  season  of  the  year  which  would  have  doomed 
any  overland  campaign  to  failure."  4  We  have  already  learned 
that  the  guiding  spirit  was  Mr.  Stanton. 

General  McClellan  intended  that  all  the  military  and  naval 
forces  of  the  Union  should  assume  the  offensive  in  the  spring 
of  1862  simultaneously,  so  that  the  troops  of  the  South  would 
be  needed  at  every  contested  point  at  the  same  moment,  and 
therefore  could  not  be  withdrawn  from  one  point  to  strengthen 
another. 

As  for  his  immediate  command,  his  first  thought  while 
rushing  along  the  creation  of  an  army  was  naturally  nothing 
else,  as  the  initial  movement  of  offensive  warfare,  but  to 
strike  the  rebels  at  Manassas.  Further  consideration,  as  we 
have  noted,  brought  to  his  mind  a  better  plan,  more  worthy 
of  his  strategic  genius;  and  this  plan  it  is  evident  he  had  no 
thought  of  revealing.  He  was  not  urged  or  even  requested 
to  reveal  it  at  any  time  in  1861  by  Mr.  Cameron,  the  Secretary 
of  War,  or  by  Mr.  Lincoln. 

4  Dial,  XXXI,  319. 


CHAPTER    XV 

FEVER   AIDS   THE   ENEMY ENTER   STANTON 

Typhus  was  a  potent  factor  in  the  affairs  of  the  general 
in  chief,  especially  when  the  peril  of  death  seemed  great. 

The  President,  up  to  the  time  of  General  McClellan's  pros 
tration,  had  almost  daily  consultations  with  him,  and  was  fond 
of  talking  with  him  and  telling  him  stories.  Not  infrequently 
he  would  call  in  the  evening  and  stay  until  midnight.  The 
greater  part  of  this  time  was  wasted  as  far  as  practical  busi 
ness  was  concerned,  for  the  general  features  of  the  progress 
of  the  work  of  organization  could  be  told  very  quickly;  and 
those  who  knew  him  best  and  loved  him  most  and,  we  may 
add,  whom  he  loved  most  assure  us  that  Mr.  Lincoln  had  no 
mind  for  detail;  that  was  altogether  outside  of  his  realm  of 
usefulness.  So  the  President  did  not  realize  fully,  if  at  all, 
how  absorbing  and  exhausting  must  be  the  labors  of  a  man 
who  had  a  genius  for  details  and  who  gave  conscientious, 
thoughtful,  and  unsparing  attention  to  them. 

What  the  General's  life  was  we  may  learn  from  his  letters. 
During  August  he  writes :  "I  do  not  live  at  all :  merely  exist, 
worked  and  worried  half  to  death.  I  have  no  privacy,  no 
leisure,  no  relaxation,  except  in  reading  your  letters  and  writ 
ing  to  you.1  .  .  .  It  is  often  ten  o'clock  when  I  get  back 
from  my  ride,  and  I  have  nothing  to  eat  all  day.  .  .  . 
Twelve  hours  in  saddle.  ...  I  have  had  a  busy  day; 
started  from  here  at  seven  in  the  morning,  and  was  in  the 
saddle  until  nine  this  evening.  ...  On  Sunday,  instead 
of  going  to  church,  was  sent  for  by  the  President  immediately 
after  breakfast,  and  kept  busy  until  midnight  when  I  returned 
from  a  long  ride  too  tired  to  talk  even."  These  extracts  prove 
how  pressingly  occupied  he  was  and  how  trying  to  his  pa- 
1  McClellan,  Own  Story,  84,  85,  89. 

82 


McCLELLAN  83 

tience  under  such  conditions  were  such  wasteful  encroachments 
upon  his  time.  They  also  enable  us  to  understand  his  refer 
ence  to  "browsing  Presidents,"  to  which  a  hostile  critic  gives 
undue  importance  and  with  highly  questionable  fairness  omits 
what  immediately  follows.  In  November  Mr.  McClellan 
writes  :  "I  have  been  at  work  all  day  nearly,  on  a  letter  to  the 
Secretary  of  War  [Cameron]  in  regard  to  future  military 
operations.  I  have  not  been  at  home  for  three  hours  but  am 
concealed  at  Stanton's  to  dodge  all  enemies  in  the  shape  of 
'browsing'  Presidents,  etc.  i.  A.  M.  I  am  pretty  thoroughly 
tired  out.  The  paper  is  a  very  important  one,  as  it  is  intended 
to  place  on  record  that  I  have  left  nothing  undone  to  make  this 
army  what  it  ought  to  be,  and  that  the  necessity  for  delay  has 
not  been  my  fault."  On  the  very  same  page  we  find,  "The 
President  is  honest  and  means  well,"  and  this  passage  displays 
his  friendly  feeling  toward  Mr.  Lincoln. 

If  his  illness  had  been  any  affliction  which  would  have  per 
mitted  him  to  continue  to  cheer  the  sorely  troubled  President, 
all  might  have  been  well ;  but  typhoid  fever,  so  severe  that  in 
a  few  days  his  life  was  threatened,  in  effect  almost  removed 
him  from  the  earth,  so  far  as  Mr.  Lincoln's  needs  were  con 
cerned,  and  this  removal  for  a  time  seemed  certain  to  be 
permanent.  The  army  had  lost  its  chief;  the  President,  his 
military  adviser. 

On  January  loth,  three  weeks  after  McClellan  was  stricken 
down  and  while  he  was  still  seriously  ill,  the  President  called 
on  him  and  learned  that  the  General  was  unable  to  see  him,2 
whereupon  Lincoln  was  grievously  disappointed  and  some 
what  chagrined  and  hurt,  as  we  are  gravely  told,  that  McClel 
lan  did  not  ask  for  him  and  that  he  was  not  admitted.  Ap 
parently  he  did  not  realize  that  the  sick  General  probably 
knew  nothing  of  his  call  and  that  a  faithful  nurse  thinks  only 
of  her  patient.  As  the  result  of  this  wholly  imaginary  rebuff, 
on  that  very  night  the  President  called  Generals  McDowell 
and  Franklin  into  consultation,  told  them  of  his  failure  to 
see  McClellan,  and  added  that,  as  he  must  talk  with  some  one, 
he  had  sent  for  them  to  obtain  their  opinion  as  to  the  possi- 

8  Nicolay  and  Hay,  Abraham  Lincoln,  V,  156. 


84  McCLELLAN 

bility  of  soon  commencing  active  operations  with  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac.3  How  ridiculous  such  feverish  and  most  unwise 
haste  would  have  seemed  in  the  first  half  of  January  of  any 
later  year  of  the  war!  General  McClellan  thus  explains  the 
President's  inability  to  see  him  on  that  and  other  occasions : 
"As  is  often  the  case  with  such  diseases,  I  sometimes  passed 
days  and  nights  without  sleeping,  and  it  more  than  once 
happened  that  the  President  called  while  I  was  asleep,  after 
such  intervals  of  wakefulness,  and  being  denied  admittance, 
his  anxiety  induced  him  to  think  that  my  disease  was  very 
acute  and  would  terminate  fatally."  4 

The  facts,  however,  seem  to  indicate  pique  and  resentment 
rather  than  anxiety  about  the  General's  recovery,  as  evidenced 
by  the  remark  of  the  President  at  the  meeting  just  mentioned 
that  "If  General  McClellan  did  not  want  to  use  the  army,  he 
would  like  to  borrow  it."  In  view  of  the  helpless  condition 
of  the  commander,  this  observation  was  most  inconsiderate 
and  irrational,  and  every  admirer  of  Mr.  Lincoln  must  wonder 
that  it  was  made. 

It  is  to  be  regretted  that  Mr.  Welles's  diary  for  this  period 
has  not  been  published.  His  published  diary  begins  with  July 
1 3th,  1862.  His  candid  revelations  would  surely  have  thrown 
great  light  upon  the  particular  point  of  time  which  we  are 
now  considering.  And  that  such  a  diary  exists  appears  from 
the  statement  that  he  kept  one  throughout  his  life.  No  part 
of  the  war  was  so  important  nor  so  teeming  with  intrigue 
and  crafty  machinations.  There  is  no  period  of  the  war  so 
productive  of  far-reaching  events  as  the  month  intervening 
between  the  2Oth  of  December,  1861,  and  the  2Oth  of  January, 
1862,  and  none  as  to  which  there  is  so  distressing  a  silence 
as  to  the  affairs  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  Even  the  mar- 
velously  diligent  and  exhaustive  searcher  Mr.  Rhodes  fails  us 
here.  He  does  not  seem  to  be  aware  of  what  Mr.  Chase's 
diary  shows,5 — namely,  that  Seward  and  Chase  maneuvered 

3  Swinton,  Army  of  the  Potomac,  80;  Nicolay  and  Hay,  Abraham 
Lincoln,  V,  156. 

*  McClellan,  Own  Story,  155. 
6  Worden's  Chase,  400. 


McCLELLAN  85 

to  secure  Stanton's  appointment  as  Secretary  of  War, — and 
merely  says,  "The  appointment  was  acceptable  to  Seward  and 
Chase."  This  is  hardly  a  correct  rendering  of  the  activities 
of  these  gentlemen  as  recorded  by  one  of  them.  Mr.  Chase 
gives  the  particulars  of  how  they  contrived,  with  the  aid  of 
Mr.  Cameron,  the  retiring  secretary,  to  accomplish  the  object 
of  their  wishes.  It  seems  like  drollery  to  say  in  effect  that 
their  own  success  was  acceptable  to  them,  as  if  they  were  in 
no  wise  instrumental  in  the  selection  of  the  new  secretary.  But 
Mr.  Flower  shows  us  how  Mr.  Cameron's  tenure  of  office 
was  brought  to  an  end  by  the  craftiness  of  Mr.  Stanton,  who 
opened  the  way  for  himself  6  by  a  paragraph  which  he  sug 
gested  and  added  to  Mr.  Cameron's  annual  report,  recommend 
ing  the  arming  of  slaves, — a  matter  concerning  which  Mr.  Lin 
coln's  mind  had  not  yet  been  made  up.  From  their  industry 
in  this  matter,  from  the  proceedings  of  the  meeting  of  January 
1 2th,  1862,  to  be  set  forth  a  little  later,  and  from  their  united 
persistent  efforts  thereafter, — which  Mr.  Welles,  their  co-sec 
retary,  dubs  a  conspiracy,  not  merely  to  oust  McClellan,  but 
with  astonishing  malice,  hard  to  understand  other  than  as  due 
to  Stanton's  deluding  slanders  and  manipulations  of  all  sources 
of  adverse  influence,  to  destroy  the  character  of  this  singu 
larly  excellent  and  upright  man  and  utterly  ruin  him, — from 
all  this  no  doubt  is  left  that  shortly  after  McClellan's  collapse 
a  thorough  understanding  and  a  harmonious  plan  of  action 
had  been  arrived  at  between  Seward,  Chase,  and  Stanton,  em 
bracing  the  management  of  the  War  Department  and  the  con 
duct  of  the  war  generally.  I  would  have  been  inclined  to  think 
that  the  new  triumvirate  was  at  first  willing  to  tolerate  Mc 
Clellan,  were  it  not  for  their  adverse  attitude,  especially  of 
Chase  and  Stanton  at  all  times  after  the  I3th  of  January,  1862, 
and  the  positive  statement  of  Mr.  Chase  that  "Stanton  was 
determined  to  get  rid  of  McClellan,"  which  design  Mr.  Chase 
indicates  no  intention  of  opposing. 

Mr.  Stanton's  biographer,  Mr.  Gorham,  thinks  that  Mc 
Clellan's  "stubborn  resistance  to  the  administration's  plan  of 
campaign  first  estranged  the  Secretary  from  him,"  but  that 

"Flower,  Edwin  McMasters  Stanton,  116,  117. 


86  McCLELLAN 

view  does  not  quite  coincide  with  Mr.  Chase's  statement,  for 
Mr.  Chase  is  speaking  of  a  time  which  antedated  any  struggle 
over  the  plan  of  campaign. 

My  own  view,  like  that  of  Mr.  Gorham,  is  that  McClel- 
lan's  reticence  as  to  his  plans  meant  to  Stanton  an  unfettered 
control  of  military  operations  which,  though  not  quite  treason, 
was  just  as  intolerable  to  the  autocratic  head  of  the  War 
Department. 

The  surrounding  facts  and  ensuing  events  dissipate  all 
doubt  that  from  the  moment  of  his  induction  into  office  on 
the  2Oth  of  January,  1862,  and  forever  afterward  the  real 
attitude  of  Mr.  Stanton  toward  General  McClellan  was  one  of 
envenomed  enmity  and  relentless  hostility;  yet,  with  astonish 
ing  wiliness  and  duplicity,  his  outward  personal  attitude  toward 
hjim  almost  to  the  very  end,  as  we  shall  show  by  his  own 
letters,  was  that  of  a  warm,  admiring,  and  devoted  friend. 
"It  was  not  long  after  Mr.  Stanton  had  entered  upon  the 
duties  of  his  office  before  McClellan  found  that  the  atmosphere 
of  the  War  Department  had  measurably  lowered  in  tempera 
ture  so  far  as  he  was  concerned.  Instead  of  the  confidential 
and  appreciative  reception  to  which  he  had  been  accustomed, 
he  was  soon  made  to  feel  the  chilling  and  repelling  attitude 
of  official  superiority. 

"Unable  to  understand  the  cause  of  McClellan's  inactivity, 
he  [Stanton]  soon  became  an  active  ally  of  the  Committee  on 
the  Conduct  of  the  War  to  remedy  this  state  of  affairs.  Actu 
ated  by  this  antagonism,  he  opposed,  though  not  always  openly, 
McClellan's  plan  of  campaign,  and  sometimes  indulged  in 
contemptuous  expressions  reflecting  upon  the  latter's  military 
ability  and  purposes."  7 

As  we  have  seen,  Mr.  Stanton  was  more  than  an  ally  of 
the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War.  He  was  one  of 
its  creators.  He  never  openly  opposed  McClellan's  plan,  and 
despite  his  actual  deadly  hatred  he  professed,  with  most  earnest 
assurances,  to  be  a  cordial  friend  and  supporter  of  General 
McClellan  as  late  as  September,  1862. 


TMichie,  General  McClellan,  167,  168. 


CHAPTER    XVI 

PRESSURE    UPON    M'CLELLAN NEED    OF    SECRECY THE    COM 
MANDER    IN    CHIEF 

On  the  1 2th  of  January  McClellan  was  well  enough  to  be 
driven  to  the  White  House,  where  he  had  a  conference  with 
the  President.  This  was  in  consequence  of  information  con 
veyed  to  him  by  Stanton.  The  President,  before  McClellan 
left,  invited  him  to  attend  a  meeting  there  on  the  following 
day.  Messrs.  Lincoln,  Seward,  Chase,  and  Blair  and  Generals 
McDowell,  Franklin,  and  Meigs  were  present.  After  some 
whispering  apart  between  the  President  and  Mr.  Chase,  the 
latter  "spoke  aloud  in  a  very  excited  tone  and  manner,  saying 
that  he  understood  the  purpose  of  the  meeting  to  be  that  Gen 
eral  McClellan  should  then  and  there  explain  his  military 
plans  in  detail,  that  they  might  be  submitted  to  the  approval  or 
disapproval  of  the  gentlemen  present."  1 

McClellan  declined  to  divulge  his  plans,  and  the  meeting 
adjourned. 

The  imperative  need  of  secrecy  as  to  military  operations, 
under  the  conditions  existing  in  Washington  at  that  time,  must 
be  obvious  to  any  unbiased  mind. 

Lord  Wolseley,  the  famous  English  general,  who  was  then 
a  young  man  and  with  the  Confederates  as  an  observer,  ex 
presses  his  views  on  this  subject  very  positively :  "McClellan 
was  right  not  to  reveal  his  plan  to  the  Cabinet.  Everything 
leaked  out.  I  was  in  Richmond  in  the  Autumn  of  1862  and 
know."  2  Colonel  Powell  is  of  the  opinion  that  "from  a  mili 
tary  standpoint  it  is  evident  that  General  McClellan  might 
with  advantage  to  the  service  have  been  even  more  reticent 
than  he  was."  3  "The  large  number  of  Confederate  spies  in 

1  McClellan,  Own  Story,  156,  157. 

3  North  American  Review,  CXLIX,  38. 

*  History  of  the  Fifth  Army  Corps,  I,  33,  n. 

87 


88  McCLELLAN 

Washington  compelled  McClellan  to  keep  his  plans  secret."  4 
"The  Cabinet  believed  in  debate  in  council,  every  member's 
opinion  being  equally  good,  while  McClellan  held  his  tongue, 
which  in  the  then  state  of  feeling  in  Washington  was  more 
than  usually  a  military  necessity."  "Johnston,  thanks  to  his 
excellent  Intelligence  Department  in  Washington,  knew  all 
about  the  Army  of  the  Potomac/5  5  "Secrecy  was  not  one  of 
our  virtues.  The  newspapers  were  able  to  publish  all  our  pro 
spective  movements  with  scandalous  accuracy ;  and  what  these 
were  unable  to  learn,  secession  sympathizers  at  the  capital 
appeared  constantly  to  unearth  for  the  benefit  of  their  South 
ern  friends."  6 

Other  authorities,  proving  the  actual  benefit  which  resulted 
from  McClellan's  reticence  and  the  evil  which  followed  at  once 
when  he  was  finally  forced  to  reveal  his  plans,  will  be  given 
at  the  appropriate  place. 

The  paramount  feature  of  Mr.  Stanton's  character  was, 
as  we  have  shown,  his  love  of  supreme  authority,  of  absolute 
dominion,  and  he  evidently  formed  an  astute  plan  to  gratify 
this  longing  before  he  became  Secretary  of  War.  It  was  this : 
to  point  out  to  the  President  that  the  Constitution  made  him  the 
Commander  in  Chief  of  the  armies  and  navies  of  the  Union 
and  that  it  was  his  sworn  duty,  under  his  oath  of  office,  to 
assume  the  functions  of  this  office  and  direct  the  operations  of 
all  the  forces  of  the  nation.  Mr.  Stanton  no  doubt  confidently 
and  sagaciously  hoped  that  before  long  the  President,  pressed 
with  other  cares,  would  find  this  added  burden  much  too  heavy 
and  that  the  supreme  military  authority  would  then  naturally 
devolve  upon  himself;  and  so  it  happened. 

He  measured  the  President  accurately,  and  in  this  seductive 
incitation  he  was  ministering  to  the  boundless  ambition  of 
which  Mr.  Herndon  advises  us. 

The  Comte  de  Paris  records  that  "Stanton  was  instrumen 
tal  more  than  anyone  else  in  developing  in  Mr.  Lincoln's  mind 
the  idea  of  directing  military  operations  from  the  depths  of 

*  Wood  and  Edmunds,  History  of  the  Civil  War,  48. 

8  Formby,  American  Civil  War,  106. 

6  General  Dodge,  Bird's-Eye  View  of  the  Civil  War,  50,  51. 


McCLELLAN  89 

the  White  House."  7  "Stanton  undoubtedly  expected  to  bring 
about  a  radical  change  in  the  military  situation,  partly  by  in 
ducing  the  President  to  exercise  his  authority  as  McClellan's 
military  superior."  8  "He  soon  found  that  McClellan  was  as 
stubborn  against  his  persuasions  as  he  had  been  against  those 
of  Mr.  Lincoln."  9  This  means  through  the  agency  of  the 
President,  for  Stanton  never  urged  McClellan  directly.  He 
always  worked  underground.  "The  law  made  even  generals 
military  subordinates  of  the  President.  His  instincts  com 
pelled  Stanton  so  to  think."  10  Stanton  "constantly  reminded 
the  President  that  he  was  the  Commander  in  Chief,  and  could 
not  divest  himself  of  this  authority."  n 

His  mode  of  persuasion  was  certainly  unique,  for  while 
all  writers  of  note  now  recognize  that  he  was  tirelessly  work 
ing  against  McClellan's  plan,  it  nowhere  appears  that  he  ever 
wrote  or  spoke  to  McClellan  about  the  coast  route  or  any  other 
route.  Messrs.  Nicolay  and  Hay  tell  us  that  "Stanton  began 
as  soon  as  he  took  charge  of  his  department  to  ply  the  com 
mander  of  the  army  with  continual  incitements  to  activity."  12 
The  reader  will  look  in  vain  in  Gorham's  book  or  in  Flower's 
or  in  McClellan's  Own  Story,  or  elsewhere,  for  any  word  of 
this  nature  from  Stanton  to  McClellan.  Stanton's  hand  was 
always  hidden. 

The  army  continued  to  grow  in  numbers,  though  not 
rapidly,  until  on  March  I5th,  1862,  McClellan  had  a  total 
of  203,213,  which,  as  he  calculated,  would  give  him  for  active 
operations  a  force  of  146,000,  to  which  10,000  were  to  be 
added  from  Fort  Monroe. 

From  his  inauguration  to  the  close  of  1861,  and  until  the 
installation  of  Mr.  Stanton  on  the  2Oth  of  January,  the  Presi 
dent  had  exercised  no  function  of  a  commander.  Then  came 
a  swift  transformation.  His  "War  Order  No.  i"  is  dated 


7  Battles  and  Leaders,  II,  120. 

8  Gorham,  Life  and  Public  Services  of  Edwin  M.  Stanton,  I,  332. 

9  Ibid.,  333- 
l«Ibid.,  334. 

n  Formby,  American  Civil  War,  105;  Flower,  Life  and  Public  Services 
of  Edwin  M.  Stanton,  138. 

"  Abraham  Lincoln,  V,  159. 


90  McCLELLAN 

January  27,  1862,  just  one  week  after  Mr.  Stanton  took  office. 
This  order  was  not  given  to  the  public  until  March  nth.13 
It  "was  Mr.  Lincoln's  first  exercise  of  his  authority  as  Com 
mander  in  Chief,"  and  was  inspired  by  Mr.  Stanton.14 

The  order  directed  a  general  movement  of  the  land  and 
sea  forces  of  the  United  States.  This  was  followed  by  Special 
War  Order  No.  i,  directing  an  advance  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  on  Manassas.  This  special  order  was  but  a  corollary 
of  the  general  one  and  so  undoubtedly  emanated  like  it  from 
the  Secretary  of  War.  It  was  a  Machiavellian  method  to 
force  McClellan  to  reveal  his  plan,  and  swiftly  met  with  the 
success  which  the  astute  war  secretary  anticipated  from  it. 

13  Battles  and  Leaders,  II,  120. 

"  Gorham,  Life  and  Public  Services  of  Edwin  M.  Stanton,  I,  333,  334. 


CHAPTER    XVII 


General  McClellan  lost  no  time  in  seeing  the  President  and 
asking  permission  to  submit  his  views.1  This  was  given,  and 
on  February  3d,  1862,  the  General  in  Chief  sent  to  the  Secre 
tary  of  War  a  full  explanation  of  his  own  plan  of  action  as 
well  as  his  objections  to  the  contemplated  advance  on  Manas- 
sas,  urging  with  great  force  and  apt  argument  the  superior 
advantages  of  his  own  designs  for  offensive  operation  and 
the  dangers  of  the  overland  route. 

As  we  have  seen,  General  McClellan  felt  that  it  was  the 
course  of  wisdom  and  economy  for  the  Government  to  employ 
its  vast  resources  in  raising  an  overwhelming  force  at  once 
and  trampling  out  all  opposition  swiftly,  and  he  suggested 
300,000  men  for  the  operations  in  Virginia,  and  this  great 
host  was  smaller  in  proportion  than  was  afterward  employed ; 
but  it  is  clear  from  his  letter  of  February  3d  that  he  recog 
nized  that  he  was  in  the  hands  of  enemies;  that  his  splendid 
plan,  which  rested  above  all  in  adequacy  of  numbers,  was 
hopelessly  frustrated;  that  the  Administration  had  not  gath 
ered  the  necessary  forces  as  it  could  easily  have  done  and 
was  now  charging  him  with  the  result  of  its  own  delay  and 
inactivity,  and,  although  it  was  in  the  midst  of  a  phenomenally 
inclement  winter,  was  determined  to  push  the  army  out  with 
out  waiting  for  numbers,  equipment,  discipline,  or  suitable 
weather.  He  saw  that  he  must  do  the  best  he  could  with  what 
he  then  had,  and  in  whatever  condition  his  army  might  be, 
or  relinquish  a  leadership  for  which  he  knew  he  was  fitted  by 
nature,  by  study,  and  by  experience.  In  this  letter,  then,  we 
find  him  resigned  to  the  inevitable  and  pointing  out  what  could 
be  done  with  the  forces  at  hand  without  waiting  for  more; 

1  Swinton,  Army  of  the  Potomac,  87. 


92  McCLELLAN 

instead  of  having  the  300,000  men  he  desired,  he  was  now 
basing  his  plans  on  about  half  that  number.  But  it  must  never 
be  lost  sight  of  that  when  a  commander  advises  that  an  in 
vading  force  of  300,000  is  necessary  and  the  administration, 
though  having  the  power  to  supply  the  required  number,  com 
pels  him  to  advance  with  half  the  force  or  less,  then,  if  the 
army  proves  inadequate  in  strength,  the  responsibility  for 
unsatisfactory  results  rests  with  the  Administration  and  not 
with  the  commander. 

General  McClellan's  plans  were  frustrated  in  a  vital  par 
ticular;  his  generalship  was  severely  handicapped  by  the 
failure  to  supply  him  with  anything  more  than  a  moiety  of 
the  force  he  considered  necessary,  and  which  the  after  his 
tory  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  demonstrated  was  in  fact 
necessary  for  the  subjugation  of  Virginia  even  when  her  army 
was  much  smaller,  her  energy  far  spent,  and  her  resources 
almost  exhausted.  We  are  told  that  "the  President  was  by 
no  means  convinced  by  General  McClellan's  reasoning;  but  in 
consequence  of  a  steady  resistance  and  unwillingness  to  enter 
upon  the  execution  of  any  other  plan,  he  assented."  2 

Mr.  Lincoln  thereupon  rescinded  the  order  for  a  move 
ment  upon  Manassas,  and  on  February  27th,  1862,  the  War 
Department  ordered  the  necessary  transports  to  convey  the 
army  to  the  Peninsula. 

The  reader  may  not  at  once  discern  the  greatest  signifi 
cance  of  the  first  two  war  orders.  The  orders  were  surely 
bad  enough  in  evincing  a  reckless  resolution  to  push  the  army 
out,  regardless  of  its  inadequacy  of  strength  and  preparation, 
but  that  was  not  their  worst  significance.  The  most  ominous 
feature  to  the  General  in  Chief  was  their  evidence  of  personal 
hostility  to  him,  for  they  were  issued  without  his  having  been 
consulted  and  even  without  his  having  been  given  a  warning. 
This  was  a  gross  discourtesy, — one  which  no  admirer  of  Mr. 
Lincoln  can  justly  approve.  The  signing  of  the  orders  meant 
Stanton's  implacable  hostility,  of  which  it  was  the  first  overt 
act.  These  orders  were  in  form  and  manner  of  issuance 
positive  commands  from  a  commander  to  a  subaltern  whose 

*  Raymond,  History  of  the  Administration  of  President  Lincoln,  225. 


McCLELLAN  93 

only  concern  was  to  obey.  They  put  the  general  in  chief 
of  the  army  upon  the  level  of  a  corporal.  He  was  simply 
to  carry  out  orders.  His  military  education  and  experience, 
his  military  genius,  went  for  nothing. 

McClellan  knew,  and  it  must  be  presumed  that  Mr.  Stanton 
knew,  that  the  execution  of  the  orders  would  be  suicidal  to 
the  Union  cause;  but  we  should  be  indulgent  enough  to  hope 
that  they  were  only  diplomatically,  not  seriously,  made,  and 
that  the  object  was  to  discover  McClellan's  plan  of  action. 

The  Administration's  plan, — or  rather,  Mr.  Stanton's  plan, 
for  until  his  advent  the  Administration  had  no  plan, — was 
one  born  of  timidity  and  fearfulness.  It  was  a  plan  of  hares, 
not  of  valiant  men.  Its  one  dominant  idea  was  "to  keep  a 
great  army  between  Washington  and  the  enemy."  From  what 
General  Grant  and  Secretary  Welles  tell  us  of  Mr.  Stanton 
we  would  expect  this  of  him;  but  what  astonishes  and  hu 
miliates  us  is  that  not  a  single  brave  voice  among  the  civilians 
in  power  was  raised  in  patriotic  indignation  to  denounce  this 
attitude  as  shameless  cowardice,  unworthy  of  Americans,  or 
to  appeal  to  their  manhood,  seeking  to  enkindle  the  flame 
of  courage  in  this  city  of  Timid  Hearts  by  pointing  to  the 
example  of  the  Romans  with  Hannibal  at  the  gate  or  to  other 
instances  supplied  by  the  spirit  of  the  ancients  under  more 
trying  circumstances.  It  is  not  an  inspiring  chapter  of  our 
history. 

"Seek  the  enemy  where  he  is  and  crush  him"  was  the  cry. 
This  practically  meant  to  let  the  enemy  select  the  most  favor 
able  position,  behind  strong  entrenchments,  aided  by  every 
artifice  and  advantage  known  to  military  science,  and  attack 
him  there.  This  method  of  advancing  to  the  Confederate 
capital  came  to  be  known  as  the  "overland  route." 

In  view  of  the  persistent  policy  of  the  Administration  to 
keep  a  large  army  between  the  rebels  and  their  "divinities," 
as  Hotspur  would  say,  the  following  letter  from  the  President 
to  General  Grant,  dated  August  3,  1864,  is  of  interest:  "I 
have  seen  your  dispatch  in  which  you  say,  'I  want  Sheridan 
put  in  command  of  all  the  troops  in  the  field,  with  instruc 
tions  to  put  himself  south  of  the  enemy  and  follow  him  to 


94  McCLELLAN 

the  death/  .  .  .  This  I  think  is  exactly  right  as  to  how  our 
forces  should  move.  But  please  look  over  the  dispatches  you 
have  received  from  here,  even  since  you  made  that  order,  and 
discover,  if  you  can,  that  there  is  any  idea  in  the  head  of 
any  one  here  of  'putting  our  army  South  of  the  enemy'  or  of 
'following  him  to  the  death'  in  any  direction.  I  repeat  to  you, 
it  will  never  be  done  nor  attempted  unless  you  watch  it  every 
day,  and  hour,  and  force  it."  3 

The  attentive  reader  will  see  that  in  this  letter  the  Presi 
dent  of  the  United  States,  the  commander  in  chief  of  the 
Army,  is  in  the  attitude  of  a  mere  spectator,  who,  observing 
what  the  War  Department  is  doing,  recognizes  its  weakness 
and  timidity  and,  accordingly,  as  a  good  citizen,  exhorts  the 
general  to  guard  against  it.  No  evidence  could  better  illus 
trate  the  "government  by  department"  of  which  Mr.  Welles 
writes  than  this  letter.  It  is  as  if  the  President  had  at  this 
time  nothing  to  do  with  the  War  Department,  no  voice  in 
its  management,  no  control  over  its  conduct  of  public  affairs. 

It  must  be  noted  that,  though  General  Grant  yielded  so 
far  as  to  take  the  overland  route,  he  did  not  "seek  the  enemy," 
but  selected  his  own  way,  marching  not  due  south  toward 
Orange  where  Lee  was  but  almost  due  east  toward  Fred- 
ericksburg,  thus  forcing  the  enemy  to  abandon  its  redoubts  to 
intercept  him. 

If  there  had  been  any  basis  for  the  silly  notion  that  the 
Confederates  would  gladly  exchange  Richmond  for  Washing 
ton,  General  Lee  would  have  permitted  General  Grant  to  pass 
on,  and  he  would  then  have  swooped  down  upon  the  National 
capital  with  an  irresistible  force.  He  would  surely  have  cap 
tured  it,  for  it  was  then  much  more  weakly  garrisoned  than 
in  the  spring  of  1862.  Evidently  no  such  thought  ever  came 
into  the  minds  of  any  of  the  Southern  leaders.  The  blood 
which  they  shed  and  the  fearful  price  which  it  cost  General 
Grant  to  draw  near  to  the  Southern  capital  should  settle  that 
point  forever.  However,  any  one  who  has  the  slightest  ap 
preciation  or  understanding  of  Southern  character  would  need 
no  proof  of  this. 

'Grant,  Memoirs,  II,  318. 


M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  N  95 

The  plan  of  General  McClellan  was  to  force  the  enemy 
to  meet  him  in  a  field  of  his  own  selection  and  to  get  as  close 
to  Richmond  as  possible  without  firing  a  shot,  without  losing 
a  man.  He  foresaw  what  was  so  terribly  proven  afterward 
in  long  years  of  bloodshed :  that  the  adoption  of  the  overland 
route  would  needlessly  drench  the  soil  of  Virginia,  every 
foot  of  the  way  from  Manassas  to  Richmond,  with  the  blood 
of  the  bravest  sons  of  the  North  and  of  the  South. 

McClellan's  plan  was  "to  carry  the  war  into  Africa,"- 
to  strike  at  once  at  the  very  heart  of  the  Confederacy  and  to 
strike  with  such  crushing  force  as  permanently  to  end  re 
sistance. 

When  Hannibal  with  his  triumphant  army  was  sorely 
pressing  the  Romans  in  their  capital  that  plucky  people  slipped 
off  an  army  under  Scipio  into  Africa,  and  the  natural  and 
immediate  result  was  that  Hannibal  was  at  once  recalled,  and 
recalled  in  vain,  for  he  was  overthrown  on  the  plains  of 
Zama;  and  this  Roman  victory  brought  the  first  Punic  War 
to  a  close. 

The  history  of  the  Boer  War  illustrates  both  plans.  First, 
the  Administration  plan :  the  English  sought  the  Boer  armies, 
and  so  had  to  fight  them  on  fields  where  there  was  not  a  sha 
dow  of  a  chance  for  victory.  As  the  result,  the  stockades 
of  Johannesburg  were  crowded  with  captives ;  the  crack  Scotch 
and  Irish  fighters  of  the  British  army  were  there  as  prisoners, 
and  South  Africa  was  said  to  be  "the  grave  of  reputations" 
of  British  generals.  Second,  the  plan  of  "Carrying  the  war 
into  Africa"  :  for  then  at  last  came  Roberts  and  Kitchener, 
and  Africa  was  no  longer  the  grave  of  reputations.  Their 
South  African  campaign  only  gave  increased  lustre  to  the  re 
nown  of  these  already  famous  soldiers.  They  did  not  seek 
the  Boers  in  the  great  natural  fortresses  of  the  mountains 
where  they  had  insuperable  advantages  in  their  favor.  They 
selected  their  own  ground  and  struck  straight  at  Pretoria  and 
Johannesburg;  and  what  they  foresaw  must  inevitably  hap 
pen  in  reality  did  happen.  The  Boers  rushed  from  their 
coigns  of  vantage  to  defend  their  cities,  and  like  Hannibal 
rushed  in  vain,  as  we  all  know. 


96  McCLELLAN 

Over-eager  to  defend  the  Administration,  a  few  writers 
have  espoused  the  overland  route,  but  its  folly  is  now  beyond 
serious  contention. 

The  weight  of  authority  is  overwhelmingly  against  it  and 
in  favor  of  McClellan's  plan  of  operations.  Mr.  Eggleston, 
the  Southern  historian,  the  most  recent  authority  on  the  war, 
echoes  the  universal  Southern  view :  "McClellan  seems  to 
have  had  no  thought  of  making  his  way  to  Richmond  by  the 
route  of  Centreville  and  Manassas,  where  Johnston  lay  be 
hind  impregnable  fortifications.  He  knew  the  easiest  way  of 
approach  was  up  the  James  River  from  Fort  Monroe  as  a 
base  of  operations."  4  But  of  course  the  very  best  witness 
of  all  must  obviously  be  the  general  whom  Stanton  wished 
McClellan  to  attack.  "I  did  not  doubt  that  this  route  [the 
coast  route]  would  be  taken  by  General  McClellan  as  it  would 
be  most  difficult  to  meet."  5  Lord  Wolseley  thought  the  coast 
route  best,6  and  says :  "Lincoln  was  wrong  in  believing  that 
the  one  way  to  get  at  Richmond  was  by  making  straight  there 
from  Washington." 7  General  Dodge  expresses  the  same 
view,  then  adds:  "Grant  had  in  theory  favored  the  coast 
route.  The  overland  route  he  deemed  too  costly  in  time  and 
men."  8  Mr.  Ropes  is  against  the  overland  route.9  Swinton 
is  strongly  adverse  to  the  overland  route.10 

Speaking  of  General  Grant's  advance  by  the  overland 
route,  Mr.  Swinton  says :  "It  had  been  repeatedly  essayed 
during  the  prior  three  years  by  Burnside  and  Hooker  on  the 
Fredericksburg  route ;  by  Pope  and  Meade  by  the  Orange  and 
Alexandria  Railroad.  Uniform  ill  success  had  attended  each 
attempted  advance,  and  the  many  repulses  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  had  met  on  that  line  had  marked  it  with  a  bloody 
condemnation."  n 


4  History  Confederate  War,  I,  353. 

"Johnston,  Narrative,  101. 

8  North  American  Review,  CXLIX,  36. 

7  Ibid.,  43- 

8  Bird's-Eye  View  of  the  Civil  War,  199. 
8  Story  of  the  Civil  War,  I,  241. 

10  Army  of  the  Potomac,  406-408. 

11  Ibid.,  406,  407. 


M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  N  97 

General  Whittier  too  condemns  it :  "McClellan  wisely 
and  cautiously  deliberated  on  a  plan  of  campaign.  The  over 
land  route  urged  by  Mr.  Lincoln  and  the  politicians  was  most 
distasteful  to  him.  He  saw  the  perils,  which  all  succeeding 
commanders  vainly  tried  to  overcome."  12  "The  best  military 
men  considered  this  plan  [the  coast  route]  almost  certain  of 
success.  Had  it  been  carried  out,  the  advance  of  McDowell 
would  have  enclosed  the  rebel  army  between  him  and  McClel 
lan  or  compelled  it  to  fall  back  on  Richmond.  This  would 
have  rendered  any  delay  at  Yorktown  unnecessary  and  no 
battle  would  have  occurred  until  the  army  stood  before  Rich 
mond."  13 

The  Richmond  Whig  of  June  i4th,  1862,  alluding  to  the 
coast  route  in  connection  with  other  movements  intended  to 
overwhelm  the  Confederate  capital,  declares  that  "The  plan 
was  a  gigantic  one,  and  in  all  probability  would  have  suc 
ceeded  but  for  the  masterly  movements  of  Jackson."  But 
there  would  have  been  no  field  for  Jackson's  movements  if 
McClellan's  advice  had  been  followed.  Mr.  J.  T.  Headley 
commends  the  coast  route  very  warmly.14  General  Fry,  a 
strong  administration  partisan,  admits  the  superiority  of  the 
coast  route.15  General  Imboden  of  the  Confederate  army 
gives  equally  emphatic  testimony.  "McClellan  had  planned 
and  organized  a  masterly  movement  to  capture,  hold  and 
occupy  the  Valley  and  the  Piedmont  region;  and  if  his  sub 
ordinates  had  been  equal  to  the  task,  and  there  had  been  no 
interference  from  Washington,  it  is  probable  that  the  Con 
federate  army  would  have  been  driven  out  of  Virginia  and 
Richmond  captured  by  midsummer,  1862."  16 

It  is  probable  that  no  military  authority  will  after  this 
defend  the  overland  route,  for  we  are  not  left  to  depend  on 
theory  or  opinion  or  speculation.  Actual  warfare  supplied 
a  demonstration  of  the  advantages  and  wisdom  of  the  coast 
route,  and  the  lamentable  experience  of  McDowell,  Burnside, 

12  Misc.,  Historical  Society  of  Massachusetts,  I,  226. 

"Moore,  History  of  Great  Rebellion. 

14  The  Great  Rebellion,  I,  383. 

"North  American  Review,  CXLIX,  732. 

"  Battles  and  Leaders,  II,  283. 


98  McCLELLAN 

Hooker,  and  Grant  made  equally  certain  the  almost  fatal  perils 
of  the  overland  route,  the  appalling  price  paid  for  any  benefit 
derived  from  it,  and  above  all  its  utter  failure  to  secure  the 
purpose  of  its  advocates  and  projectors, — that  is,  of  keeping 
a  large  army  between  Washington  and  the  enemy. 

Both  McClellan  and  Grant  found  that  the  key  point  of 
success  was  on  the  James  River  south  of  Richmond.  If 
the  James  had  been  open  when  McClellan  was  pushed  out 
into  the  morasses  of  the  Peninsula  with  only  a  third  of  the 
army  he  had  requested  and  should  have  been  supplied  with,  he 
would  have  arrived  there  without  the  necessity  of  striking 
a  blow.  As  it  was,  in  spite  of  heart-breaking  obstacles,  dis 
couragements,  and  difficulties,  he  arrived  there  finally  with 
his  army  in  splendid  condition,  full  of  hope  and  courage, 
full  of  fighting  capacity,  inspired  with  an  enthusiastic  con 
fidence  in  the  skill  of  its  leader  and  in  its  own  ability  to  meet 
with  credit  the  bravest  the  South  could  bring.  And  these 
propitious  circumstances  gave  every  promise  of  victory. 

General  Grant  did  not  willingly  take  the  overland  route. 
He,  too,  preferred  the  coast  route,  but  being  forced  upon 
the  former  line  of  action,  pushed  his  way  forward  with  his 
usual  energy  and  vigor;  but  the  result  of  his  march  demon 
strated  above  all  else,  by  actual  test,  the  terrible  folly  of 
the  Administration's  insistence  upon  "The  Bloody  Way,"  even 
under  the  most  favorable  conditions.  We  will  have  more  to 
say  of  this  campaign  of  1864  in  a  later  chapter. 

Mr.  Stanton  has  scattered  the  seeds  of  prejudice  so  widely 
that  many  who  admit,  or  rather  strongly  assert,  the  wisdom 
of  the  coast  route  at  the  same  time  condemn  General  McClel 
lan  for  not  abandoning  it.  They  do  not  put  the  case  in  those 
terms,  of  course,  as  the  contradiction  would  be  too  manifest; 
but  the  meaning  is  just  that  and  nothing  else.  They  say  he 
was  right  in  rejecting  the  slaughterous  line  urged  by  Mr. 
Stanton,  through  the  President,  yet  they  charge  him  with 
hesitation,  inertia,  and  lack  of  aggressiveness  for  not  having 
done  what  he  and  Stanton  both  saw  would  surely  shut  him 
out  from  the  coast  route.  The  astute  Secretary  was  eager 
to  have  an  attack  made  on  the  rebel  forces  at  Manassas  or 


McCLELLAN  99 

on  the  Potomac  or  on  the  line  of  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio 
Railroad.  Any  of  these  measures  the  Secretary  believed,  and 
the  General  knew,  would  surely  result  in  binding  McClellan 
securely  to  the  overland  route.  That  is  why  Stanton  wanted 
such  action;  that  is  why  McClellan  was  averse  to  it.  It  is 
the  sheerest  frivolity  of  reasoning  to  contend  that  McClellan 
could  smite  the  foe  at  Manassas  and  then  withdraw  and  go 
to  Richmond  by  the  coast  route.  If  he  defeated  Johnston, 
he  would  be  forced  to  pursue  him,  and  that  would  be  the  end 
of  the  coast  route.  If  he  was  defeated,  the  Administration 
would  be  too  frightened  to  allow  him  to  take  the  coast  route. 
So  in  either  case  the  movement  would  destroy  his  cherished 
plan.  Moreover,  why  do  an  unnecessary  thing?  McClellan 
predicted  that  Washington,  the  Potomac,  and  the  railroad 
would  be  entirely  relieved  of  the  Southerners  as  soon  as  the 
campaign  began.  This  view  was  more  than  verified.  The 
moment  the  Peninsular  campaign  was  definitely  decided  upon, 
the  Potomac,  the  railroad,  and  Manassas  were  abandoned 
at  once.  Every  Southern  soldier  vanished  from  the  vicinity 
of  the  National  capital. 


CHAPTER    XVIII 

THE   WAY   TO   POWER — A    NEW    COMMANDER 

The  desire  for  untrammeled  supremacy  and  despotic  power 
now  called  forth  all  the  astuteness  of  the  new  Secretary. 
The  downfall  of  McClellan  was  not  the  only  object  in  life 
with  him.  It  was  merely  an  incident,  though  an  indispensable 
one,  to  his  acquisition  of  unquestioned  authority. 

The  new  Secretary  formulated  his  plans  in  a  manner  which 
would  have  delighted  his  Florentine  prototype  and,  on  taking 
up  the  reins  of  office,  proceeded  without  delay  to  set  them  in 
operation. 

First,  the  wires  from  all  the  military  districts  were  for 
the  first  time  in  the  history  of  the  country  centred  in  the 
office  of  the  Secretary  of  War.1  "He  centred  the  telegraph 
in  the  War  Department,  where  the  publication  of  news,  which 
might  prematurely  reach  the  enemy,  could  be  supervised,  and 
if  necessary  changed."  This  movement  made  him  the  na 
tional  press  agent;  and  by  the  manipulation  of  news  enabled 
him  to  favor  certain  officers  and  injure  others,  but  above  all 
it  enabled  him  to  bring  a  pressure  to  bear  upon  the  President 
through  the  apparently  spontaneous  voice  of  the  people  in 
widely  separated  sections.  His  use  of  the  press  to  destroy 
General  Sherman  is  a  familiar  example  of  his  methods. 

Second,  clearly  in  order  to  fortify  his  authority  and  con 
trol  the  President,  if  he  was  not  the  sole  instigator,  he  was 
surely  among  the  first  to  conceive  the  idea  of  a  Congressional 
Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  a  body  which  has 
done  immeasurable  mischief  ever  since.  "It  called  generals 
and  statesmen  before  it  and  questioned  them  like  refractory 
school  boys."  2  The  Hon.  Henry  Wilson  tells  us :  "I  think 

1  McClellan,  Own  Story,  217,  218. 
'Nicolay  and  Hay,  Abraham  Lincoln,  V,  150. 

100 


McCLELLAtt  101 

he  [Stanton]  drew  the  resolution  to  empower  the  Committee 
on  the  Conduct  of  the  War."  With  this  committee  he  main 
tained  the  closest  and  most  intimate  relations.  To  him  the 
committee  looked  for  information  and  advice,  for  besides 
being  the  fountainhead  of  news  of  the  war,  was  he  not  a 
most  learned  and  capable  lawyer?  The  efficacy  of  such  an 
agency  in  persuading  a  reluctant  president  or  in  dealing 
with  a  stubborn  general  can  not  easily  be  overestimated.  It 
is  equally  obvious  that  under  the  skilful  direction  of  Mr. 
Stanton  the  press  could  be  made  to  supply  reasons  for  action 
by  the  committee  and  the  committee  in  turn  supply  rich 
material  for  the  press. 

Third,  the  Cabinet.  This  was  a  means  of  pressure  of 
which  Mr.  Stanton  made  unstinted  use,  as  Mr.  Welles  reveals 
and  Mr.  Chase  confesses. 

In  all  these  agencies  Mr.  Stanton  no  doubt  had  in  view 
a  trait  of  Mr.  Lincoln  which  is  recorded  by  his  nearest  friends, 
— that  is,  his  susceptibility  to  influence,  except  in  matters 
of  the  rarest  and  most  vital  importance. 

All  these  agencies  were  employed  to  secure  the  ruin  of  the 
general  in  chief. 

So  far  as  the  author  has  ascertained,  the  order  of  Janu 
ary  27th,  1862,  inspired  by  Mr.  Stanton,  was  the  first  order 
of  its  kind  ever  issued  in  the  United  States  since  its  birth 
as  a  nation.  Its  number  confirms  this  view.  It  is  so  desig 
nated  and  numbered  as  clearly  to  indicate  an  intention  to 
conduct  all  the  operations  of  the  army  and  navy,  as  the  Comte 
de  Paris  says,  ''from  the  depths  of  the  White  House." 

In  his  communication  of  February  3d,  1862,  McClellan, 
recognizing  the  hostile  environment,  deals  with  the  army  as 
it  then  was  and  contends  for  his  plan  upon  this  basis.  He 
rests  his  calculations  as  to  the  number  available  to  him  on 
the  actual  coming  in  of  the  men.  That  is  what  the  phrase 
"I  hope  to  have  110,000  to  140,000  men"  evidently  means. 
He  was  not  sure  how  many  would  be  at  hand  at  the  time  of 
starting.  That  is  a  point  concerning  which  the  Secretary 
of  War  would  naturally  be  much  better  advised  than  he  was. 

He  had  concluded  that  he  could  hope  no  longer  for  the 


102  McCTLELLAN 

fulfilment  of  his  wishes  under  the  conditions  about  him,  but 
must  patriotically  do  the  best  he  could  with  such  a  force 
as  might  be  on  hand  when  the  transports  for  the  army  would 
be  ready. 

On  that  very  day,  February  the  3d, — he  received  a  letter 
from  the  President,  as  from  another  officer  equal  in  knowl 
edge  and  skill  and  superior  in  rank,  challenging  the  wisdom 
of  the  coast  plan  compared  with  what  the  President  calls 
"My  plan," — that  is,  "The  Bloody  Way,"  the  overland  route. 

The  letter  begins :  "My  Dear  Sir :  You  and  I  have  dis 
tinct  and  different  plans  for  a  movement  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac.  Does  not  your  plan  involve  a  greatly  larger 
expenditure  of  time  and  money  than  mine?  Wherein  is  a 
victory  more  certain  by  your  plan  than  mine?  Wherein  is 
a  victory  more  valuable  by  your  plan  than  mine  ?  .  .  ."  What 
an  exhibition  of  lamentable  conceit  this  letter  is! 

Here  is  an  expert  strategist,  sprung  fully  equipped  so  to 
speak  from  the  head  of  Jove,  without  need  of  military  edu 
cation,  training,  or  experience,  and  above  all  with  a  mental 
endowment,  excellent  in  its  way  but  wholly  unadapted,  be 
cause  of  its  lack  of  method  and  its  incapacity  for  detail,  to 
deal  with  the  problems  of  military  science. 

"But  man,  proud  man, 
Drest  in  a  little  brief  authority, 
Most  ignorant  of  what  he's  most  assured, 
His  glassy  essence,  like  an  angry  ape, 
Plays  such  fantastic  tricks  before  high  Heaven 
As  make  the  angels  weep." 

But  there  was  a  strong  substratum  of  common  sense  in 
the  President,  which,  despite  the  crafty  influence  and  per 
suasion  of  Mr.  Stanton  and  despite  the  urgency  of  his  am 
bition,  gradually  set  him  right,  for  two  years  later  he  wrote 
to  General  Grant :  "The  particulars  of  your  plans  I  neither 
know  nor  seek  to  know."  3  And  yet  a  speck  of  the  Stantonian 
virus  still  remained,  for  on  another  occasion  he  confidently 
revealed  to  General  Grant  a  plan  of  operations.  "He  brought 
out  a  map  of  Virginia  on  which  he  had  evidently  marked 
-  8 Letters  of  Abraham  Lincoln,  II,  22-24. 


McCLELLAN  103 

every  position  occupied  by  the  Federal  and  Confederate  armies 
up  to  that  time.  He  pointed  out  on  the  map  two  streams 
which  empty  into  the  Potomac  and  suggested  that  the  army 
might  be  moved  on  boats  and  landed  between  the  mouths 
of  these  streams.  We  would  then  have  the  Potomac  to  bring 
our  supplies,  and  the  tributaries  would  protect  our  flanks 
while  we  moved  out.  I  listened  respectfully,  but  did  not 
suggest  that  the  same  streams  would  protect  Lee's  flanks 
while  he  was  shutting  us  up."  The  General  adds:  "I  did  not 
communicate  my  plans  to  the  President,  nor  did  I  to  the 
Secretary  of  War,  or  to  General  Halleck."  4 

Regardless  of  the  route  to  be  taken,  as  the  Government  had 
wisely  acquiesced  in  McClellan's  ideas  of  an  adequate  army, 
enlistments  should  have  been  hurried  with  the  greatest  pos 
sible  dispatch,  vigor,  and  energy;  and  the  total  force  required 
should  have  been  collected  in  Washington  within  two  months 
after  the  battle  of  Bull  Run, — July  2ist, — that  is,  by  October 
ist,  1861.  Of  course  this  armament  would  not  have  been 
sufficiently  trained  and  disciplined  to  begin  offensive  opera 
tions  before  the  severe  winter  blocked  an  advance,  but  it  would 
have  been  ready  to  move  at  the  earliest  moment  when  the 
elements  were  auspicious  in  the  spring. 

On  November  2Oth,  i86i,5  the  army  could  turn  out  only 
50,000  men,  and  a  considerable  part  of  these  needed  a  few 
months  of  instruction  and  discipline  before  they  would  be 
reliable  soldiers.  It  should  also  be  held  in  mind  that  a  large 
proportion  of  the  number  stated  was  a  part  of  the  garrison 
of  Washington. 

The  colossal  work  of  disciplining,  drilling,  instructing,  and 
equipping  the  troops  as  rapidly  as  they  arrived  went  on  with 
unabated  energy  throughout  the  winter  and  was  still  in  prog 
ress  in  March,  1862.  Numbers  were  wanting,  equipment  was 
lacking;  many  were  newcomers,  and  still  novices  and  raw  re 
cruits.  The  great  work  of  making  Washington  practically 
impregnable,  with  a  comparatively  small  force  to  man  its  forts 
and  batteries,  was  also  still  under  way. 

4  Grant,  Memoirs,  II,   123. 

5  Nicolay  and  Hay,  Abraham  Lincoln,  IV,  469. 


104  McCLELLAN 

If  it  was  wise  to  enter  upon  an  undertaking  of  such  magni 
tude,  it  was  equally  wise  to  complete  it. 

The  history  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  supplies  a  prac 
tical  demonstration,  irresistibly  convincing,  of  the  wisdom  of 
providing  a  great  army  and  of  thoroughly  perfecting  its  dis 
cipline  and  organization. 

The  President  had  acquiesced  in  this  view;  no  doubt  his 
intelligence  commended  it  and  constant  daily  intercourse  with 
McClellan  confirmed  his  approbation.  But  almost  from  the 
moment  of  the  assembling  of  Congress  the  influence  of  inter- 
meddlers  was  felt,  and,  unmindful  of  all  opposing  conditions, 
they  brought  a  strong  pressure  upon  the  President  for  imme 
diate  action;  the  result  was  the  undated  memorandum  which 
by  its  queries  showed  that  they,  heedless  of  conditions,  ele 
ments,  and  the  certainty  of  disaster,  intended  to  shove  the 
army  out  at  once, — in  the  depths  of  winter. 

Surely  Edwin  M.  Stanton  was  the  most  singular  man  who 
ever  appeared  in  American  history.  The  story  of  his  machi 
nations  is  like  a  tale  of  the  intrigues  of  medieval  times  or  of 
the  darkest  days  of  Philip  the  Second  as  depicted  by  Motley. 
At  the  time  of  which  we  speak  he  was  apparently  standing 
aloof  from  the  struggle  over  the  plan  of  campaign,  indifferent 
to  it;  taking  no  part  in  it  or  in  the  pressure  to  force  the  un 
ready  army  out  into  the  mire ;  doing  no  overt  act  and  saying 
no  word  to  McClellan  to  indicate  any  interest  in  these  matters, 
and  yet  there  is  no  historian  of  the  time  who  does  not  recog 
nize  that  his  was  the  hand  that  moved  all  the  marionettes. 
So  they  tear  away  the  veil  and  treat  him  as  if  he  had  acted 
openly;  as  if  he  had  held  daily  interviews  with  the  general  in 
chief,  persuading,  inciting,  urging  a  movement  of  the  army  in 
general,  and  especially  a  movement  by  the  overland  route; 
and  this  explains  the  otherwise  untrue  statement  of  Nicolay 
and  Hay  that  Stanton  was  continually  inciting  McClellan  to 
activity,  and  it  also  explains  the  similar  statement  of  Gorham 
that  Stanton  found  McClellan  "as  obstinate  to  his  persua 
sions"  as  he  had  been  to  Lincoln's.  As  we  have  seen  and  will 
still  further  see,  Stanton's  persuasions  were  practical  not  direct 
persuasions,  and  that  they  came  from  him  he  kept  carefully 


McCLELLAN  105 

concealed.  As  soon  as  Stanton  was  securely  in  office,  he  no 
longer  courted  McClellan's  friendship.  It  became  more  and 
more  difficult  to  see  him,  and  McClellan  became  satisfied  that 
Stanton  had  estranged  the  President  and  that  this  made  it 
very  rarely  possible  to  have  an  interview  with  him.  The  days 
of  daily  exchange  of  views  were  gone  forever.  It  was  arctic 
weather  for  the  General  in  Chief.  But  still  the  Secretary 
professed  to  be  friendly;  and  at  the  very  time  that  he  was 
employing  every  resource  to  force  the  army  out,  unready  as 
he,  as  the  head  of  the  War  Department,  well  knew  it  was,  he 
said  to  General  Barnard :  "General  McClellan  has  no  firmer 
friend  than  myself.  ...  I  think  General  McClellan  ought 
not  to  move  until  he  is  fully  ready."  6 

This  is  of  moment  as  a  revelation  of  Stanton's  marvelous 
double-dealing. 

8  Letter  of  General  Barnard,  March  19,  1862;  McClellan,  Own  Story, 
246. 


CHAPTER    XIX 

THE  AUTOCRAT  OF  THE  WAR THE  FIGHT  AGAINST  THE  COAST 

ROUTE AMAZING  TREACHERY 

It  appears  that  General  McClellan  made  no  special  reply 
to  the  President's  argumentative  note  of  February  3d,  as  he 
regarded  his  exhaustive  letter  of  the  same  date,  already  for 
warded,  a  sufficient  response. 

Mr.  Stanton  apparently  expected  by  his  underground 
method  of  pressing  McClellan,  through  the  President,  to  in 
duce  him  to  yield  up  his  plan  of  advance  by  the  coast  route. 

According  to  Colonel  Powell,  Stanton's  theory  was  that 
"everything  concerned  his  department  and  that  it  was  he  who 
was  carrying  on  the  war."  1  Speaking  of  the  Secretary's 
agencies,  he  informs  us  of  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of 
the  War  that  "its  records  bear  unmistakable  proof  of  the  par 
tisan  purpose  and  spirit  of  its  efforts,  and  so  it  came  about 
that  from  the  so-called  Cabinet  and  Congress  and  the  Com 
mittee,  a  junto  self-styled,  the  Administration  was  evolved, 
composed  of  many  incongruous  elements,  held  together  by 
a  purpose  so  to  manage  the  resources  tendered  to  the  govern 
ment  by  the  unbounded  liberality  and  patriotism  of  the  loyal 
states  that  the  power  it  had  usurped  should  be  perpetuated 
by  the  overthrow  of  all  who  might  seem  to  antagonize  a  newly 
born  radical  party.  Its  efforts  were  directed  by  skillful  and 
experienced  politicians,  and  by  act  and  word  Mr.  Lincoln 
was  forced  to  confess  himself  unable  to  withstand  the  influ 
ence  it  wielded."  2 

No  reply  was  ever  given  to  McClellan's  communication  of 
February  3d,  1862,  nor  was  any  direct  assent  to  his  plan  con 
veyed  to  him,  so  far  as  appears;  but  after  more  than  three 

1  History  of  the  Fifth  Army  Corps,  32. 
.,  34- 

106 


McCLELLAN  107 

weeks  of  hesitation  and  delay  on  the  part  of  the  administration, 
the  necessary  order  for  transports  to  convey  the  troops  to 
Fortress  Monroe  was  issued.  This  was  a  practical  assent  to 
the  coast  route. 

But  even  after  the  transports  had  been  ordered  Mr.  Stan- 
ton,  through  the  President,  still  resisted,  and  continued  to 
urge  movements  to  open  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad  and 
also  to  urge  the  clearing  of  the  Potomac  of  the  enemy. 
McClellan,  as  we  have  pointed  out,  foresaw,  first,  that  enter 
ing  upon  these  enterprises  would  bring  him  in  conflict  with  the 
whole  force  of  the  enemy  and  lead  to  an  abandonment  of 
his  coast  plan,  as  no  doubt  the  Secretary  of  War  both  expected 
and  desired ;  second,  that  these  special  enterprises  would  be  a 
waste  of  time,  money,  and  men,  and  that  his  advance  would 
of  itself  naturally  effect  the  desired  purpose. 

Accordingly,  the  General  did  not  act  upon  such  sugges 
tions,  which  only  meant  a  still  active  opposition  to  the  coast 
plan  of  attack.  Certain  authors  seem  to  be  under  the  impres 
sion  that  in  the  beginning  of  March  the  President,  still  adverse 
to  the  coast  route,  although  the  work  of  gathering  the  great 
flotilla  of  transports  for  the  landing  of  146,000  men  at  Fortress 
Monroe  was  now  far  advanced,  compelled  the  Commander  of 
the  Army  to  call  a  council  of  generals,  to  pass  upon  the  wisdom 
of  the  plan  as  if  it  were  still  an  open  question. 

We  have  the  very  best  evidence  that  it  was  General  Mc 
Clellan  who  suggested  such  submission  of  the  plan,  though 
he  did  so  under  the  pressure  of  a  situation  that  resulted  from 
a  device  so  crafty  and  malevolent  that  nothing  in  the  life  of 
Mr.  Lincoln  makes  it  likely,  or  we  may  say  credible,  that  he 
conceived  it. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  8th  of  March,  McClellan,  at 
the  President's  request,  was  in  the  White  House.  Mr.  Lin 
coln  seemed  to  find  great  difficulty  and  embarrassment  in 
bringing  himself  to  speak  of  the  "very  ugly  matter,"  as  he 
termed  it,  which  was  the  chief  occasion  of  the  interview,  and 
talked  of  .many  other  things  before  revealing  it.  At  last  the 
infamous  matter  was  set  forth, — namely,  "That  it  had  been 
represented  to  him,  and  that  he  was  inclined  to  believe,  that 


io8  McCLELLAN 

the  coast  route  was  conceived  with  the  traitorous  intent  of 
leaving  the  capital  defenseless  and  turning  it  over  to  the  en 
emy."  This  ruse  to  turn  McClellan  from  his  project  was 
surely  hatched  by  Stanton.  It  was  a  lawyer's  trick  and  on  a 
plane  with  the  least  reputable  devices  of  the  police  court. 
The  effect  of  such  an  imputation  upon  a  man  at  once  so  pa 
triotic  and  so  upright  as  McClellan  can  readily  be  imagined. 
Lincoln  was  not  a  good  instrument  to  ensure  the  success  of 
such  a  plot,  for  when  McClellan  resented  the  attack  with  hon 
est  and  hot  indignation  and  demanded  a  retraction  the  Presi 
dent  was  much  moved,  and  at  once  complied  and  repeatedly 
apologized. 

It  was  in  this  connection  that  McClellan,  seeing  the  malice 
of  his  enemies,  proposed  that  the  plan  should  be  submitted 
to  the  generals  of  division,  who  were  to  meet  that  same  day 
for  another  purpose."  This  was  agreed  to,  and  the  plan  was 
submitted  to  the  generals  accordingly.  These  generals  were : 
Blenker,  Casey,  Heintzelman,  Keyes,  McCall,  McDowell,  An 
drew  Porter,  Fitz  John  Porter,  W.  F.  Smith,  Sumner,  Naglee 
(for  Hooker),  and  Barnard. 

McClellan  was  hazarding  everything,  for  if  the  decision 
was  adverse,  that  would  surely  be  the  end  of  the  coast  plan, 
and  he  must  then  fairly  and  in  good  faith  follow  out  the  over 
land7  plan  of  advance;  it  was  implied  that  the  decision  would 
be  equally  conclusive  upon  the  Administration,  and  if  he  se 
cured  a  favorable  decision  he  had  a  right  to  expect  that  the 
Government  would  then  in  good  faith  do  everything  necessary 
to  make  the  advance  by  the  coast  route  a  success.  But  the 
Administration  was  not  acting  in  good  faith,  as  will  clearly 
appear,  and  its  acts  at  this  time  are  so  far  at  variance  with 
what  would  be  expected  from  Mr.  Lincoln's  character,  so 
tricky,  cunning,  and  lacking  in  candor  and  even  in  common 
honesty,  as  to  assure  us  that  the  moving  hand  was  Stanton's. 
Despite  Lincoln's  consent  to  the  council,  Stanton  still  opposed 
it  and  programmed  a  line  of  action  to  defeat  the  verdict  and 
"beat  McClellan  on  the  execution/'  as  cunning  lawyers  say, 
by  preventing  it  from  being  carried  into  effect. 

8  McClellan,  Own  Story,  196. 


McCLELLAN  109 

This  was  highly  treacherous  and  discreditable. 

General  McClellan,  actuated  by  a  commendable  spirit  of 
fairness,  took  no  part  in  the  meeting  of  the  generals  and  was 
not  even  present. 

The  verdict  of  the  council  did  more  than  to  force  the 
Administration  to  give  an  ostensible  assent  to  McClellan's 
plan  of  campaign.  To  endorse  the  plan  was  to  endorse  the 
commander,  at  a  time  when  we  now  learn  that  Stanton  had 
brought  so  much  pressure  to  bear  on  Lincoln  as  to  persuade 
him  to  remove  McClellan  altogether. 

The  accusation  of  treason  (no  doubt  devised  by  Stanton) 
in  urging  the  coast  route  was  crushed  by  the  strong  endorse 
ment  of  the  council,  and  so  the  venomous  purpose  of  disgrac 
ing  the  commander  was  foiled.  In  the  face  of  the  decision 
it  could  not  be  carried  out. 


CHAPTER    XX 

THE    COAST    ROUTE   APPROVED UNDERGROUND   OPPOSITION 

As  the  result  of  the  submission  of  the  plan,  eight  of  the 
twelve  generals  approved  it, — namely,  Blenker,  Casey,  Keyes, 
McCall,  the  two  Porters,  Smith,  and  Naglee.  And  only 
four, — namely,  McDowell,  Sumner,  Heintzelman,  and  Bar 
nard,  were  against  it.  This  should  have  ended  the  struggle 
against  the  plan,  but  as  will  be  seen  it  was  but  fairly  begun. 

The  cunning  of  Mr.  Stanton  and  the  extent  to  which  he 
would  go  to  carry  his  point  are  well  illustrated  here.  With 
Machiavellian  subtlety  he  urged  Mr.  Lincoln  to  reject  the 
decision;  he  insisted  that  the  result  should  be  viewed  as  a 
vote  of  four  to  one  against  McClellan's  plan,  for  the  eight  were 
McClellan  men  and  should  be  viewed  as  one.1  The  President 
would  not  go  so  far;  the  responsibility  he  said  was  too  great; 
but  the  alternative  course  pursued  was  hardly  more  straight 
forward  or  reputable.  The  decision  was  hardly  announced 
when,  without  any  consultation  with  General  McClellan  or  even 
any  prior  knowledge  on  his  part,  an  order  was  issued  divid 
ing  his  army  into  corps  (which  he  did  not  desire),  and,  as  a 
still  more  flagrant  and  inexcusable  indignity,  making  three  of 
the  four  generals  who  opposed  his  plan  of  action  (as  if  to 
reward  them  for  their  fidelity)  corps  commanders,  the  four 
being  McDowell,  Sumner,  Heintzelman,  and  Keyes.  Only  the 
last  of  these  was  in  sympathy  with  the  commander's  views. 

Not  one  of  these  men,  not  even  Keyes,  would  have  been 
selected  by  the  commander,  as  one  may  learn  from  his  me 
moirs.  He  had  too  many  better  men  of  eminent  fitness  and 
capacity  to  select  from.  The  author  of  the  excellent  biography 
of  General  Mea'de  says :  "Of  the  degree  of  capacity  indicated 
and  reputation  made  by  these  officers,  it  is  sufficient  to  say 

1  Flower,  Edwin  McMasters  Stanton,  139. 

no 


McCLELLAN  nl 

that  theirs  are  not  among  the  great  names  of  the  war.  Sumner 
and  Heintzelman  were  already  well  advanced  in  years :  Keyes 
was  soon  retired ;  and  McDowell,  like  McClellan,  had  already 
suffered  from  being  expected  to  do  with  raw  volunteers  that 
which  only  an  organized  and  disciplined  army  could  accom 
plish."  2  This  action  was  plainly  a  rebuke  to  the  "obstinacy" 
of  which  Mr.  Gorham  informs  us  and  a  reminder  that  further 
persistence  in  the  coast  route  would  be  visited  with  still  heavier 
penalties.  It  was  one  of  Mr.  Stanton's  indirect  "persuasions" 
already  alluded  to. 

One  by  one  the  plans  of  McClellan  for  putting  down  the 
rebellion  by  a  swift,  decisive,  irresistible  campaign  were  be 
ing  crushed  to  the  earth.  Through  the  Administration's  lack 
of  energy,  not  only  was  he  forced  to  content  himself  finally 
with  half  the  requisite  number  of  men,  but  through  the  slow 
coming  in  of  materials  and  recruits  much  of  that  half  was 
far  from  being  as  well  disciplined  and  equipped  as  he  desired ; 
and  now  an  inimical  influence  was  interfering  with  the  organ 
ization  of  his  army,  appointing  his  lieutenants  for  him,  and 
worst  of  all  maliciously  selecting  those  known  to  be  opposed 
to  his  views.  "It  was  through  the  pressure  of  the  Committee 
on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  and  Mr.  Stanton  that  corps  were 
formed  and  indeed  by  them,  as  a  species  of  Aulic  Council,  that 
all  the  larger  war  questions  were  decided."  3 

Speaking  of  the  council  of  generals,  Pennypacker  in  his 
able  critique  of  Michie's  General  McClellan,  after  alluding  to 
the  circumstances  which  forced  the  general  to  suggest  it,  gives 
his  opinion  that  "The  nature  of  the  proposition  sufficiently 
indicates  the  conditions  which  made  it  necessary,  conditions 
under  which  no  general  could  hope  to  conduct  campaigns  to  a 
successful  issue."  4 

The  interference  with  the  management  of  the  army  by 
selecting  corps  commanders  adverse  to  the  campaign  was  not 
the  only  bad  feature  of  the  order  of  March  8th.  It  also  in 
effect  divided  the  army,  which  was  already  too  small,  into 

'Dial,  XXXI,  319- 

*  Swinton,  Army  of  the  Potomac,  89,  n. 

'Dial,  XXXI,  319. 


ii2  McCLELLAN 

three  parts :  one  to  guard  Washington ;  one  to  clear  the  Poto 
mac;  and  the  third,  of  50,000  men  only,  to  invade  Virginia. 

If  McClellan  had  had  the  least  spark  of  the  politician  in 
him,  he  would  surely  have  taken  the  hint  and  "got  right1'  and 
ceased  to  be  "obstinate"  with  Mr.  Stanton.  He  would  have 
yielded  to  his  "persuasions." 

But  on  March  9th  Johnston  left  Manassas,  and  the  railroad 
and  the  Potomac  were  cleared  of  the  enemy. 

In  other  words,  the  moment  the  coast  route  was  fixed  upon, 
Johnston  evacuated  the  vicinity  of  Washington  and  went  to 
meet  the  invaders.  The  Comte  de  Paris  believes  that  this 
movement  came  from  a  "leak"  at  Washington.5 

"At  that  time  the  communication  between  Washington  and 
the  Confederate  authorities  in  Richmond  was  remarkably 
direct  and  on  March  gth,  1862,  the  enemy,  evidencing  their 
appreciation  of  the  efficiency  of  General  McClellan's  plan, 
abandoned  their  lines  at  Manassas  and  on  the  Potomac."  6 

The  situation  was  a  chilling  one  for  the  young  comman 
der.  He  was  encompassed  with  opposition.  The  President 
no  longer  sought  him  daily,  but  was  estranged  and  avoided 
him  entirely.  After  Stanton  took  the  helm,  the  interviews 
between  Lincoln  and  McClellan  were  very  rare  and  never  of 
the  former  cordial  nature. 

This  aloofness  was  in  itself  another  of  Mr.  Stanton's  "per 
suasions."  If  there  had  been  anything  of  the  courtier  about 
the  General,  he  might  have  changed  this  polar  atmosphere  to 
one  of  genial  warmth  the  instant  he  felt  its  frostiness.  If  he 
had  diplomatically  affected  to  believe  that  the  new  Secretary 
was  the  cordial  friend  he  professed  to  be,  if  he  had  sought 
his  advice  both  as  a  lawyer  and  a  friend  in  so  critical  a  situa 
tion,  and,  if  convinced  by  his  reasoning(  ?),  he  had  minis 
tered  to  his  greed  of  authority,  kept  in  constant  touch  with 
him,  and  fully  yielded  to  the  views  born  of  the  Secretary's 
fears, — if  all  this  had  happened,  the  two  men  would  have  been 
friends.  Stanton's  "persuasions"  \vere  all  overtures  toward 
that  end,  but  McClellan  was  not  politician  enough  to  see  this. 

0  History  of  the  Civil  War,  I,  61.3. 
e  Fifth  Army  Corps,  36-7. 


McCLELLAN  113 

He  viewed  them  not  as  allurements  to  draw  him  into  line, 
but  only  as  vexatious  annoyances  to  handicap  and  harass  him 
in  the  carrying  out  of  his  plan.  That  all  the  manifestations  of 
opposition  and  enmity,  while  on  the  one  hand  they  might 
be  regarded  as  menaces  of  destruction,  might  also  be  looked 
upon  as  intimations  that  he  could  surround  himself  with  warm 
support,  sympathy,  and  friendship, — if  he  chose  to  be  wise  and 
to  conform  to  conditions  which  were  imperative,  irresistible, 
and  unchangeable, — evidently  never  once  dawned  upon  the 
general's  mind.  He  was  occupied  entirely  with  military  prob 
lems  and  not  with  politics.  So  he  found  himself  practically 
marooned  as  far  as  the  sympathetic  aid  of  the  Government 
and  its  cooperation  with  his  plans  were  concerned. 

One  is  surprised  that  many  well  meaning  writers  should 
fail  to  notice  that  Johnston's  withdrawal  demonstrated  the 
folly  of  incurring  loss  of  life  and  the  blunder  of  going  to 
great  expense,  by  special  expeditions,  to  enforce  it.  They  fail 
to  mention,  and  perhaps  to  observe,  that  the  result  vindicated 
General  McClellan's  sagacity  and  military  acumen,  and  that 
justice  requires  this  acknowledgment;  several  even  omit  all 
mention  of  the  withdrawal. 

Nor  were  Mr.  Stanton  and  his  adherents  more  ready 
to  give  McClellan  the  credit  due  to  his  wisdom  when  so  veri 
fied  than  are  these  thoughtless  or  unfair  historians.  They 
were  not  pleased  as  they  should  have  been.  They  were  en 
raged.  They  were  blind  to  reasons  for  applauding  his  judg 
ment,  and  the  National  press  agent,  Mr.  Stanton,  made  the 
people  blind  to  it  as  well.  What  they  saw  was  that  with 
the  voluntary  retirement  of  the  Confederates  all  chance  to 
get  McClellan  entangled  with  the  enemy,  therefore  drawn 
away  from  the  coast  route  and  fixed  in  the  overland  route, 
had  vanished ;  and  above  all,  to  them  the  withdrawal  of  the 
rebels  proved  with  absolute  certainty  a  weakness  which  to 
their  minds  and  upon  their  superficial  consideration  of  the 
matter  would  have  ensured  victory,  if  McClellan  had  followed 
their  views  and  advanced  upon  Manassas.  "The  enemy  had 
escaped  through  McClellan's  lack  of  aggressiveness."  So 
they  hastily  concluded;  and,  accordingly,  a  number  of  unre- 


ii4  McCLELLAN 

fleeting  writers  find  proof  of  the  alleged  weakness  in  the 
fact  that  while  the  rebel  batteries  were  all  apparently  filled 
with  guns,  the  guns  were  found  to  be  dummies,  guns  of  painted 
wood;  and  the  outcry  of  derision  over  this  gives  a  strong 
example  of  the  biasing  influence  of  political  fervor.  These 
same  writers  in  their  zeal  forgot  what  they  had  previously 
narrated, — namely,  that  the  Confederates  had  a  large  amount 
of  artillery  at  the  battle  of  Bull  Run.  A  considerable  part 
of  the  description  of  that  battle  is  always  given  to  the  account 
of  the  deadly  work  of  the  rebel  masked  batteries.  It  is  ad 
mitted  also  that  other  cannon  were  taken  by  them  in  the  rout 
of  the  Union  army.  Now,  being  so  equipped  with  artillery, 
why  should  they  not  use  it?  It  is  incredible  that  they  would 
not.  They  did.  We  know  all  the  facts  now  from  the  inside. 
As  we  have  shown,  Johnston  knew  all  that  was  transpiring 
in  Washington, — all  the  movements  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac.  We  are  told  that  "there  were  men  occupying  im 
portant  posts  in  the  Government  and  in  the  army,  who  were 
the  secret  agents  of  the  rebels  and  who  regarded  treason  and 
perfidy  as  chivalry  and  honor." 

So  General  Johnston  undoubtedly  knew  of  McClellan's 
plan  as  soon  as  he  was  forced  to  divulge  it,  but  knew  too  that 
it  was  still  doubtful  that  it  would  be  acted  upon ;  but  the 
ordering  of  the  transports  made  it  so  nearly  certain  that  the 
advance  by  the  Peninsula  would  be  made  that  apparently  he 
then  began  to  get  ready  to  move  the  army;  as  the  first  step, 
he  began  to  take  away  the  guns  and  substitute  dummies  so 
gradually  and  stealthily  that  the  Southern  soldiers  in  general 
did  not  know  of  it;  and  the  moment  the  verdict  of  the  council 
of  generals  was  given  on  March  8th  all  the  Confederate  forces 
were  withdrawn. 

Mr.  Eggleston's  account  is  that  Johnston  "transported  his 
artillery  to  the  Peninsula  east  of  Richmond  to  meet  his  ad 
versary's  confidently  expected  advance  in  that  quarter." 7 
And  Mr.  Pollard  says :  "During  the  winter  Johnston  re 
moved  his  cannon  and  dummies  were  put  in."  8 

1  History  of  the  Confederate  War,  I,  353. 
8  Lost  Cause,  262,  263. 


McCLELLAN  115 

The  Government  advices  while  Johnston  was  at  Manassas 
were  that  he  had  an  army  of  over  100,000  men.  McClellan 
occupied  the  works  on  March  loth  and  found  evidence  in  the 
number  of  caps  and  other  indicia  of  the  recent  presence  of  a 
large  army.9 

9  McClellan,  Own  Story,  179- 


CHAPTER    XXI 

THE    HIDDEN    HAND 

As  McClellan  still  continued  obtuse  and  unable  to  recog 
nize  the  pressing  invitations  extended  to  him  (by  implica 
tion)  to  set  himself  right,  another  "persuasion"  now  ap 
peared,  and  as  usual  without  any  prior  consultation,  notice,  or 
intimation, — in  the  shape  of  a  war  order  degrading  him  from 
his  rank  of  general  in  chief.  This  was  followed  by  other 
orders,  taking  from  under  his  control  even  the  forces  in  Vir 
ginia,  excepting  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

The  President  afterward  admitted  that  this  series  of 
military  orders  was  forced  upon  him.  "He  did  not  know  but 
they  were  all  wrong,  and  did  know  that  some  of  them  were."  1 

There  is  something  so  indefensible,  so  brusque,  so  undigni 
fied,  so  lacking  in  the  most  ordinary  requirements  of  official 
intercourse,  in  the  treatment  of  McClellan  by  the  Administra 
tion  at  this  time  that  the  best  apparent  defense  for  Mr.  Lin 
coln  in  the  matter  is  that  he  was  not  able  to  withstand  the 
influences  about  him,  and  that  none  of  these  measures  were 
his.  They  certainly  need  more  earnest  and  satisfactory  apolo 
gies  than  have  ever  been  given. 

If  the  prospective  operations  had  been  thoroughly  talked 
over  with  McClellan  when  his  plan  was  no  longer  a  secret, 
the  attitude  of  the  Administration  would  appear  in  a  far  more 
favorable  light. 

If  Mr.  Stanton  had  said  frankly,  "We  are  afraid  and 
all  your  assurances  fail  to  give  us  confidence;  as  soon  as  the 
army  is  taken  from  between  us  and  Richmond  the  rebels  will 
surely  rush  in  and  seize  the  Capital,"  the  position  would  not 
have  been  glorious,  but  at  least  it  would  have  been  open  and 
candid  and  not  furtive,  masked,  and  crafty. 


1  Grant,  Memoirs,  ii,  122. 

116 


McCLELLAN  117 

Again,  if  General  McClellan  had  known  at  this  time  that 
the  Secretary  of  War  "invariably  carried  a  dagger  under  his 
vest,"  he  would  no  doubt  have  rightly  divined  that  the  founda 
tion  of  all  the  opposition  to  the  coast  route  lay  in  an  ignoble 
but  ineradicable  terror  of  an  attack ;  and  he  might  have  found 
means  of  giving  a  feeling  of  security  to  the  Secretary,  and 
so  have  gained  his  good-will.  But  it  seems  that  it  was  not 
only  the  enemy  which  Mr.  Stanton  feared.  He  feared  the 
Union  army  too.  Its  presence  in  Washington  was  a  cause 
of  alarm  to  him.  That  it  might  set  itself  above  all  civil 
authority  was  to  his  mind  easily  possible.  Intense  political 
feeling  is  so  akin  to  patriotism  as  to  be  easily  mistaken  for 
it.  Its  inspiration  is  the  supposed  welfare  of  the  nation,  and 
in  its  highest  glow  those  of  opposing  views  are  regarded  as 
traitors  seeking  to  destroy  the  commonwealth. 

For  a  long  time  after  the  war  this  feeling  blinded  many 
writers,  and  prevented  them  from  seeing  the  significance  and 
meaning  of  the  attitude  of  the  Administration  toward  General 
McClellan  in  the  spring  of  1862  and  long  afterward.  This 
is  lamentable,  for  never  was  a  sentiment  noble  in  itself  more 
degraded  in  its  application.  The  writer  has  the  best  of  rea 
sons  for  knowing  that  one  may  warmly  espouse  "first,  last, 
and  all  the  time"  a  succession  of  Republican  Presidents  and 
yet  recognize  the  great  wrong  and  injury  done  to  General 
McClellan,  and  through  him  to  the  country.  And  all  this 
bitterness  of  deluded  writers  springs  from  what?  From 
the  manipulations  of  a  man  who  had  no  politics;  who,  when 
it  "feathered  his  nest"  to  be  so,  was  a  virulent  Democrat,  as 
his  own  letters  already  cited  show,  and  the  most  radical  of 
Radicals  when  that  better  served  his  love  of  power,  and 
who,  if  the  new  party  had  declined  in  strength,  would  surely 
have  left  it  to  ally  himself  with  whatever  other  organization 
seemed  more  promising  of  success  and  of  reward  to  its  ad 
herents. 

Such  a  man  is  wholly  devoid  of  principle;  yet  under  the 
alluring  guise  of  patriotism  this  master  craftsman  manipu 
lated  Congress  and  the  committee  he  was  instrumental  in 
creating,  manipulated  the  press  by  becoming  the  national  news 


ii8  McCLELLAN 

agent,  manipulated  the  Cabinet,  and  through  all  these  agencies 
brought  a  pressure  to  bear  upon  the  President  which  he  could 
never  permanently  resist;  then,  as  the  harvest  of  his  work, 
crippled  the  reputation  of  an  able  general,  brought  repeated 
discredit  upon  the  measures  of  a  good-hearted  executive,  and 
as  the  final  result  prolonged  the  war  for  years  and  needlessly 
sacrificed  hundreds  of  thousands  of  lives  and  wasted  thou 
sands  of  millions  of  dollars.  In  view  of  all  the  homes  deso 
lated  through  his  misdirected  and  sinister  activities,  it  is 
hardly  a  matter  for  wonder  that  in  his  case  even  "death  did 
not  materially  soften  dislike"  and  that  his  memory  has  been 
"bitterly  pursued  beyond  the  grave." 

That  his  acts  should  be  still  defended,  though  by  a  de 
creasing  number  of  adherents,  under  the  belief  that  they 
were  Lincoln's  acts,  representing  the  conclusions  of  the  Presi 
dent's  deliberate  judgment,  and  that  the  noble,  generous,  and 
gifted  man  whom  he  maligned  and  whose  career  as  a  general 
he  destroyed  should  be  misunderstood  and  undervalued  by 
many  writers  is  one  of  the  grim  jests  of  history.  Such  writ 
ers,  thinking  that  they  are  defending  Lincoln,  vindicate  Stan- 
ton's  malevolence.  Stanton's  career  would  now  be  impossible. 
Present  conditions  prove  that  officials  can  no  longer  hide  acts 
against  the  interests  of  the  people  under  the  shield  of  the 
party  name.  Stanton's  course  was  personal  and  individual, 
not  political. 

The  reason  assigned  for  reducing  General  McClellan's 
command  is  given  in  the  order  itself.  It  was  that  he  had 
taken  the  field.  No  author  credits  this  reason.  The  actual 
cause  was  too  apparent.  This  reason  was  made  absurd  by 
later  events,  for  General  Grant,  though  likewise  in  the  field, 
retained  the  supreme  command  throughout  his  Virginia  cam 
paigns. 

A  minor  incident  illustrates  how  far  the  Government  went 
and  how  completely  it  ignored  the  observances  of  official  life, 
with  the  aim  of  persuading  McClellan  to  abandon  the  coast 
route,  or  to  punish  him  for  his  "obstinacy"  in  adhering  to  it. 
Upon  the  issuance  of  the  order  last  mentioned,  the  office  of  the 
general  in  chief  in  Washington  was  at  once  closed  up  in  his 


McCLELLAN  119 

absence  and  the  papers  in  it  taken  possession  of  by  the  War 
Department.  The  General  never  entered  the  office  again  and 
never  again  had  his  official  papers  in  his  possession.  Even 
the  little  privilege  of  delivering  over  the  office  and  its  con 
tents  was  denied  to  him.  Such  unseemly  discourtesy  to  one 
of  McClellan's  standing  and  character  was  disgraceful  to 
all  who  participated  in  it  or  permitted  it.  An  act  at  once  so 
petty,  irritating,  and  needless  forbids  any  unbiased  mind  from 
believing  that  the  attitude  toward  McClellan  was  inspired  by 
patriotism,  or  any  other  worthy  or  defensible  sentiment. 

Besides  degrading  the  commander  to  the  control  of  a  single 
army,  the  order  of  March  the  loth  directed  in  the  most  man 
datory  terms  that  the  general  should  set  out  on  his  campaign 
riot  later  than  March  the  i8th,  and  with  only  50,000  men. 
The  transports  to  convey  the  army  to  Fort  Monroe  were 
not  ordered  until  February  the  27th,  and  were  not  expected  to 
be  ready  until  thirty  days  later.  If  this  order  had  been  fully 
enforced,  can  any  one  doubt  the  result  ?  Imagine  what  chance 
General  Grant  would  have  had  of  escaping  destruction  in  the 
Wilderness,  if  he  had  been  forced  to  fight  under  similar  con 
ditions.  In  effectives  Lee  had  60,000;  Grant,  120,000.  If 
McClellan  had  advanced  with  only  50,000  men,  he  would 
have  been  met  by  Lee  with  an  army  larger,  as  we  shall  soon 
show,  than  that  of  Grant. 

Was  there  no  responsibility  in  ordering  out  so  small 
a  force  against  these  victorious  Virginians,  fighting  on  their 
own  soil  and  for  their  own  homes?  Nothing  could  have  saved 
the  army  from  practical  annihilation,  if  the  order  had  been 
executed. 


CHAFFER  XXII 

INTO    THE    MIRE 

The  withdrawal  of  all  Confederate  troops  from  the  vicin 
ity  of  Washington  and  of  the  Potomac  removed  all  pretext 
for  sending  out  so  inadequate  a  force  and  saved  the  army 
from  disaster,  but  the  report  of  the  Assistant  Secretary  of 
War  shows  that  he  was  at  first  asked  to  provide  shipment  for 
only  50,000  troops.1 

The  retirement  of  the  Southerners  rendered  a  modifica 
tion  of  the  coast  plan  imperative.  If  the  Urbana  plan  could 
have  been  kept  secret,  McClellan  would  have  interposed  his 
army  between  Richmond  and  the  rebel  army  at  Manassas,  but 
the  enforced  divulgence  of  his  design  now  rendered  this  im 
possible  ;  so,  according  to  the  established  precedent,  another 
council  of  generals  convened  on  March  the  I3th  at  Fairfax 
Courthouse,  to  which  was  submitted  the  alternative  project  set 
forth  in  the  commander's  letter  of  February  3d, — the  project 
of  advancing  by  way  of  Fortress  Monroe  and  the  Peninsula. 
This  was  approved  by  all,  provided  the  Merrimac  could  be 
neutralized,  transports  supplied,  naval  aid  against  the  York 
River  batteries  obtained,  and  a  sufficient  force  left  at  Wash 
ington  to  give  an  entire  feeling  of  security.  The  President 
approved,  on  condition  that  Washington  be  made  entirely  safe 
and  Manassas  protected  against  recapture. 

The  embarkation  began  on  the  I7th  of  March  and  con 
tinued  in  rapidly  increasing  volume  until  the  5th  of  April. 

General  McClellan  boarded  the  Steamer  Commodore  on 
the  ist  of  April  and  started  for  Fort  Monroe  early  on  the 
morning  of  the  2cl. 

In  one  respect  it  was  a  sad  setting  forth.  Here  was  a 
man, — unquestionably  endowed  with  splendid  talents;  of 

1  McClellan,  Own  Story,  237. 

120 


McCLELLAN  121 

clean,  pure  life  and  high  ideals;  one  who  had  accomplished 
a  work  of  such  undeniable  merit  that  friend  and  foe  have 
joined  in  praising  it, — yet  going  off  as  if  to  banishment, 
without  a  word  of  cheer  or  encouragement,  without  the  slight 
est  assurance  of  sympathy  or  support.  No  one  representing 
the  Administration  went  to  see  him  off.  No  one  wished  him 
Godspeed  in  a  campaign  in  which  the  welfare  of  the  nation 
was  very  deeply  involved.  And  what  had  he  done  to  create 
this  grave  displeasure?  He  had  merely  adhered  without 
vacillation  to  the  plan  of  advance  which  his  well-trained  mili 
tary  capacity  assured  him  was  the  best,  and  which  is  now 
known  to  have  been  actually  and  incomparably  the  best. 

How  different  was  General  Grant's  entrance  upon  his  Vir 
ginia  Campaign  of  1864!  All  possible  aid,  cooperation,  and 
sympathy  were  extended  to  him  by  the  Government.  He  was 
assured  that  he  should  have  all  the  troops  he  wanted.  He 
started  when  he  pleased.  There  was  no  pressure.  He  tells 
us  that  about  this  time, — from  March  the  26th  to  May  the 
4th, — he  had  weekly  conferences  with  Messrs.  Stanton  and 
Lincoln,2  and  that  "By  the  27th  of  April  spring  had  so  far  ad 
vanced  as  to  justify  me  in  fixing  a  day  for  the  great  move."  3 
In  other  words,  he  waited  until  he  felt  sure  that  the  winter  was 
over,  and  no  one  goaded  him  to  action. 

Every  suggestion  was  complied  with,  without  hesitation, 
and  yet  General  Grant,  who  had  at  first  intended  to  remain 
in  the  West  after  having  been  made  lieutenant-general,  found 
that  he  must  stay  in  the  East,  for  "No  one  else  could  prob 
ably  resist  the  pressure  that  would  be  brought  upon  him  to 
desist  from  his  own  plans  and  pursue  others."  4 

McClellan,  on  the  contrary,  was  as  completely  isolated  as 
if  he  had  been  on  one  side  of  the  world  and  the  President 
and  the  Secretary  of  War  on  the  other. 

McClellan  was  setting  out  upon  his  chosen  course,  but 
not  in  his  chosen  way.  To  force  the  army  out  into  the 
swamps  of  the  Peninsula  until  the  rains  were  over  was  reck- 

3  Grant,  Memoirs,  II,  141. 
3  Ibid. 


122  McCLELLAN 

less  of  life  to  the  verge  of  criminality.  It  was  like  fighting 
Heaven  and  all  the  forces  of  nature.  Moreover,  the  force 
which  was  to  go  was  absurdly  insufficient,  and  this,  as  Mc- 
Clellan  recognized,  made  the  enterprise  hazardous. 

In  his  November  communication  he  for  the  first  time 
alludes  to  a  lesser  number  than  that  first  named,  but  merely 
from  unavoidable  necessity  and  for  the  purpose  of  getting 
in  a  blow  before  the  coming  of  the  snows. 

In  his  letter  of  February  3d  he  says :  "In  the  earliest 
papers  I  submitted  to  the  President,  I  asked  for  an  effective 
and  movable  force  far  exceeding  the  aggregate  now  on  the 
banks  of  the  Potomac.  I  have  not  the  force  I  asked  for."  5 

This  is  a  protest  against  the  inadequacy  of  the  army  for 
the  great  work  demanded  of  it. 

If  he  had  possessed  a  little  of  Mr.  Stanton's  political  cun 
ning,  he  would  have  added,  "I  will  do  the  very  best  I  can, 
but  if  disaster  comes  from  the  disadvantage  of  operating 
under  present  conditions  and  with  an  army  so  inferior  to  that 
which  I  advised  you  to  provide,  the  responsibility  will  be 
entirely  yours,"  and  he  would  probably  have  been  surprised 
at  the  magical  effect  of  the  intimation. 

As  will  be  demonstrated  later,  to  keep  the  President  fully 
alive  as  to  his  responsibilities  was  the  key  to  the  situation. 
But  this  was  a  terra  ignota  to  the  commander. 

On  the  1 4th  of  March  the  Secretary  of  War  called  for  a 
report  on  the  status  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  which  was 
presented  on  the  iQth,,  as  follows : 

"Sir:  I  have  the  honor  to  submit  the  following  notes 
on  the  proposed  operations  of  the  active  portion  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac. 

"The  proposed  plan  of  campaign  is  to  assume  Fort  Mon 
roe  as  the  first  base  of  operations,  taking  the  line  of  York- 
town  and  West  Point  upon  Richmond  as  the  line  of  opera 
tions,  Richmond  being  the  objective  point.  It  is  assumed 
that  the  fall  of  Richmond  involves  that  of  Norfolk  and  the 
whole  of  Virginia ;  also  that  we  shall  fight  a  decisive  battle 
between  West  Point  and  Richmond,  to  give  which  battle  the 

0  McClellan,  Own  Story,  230. 


McCLELLAN  123 

rebels  will  concentrate  all  their  available  forces,  understand 
ing,  as  they  will,  that  it  involves  the  fate  of  their  cause. 
It  therefore  follows: 

"ist.  That  we  should  collect  all  our  available  forces  and 
operate  upon  adjacent  lines,  maintaining  perfect  communica 
tion  between  our  columns. 

"2d.  That  no  time  should  be  lost  in  reaching  the  field 
of  battle. 

"The  advantages  of  the  Peninsula  between  York  and 
James  Rivers  are  too  obvious  to  need  explanation.  It  is  also 
clear  that  West  Point  should  as  soon  as  possible  be  reached 
and  used  as  our  main  depot,  that  we  may  have  the  shortest 
line  of  land  transportation  for  our  supplies  and  the  use  of 
the  York  River. 

"There  are  two  methods  of  reaching  this  point : 

"ist.  By  moving  directly  from  Fort  Monroe  as  a  base, 
and  trusting  to  the  roads  for  our  supplies,  at  the  same  time 
landing  a  strong  corps  as  near  Yorktown  as  possible,  in  order 
to  turn  the  rebel  lines  of  defense  south  of  Yorktown;  thence 
to  reduce  Yorktown  and  Gloucester  by  a  siege,  in  all  prob 
ability  involving  a  delay  of  weeks,  perhaps. 

"2d.  To  make  a  combined  naval  and  land  attack  upon 
Yorktown  the  first  object  of  the  campaign.  This  leads  to 
the  most  rapid  and  decisive  results.  To  accomplish  this,  the 
navy  should  at  once  concentrate  upon  the  York  River  all 
their  available  and  most  powerful  batteries.  Its  reduction 
should  not  in  that  case  require  many  hours.  A  strong  corps 
would  be  pushed  up  the  York,  under  cover  of  the  navy,  di 
rectly  upon  West  Point,  immediately  upon  the  fall  of  York- 
town,  and  we  could  at  once  establish  our  new  base  of  opera 
tions  at  a  distance  of  some  twenty-five  miles  from  Richmond, 
with  every  facility  for  developing  and  bringing  into  play  the 
whole  of  our  available  force  on  either  or  both  banks  of  the 
James. 

"It  is  impossible  to  urge  too  strongly  the  absolute  neces 
sity  of  the  full  co-operation  of  the  navy  as  a  part  of  this  pro 
gramme.  Without  it  the  operations  may  be  prolonged  for 
many  weeks,  and  we  may  be  forced  to  carry  in  front  several 


124  McCLELLAN 

strong  positions,  which  by  their  aid  could  be  turned  without 
serious  loss  of  either  time  or  men. 

"It  is  also  of  first  importance  to  bear  in  mind  the  fact, 
already  alluded  to,  that  the  capture  of  Richmond  necessarily 
involves  the  prompt  fall  of  Norfolk,  while  an  operation  against 
Norfolk,  if  successful  at  the  beginning  of  the  campaign,  facili 
tates  the  reduction  of  Richmond  merely  by  the  demoraliza 
tion  of  the  rebel  troops  involved,  and  that  after  the  fall  of 
Norfolk  we  should  be  obliged  to  undertake  the  capture  of 
Richmond  by  the  same  means  which  would  have  accomplished 
it  in  the  beginning,  having  meanwhile  afforded  the  rebels 
ample  time  to  perfect  their  defensive  arrangements ;  for  they 
would  well  know,  from  the  moment  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac  changed  its  base  to  Fort  Monroe,  that  Richmond  must  be 
its  ultimate  object. 

"It  may  be  summed  up  in  a  few  words,  that  for  prompt 
success  of  this  campaign  it  is  absolutely  necessary  that  the 
navy  should  at  once  throw  its  whole  available  force,  its  most 
powerful  vessels,  against  Yorktown.  There  is  the  most  im 
portant  point — there  the  knot  to  be  cut.  An  immediate 
decision  upon  the  subject-matter  of  this  communication  is 
highly  desirable,  and 'seems  called  for  by  the  exigencies  of 
the  occasion."  6 

Despite  the  lowering  skies,  General  McClellan  must  have 
felt  a  strong  sensation  of  relief  as  the  steamer  bore  him  away 
from  the  City  of  Intrigues.  He  had  a  brave  army,  much 
smaller  than  was  suitable,  but  efficient  and  reliable;  and,  re 
moved  from  almost  hourly  worry  and  annoyance,  he  felt  that 
with  the  146,000  men  to  come  from  Washington  and  the 
additional  10,000  from  Fort  Monroe  he  might  with  fairly 
good  fortune  achieve  great  results. 

And  we  may  fancy  that,  with  about  45,000  effectives  then 
landed  on  the  Peninsula,  the  young  commander  retired  on  the 
night  of  the  2d  of  April  elated  with  the  prospect  of  a  success 
ful  and  brilliant  campaign. 

a  Official  War  Records,  V,  57. 


CHAPTER    XXIII 

MADDENING    CONDITIONS — STANTON's    REVENGE 

The  forcing  of  the  army  out  in  March,  1862,  was  idiotic 
ally  premature.  General  Grant  was  made  supreme  comman 
der  on  the  9th  of  March,  1864.  He  did  not  stir  until  two 
months  later,  and  even  then  only  on  his  own  volition.  For 
what  was  he  waiting?  For  the  rains  to  stop.  McClellan  was 
pushed  out  seven  weeks  earlier,  in  a  "phenomenal  and  un 
precedented  season,"  as  was  obvious  to  all.  In  1862  General 
Grant  would  not  have  moved  until  the  middle  of  June,  if  he 
had  had  the  same  absolute  control  that  he  had  in  1864,  and 
wisdom  would  have  approved  his  prudence. 

It  is  an  interesting  speculation  of  ethics  to  consider  at 
what  point  the  exposure  of  the  lives  of  soldiers  to  needless 
sacrifice  becomes  murderous  or  treasonable.  A  commander 
who  would  send  forward  only  a  company  at  a  time  along  an 
extended  causeway  so  enfiladed  and  swept  by  an  enemy's 
batteries  that  destruction  was  inevitable,  and  who,  after  a 
dozen  companies  had  been  so  annihilated,  would  persist  in 
sending  company  after  company  along  that  same  road  to 
death  until  his  whole  army  was  extinct,  would  surely  incur 
guilt  under  either  charge.  Are  those  who  stand  higher  up 
less  responsible?  When  Americans  contend  with  Americans, 
a  small  disadvantage  turns  the  scale  and  invites  destruction. 
And  if  handicap  be  added  to  handicap  and  discouragement  to 
discouragement,  as  if  to  ensure  disaster,  what  then  is  the 
responsibility,  what  then  the  guilt?  McClellan's  respite  from 
worry  was  brief  indeed.  Not  even  a  second  night  of  surcease 
from  care  was  allowed  to  him. 

The  conditions  were  surely  dispiriting.  The  resources 
of  the  South  were  yet  undrained  and  its  spirit  was  unbroken. 
Its  armies  in  Virginia  were  large  and  led  by  the  best  military 
genius  of  the  South. 

125 


126  McCLELLAN 

Therefore  McClellan  knew  that  a  formidable  armament 
was  necessary  to  overcome  these  fierce  fighters  battling  on 
familiar  ground.  And  he  had  repeatedly  urged  this  necessity, 
but  without  success. 

The  conditions  which  made  a  great  army  essential  to  as 
sure  success  likewise  demanded  favorable  conditions  of  sea 
son.  Yet  he  was  forced  off  when  the  Peninsula  was,  and 
continued  to  be  through  all  his  campaign,  almost  a  bottomless 
mire. 

Cooperative  action  of  the  Union  armies  everywhere  was 
a  vital  element  in  General  McClellan's  scheme  of  operations, 
so  that  the  separated  forces  of  the  Confederacy  would  be 
kept  so  busy  at  every  point  that  not  a  man  could  be  safely 
withdrawn  from  one  point  to  strengthen  another.  Through 
the  reduction  of  his  authority,  the  power  to  secure  such  action 
was  lost;  and  as  the  result, — in  acknowledgment  of  his  mili 
tary  capacity,  as  we  will  see, — the  greatest  Southern  army 
ever  seen  in  Virginia  at  any  time  during  the  war  was  gath 
ered  from  every  quarter  to  oppose  him,  and  when  the  crisis 
was  over  these  troops  returned  to  their  various  stations. 
Worst  of  all,  he  was  prevented  from  availing  himself  and 
the  nation  of  the  united  strength  of  the  various  Union  armies 
that  were  scattered  senselessly  over  the  Old  Dominion.  If 
the  direction  of  these  forces  had  been  left  with  him,  he  could 
have  overcome  every  other  obstacle,  even  the  lack  of  rein 
forcements. 

All  these  elements  of  opposition  to  favorable  action  taxed 
his  patience,  fretted  his  spirit,  and  imperiled  his  operations 
to  the  utmost  limit,  but  as  he  was  confident  of  himself  and 
of  the  devotion  of  his  army,  hope  still  burned  brightly  in  him. 
At  last  his  vexations  were  over.  The  rest  lay  with  him  and 
the  army  he  had  created. 

An  essential  and  vital  part  of  his  plan  was  the  coopera 
tion  of  the  navy  in  overthrowing  the  hostile  batteries  on  the 
York  and  James  Rivers.  This  was  one  of  the  express  condi 
tions  on  which  the  council  of  March  I3th  had  approved  of 
the  movement.  In  approving  the  report  of  the  council  the 
President  endorsed  this  element  of  it,  and  as  the  navy  was 


McCLELLAN  127 

not  under  McClellan's  command  it  was  incumbent  upon  the 
Administration  to  arrange  for  and  secure  its  action,  or  rather 
to  direct  and  enforce  it,  for  here  a  valid  reason  existed  upon 
Mr.  Stanton's  theory  for  a  naval  order  requiring  the  neces 
sary  cooperation. 

To  his  amazement,  when  already  on  the  Peninsula,  General 
McClellan  found  that  the  naval  authorities  had  made  no 
preparations  to  assist  him,  and  had  not  been  directed  to  do  so. 
Even  if  this  was  merely  negligence,  it  is  difficult  temperately 
to  characterize  the  almost  criminal  lack  of  attention  and  total 
absence  of  interest  in  the  Peninsular  movement  which  made 
such  an  omission  possible. 

Stanton,  on  March  the  iQth,  wrote  that  Mr.  Lincoln  would 
go  immediately  to  Alexandria  to  confer  with  McClellan  about 
it ;  but  he  did  not  go.1 

"No  adequate  cooperation  of  the  navy  was  arranged  for 
or  apparently  contemplated  by  the  authorities."  2  "It  was 
at  first  intended  that  the  navy  should  cooperate,  but  incredible 
as  it  may  seem,  the  military  authorities  did  not  communicate 
with  those  of  the  navy,  so  the  latter  got  no  order  and  this 
part  of  the  plan  fell  through."  3 

With  his  characteristic  activity  and  attention  to  every  de 
tail,  General  McClellan  kept  this  matter  constantly  before  the 
mind  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  besides  sending  officers  directly 
to  Assistant  Secretary  Fox  of  the  Navy.  Ample  proof  of 
this  energy  and  diligence  will  be  found  in  volume  XI,  part  3, 
of  the  Official  Record,  on  pages  15,  18,  24,  and  28. 

It  was  the  dominant  military  authorities  to  whom  Mr. 
Formby  refers, — the  men  who  had  the  power  of  directing 
naval  action.  It  was  the  President,  counseled  and  advised 
by  the  great  military  strategist  Mr.  Stanton,  who  was  re 
sponsible  for  the  inaction  of  the  navy. 

Stanton's  sinister  acts  about  this  time  indicate  that  this 
was  but  one  of  many  methods  used  to  make  failure  certain, 
and  thereby  prove  that  the  coast  plan  of  attack  was  a  blunder. 

1  Official  Record,  XI,  3,  18. 

3  Dial,  XXXI,  319,  320. 

8  Formby,  A  merican  Civil  War,  108. 


128  McCLELLAN 

It  was  one  of  the  means  used  by  the  vindictive  and  relentless 
Secretary  to  destroy  McClellan  and  gratify  his  revenge. 

But  the  loss  of  the  expected  and  necessary  naval  coopera 
tion  was  not  the  only  nor  the  hardest  blow  dealt  at  McClel- 
lan's  hopes.  By  the  reduction  of  his  command,  he  lost  con 
trol  of  the  military  situation  as  a  whole.  The  army  he  de 
sired  and  should  have  had  was  not  given.  He  was  forced  to 
begin  operations  in  the  most  unfavorable  season  imaginable; 
still,  as  he  was  to  have  146,000  men  from  Washington  and 
10,000  more  from  Fortress  Monroe,  his  brave  heart  hoped 
for  good  results.  A  few  days  before  leaving  Washington 
the  President  had  an  interview  with  the  General  at  Alexandria, 
in  which  the  latter  was  told  that  a  strong  pressure  had  been 
brought  to  give  Blenker's  division  of  10,000  men  to  Fremont, 
but  the  President  stated  many  reasons  against  it  and  promised 
that  he  would  refuse  the  request.  The  outcome  of  this  mat 
ter,  like  that  of  countless  others,  proves  how  absolutely  Mr. 
Lincoln  was  in  the  hands  of  those  about  him,  and  especially 
of  the  astute  Minister  of  War  and  his  agencies ;  for  the  divi 
sion  of  Blenker,  despite  the  President's  promise,  was  with 
drawn,  and  the  army  which  was  already  too  small  for  its 
work,  was  thereby  despoiled  of  10,000  men;  but  the  Presi 
dent,  in  response  to  McClellan' s  remonstrance,  assured  him 
that  there  would  be  no  further  reduction.  The  withdrawal  of 
Blenker  left  136,000  men  as  the  starting  force,  to  be  aug 
mented  by  10,000  men  from  Fortress  Monroe,  making  146,000 
in  all. 

But  on  April  3d  he  was  informed  that  the  force  at  Fortress 
Monroe  and  the  fort  itself  were  removed  from  his  command. 
This  left  his  total  force  136,000  instead  of  156,000  as  at  first, 
of  which  only  about  53,000  were  yet  on  the  Peninsula.  On 
the  same  day,  just  at  the  time  when  it  was  most  necessary 
to  keep  up  the  strength  of  the  armies,  recruiting  was  discon 
tinued.  If  this  course  had  been  pursued  during  General 
Grant's  campaign  in  Virginia,  the  result  would  have  been 
most  disastrous  to  the  Union  cause,  but  the  recruiting  bu 
reaus  worked  diligently  to  fill  the  depleting  ranks,  and  40,000 
men  were  supplied  during  his  march  to  Richmond.  "But 


McCLELLAN  129 

more  astounding  than  all,  the  Secretary  of  War  had  actually 
issued  an  order  stopping  enlistments  of  volunteers,  and  this 
month  witnessed  the  anomalous,  extraordinary  spectacle  of 
disbanded  regiments  and  closed  recruiting  stations.  The  two 
great  rebel  armies  were  still  in  the  field,  while  the  Confeder 
ate  Government  had  completed  its  conscription,  which  em 
braced  all  able-bodied  men  between  eighteen  and  thirty-five, 
and  thus  more  than  doubled  its  military  force.  We,  in  the 
meantime,  were  losing  by  sickness,  wounds  and  death,  more 
than  ten  thousand  men  a  month,  and  the  great  decisive  battles 
were  yet  to  be  fought.  It  would  seem  that  our  victories  West 
had  deluded  the  Government  into  the  belief  that  the  war  was 
actually  over,  or  that  some  strange  hallucination  had  seized  it. 
The  Secretary  of  War  saw  the  rebel  army  doubling — ours 
rapidly  diminishing,  while  the  great  struggle  was  yet  to  take 
place,  and  despite  all  bade  the  people  who  were  rushing  to 
the  field,  lay  down  their  arms  and  go  home.  There  is  no 
occasion  to  go  any  farther,  to  account  for  the  disaster  that 
followed  the  two  acts,  one  taking  away  a  military  head  from 
the  army,  and  substituting  in  its  place  the  department  at  Wash 
ington — the  other,  reducing  the  army  in  the  presence  of  the 
enemy,  while  he  was  doubling  his  own — are  quite  sufficient 
without  seeking  other  causes  for  it.  They  cost  and  will  cost 
us  millions  of  treasure  and  tens  of  thousands  of  lives."  4 

This  prediction  made  in  1862  was  more  than  verified.  He 
might  have  truly  said  $2,700,000,000  of  treasure  and 
half  a  million  lives.  Surely  the  demons  of  malice  had  ex 
hausted  their  spleen  upon  McClellan.  The  lack  of  naval  aid 
meant  a  long  siege  of  Yorktown,  as  he  had  pointed  out  would 
be  the  case  in  the  letter  of  March  igth,  and  an  opportunity 
for  the  enemy  to  gather  their  forces  from  every  quarter.  If  he 
could  have  kept  his  plans  concealed,  he  would  have  landed 
at  Urbanna,  avoided  all  the  difficulties  of  the  Peninsula,  and 
interposed  between  Richmond  and  Johnston  while  the  latter 
was  still  at  Manassas;  and  now  all  that  he  strove  to  avoid 
would  be  charged  to  himself. 

The  supreme  blow  was  about  to  fall.    On  the  4th  of  April 

*  Headley,  Great  Rebellion,  459,  460- 


130  McCLELLAN 

he  was  officially  notified  that  practically  one-third  of  his  army, 
already  too  much  reduced,  would  be  retained  at  Washington 
for  the  defense  of  that  city. 

In  other  words,  to  the  force  of  more  than  83,000  men  in 
Washington  and  Northern  Virginia  easily  available  for  its 
defense  General  McDowell's  corps  of  40,000  men  was  now 
added,  reducing  the  army  which  was  to  be  156,000  to  96,000, 
of  which  only  about  85,000  were  available  as  soldiers. 

As  to  the  retention  of  McDowell's  corps,  Mr.  Headley 
says :  "The  time  for  apportioning  the  tremendous  amount  of 
guilt  that  belongs  somewhere  has  not  yet  come.  The  outline 
of  the  plan  sketched  above  is  not  given  to  settle  this,  but  to 
show  that  the  stupendous  failure  that  followed  was  inevitable 
— and  that  the  mad  attempt  of  moving  unsupported  on  Rich 
mond,  with  only  a  little  over  a  hundred  thousand  men  was 
never  contemplated  by  McClellan  or  his  fellow  comman 
ders."  5 

Mr.  Headley  very  forcibly  adds  and  the  italics  are  his : 
'The  truth  can  be  told  in  a  few  words :  McClellan  never  pro 
posed  or  promised  to  take  Richmond  with  the  forces  given 
him." 6  He  was  right,  for  the  experience  of  every  other 
commander  shows  that  it  was  not  possible. 

"The  government  tried  an  experiment  in  this  campaign 
which  we  believe  no  other  government  ever  dared  to  make. 
Having  an  army  of  over  two  hundred  thousand  men,  designed 
to  act  against  a  common  center,  Richmond — and  thus  occupy 
in  fact  one  great  battlefield — it  divided  it  up  into  independent 
corps  with  no  commander  in  chief  to  direct  the  movements 
of  the  whole  except  the  Secretary  of  War,  who  knew  less 
of  military  science  than  any  regular  colonel  in  the  field. 
.  .  .  It  was  one  of  the  most  stupendous  blunders  ever 
committed  by  a  great  nation."  7 

I  have  drawn  freely  from  Mr.  Headley's  history  because 
it  was  written  at  this  very  time,  and  so  shows  us  better  than 
any  other  the  people's  views  of  the  events  we  are  narrating. 

5  Headley,  Great  Rebellion,  384. 

'Ibid.,  421. 

''Ibid. 


McCLELLAN  131 

The  first  volume  of  his  book  was  published  November   i, 
1862. 

Mr.  Swinton  censures  the  Administration  very  strongly: 
"When  Mr.  Lincoln  saw  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  carried 
away  in  ships  out  of  his  sight,  and  learnt  that  hardly  twenty 
thousand  men  had  been  left  in  the  works  of  Washington 
(though  above  thrice  that  number  was  within  call),  it  is  not 
difficult  to  understand  how  he  should  have  become  nervous 
as  to  the  safety  of  the  national  capital,  and,  so  feeling,  should 
have  retained  the  corps  of  McDowell  to  guard  it.  In  this 
he  acted  from  what  may  be  called  the  common-sense  view  of 
the  matter.  But  in  war,  as  in  the  domain  of  science,  the 
truth  often  transcends,  and  even  contradicts,  common  sense. 
It  required  more  than  common  sense,  it  required  the  intuition 
of  the  true  secret  of  war,  to  know  that  the  twenty-five  thou 
sand  men  under  General  McDowell  would  really  avail  more 
for  the  defence  of  the  capital,  if  added  to  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  on  the  Peninsula,  thus  enabling  that  army  to  push 
vigorously  its  offensive  intent,  than  if  actually  held  in  front 
of  Washington.  This  Mr.  Lincoln  neither  knew  nor  could 
be  expected  to  know ;  and  it  is  precisely  because  the  principles 
that  govern  military  affairs  are  peculiar  and  of  a  professional 
nature,  that  the  interference  of  civilians  in  the  war-councils 
of  a  nation  must  commonly  be  disastrous.  The  President, 
who  found  himself  by  virtue  of  his  office  made  commander- 
in-chief  of  all  the  forces  of  the  United  States,  and  who  had, 
since  the  supersession  of  McClellan  as  general-in-chief,  as 
sumed  a  species  of  general  direction  of  the  war,  had  passed 
his  life  in  the  arena  of  politics ;  and  he  brought  the  habits  of 
a  politician  to  affairs  in  which,  unfortunately,  their  intrusion 
can  only  result  in  a  confusion  of  all  just  relations.  This 
antagonism  between  the  maxims  that  govern  politics  and  those 
that  govern  military  affairs,  is  strikingly  illustrated  in  a  sen 
tence  of  one  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  dispatches  to  General  McClellan 
about  this  time.  Referring  to  McClellairs  repeated  requests 
that  McDowell's  force  should  be  sent  him,  the  President  says : 
'I  shall  aid  you  all  I  can  consistently  with  my  view  of  due 


132  McCLELLAN 

regard  to  all  points.'  8  Nothing  could  be  more  naive  than 
this  statement  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  policy  of  an  equable  distribu 
tion  of  favors.  But  while  this  maxim  is  just  in  politics,  it  is 
fatal  in  war,  and  is  precisely  that  once-honored  Austrian 
principle  of  'covering  everything,  by  which  one  really  covers 
nothing.'  War  is  practical  and  imperious,  and  in  place  of 
having  'regard  to  all  points,'  it  neglects  many  points  to  accu 
mulate  all  on  the  decisive  point.  The  decisive  point  in  the 
case  under  discussion  was  assuredly  with  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  confronting  the  main  force  of  the  enemy.  The 
proof  of  this  was  not  long  in  declaring  itself."  9 

8  McClellan,  Report,  106. 

9  Swinton,  Campaigns  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  104,  105. 


CHAPTER    XXIV 

THE  DEFENSE  OF   WASHINGTON 

It  is  not  disputed  that  the  retention  of  McDowell's  corps 
was  the  work  of  Stanton,  and  the  pretext  for  this  crowning  act 
of  treachery  was  that  a  sufficient  garrison  had  not  been  left 
for  the  defense  of  Washington. 

Never  was  pretense  more  shallow  or  more  easily  exposed. 
We  have  seen  how  much  labor  General  McClellan  had  be 
stowed  on  the  project  of  making  the  city  secure  from  attack. 
"He  also  strengthened  the  fortifications  at  Washington  in  a 
way  that  made  their  conquest  forever  afterward  a  hopeless 
enterprise."  l  The  result  was  that  the  Southern  leaders  never 
thought  of  attacking  it  thereafter,  even  when  in  1864  its  cap 
ture  was  easily  possible.  So  McClellan's  purpose  was  per 
fectly  accomplished, — namely,  that  the  Capital  could  be  held 
safe  with  a  moderate  force,  thus  enabling  a  larger  number  to 
take  the  field  for  offensive  operations.  The  full  force  required 
to  hold  the  city  against  assault  was  30,000  men,  but  there  was 
no  reason  why  the  Administration  should  not  have  kept  50,- 
ooo  or  60,000  men  there,  if  it  had  been  so  desired.  Following 
the  feeble  "pepper-box"  policy,  Federal  armies  were  scattered 
over  Northern  Virginia.  Fremont  had  an  army  of  35,000, 
Banks  had  25,000,  Shields  and  Milroy  each  had  an  army  of 
15,000  or  20,000;  McDowell  had  an  army  of  40,000;  Wool 
had  10,000  men  and  Dix  at  Baltimore  had  an  army  of  10,- 
ooo  and  Wadsworth  had  an  army  of  20,000  in  the  Capital 
itself.  Moreover,  these  troops  could  have  been  increased  to 
any  extent  by  enlistment.  The  scattered  armies  served  only 
as  objects  of  attack,  and  their  reverses  were  constantly  creat 
ing  terror  in  Washington.  Swinton  truly  says :  "One  hardly 
wishes  to  inquire  by  whose  crude  and  fatuous  inspiration 

1  Eggleston,  History  of  the  Confederate  War,  I,  246. 

133 


134  M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  N 

these  things  were  done  .  .  .  these  detached  columns  in 
vited  destruction  in  detail.  Not  to  have  taken  advantage  of 
such  an  opportunity  would  have  shown  General  Johnston  to  be 
a  tyro  in  his  trade."  2  These  forces  should  have  been  con 
centrated  and  kept  in  touch  with  Washington  so  as  to  be  avail 
able  for  its  defense  whenever  required,  so  as  to  be  in  effect  its 
garrison. 

That  was  the  sensible  course  pursued  by  the  Confederates. 
No  considerable  army  was  ever  kept  in  Richmond ;  yet  no 
Northern  force  could  touch  it  without  overcoming  the  full 
strength  of  the  Army  of  Virginia.  So  practically  all  their 
military  resources  were  continuously  utilized,  and  no  North 
ern  army  ever  assaulted  Richmond.  Like  Norfolk,  it  was 
occupied  only  when  it  was  abandoned. 

Here  is  in  brief  the  case  for  Mr.  Stanton :  just  after  Gen 
eral  McClellan  had  embarked  he  sent  a  communication  to  the 
War  Department  which  caused  the  Secretary  great  alarm 
for  the  Capital ;  Mr.  Stanton  at  once  ordered  an  investigation 
and  found  that  there  were  only  19,022  men  left  to  garrison 
the  city;  that  this  number  was  wholly  insufficient,  as  a  full 
garrison  would  require  30,000  men,  and  the  President  on  his 
suggestion  then  issued  an  order  detaining  McDowell's  corps. 
One  of  the  surest  and  simplest  methods  of  detecting  a  false 
pretext  is  to  assume  its  truth,  carry  the  theory  out  to  its  logi 
cal  conclusion,  and  then  compare  that  conclusion  with  the 
actual  facts. 

It  is  obviously  a  very  serious  matter  when  a  commander 
has  started  on  a  campaign,  and  is  already  in  front  of  the 
enemy,  to  deprive  him  of  a  third  of  his  army.  Only  the  clear 
est  and  most  pressing  necessity  could  excuse  such  a  course. 
Such  a  necessity,  we  are  told,  existed  in  the  form  of  a  dan 
gerously  insufficient  garrison  to  utilize  properly  the  widely 
separated  and  extended  fortifications  of  the  National  capital ; 
some  of  which,  we  are  told,  would  have  been  entirely  empty. 
So  the  corps  of  General  McDowell  was  retained.  Apparently, 
the  alleged  shortage  in  the  garrison  was  about  11,000  men. 
What  was  the  sequel  of  that  retention  ?  Logically  and  surely 

2  Army  of  the  Potomac,  123. 


McCLELLAN  135 

in  theory  it  would  have  been  this,  that  immediately  after  the 
order  detaining  McDowell  another  order  would  have  been 
issued,  detaching  11,000  men  from  that  corps  and  adding 
them  to  the  force  under  General  Wadsworth,  to  make  the  gar 
rison  complete. 

No  such  order  was  ever  made.  It  does  not  appear  that 
a  regiment,  a  company,  or  a  man  of  that  corps  was  ever 
added  to  the  garrison.  This  fact  alone  demonstrates  beyond 
any  doubt  the  insincerity  and  falsity  of  Stanton's  pretense. 
But  further  demonstration  is  not  wanting.  Mr.  Stanton, 
being  a  zealous  patriot  and  wishing  to  do  what  he  could  to 
aid  the  cause  of  the  Union,  would  have  regretted  the  neces 
sity  of  needlessly  detaining  a  single  man  from  McClellan's 
command,  and  so  would  surely  have  kept  as  few  as  possible; 
and  as  11,000  at  most  were  needed  to  bring  the  garrison  up 
to  its  full  strength,  then  if  this  purpose  were  his  only  one, 
he  would  not  have  detained  40,000  men  to  accomplish  it.  He 
would  have  withheld  only  the  lacking  number  and  sent  the 
rest  on  to  Fortress  Monroe. 

But  that  is  not  all.  We  come  now  to  a  point  where  the 
gullibility  of  many  writers  is  simply  ludicrous, — namely,  the 
indignant  amazement  of  Mr.  Stanton  when  he  learned,  after 
McClellan  had  already  reached  the  Peninsula,  of  the  perilous 
weakness  of  the  garrison.  The  commander  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  is  to  these  writers  a  thief  slipping  off  in  the 
darkness,  with  his  master's  jewels  concealed  on  his  person. 
He  was  stealing  away  and  leaving  an  insufficient  garrison. 
But  the  faithful  watchdog  of  the  Capital  discovered  his  fell 
design  just  in  time  to  foil  it. 

It  follows,  then,  from  this  that  Mr.  Stanton  knew  noth 
ing  of  the  numbers  to  go  and  to  stay,  and  but  for  McClellan's 
report  would  have  discovered  too  late  the  actual  state  of  af 
fairs.  Indeed  it  takes  supreme  faith  to  close  one's  eyes  and 
mind  and  gulp  this  down;  but  many  have  done  so. 

Any  one  who  knows  anything  about  military  affairs  is 
aware  that  there  is  no  bookkeeping  so  punctilious  as  that  of 
an  army.  The  muster  rolls,  attendances  at  drills,  maneuvers, 
absences,  and  so  on  are  carefully  noted.  Where  are  these 


136  McCLELLAN 

records  kept?  Those  of  a  state  militia  are  in  the  custody 
of  the  adjutant-general;  those  of  the  Federal  armies,  in  the 
custody  of  the  War  Department.  Here  also  the  executive 
officer  is  called  the  adjutant-general,  but  he  is  no  more  than 
an  aide  to  the  Secretary  of  War.  The  same  methods  are 
used  with  respect  to  arms  and  ammunition  issued  and  to 
money  paid  to  soldiers  and  officers. 

If  an  experienced  writer  wished  in  time  of  war  to  ascer 
tain  the  strength  of  our  various  forces  in  the  field,  where 
would  he  go?  To  the  Secretary  of  War.  There  he  would 
get  the  desired  information  immediately,  if  the  Government 
was  willing. 

It  appears,  accordingly,  that  at  this  very  time  Mr.  Stan- 
ton  caused  a  tabulated  statement  of  the  strength  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  to  be  made  up  from  his  office  records  by  his 
clerks.3  So  the  pretext  that  the  Secretary  found  alarming 
news  of  the  state  of  Washington  from  McClellan's  letter  is 
incredible. 

8  Flower,  Edwin  McMasters  Stanton,  352. 


CHAPTER    XXV 

THE  DEFENSE  OF  WASHINGTON  CONTINUED 

Let  us  assume  that  in  fact  11,000  more  troops  were  im 
peratively  needed  in  Washington,  and  that  McDowell  had 
gone  to  the  Peninsula.  Fremont  had  35,000  men  and  Banks 
had  15,000  or  20,000,  and  Dix  10,000.  Is  it  not  evident  that 
rather  than  enfeeble  the  main  campaign,  Banks's  army  should 
have  been  taken  into  Washington  or  kept  so  near  as  to  be 
always  available?  As  was  repeatedly  proven  later,  the  surest 
way  of  securing  Washington  from  annoyance  by  the  enemy 
was  to  put  Richmond  in  danger.  This  lesson  should  have 
been  learned  when  without  a  shot  having  been  fired  the  mere 
anticipation  of  McClellan's  advance  by  the  coast  route  had 
cleared  the  Potomac  and  the  vicinity  of  Washington  of  the 
enemy. 

Knowing  at  all  times  the  disposition  and  number  of  the 
troops,  it  was  Mr.  Stanton's  business  to  know  how  many 
men  would  go  to  the  Peninsula  and  therefore  how  many 
would  remain.  Being  the  bookkeeper  and  auditor  of  the 
army,  it  is  certain  that  he  did  know,  but  it  is  specially  obvi 
ous  here,  for  the  transportation  of  the  troops  had  to  be  pro 
vided  for  under  the  order  of  February  27th,  and  this  was 
in  fact  managed  by  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  War,  Mr. 
Tucker.  To  convey  a  regiment  to  Fortress  Monroe  was  one 
thing;  to  convey  146,000  men  was  quite  a  different  thing. 
So  the  great  fact  for  Mr.  Tucker, — in  other  words,  for  the 
War  Department, — to  know  was:  for  how  many  transporta 
tion  must  be  provided. 

The  pretext  of  surprise  and  the  want  of  knowledge  are 
therefore  frivolous  and  transparently  false. 

It  is  clear  that  McDowell's  corps  was  needlessly  with 
drawn,  and  as  the  alleged  reason  was  the  weakness  of  the 

137 


138  McCLELLAN 

garrison,  and  as  the  garrison  was  not  enlarged,  it  is  equally 
clear  that  Stanton  knew  that  the  retention  was  needless;  and 
this  view  is  strengthened  by  the  retention  of  a  whole 
corps  of  40,000  or  more,  in  order  to  fill  up  the  garrison  to  its 
full  quota  with  11,000  men,  none  of  whom  were  ever  added 
to  it. 

The  assigned  reason  for  the  withholding  of  McDowell's 
corps  being  false  and  the  natural  consequences  being  so  serious 
to  the  lives  of  men  and  the  cause  of  the  Union,  the  natural 
suspicion  arises  that  the  action  was  dictated  by  a  fearful  malice 
and  designed  at  any  cost  to  destroy  every  chance  of  success. 
This  is  in  harmony  with  the  treatment  of  McClellan  as  a 
whole  after  Stanton's  advent  into  office;  for  in  the  brusque, 
undignified,  contemptuous,  and  indeed  disgraceful  conduct 
of  the  nation's  representatives,  in  the  total  absence  of  the  most 
ordinary  amenities  of  social  and  official  life  in  dealing  with 
General  McClellan,  we  seem  to  have  constantly  before  us, 
despite  all  his  craftiness  and  concealment,  the  disagreeable 
and  rasping  personality  of  Mr.  Stanton. 

The  retention  of  McDowell's  corps  was  just  such  another 
act  as  that  of  pushing  the  inadequate  army  out  into  the  rain 
and  the  swamps  in  the  midst  of  a  severe  winter;  an  act  of 
the  highest  turpitude  and  possessing  all  the  moral  guilt  of 
treason,  since  its  purpose  must  have  been  the  defeat  of  the 
army  and  the  useless  sacrifice  of  thousands  of  men  battling 
loyally  for  the  Union.  We  have  already  learned  from  his 
co-secretaries,  Mr.  Chase  and  Mr.  Welles,  whence  the  sinister 
inspiration  came, — namely,  from  Stanton's  hatred  and  his 
determination  to  get  rid  of  McClellan.  "Thus  within  four 
days,  the  commander  who  had  left  the  National  Capital  au 
thorized  to  execute  a  definite  campaign  with  certain  pre 
scribed  means  and  vested  with  the  control  of  the  forces, 
communications  and  supplies  upon  which  he  had  planned  for 
success,  found  himself  suddenly  shorn  of  every  element  of 
necessary  strength  and  reduced  to  the  hazardous  military 
necessity  of  a  radical  alteration  of  his  plans  while  in  contact 
with  the  enemy."  1 

1  Powell,  Fifth  Army  Corps,  40. 


McCLELLAN  139 

The  reason  given  at  the  time  for  McDowell's  retention 
was  an  insufficient  garrison  at  Washington.  Later  Mr.  Stan- 
ton  in  a  letter  to  Mr.  Dyer  2  gave  a  reason  which  did  no  credit 
to  his  astuteness, — namely,  that  McClellan  did  not  need  this 
corps  and  could  not  use  it.  But  Mr.  Lincoln  put  it  on  the 
ground  of  an  insufficient  security  for  Washington.3 

The  real  reason  is  obvious.  It  was  a  return  in  bad  faith, 
in  spite  of  all  that  had  been  done;  in  spite  of  councils  of  gen 
erals  and  pretended  assent  to  the  overland  route;  and  on  this 
line  McDowell  was  at  once  started  off.  It  should  be  remem 
bered  above  all  that  there  was  no  reason  why  the  Government 
should  not  have  had  100,000  men  to  garrison  Washington. 
That  rested  entirely  with  the  War  Department.  McClellan 
had  nothing  to  do  with  it.  The  Army  of  the  Potomac  should 
not  have  been  sent  off  until  troops  in  abundance  to  satisfy  the 
administration  had  been  gathered  for  the  safety  of  the  Capital. 
If  there  was  not  a  sufficient  garrison  on  the  ist  of  April,  in 
dependent  of  the  army  of  operations,  then  the  Government 
was  not  yet  ready  to  have  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  advance ; 
and  the  army  should  not  have  been  sent  away  until  the  garri 
son  was  sufficiently  strengthened  to  remove  all  uneasiness 
and  all  possibility  of  future  panic.  There  was  no  obstacle 
in  the  way,  for  the  men  who  feared  and  the  men  who  had  the 
power  to  collect  troops  were  the  same.  Very  few  writers 
fail  to  condemn  these  acts  of  the  Administration,  yet  many  are 
blind  to  their  full  significance  and  effect,  and  do  not  recognize 
the  conclusions  which  irresistibly  flow  from  them.  They 
censure  the  government  for  these  acts,  yet  they  censure  Mc 
Clellan  for  the  result  of  the  acts. 

Mr.  Formby  says :  "McClellan's  main  idea  had  always 
been  to  place  the  capital  beyond  the  danger  of  a  sudden  coup 
de  main  by  creating  a  system  of  strong  defensive  lines,  in 
which  a  sufficient  garrison  would  give  a  feeling  of  political 
and  civil  security,  leaving  the  whole  of  the  mobile  army  free 
for  offensive  operations,  but  unfortunately  there  was  no  point 
in  which  the  fears  of  the  politicians  hampered  the  conditions 


2  Flower,  Edwin  McMasters  Stanton,  60. 
8  Letters,  II,  252,  253. 


140  McCLELLAN 

of  the  war  more  than  in  this,  for  no  strength  of  line  or  gar 
rison  could  mitigate  their  panicky  terror  when  a  raid  was 
threatened,  but  they  must  insist  on  diverting  an  army  from 
its  proper  work,  even  if  the  success  of  an  important  campaign 
were  jeopardized  thereby."  4 
*  American  Civil  War,  108. 


CHAPTER   XXVI 

APPALLING  OBSTACLES 

To  have  a  clear  understanding  of  the  campaign  in  the 
Peninsula,  it  is  necessary  to  keep  constantly  in  view  all  the 
disheartening  interferences  with  McClellan' s  plan,  from  the 
appearance  of  Stanton  until  McClellan  found  himself  on  the 
Peninsula  with  less  than  two-thirds  of  the  force  on  which 
he  had  based  his  calculations. 

There  was,  then:  First,  the  failure  to  enlist  an  army 
adequate  to  the  task  of  crushing  the  rebel  forces  gathered  and 
gathering  in  Virginia.  Second,  the  enforced  opening  of  opera 
tions  in  that  swampy  region  in  the  midst  of  a  season  of  rain 
so  heavy  and  incessant  as  to  keep  the  country  soaked  and 
miry  throughout  the  whole  campaign  and,  without  excuse  or 
necessity,  forcing  the  army  to  start  "forty-six  days  earlier 
than  the  campaigns  of  either  1863  or  1864  were  opened."  J 
Third,  the  withdrawal  from  McClellan's  already  inadequate 
force,  under  political  pressure,  of  the  important  division  of 
Blenker, — 10,000.  Fourth,  the  lack  of  naval  assistance  al 
though  his  own  approbation  of  the  route  to  be  taken  and  the 
endorsement  of  it  by  the  council  of  generals  rested  as  an  indis 
pensable  condition  upon  the  active  and  militant  cooperation 
of  the  navy.  This  was  neither  provided  for  nor  was  Mc 
Clellan  ever  notified  before  he  started  that  he  would  not  have 
it,  and  he  had  every  reason  to  expect  it.  Fifth,  McClellan 
deemed  it  conducive  to  his  success  that  the  forces  of  the 
nation  should  everywhere  move  at  the  same  time,  so  that 
the  rebels  could  not  concentrate  on  him  from  all  the  South. 
He  deemed  it  still  more  essential  that  he  should  have  entire 
control  of  all  the  forces  in  Virginia.  By  a  series  of  orders 

1  Powell,  History  of  the  Fifth  Army  Corps,  38. 

141 


142  McCLELLAN 

all  control  except  of  the  Peninsular  army  was  wrested  from 
him.  Sixth,  ten  thousand  men  from  Fortress  Monroe  were 
to  join  his  army.  This  arrangement  was  not  only  rescinded 
but  Fortress  Monroe,  his  base,  was  removed  from  his  com 
mand.  Seventh,  McDowell's  fine  corps  of  40,000  men  had 
a  special  function, — namely,  to  accelerate  McClellan's  advance 
by  landing  beyond  Gloucester  Point  and  so  making  Yorktown 
untenable.  Of  this  he  was  deprived,  cutting  off  a  third  of 
his  expected  force.  Eighth,  the  concentration  of  the  enemy 
in  his  front  was  due  to  his  enforced  revelation  of  his  plans. 
If  he  had  been  allowed  to  keep  them  concealed,  he  would  have 
landed  his  army  at  Urbanna  and  interposed  it  between  John 
ston  and  Richmond  before  the  latter  had  left  Manassas. 
Ninth,  finally  the  discontinuance  of  the  recruiting  offices  was 
especially  vexatious  and  hostile,  in  view  of  the  depletion  of 
the  army  through  the  withdrawal  of  Blenker  and  McDowell. 
It  was  useless  for  McClellan  to  close  his  eyes  to  the  fact 
that  there  was  a  foe  behind  him  even  more  dangerous  than 
the  foe  in  front.  An  intent  to  make  success  impossible  for 
him  was  evident.  No  plausible  reason  for  this  apparently 
intense  hostility  was  ever  offered;  no  intimation  was  given 
in  advance;  no  consultation  was  ever  held;  no  explanation 
of  a  supposed  necessity  for  these  proceedings  was  ever  of 
fered,  and,  worst  of  all,  after  events  proved  that  he  was  right, 
no  regret  was  ever  expressed.  No  soothing  word  of  sym 
pathy  or  encouragement  was  ever  tendered.  The  manner 
of  the  performance  of  the  foe  behind  him  was  contemptuous, 
rasping,  galling,  brutal,  and  exasperating;  and  this  aids  us 
in  discovering  its  meaning  and  purpose.  We  can  now  better 
appreciate  the  obstacles  presented  by  the  field  of  operations 
and  the  forces  of  the  enemy.  If  General  McClellan  had  been 
able  to  keep  his  plans  secret  and  had  landed  at  Urbanna 
while  Johnston,  not  divining  his  intent,  was  still  at  Manassas, 
and  if  his  landing  had  been  in  midsummer,  with  every  condi 
tion  of  ground  and  weather  favorable,  still,  with  an  army  so 
diminished  and  inadequate  as  that  which  landed  upon  the 
Peninsula,  the  enterprise  would  have  been  hazardous  in  view 
of  the  numbers  and  fighting  qualities  of  the  Southerners, 


McCLELLAN  143 

stimulated  and  inspired  as  they  were  by  the  sentiment  that 
they  were  battling  on  their  own  soil. 

Or  if  McClellan  could  have  gone  directly  to  the  James 
and  established  his  army  close  to  Richmond  at  the  outset  as  he 
wished,  still,  with  a  force  so  diminished,  success  would  have 
been  imperiled,  until  his  army  had  been  sufficiently  enlarged 
to  meet  Lee's  forces  at  least  on  equal  terms.  Only  a  cir 
cumstance  hereafter  to  be  noted  afforded  any  hope  of  suc 
cess. 

He  was  so  beset  with  obstacles  at  the  time  of  which  we 
speak  that  all  hope  of  success  would  have  seemed  clearly  vain 
but  for  the  promise  of  Stanton  now  given  that  McDowell 
would  join  him  near  Richmond.2  The  new  conditions  impera 
tively  required  a  slow  and  cautious  advance  in  the  absence 
of  naval  aid  and  a  flanking  force;  and  in  this  conclusion 
the  hostile  attitude  of  the  War  Department  was  a  potent 
factor.  McClellan  realized  now  that  Mr.  Stanton's  opposi 
tion  to  the  coast  route  and  to  himself  as  its  exponent  and  ad 
vocate  had  reached  a  degree  which  was  in  effect  traitorous. 
To  ruin  McClellan  for  opposing  him,  he  wanted  the  expedition 
to  fail.  To  prove  that  the  coast  route  was  a  blunder  he  was 
willing  for  the  army  to  be  destroyed.  So  McClellan  felt,  and 
he  could  take  no  risk.  He  must  be  careful,  circumspect,  sure. 

To  all  the  elements  of  discouragement  already  mentioned 
an  additional  one  in  the  shape  of  a  formidable  natural  obstacle 
now  presented  itself.  The  Warwick  River  was  shown  on  the 
government  map  as  running  from  north  to  south,  nearly 
parallel  to  the  James  and  close  to  the  western  line  of  the 
Peninsula.  This  would  afford  a  favorable  territory  for  swiftly 
turning  and  investing  Yorktown.  But,  to  McClellan's  surprise 
and  dismay,  it  was  now  seen  that  the  Warwick  ran  almost  due 
west,  practically  from  the  very  walls  of  Yorktown  to  the 
James,  and  the  strong  defensive  works  of  Yorktown  extended 
to  its  banks.  "From  its  head  to  Lee's  Mill  the  Warwick  was 
flooded  by  means  of  artificial  inundations  which  rendered  it 
unfordable.  The  dams  constructed  for  this  purpose  were 
all  covered  by  strong  works  so  situated  as  to  be  unassailable 

1  Headley,  Great  Rebellion,  I,  384. 


144  McCLELLAN 

until  their  artillery  fire  was  reduced.  Below  Lee's  Mill  the 
river  was  a  tidal  stream,  not  fordable  at  any  stage  of  the 
tide.  That  portion  of  the  river,  moreover,  was  controlled 
by  the  fire  of  the  Confederate  gunboats  in  the  James  River. 
The  valley  of  the  Warwick  was  generally  low  and  swampy; 
the  approaches  to  the  dams  were  through  dense  forests  and 
deep  swamps,  and  every  precaution  had  been  taken  by  the 
enemy,  in  the  way  of  falling  timber  and  constructing  works 
to  make  a  crossing  as  difficult  as  possible."  3 

General  Barnard  in  his  report  of  May  6th  expressed  his 
recognition  of  these  natural  barriers  in  equally  forcible  terms, 
adding:  "If  we  could  have  broken  the  enemy's  line  across 
the  isthmus,  we  could  have  invested  Yorktown,  and  it  must, 
with  its  garrison,  have  soon  fallen  into  our  hands.  It  was 
not  deemed  practicable  to  do  so." 

The  defenses  of  Yorktown  were  in  themselves  very  for 
midable.  Two  thousand  negroes  had  been  employed  upon 
them  for  a  year,  and  they  were  considered  impregnable  by 
General  Johnston.4 

"The  fortifications  of  this  place  extended  entirely  across 
the  Peninsula  from  the  York  to  the  James  and  at  either  ex 
tremity  were  protected  by  batteries  of  immense  strength.  Spe 
cial  attention  had  been  given  to  them  by  the  rebels  from  the 
outset  of  the  war.  They  knew  it  was  the  most  direct  route 
to  Richmond,  and  hence  had  made  them,  as  they  supposed,  im 
pregnable.  Mounted  with  heavy  guns,  fronted  with  rifle  pits 
and  easy  of  access  to  the  whole  rebel  force  in  Virginia,  they 
presented  a  most  formidable  appearance."  5 

8  McClellan,  Own  Story,  272. 
4  Ellis,  United  States,  III,  980. 
6  Headley,  Great  Rebellion,  I,  380. 


CHAPTER    XXVII 

THE    STRENGTH    OF    THE    ENEMY 

By  what  forces  were  these  obstacles,  natural  and  artificial, 
backed  up?  Many  writers,  with  a  singular  and  tireless  per 
versity,  insist  on  the  baseless  statement  that  McClellan  with 
over  120,000  men  was  opposed  by  Magruder  with  only  15,000 
men.  When  General  McClellan  reached  the  Warwick  he  had 
less  than  40,000  men  available  for  attack.1  But  it  is  the  force 
of  the  enemy  that  we  are  concerned  with  here.  While  Gen 
eral  Johnston  was  still  at  Manassas  there  were  15,000  men 
at  Yorktown,  and  15,000  more  from  Norfolk  joined  them. 
This  force  of  30,000  was  under  General  Magruder.2  On 
January  loth,  1862,  when  Generals  McDowell  and  Franklin 
waited  on  the  President  at  his  request,  "The  Secretary  of 
State  gave  the  substance  of  some  information  he  considered 
reliable  ...  to  the  effect  that  the  enemy  had  20,000  men 
under  Huger  at  Norfolk;  30,000  at  Centreville;  and  in  all  in 
our  front,  an  effective  force,  capable  of  being  brought  up  at 
short  notice,  of  about  103,000  men."  3 

On  March  Qth  Johnston  left  Manassas,  to  go  where? 
Obviously  to  intercept  McClellan,  of  whose  movements  and 
of  all  other  matters  in  Washington  he  was  well  advised. 
"General  Johnston  interpreted  McClellan's  designs  aright  and 
was  transporting  his  army  to  the  peninsula  East  of  Richmond 
to  meet  his  adversary's  confidently  expected  advance  in  that 
quarter."4  General  Johnston  himself  gives  this  testimony: 
"I  did  not  doubt  that  this  route  would  be  taken  by  General 
McClellan,  as  it  would  be  most  difficult  to  meet.  I  moved  to 

1  McClellan,  Own  Story,  279. 

J  Battles  and  Leaders,  II,  202. 

8  Swinton,  Army  of  the  Potomac,  80. 

*  Eggleston,  History  of  the  Confederate  War,  I,  353. 

H5 


146  McCLELLAN 

be  ready  for  it,  as  well  as  to  unite  with  any  Confederate 
forces  that  might  be  sent  to  oppose  him,  should  the  movement 
by  the  Lower  Rappahannock  or  Fort  Monroe  be  adopted."  5 
So  when  Johnston  and  Magruder  had  united,  not  only  had 
they  a  great  advantage  in  their  position  behind  the  forts 
and  redoubts  from  Yorktown  to  the  James  and  the  morasses 
of  the  Warwick,  but  they  had  the  advantage  of  superior  effec 
tive  numbers  also;  but  that  was  not  all.  The  states  farther 
south  were  very  little  harassed  at  that  time  and  troops  were 
being  rushed  into  Virginia  from  them  all,  with  a  result  to  be 
shown  later.  I  am  astonished  at  the  silence  of  authors  gen 
erally  as  to  another  circumstance  of  the  greatest  moment  in 
judging  of  the  force  of  the  enemy  and  the  wisdom  of  Mc- 
Clellan's  movements.  As  soon  as  the  Peninsular  plan  of 
campaign  was  settled  upon  in  Washington,  it  appears  that 
"The  governor  of  Virginia  called  out  the  whole  militia  of  his 
state  estimated  to  amount  to  100,000  men.  The  governor 
had  previously  taken  steps  to  push  enlistments  of  troops  and 
under  the  influence  of  all  of  this  action,  the  reorganization 
of  the  army  went  on  with  a  vigor  and  heartiness  of  spirit  that 
resulted  in  an  earnest  and  efficient  body.  When  McClellan  at 
last  allowed  his  men  to  fight,  he  had  to  contend  with  a  large 
army  under  Johnston  and  Lee,  increased  by  resolute  free  re 
cruits  yet  with  enough  of  the  leaven  of  disciplined  soldiers 
to  maneuver  and  fight  like  veterans."  6 

Mr.  Formby  relates  that  "Johnston's  movement  at  exactly 
the  right  time  to  the  south  bank  of  the  Rappahannock  caused 
the  base  to  be  changed  to  Fort  Monroe  on  the  Peninsula, 
which  gave  the  Confederates  time  to  forestall  McClellan  there 
and  make  him  fight  his  way."  7 

The  Baltimore  American,  of  April  gth,  1862,  announced 
that  "Our  military  authorities  have  reliable  information  that 
Magruder's  force  up  to  last  night  was  60,000  and  still  being 
reinforced." 

On  March  i8th,  when  the  first  Union  troops  arrived  on 

6  Johnston,  Narrative,  25. 

6  Richmond  Examiner,  March  12,  1862. 

*  Civil  War,  107,  108;  Rhodes,  History  of  the  United  States,  III,  607. 


McCLELLAN  147 

the  Peninsula,  it  may  be  that  Magruder  had  a  comparatively 
small  force  on  the  Warwick,  but  through  his  excellent  in 
formation  bureau,  of  which  we  have  learned,  General  John 
ston  knew  that  the  commander  of  the  Union  Army  was  still 
in  Washington,  that  the  shipment  of  the  army  would  occupy 
two  weeks,  and  that  of  course  the  army  would  not  advance 
until  it  was  all  assembled  on  the  Peninsula,  as  it  would  be 
supreme  folly  to  send  on  a  vanguard  to  be  overwhelmed  by 
superior  forces.  In  a  few  days,  and  long  before  the  Federal 
forces  were  all  landed,  Johnston  had  joined  Magruder. 

In  view  of  all  this,  only  the  most  rabid  type  of  political 
fanaticism  or  absolute  ignorance  of  easily  accessible  and  un 
disputed  facts  can  account  for  the  statement  that  McClellan 
was  confronted  with  only  11,000  or  15,000  men,  or,  as  a  few 
say,  5,000.  However,  the  statement,  having  been  made  by 
many,  has  with  astonishing  gullibility  and  lack  of  sagacity 
and  inquiry  been  accepted  by  many  more,  who  have  erected 
upon  it  a  great  superstructure  of  false  and  absurd  conclusions. 
Assuming  that  the  enemy  had  only  15,000  men  and  that  Mc 
Clellan  had  120,000  to  hurl  upon  them,  the  conclusion  was 
then  easily  drawn  that  McClellan  was  timid,  fearful,  lacking  in 
energy  and  aggressiveness,  and  prone  to  gross  and  ridiculous 
exaggerations  of  the  enemy's  strength ;  and  this  conclusion 
then  became  a  source  of  erroneous  opinions  as  to  the  prior 
and  subsequent  acts  of  the  commander.  The  actual  facts 
being  approximately  known  as  above  stated,  we  discover  that 
the  reports  of  the  secret  service  department  were  substantially 
correct.  From  these  reports,  the  Confederate  forces  in  Vir 
ginia  on  March  the  I7th  amounted  to  150,000;  from  April 
the  7th  to  May  the  3d  (in  the  Peninsula),  to  from  100,000  to 
120,000,  "at  a  low  estimate."  Certain  writers  repeatedly 
allude  to  McClellan's  "absurd  and  preposterous  overestima- 
tion  of  the  foe,"  but  they  do  not  mention,  nor  does  the  most 
industrious  and  careful  search  reveal  a  single  case  where  he 
made  any  estimation  of  the  foe.  He  acted  upon  official 
advices.  The  Government  relied  upon  and  acted  upon  the 
same  advices.  Allan  Pinkerton,  who  was  in  charge  of  that 


148  McCLELLAN 

department,  stoutly  asserted  and  defended  the  accuracy  of 
the  reports  more  than  twenty  years  later. 

General  Webb,  a  biased  critic,  admits  that  General  McClel- 
lan  was  bound  to  act  upon  these  official  advices.8     All  the 
general  officers  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  were  averse  to  an 
attempt  to  force  the  passage  of  the  Warwick  or  to  a  direct  at 
tack  upon  the  formidable  defenses  of  Yorktown.    We  are  told 
that  "the  Grant  of  Donelson"  would  not  have  been  delayed 
by  the  morasses  of  the  Warwick  nor  by  the  handful  of  Con 
federates  behind  it,  but  this  view  does  little  credit  to  the 
shrewdness  and  sagacity  of  the  final  leader  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac.     From  a  thoughtful  study  of  his  bent  of  mind, 
I  feel  sure  that  General  Grant  would  never  have  found  it 
necessary  to  enter  upon  the  consideration  of  so  hazardous  an 
enterprise.    In  the  first  place,  even  if  he  had  been  sure  it  was 
the  best  route,  he  would  have  abandoned  the  project,  as  he 
did  abandon  it  two  years  later,  to  avoid  the  displeasure  and 
to  secure  the  approbation  of  the  President  and  the  War  De 
partment.     In  the  next  place,  if  by  misapprehension  he  had 
found  himself  at  Fortress  Monroe  denuded  of  more  than  one- 
third  of  his  expected  force,  stripped  of  the  cooperation  of  the 
navy,  and  with  the  expedition  thus  robbed  of  every  reasonable 
hope  of  success,  I  am  sure  he  would  at  once  have  rushed  back 
to  Washington  and  have  had  a  heart-to-heart  talk  with  the 
President.     He  would  have  made  Mr.  Lincoln  understand 
the  virtual  treason  of  the  attitude  of  the  Administration  and 
that,  as  the  head  of  the  Government,  the  President  could  not 
hope  to  escape  all  the  blame,  no  matter  how  little  he  was  per 
sonally  responsible,  and  he  would  have  convinced  him  that  to 
advance  with  a  force  so  inadequate  for  its  purpose  was  to  en 
sure  its  destruction.     He  would  have  convinced  him  that  the 
only  sane  course  was  to  bring  an  array  of  war  vessels,  as  he 
should  have  done  before,  to  open  the  York  and  James  Rivers, 
and  at  the  same  time  to  resume  enlistments,  hurry  enough 
men  into  the  Capital  to  give  confidence  to  the  weak  hearts  who 
ruled  it,  and  then  forward  McDowell's  men  and  as  many  more 
as  could  be  spared  to  carry  out  the  commander's  plan  in  con- 
9  The  Peninsula,  181. 


McCLELLAN  149 

junction  with  the  navy.  As  he  and  Lincoln  were  both  West 
erners,  of  similar  modes  of  thought  and  of  nearly  the  same 
age,  he  would  no  doubt  have  won  the  President  over  to  his 
views;  and  if  he  had  not,  he  would  have  considered  the  cam 
paign  hopelessly  lost  because  of  the  bad  faith  of  the  Govern 
ment,  and  would  have  abandoned  it  and  taken  the  overland 
route. 

A  letter  of  General  Keyes,  one  of  the  corps  commanders, 
throws  so  much  light  upon  the  condition  of  affairs  at  this 
time  that  it  should  receive  the  most  careful  consideration  of 
the  reader. 

"HEADQUARTERS,  4TH  CORPS, 

"WARWICK  COURT-HOUSE,  VA., 

"April  7,  1862. 

"Mv  DEAR  SENATOR  :  The  plan  of  campaign  on  this  line 
was  made  with  the  distinct  understanding  that  four  army  corps 
should  be  employed,  and  that  the  navy  should  co-operate  in 
the  taking  of  Yorktown,  and  also  (as  I  understood  it)  sup 
port  us  on  our  left  by  moving  gunboats  up  James  river. 

"To-day  I  have  learned  that  the  ist  corps,  which  by  the 
President's  order  was  to  embrace  four  divisions,  and  one  di 
vision  (Blenker's)  of  the  2d  corps,  have  been  withdrawn  alto 
gether  from  this  line  of  operations  and  from  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac.  At  the  same  time,  as  I  am  informed,  the  navy 
has  not  the  means  to  attack  Yorktown,  and  is  afraid  to  send 
gunboats  up  James  river  for  fear  of  the  Merrimac. 

"The  above  plan  of  campaign  was  adopted  unanimously 
by  Maj.-Gen.  McDowell  and  Brig.-Gens.  Sumner,  Heintzel- 
man,  and  Keyes,  and  was  concurred  in  by  Maj.-Gen.  McClel- 
lan,  who  first  proposed  Urbanna  as  our  base. 

"This  army  being  reduced  by  forty-five  thousand  troops, 
some  of  them  among  the  best  in  the  service,  and  without  the 
support  of  the  navy,  the  plan  to  which  we  are  reduced  bears 
scarcely  any  resemblance  to  the  one  I  voted  for. 

"I  command  the  James  river  column,  and  I  left  my  camp 
near  Newport  News  the  morning  of  the  4th  instant.  I  only 
succeeded  in  getting  my  artillery  ashore  the  afternoon  of  the 


150  McCLELLAN 

day  before,  and  one  of  my  divisions  had  not  all  arrived  in 
camp  the  day  I  left,  and  for  the  want  of  transportation  has 
not  yet  joined  me.  So  you  will  observe  that  not  a  day  was  lost 
in  the  advance,  and  in  fact  we  marched  so  quickly  and  so 
rapidly  that  many  of  our  animals  were  twenty-four  and  forty- 
eight  hours  without  a  ration  of  forage.  But,  notwithstand 
ing  the  rapidity  of  our  advance,  we  were  stopped  by  a  line 
of  defense  nine  or  ten  miles  long,  strongly  fortified  by  breast 
works,  erected  nearly  the  whole  distance  behind  a  stream  or 
succession  of  ponds,  nowhere  fordable,  one  terminus  being 
Yorktown  and  the  other  ending  in  the  James  river,  which  is 
commanded  by  the  enemy's  gunboats.  Yorktown  is  fortified 
all  around  with  bastioned  works,  and  on  the  waterside  it  and 
Gloucester  are  so  strong  that  the  navy  are  afraid  to  attack 
either. 

"The  approaches  on  one  side  are  generally  through  low, 
swampy,  or  thickly  wooded  ground,  over  roads  which  we  are 
obliged  to  repair  or  to  make  before  we  can  get  forward  our 
carriages.  The  enemy  is  in  great  force,  and  is  constantly  re 
ceiving  reinforcements  from  the  two  rivers.  The  line  in  front 
of  us  is  therefore  one  of  the  strongest  ever  opposed  to  an 
invading  force  in  any  country. 

"You  will,  then,  ask  why  I  advocated  such  a  line  for  our 
operations?  My  reasons  are  few,  but,  I  think,  good. 

"With  proper  assistance  from  the  navy  we  could  take 
Yorktown,  and  then  with  gunboats  on  both  rivers  we  could 
beat  any  force  opposed  to  us  on  Warwick  river,  because  the 
shot  and  shell  from  the  gunboats  would  nearly  overlap  across 
the  Peninsula;  so  that  if  the  enemy  should  retreat — and  re 
treat  he  must — he  would  have  a  long  way  to  go  without  rail 
or  steam  transportation,  and  every  soul  of  his  army  must 
fall  into  our  hands  or  be  destroyed. 

"Another  reason  for  my  supporting  the  new  base  and  plan 
was  that  this  line,  it  was  expected,  would  furnish  water 
transportation  nearly  to  Richmond. 

"Now,  supposing  we  succeed  in  breaking  through  the  line 
in  front  of  us,  what  can  we  do  next?  The  roads  are  very 
bad,  and  if  the  enemy  retains  command  of  James  river,  and 


McCLELLAN  151 

we  do  not  first  reduce  Yorktown,  it  would  be  impossible  for 
us  to  subsist  this  army  three  marches  beyond  where  it  is  now. 
As  the  roads  are  at  present,  it  is  with  the  utmost  difficulty 
that  we  can  subsist  it  in  the  position  it  now  occupies. 

"You  will  see,  therefore,  by  what  I  have  said,  that  the 
force  originally  intended  for  the  capture  of  Richmond  should 
be  all  sent  forward.  If  I  thought  the  four  army  corps  neces 
sary  when  I  supposed  the  navy  would  co-operate,  and  when  I 
judged  of  the  obstacles  to  be  encountered  by  what  I  learned 
from  maps  and  the  opinions  of  officers  long  stationed  at 
Fort  Monroe,  and  from  all  other  sources,  how  much  more 
should  I  think  the  full  complement  of  troops  requisite  now 
that  the  navy  cannot  co-operate,  and  now  that  the  strength 
of  the  enemy's  line  and  the  number  of  his  guns  and  men  prove 
to  be  almost  immeasurably  greater  than  I  had  been  led  to 
expect !  The  line  in  front  of  us,  in  the  opinion  of  all  military 
men  here  who  are  at  all  competent  to  judge,  is  one  of  the 
strongest  in  the  world,  and  the  force  of  the  enemy  capable  of 
being  increased  beyond  the  numbers  we  now  have  to  oppose 
to  him.  Independently  of  the  strength  of  the  lines  in  front 
of  us,  and  of  the  force  of  the  enemy  behind  them,  we  cannot 
advance  until  we  get  command  of  either  York  river  or  James 
river.  The  efficient  co-operation  of  the  navy  is,  therefore, 
absolutely  essential,  and  so  I  considered  it  when  I  voted  to 
change  our  base  from  the  Potomac  to  Fort  Monroe. 

"An  iron-clad  boat  must  attack  Yorktown;  and  if  several 
strong  gunboats  could  be  sent  up  James  river  also,  our  success 
will  be  certain  and  complete,  and  the  rebellion  will  soon  be 
put  down. 

"On  the  other  hand,  we  must  butt  against  the  enemy's 
works  with  heavy  artillery  and  a  great  waste  of  time,  life,  and 
material. 

"If  we  break  through  an  advance,  both  our  flanks 
will  be  assailed  from  two  great  watercourses  in  the  hands  of 
the  enemy;  our  supplies  would  give  out,  and  the  enemy,  equal, 
if  not  superior,  in  numbers,  would,  with  the  other  advantages, 
beat  and  destroy  this  army. 

"The  greatest  master  of  the  art  of  war  has  said  that  'if 


152  McCLELLAN 

you  would  invade  a  country  successfully,  you  must  have  one 
line  of  operations  and  one  army,  under  one  general.'  But 
what  is  our  condition  ?  The  State  of  Virginia  is  made  to  con 
stitute  the  command,  in  part  or  wholly,  of  some  six  generals, 
viz. :  Fremont,  Banks,  McDowell,  Wool,  Burnside,  and  Mc- 
Clellan,  besides  the  scrap,  over  the  Chesapeake,  in  the  care  of 
Dix. 

"The  great  battle  of  the  war  is  to  come  off  here.  If  we 
win  it  the  rebellion  will  be  crushed.  If  we  lose  it  the  conse 
quences  will  be  more  horrible  than  I  care  to  foretell.  The 
plan  of  campaign  I  voted  for,  if  carried  out  with  the  means 
proposed,  will  certainly  succeed.  If  any  part  of  the  means 
proposed  are  withheld  or  diverted,  I  deem  it  due  to  myself 
to  say  that  our  success  will  be  uncertain. 

"It  is  no  doubt  agreeable  to  the  commander  of  the  ist 
corps  to  have  a  separate  department,  and,  as  this  letter  advo 
cates  his  return  to  Gen.  McClellan's  command,  it  is  proper  to 
state  that  I  am  not  at  all  influenced  by  personal  regard  or  dis 
like  to  any  of  my  seniors  in  rank.  If  I  were  to  credit  all 
the  opinions  which  have  been  poured  into  my  ears,  I  must 
believe  that,  in  regard  to  my  present  fine  command,  I  owe 
much  to  Gen.  McDowell  and  nothing  to  Gen.  McClellan.  But 
I  have  disregarded  all  such  officiousness,  and  I  have  from  last 
July  to  the  present  day  supported  Gen.  McClellan  and  obeyed 
all  his  orders  with  as  hearty  a  good-will  as  though  he  had 
been  my  brother  or  the  friend  to  whom  I  owed  most.  I 
shall  continue  to  do  so  to  the  last  and  so  long  as  he  is  my 
commander,  and  I  am  not  desirous  to  displace  him,  and  would 
not  if  I  could.  He  left  Washington  with  the  understanding 
that  he  was  to  execute  a  definite  plan  of  campaign  with  certain 
prescribed  means.  The  plan  was  good  and  the  means  suffi 
cient,  and,  without  modification,  the  enterprise  was  certain  of 
success.  But,  with  the  reduction  of  force  and  means,  the 
plan  is  entirely  changed,  and  is  now  a  bad  plan,  with  means 
insufficient  for  certain  success. 

"Do  not  look  upon  this  communication  as  the  offspring  of 
despondency.  I  never  despond ;  and  when  you  see  me  working 


McCLELLAN  153 

the  hardest  you  may  be  sure  that  fortune  is  frowning  upon 
me.     I  am  working  now  to  my  utmost. 

"Please  show  this  letter  to  the  President,  and  I  should 
like  also  that  Mr.  Stanton  should  know  its  contents.  Do  me 
the  honor  to  write  to  me  as  soon  as  you  can,  and  believe 
me,  with  perfect  respect, 

"Your  most  obedient  servant, 

"E.  D.  KEYES, 

"Brig.-Gen.  Commanding  4th  Army  Corps. 
"HoN.  IRA  HARRIS, 
"U.  S.  SENATE." 


CHAPTER    XXVIII 

EXASPERATING    TREATMENT 

General  McClellan  says  of  his  situation  at  this  time: 
"Thus,  instead  of  operating  with  an  army  of  156,000  men 
under  my  immediate  command,  with  control  of  all  the  forces, 
supplies  and  operations  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Alleghanies, 
and  from  the  North  Carolina  line  to  New  York,  I  was  reduced 
to  85,000  men  (effectives)  and  a  little  strip  of  ground.  My 
bases  of  operations  at  Washington  and  Fortress  Monroe  were 
both  removed  from  my  control  and  I  remained  simply  with 
my  85,000  men  and  not  even  (in  control  of)  the  ground  they 
occupied  until  I  passed  beyond  White  House.  Add  to  this 
consideration  that  I  had  now  only  too  good  reason  to  feel 
assured  that  the  administration,  and  especially  the  Secretary 
of  War,  were  inimical  to  me  and  did  not  desire  my  success, 
and  some  conception  may  be  formed  of  the  weight  upon  my 
mind  at  the  time  when  whatever  hopefulness  and  vigor  I 
possessed  were  fully  needed  to  overcome  the  difficulties  in  my 
path."  1 

The  very  object  and  essential  functions  of  the  War  De 
partment  make  it  inconceivable  that  any  unforeseen  emer 
gency  should  have  compelled  the  retention  of  McDowell's 
corps, — a  third  of  the  army.  But  let  us  assume  that  the 
retention  was  actually  unforeseen  and  unavoidable;  then  it 
seems  to  me  clear  that  its  effect  was  to  make  the  campaign  so 
obviously  perilous  that  the  same  order  which  detached  Mc 
Dowell's  corps  should  have  directed  the  army  to  remain  at 
Fortress  Monroe  until,  through  the  arrival  of  sufficient  new 
levies,  the  detached  troops  could  be  forwarded. 

Having  blundered  in  forcing  McClellan  into  the  bogs  of 
the  Peninsula  in  a  most  inclement  season  and  long  before  the 

1  McClellan,  Own  Story,  241. 

154 


McCLELLAN  155 

administration  had  gathered  a  sufficient  force  to  send  forth 
an  adequate  invading  army,  if  they  had  been  sincere  and 
acting  in  entirely  good  faith,  the  ruling  powers  would  have 
sympathized  with  the  crippled  condition  in  which  they  had 
put  him;  and,  knowing  from  their  daily  advices  of  the  great 
and  rapidly  increasing  strength  of  the  enemy,  they  would 
have  been  most  anxious  for  the  safety  of  his  army,  and  would 
have  urged  him  to  avoid  every  risk  until  he  could  be  suffi 
ciently  strengthened  to  accord  some  reasonable  prospect  of  suc 
cess  in  a  forward  movement. 

But  in  no  point  of  McClellan's  military  career  does  the 
culpable  and  unpatriotic  attitude  of  the  Administration  more 
strikingly  appear  than  here.  The  inadequacy  of  his  force, 
the  lack  of  naval  cooperation,  the  constant  downpour,  the 
morasses,  the  intrenched  and  booming  Warwick,  the  formi 
dable  works  of  Yorktown,  and  the  incomplete  transfer  of  even 
the  two-thirds  of  the  army  still  allowed  to  McClellan  were 
all  more  than  ignored;  for  he  was  insolently  goaded  on 
when  less  than  50,000  effectives  had  arrived,  as  if  he  had  ideal 
weather,  roads  of  adamant,  a  clear,  dry,  firm  plain  to  operate 
upon,  no  obstacle  save  an  inconsiderable  force  of  the  enemy 
in  front,  and  at  his  command  the  full  army  and  equipment 
he  had  originally  requested. 

Nothing  but  McClellan's  intense  patriotism  and  military 
ardor, — his  desire  to  be  of  service  to  his  country, — kept  him 
from  resigning.  The  situation  proves  incontestably  that  the 
commander  was  wholly  wanting  in  the  arts  and  crafts  of  the 
politician.  All  experienced  politicians,  I  am  sure,  will  agree 
that  if  he  had  been  versed  in  such  matters  he  would  have 
recognized  that  his  campaign  was  absolutely  and  permanently 
blocked  by  the  hostility  of  the  Government,  unless  he  could 
change  their  attitude  into  one  of  warm  support. 

And  he  would  have  recognized  also  that  the  tools  to  ac 
complish  this  laudable  object  were  in  his  own  hands.  He 
would  have  appreciated  how  potent  a  factor  in  his  vexations 
was  the  timidity  of  the  insolent  civilians.  He  would  have 
realized  that  that  man  in  Washington  with  the  dagger  in 
his  vest  was  afraid  of  his  own  shadow,  afraid  of  the  foe, 


156  McCLELLAN 

but  afraid  too  of  the  presence  of  the  army  and  its  com 
mander  in  the  city,  and  that  he  was  feverishly  eager  to  start 
them  off  and  delighted  when  they  were  gone.  He  would 
have  known  too  that  it  was  merely  a  phase  of  this  timidity 
which  prevented  the  President,  influenced  by  Stanton,  from 
throwing  him  out, — that  it  was  the  fear  of  public  indignation 
only  which  stayed  the  official  hand.  The  generals  had  en 
dorsed  him.  To  remove  him  then  would  have  been  too  daring 
a  performance.  It  were  better  to  gain  the  purpose  furtively 
and  gradually.  And,  observing  this  panicky  terror  of  many 
things,  McClellan  would  have  used  his  knowledge  for  his 
own  protection  and  his  country's  welfare.  It  was  a  prime 
opportunity. 

He  would  have  written  a  letter  stating  without  heat  or 
comment  the  long  array  of  facts  demonstrating  the  personal 
enmity  of  Mr.  Stanton  and  Mr.  Lincoln,  and  at  the  same 
time  showing  the  wisdom  of  his  own  course;  he  would  have 
declined  to  take  part  in  the  slaughter  of  his  soldiers,  which 
he  would  have  pointed  out  would  certainly  ensue  if  the  pro 
posed  campaign  were  persisted  in,  and  he  would  have  ten 
dered  his  resignation,  for  the  sake  of  his  army,  that  the  Gov 
ernment  might  select  a  leader  who  would  enjoy  the  friend 
ship  and  cordial  support  of  the  Administration.  He  would 
have  had  this  letter  reach  Baltimore,  Philadelphia,  and  New 
York  on  the  same  day  that  it  reached  Washington,  in  order 
that  it  might  appear  with  flaming  headlines  in  the  press  of  the 
country  the  next  morning,  before  any  action  could  have  been 
taken  upon  the  resignation;  and  it  would  have  raised  such 
an  outcry  of  indignation,  because  of  its  calm  marshaling  of 
indisputable  facts,  and  would  have  so  imperiled  the  political 
fortunes  of  those  who  were  doing  more  harm  to  the  Union 
than  were  all  the  armies  of  Dixie,  that  those  who  know  the 
game  will  agree  that  in  all  reasonable  probability  his  enemies 
in  Washington  would  no  longer  have  regarded  General  Mc 
Clellan  as  an  easy  and  helpless  victim,  but  would  have  felt 
it  imperative  to  satisfy  and  pacify  him,  to  secure  the  with 
drawal  of  his  resignation,  and  to  induce  him  to  make  a  public 
announcement  that  the  relations  between  him  and  them  had 


McCLELLAN  157 

been  amicably  adjusted.  But  the  more  one  is  convinced  of 
his  rare  military  talent,  the  more  evident  is  his  inexperience, 
which  the  Comte  de  Paris  noted,  in  dealing  with  crafty  men. 

We  can  easily  imagine  the  air  of  the  Peninsula  becoming 
misty  with  imprecations  if  General  Sheridan  or  General  Sher 
man  or  even  the  cooler  General  Grant  had  been  in  McClel- 
lan's  shoes  when  he  received  the  following  appreciative  and 
consoling  letter  from  the  President :  "I  suppose  the  whole 
force  which  has  gone  forward  to  you  is  with  you  by  this 
time,  and  if  so  I  think  it  is  the  precise  time  for  you  to  strike 
a  blow.  By  delay  the  enemy  will  steadily  gain  on  you;  that 
is,  he  will  gain  faster  by  fortifications  and  reinforcements 
than  you  by  reinforcements  alone.  And  once  more  let  me 
tell  you,  it  is  indispensable  to  you  that  you  strike  a  blow. 
I  am  powerless  to  help  this.  You  will  do  me  the  justice  to 
remember  that  I  always  insisted  that  going  down  the  bay  in 
search  of  a  field  instead  of  fighting  at  or  near  Manassas,  was 
only  shifting  and  not  surmounting  a  difficulty;  that  we  would 
find  the  same  enemy  and  the  same  or  equal  entrenchments  at 
either  place.  The  country  will  not  fail  to  note,  is  now  noting, 
that  the  present  hesitation  to  move  upon  an  entrenched  en 
emy  is  but  the  story  of  Manassas  repeated.  I  beg  to  assure 
you.  .  .  .  But  you  must  act." 2 

This  letter  is  an  exhibition  of  flagrant  and  indefensible 
insolence.  No  letter  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  ever  did  him  so  little 
credit,  but  of  course  it  came  from  Stanton's  instigation.  To 
appreciate  its  folly,  one  must  bear  in  mind  the  unanimity  of 
the  best  military  authorities  in  approving  of  McClellan's  plan 
of  campaign.  One  should  also  bear  in  mind  the  apparent 
treachery  of  the  Administration  in  depriving  him  of  control 
of  the  entire  field  of  operations,  such  as  General  Grant  had 
later,  and  in  robbing  him  of  one-third  of  his  army  and  of 
the  indispensable  aid  of  the  navy,  thus  crippling  and  en 
feebling  him  in  such  a  way  as  to  compel  a  delay.  He  had 
predicted  that  if  naval  aid  were  not  supplied  delay  would  be 
inevitable,  and  because  of  it  he  was  chafing  like  a  caged 
tiger. 

3  McClelljin,  Own  Story,  276. 


158  McCLELLAN 

If  there  was  ever  a  time  when  provocation  could  make 
profanity  commendable  it  was  then.  The  situation  demanded 
from  the  Government  a  letter  of  apology  for  not  having  done 
its  part,  a  letter  of  regret  and  of  sympathy,  instead  of  which 
the  situation  was  treated  as  demonstrating  the  folly  of  the 
coast  plan,  and  the  commander  was  treated  as  if  there  was 
no  reason  in  the  world  save  cowardice  why  he  should  not 
have  marched  straight  into  Richmond.  There  are  times  when 
patience  is  mistaken  for  weakness  and  invites  contempt,  and 
when  even  prayers  must  be  supplemented  by  endeavor.  When 
the  boat  is  drifting  toward  the  falls  the  boatman  should  take 
vigorously  to  his  oars,  and  he  should  not  imagine  that  the 
most  fervent  prayer  will  be  a  sufficient  substitute. 

This  letter  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  instead  of  being  borne  in 
silence  as  it  apparently  was,  demanded  a  hot  and  caustic  re 
sponse,  exposing  its  injustice  and  insolence  and  lodging  the 
responsibility  where  it  rightly  belonged.  If  at  this  time  Mc- 
Clellan  had  truly  measured  the  deadly  malice  of  Stanton  and 
the  necessity  for  protecting  himself  and  his  soldiers,  that  let 
ter  would  have  received  a  prompt  reply  exposing  the  hand 
of  Stanton,  and  care  would  have  been  taken  that  both  letter 
and  answer  should  reach  the  public.  Let  us  suppose  that  the 
General  had  replied  to  the  President  in  this  manner :  "Dear 
Sir :  As  you  are  well  aware,  there  has  been  no  hesitation 
on  my  part  and  no  lack  of  activity.  That  we  are  not  far 
on  our  way  is  clue  to  the  act  of  the  Government  by  which 
the  army,  none  too  large  for  its  purpose  when  at  its  full 
strength,  has  lost  more"  than  one-third  of  its  force  and  to 
the  fact  that  the  Government  has  failed  to  give  me  the  co 
operation  of  the  navy,  which  was  an  indispensable  factor  in 
the  plan  of  campaign.  The  Warwick  and  its  swamps  from 
Yorktown  to  the  James  make  an  obstacle  so  impassable  that 
with  a  much  smaller  force  than  I  now  have  I  would  confi 
dently  engage  to  destroy  the  whole  rebel  army  in  Virginia,  if 
it  should  attempt  to  cross  it. 

"As  your  official  advices  assure  you,  the  Confederate 
forces  are  already  superior  to  ours  and  are  constantly  increas 
ing.  To  attempt  to  cross  the  flooded  Warwick  under  present 


McCLELLAN  159 

circumstances  would,  in  my  opinion,  be  a  foolhardy  enter 
prise — one  doomed  to  inevitable  failure. 

"If  the  attempt  is  made,  it  must  be  upon  your  imperative 
order,  leaving  me  no  discretion.  The  army  and  its  officers 
will  do  their  best,  and  they  will  acquit  themselves  bravely, 
but  beyond  doubt  the  result  will  be  an  inexcusable  slaughter. 
The  army  will  be  destroyed,  and  you  will  have  to  bear  the 
whole  blame  of  the  disaster,  if  you  order  the  advance  after 
having  been  thus  fully  informed.'' 

If  such  a  letter  had  been  written,  no  one  who  has  atten 
tively  studied  the  characters  of  the  President  and  of  Mr. 
Stanton  will  believe  that  Mr.  Stanton  could  have  persuaded 
Mr.  Lincoln  to  take  such  a  responsibility  or  that  Mr.  Stan- 
ton  himself  would  have  dared  to  take  it. 


CHAPTER   XXIX 

—THE    SIEGE   OF    YORKTOWN 

No  direct  answer  was  made  to  Mr.  Lincoln's  letter,  and 
two  days  later  the  General  requested  that  Franklin's  and  Mc- 
Call's  divisions  of  McDowell's  corps  should  be  sent  to  him, 
with  the  result  that  Franklin's  was  sent.  This  was  the  third 
appeal  for  Franklin's  corps,  the  first  having  been  made  on  the 
5th.  Although  General  McClellan  made  no  direct  answer 
to  the  President's  letter,  probably  because  he  desired  no  open 
war  with  him,  on  the  2Oth  of  April  he  wrote  the  following 
letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  whom  he  at  all  times  held  to 
be  his  enemy  in  the  Administration  and  the  author  of  all 
hostile  communications.1 

"HEADQUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

"BEFORE  YORKTOWN, 
"HoN.  E.  M.  STANTON,  Secretary  of  War : 

"SiR :  I  received  to-day  a  note  from  Assistant  Secretary 
Watson  enclosing  an  extract  from  a  letter  the  author  of  which 
is  not  mentioned.  I  send  a  copy  of  the  extract  with  this. 
I  hope  that  a  copy  has  also  been  sent  to  Gen.  McDowell,  whom 
it  concerns  more  nearly,  perhaps,  than  it  does  me. 

"At  the  risk  of  being  thought  obtrusive  I  will  venture 
upon  some  remarks  which  perhaps  my  position  does  not  justify 
me  in  making,  but  which  I  beg  to  assure  you  are  induced 
solely  by  my  intense  desire  for  the  success  of  the  government 
in  this  struggle. 

"You  will,  I  hope,  pardon  me  if  I  allude  to  the  past,  not 
in  captious  spirit,  but  merely  so  far  as  may  be  necessary  to 
explain  my  own  course  and  my  views  as  to  the  future. 

"From  the  beginning  I  had  intended,  so  far  as  I  might 
have  the  power  to  carry  out  my  own  views,  to  abandon  the 

1  McClellan,  Own  Story,  281. 

1 60 


McCLELLAN  161 

line  of  Manassas  as  the  line  of  advance.  I  ever  regarded  it 
as  an  improper  one;  my  wish  was  to  adopt  a  new  line,  based 
upon  the  waters  of  the  lower  Chesapeake.  I  always  expected 
to  meet  with  strong  opposition  on  this  line,  the  strongest  that 
the  rebels  could  offer,  but  I  was  well  aware  that  upon  over 
coming  this  opposition  the  result  would  be  decisive  and  preg 
nant  with  great  results. 

4 'Circumstances,  among  which  I  will  now  only  mention 
the  uncertainty  as  to  the  power  of  the  Merrimac,  have  com 
pelled  me  to  adopt  the  present  line,  as  probably  safer,  though 
far  less  brilliant,  than  that  by  Urbanna.  When  the  move 
ment  was  commenced  I  counted  upon  an  active  and  disposable 
force  of  nearly  150,000  men,  and  intended  to  throw  a  strong 
column  upon  West  Point  either  by  York  river  or,  if  that 
proved  impracticable,  by  a  march  from  the  mouth  of  the 
Severn,  expecting  to  turn  in  that  manner  all  the  defenses 
of  the  Peninsula.  Circumstances  have  proved  that  I  was 
right,  and  that  my  intended  movements  would  have  pro 
duced  the  desired  results. 

"After  the  transfer  of  troops  had  commenced  from  Alex 
andria  to  Fort  Monroe,  but  before  I  started  in  person,  the 
division  of  Blenker  was  detached  from  my  command — a  loss 
of  near  10,000  men.  As  soon  as  the  mass  of  my  troops  were 
fairly  started  I  embarked  myself.  Upon  reaching  Fort  Mon 
roe  I  learned  that  the  rebels  were  being  rapidly  reinforced 
from  Norfolk  and  Richmond.  I  therefore  determined  to 
lose  no  time  in  making  the  effort  to  invest  Yorktown,  without 
waiting  for  the  arrival  of  the  divisions  of  Hooker  and  Rich 
ardson  and  the  ist  corps,  intending  to  employ  the  ist  corps 
in  mass  to  move  upon  West  Point,  reinforcing  it  as  circum 
stances  might  render  necessary. 

"The  advance  was  made  on  the  morning  of  the  second 
day  after  I  reached  Fort  Monroe.  When  the  troops  reached 
the  immediate  vicinity  of  Yorktown  the  true  nature  of  the 
enemy's  position  was  for  the  first  time  developed.  While 
my  men  were  under  fire  I  learned  that  the  First  Corps  was 
removed  from  my  command.  No  warning  had  been  given 
me  of  this,  nor  was  any  reason  then  assigned.  I  should  also 


1 62  McCLELLAN 

have  mentioned  that  the  evening  before  I  left  Fort  Mon 
roe  I  received  a  telegraphic  despatch  from  the  War  Depart 
ment  informing  me  that  the  order  placing  Fort  Monroe  and 
its  dependent  troops  under  my  command  was  rescinded. 
No  reason  was  given  for  this,  nor  has  it  been  to  this  day. 
I  confess  that  I  have  no  right  to  know  the  reason.  This 
order  deprived  me  of  the  support  of  another  division  which 
I  had  been  authorized  to  form  for  active  operations  from 
among  the  troops  near  Fort  Monroe. 

"Thus  when  I  came  under  fire  I  found  myself  weaker 
by  five  divisions  than  I  had  expected  when  the  movement 
commenced.  It  is  more  than  probable  that  no  general  was 
ever  placed  in  such  a  position  before. 

"Finding  myself  thus  unexpectedly  weakened,  and  with 
a  powerful  enemy  strongly  entrenched  in  my  front,  I  was 
compelled  to  change  my  plans  and  become  cautious.  Could 
I  have  retained  my  original  force  I  confidently  believe  that  I 
would  now  have  been  in  front  of  Richmond  instead  of  where 
I  now  am.  The  probability  is  that  that  city  would  now  have 
been  in  our  possession. 

"But  the  question  now  is  in  regard  to  the  present  and 
the  future  rather  than  the  past. 

"The  enemy,  by  the  destruction  of  the  bridges  of  the 
Rappahannock,  has  deprived  himself  of  the  means  of  a  rapid 
advance  on  Washington.  Lee  will  never  venture  upon  a  bold 
movement  on  a  large  scale. 

"The  troops  I  left  for  the  defense  of  Washington,  as 
I  fully  explained  to  you  in  the  letter  I  wrote  the  day  I 
sailed,  are  ample  for  its  protection. 

"Our  true  policy  is  to  concentrate  our  troops  on  the  few 
est  possible  lines  of  attack;  we  have  now  too  many,  and  an 
enterprising  enemy  could  strike  us  a  severe  blow. 

"I  have  every  reason  to  believe  that  the  main  portion  of 
the  rebel  forces  are  in  my  front.  They  are  not  'drawing  off' 
their  troops  from  Yorktown. 

"Give  me  McCall's  division  and  I  will  undertake  a  move 
ment  on  West  Point  which  will  shake  them  out  of  Yorktown. 
As  it  is,  I  will  win,  but  I  must  not  be  blamed  if  success  is 


McCLELLAN  163 

delayed.     I  do  not  feel  that  I  am  answerable  for  the  delay 
of  victory. 

"I  do  not  feel  authorized  to  venture  upon  any  suggestions 
as  to  the  disposition  of  the  troops  in  other  departments,  but 
content  myself  with  stating  the  least  that  I  regard  as  essen 
tial  to  prompt  success  here.  If  circumstances  render  it  im 
possible  to  give  what  I  ask,  I  still  feel  sure  of  success,  but 
more  time  will  be  required  to  achieve  the  result. 

"Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"CEO.    B.    McCLELLAN, 

"Maj.-Gen.  Commanding." 

From  the  moment  he  set  foot  on  the  Peninsula  General 
McClellan  kept  the  War  Department  fully  informed  of  every 
thing  he  discovered,  and  as  early  as  April  the  5th  the  Govern 
ment  learned  from  him  the  probable  necessity  of  securing 
heavy  artillery  to  besiege  Yorktown  2  and  again  on  the  7th,3 
and  General  Keyes  in  his  letter  of  April  7th  to  Senator  Harris, 
which  he  asks  him  to  show  to  the  President  (and  in  a  matter 
so  urgent  it  must  be  assumed  that  this  was  done)  the  follow 
ing  direct  statement  is  made,  "On  the  other  hand  we  must 
butt  against  the  enemy's  works  with  heavy  artillery  and 
[with]  a  great  waste  of  time,  life,  and  material."  In  his 
letter  of  March  igth  General  McClellan  had  warned  the  Gov 
ernment  of  the  result  to  be  expected  if  naval  aid  were  lacking. 

Finding  himself  stopped  by  the  Warwick,  with  ample  and 
rapidly  increasing  forces  behind  it,  flanked  by  the  James 
on  one  side  and  the  York  on  the  other,  and  with  both  rivers 
in  command  of  the  rebels,  General  McClellan  found  that  the 
siege  of  Yorktown  was  indispensable  to  his  advance.  Not 
until  the  i6th  was  his  army  fully  gathered  on  the  Peninsula, 
and  meantime,  despite  the  constant  rains,  all  his  plans  for 
the  siege  were  matured;  on  the  I7th  the  ground  was  broken 
for  the  siege  operations,  certain  heavy  guns  were  ordered, 
and  more  than  a  week  later,  as  through  some  fault  of  the 
authorities  they  had  not  arrived,  they  were  again  asked  for. 

2  McClellan,  Own  Story,  263. 

3  Ibid.,  267. 


164  McCLELLAN 

The  reply  affects  to  be  in  total  ignorance  of  the  first  request, 
and  is  in  the  usual  form  of  governmental  apology,  as  fol 
lows  :  "Your  call  for  Parrott  guns  from  Washington  alarms 
me,  chiefly  because  it  argues  indefinite  procrastination.  Is 
anything  to  be  done?" 

The  siege  works  were  so  well  and  rapidly  and  convinc 
ingly  prosecuted  that  sixteen  days  later,  on  May  3d,  just  as 
the  bombardment  was  about  to  begin  Yorktown  was,  by  Lee's 
advice,4  abandoned.  For  a  formidable  position,  this  was  by 
far  the  shortest  siege  on  record.  It  has  no  parallel  in  the  an 
nals  of  the  war. 

Of  General  McClellan's  energy  at  this  time  Mr.  Prime 
says :  "While  politicians  were  plotting,  McClellan  was  work 
ing.  It  is  impossible  to  over-estimate  the  laborious  character 
of  the  general's  life.  His  whole  soul  was  in  his  work;  his 
every  energy  and  thought  was  given  to  it.  He  was  always, 
while  in  Washington  and  while  in  the  field,  in  the  habit  of 
seeing  personally,  as  far  as  possible,  to  the  execution  of  im 
portant  orders.  Out  of  countless  illustrations  of  this  which 
might  be  given,  let  one  suffice.  The  lieutenant-colonel  of  that 
superb  regiment,  the  ist  Conn.  Artillery,  wrote  to  me  from 
the  works  before  Yorktown  that,  a  little  after  midnight,  the 
previous  rainy  night,  while  the  men  were  at  work  in  the 
trenches,  McClellan  rode  up,  attended  by  a  single  orderly, 
sprang  from  his  horse,  inspected  the  work,  gave  some  direc 
tions,  remounted,  and  rode  away.  About  three  A.  M.  he  re 
appeared  as  before,  approved  the  work,  gave  further  direc 
tions,  and  vanished.  My  correspondent  met  him  at  his  head 
quarters  before  seven  A.  M.,  and  also  met  there  a  friend, 
whose  regiment  was  stationed  some  miles  away,  who  told  him 
that  the  general  had  surprised  them  by  a  visit  and  inspection 
about  two  A.  M.  The  soldiers  soon  learned  not  to  be  sur 
prised  at  his  appearance  among  them  anywhere,  at  any  hour 
of  day  or  night."  ° 

On  evacuating  Yorktown  the  Confederates  removed  many 

*  Headley,  Great  Rebellion,  404. 
'McClellan,  Own  Story,  n. 


McCLELLAN  165 

of  the  guns  and  replaced  them  with  dummies,  as  had  been 
done  at  Manassas.6 

Still  ninety-one  guns  of  various  calibers  were  left.7  Be 
cause  of  the  statement  that  many  guns  were  carried  off  and 
replaced  by  dummies  certain  thoughtless  writers  jump  at  the 
conclusion  that  only  dummies  were  there  originally.  This 
shows  how  deeply  they  were  inoculated  with  Mr.  Stanton's 
mode  of  reasoning. 

General  Barnard  claims  that  during  the  winter  he  sug 
gested  to  General  McClellan  the  wisdom  of  capturing  Nor 
folk  by  a  special  expedition,  but  McClellan  was  averse  to 
such  petty  enterprises,  as  he  felt  sure  that  Norfolk  would 
be  abandoned  when  his  advance  upon  Richmond  was  fairly 
under  way.  How  sagacious  was  his  judgment  will  be  seen 
a  little  later. 

Moreover,  Norfolk  was  a  seaport,  and  if  a  special  expedi 
tion  against  it  would  have  been  desirable,  such  an  expedition 
was  work  for  the  navy  and  much  easier  work  than  many  of 
its  great  exploits  during  the  war. 

'  Pollard,  Lost  Cause,  266. 

7  Heaclley,  Great  Rebellion,  405. 


CHAPTER    XXX 

UP  THE  PENINSULA 

The  most  important  enterprise  of  the  war  was  the  cap 
ture  of  Richmond.  There  lay  the  vitals  of  the  Confederacy. 
And  as  the  York  and  James  Rivers,  which  formed  the  Penin 
sula,  were  factors  of  prime  importance  in  this  achievement, 
a  formidable  naval  force  should  have  been  collected  and  main 
tained  in  this  section  until  those  rivers  were  securely  in  the 
possession  of  the  Federal  Government.  There  was  not  the 
slightest  excuse  for  not  doing  this,  for  the  necessity  of  naval 
action  and  the  consequences  of  neglecting  it  were  repeatedly 
urged  in  General  McClellan's  communication  of  November, 
1861.  On  the  8th  of  March,  1862,  the  Merrimac  came  down 
the  York  River  and  threw  the  nation  into  a  state  of  terror  by 
destroying  the  Cumberland  and  the  Congress. 

On  the  9th  of  March  the  Monitor,  Ericson's  new  device, — 
"a  cheese  box  on  a  raft,"  as  the  Confederates  called  it, — 
appeared  in  Hampton  Roads.  An  engagement  with  the  Mer 
rimac  resulted  apparently  in  a  drawn  battle,  but  it  ended  the 
offensive  career  of  the  latter.  Why  the  Monitor  was  made  so 
little  use  of  thereafter,  where  aggressive  naval  action  would 
have  counted  for  so  much,  is  one  of  the  enigmas  of  the  war. 
No  one  can  read  the  published  diary  of  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  and  note  the  general  efficiency  of  naval  action  under 
his  administration  without  feeling  assured  that  the  idleness 
of  the  Monitor  was  not  due  to  want  of  energy  or  of  judg 
ment  on  his  part.  The  record  of  the  navy  in  the  Civil  War 
is  a  splendid  one.  It  may  be  said  that  it  was  splendid  wher 
ever  that  department  had  control  of  the  operations.  But  in 
the  immediate  vicinity  of  Washington  the  military  depart 
ment  was  paramount.  General  McClellan  kept  the  authori 
ties  constantly  in  mind  that  he  needed  the  cooperation  of  the 

166 


McCLELLAN  167 

navy.1  On  March  i3th  it  seems  he  suggested  to  Secretary 
Stanton  "that  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  be  requested  to  order 
to  Fort  Monroe  whatever  force  Dupont  can  spare,  as  well  as 
any  available  force  that  Goldborough  can  send  up  as  soon  as 
his  present  operations  are  completed."  Mr.  Welles,  we  are 
told,  demurred,  unless  Norfolk  was  to  be  the  objective,  and 
no  order  came  from  the  President  to  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  to  supply  the  aid  which  McClellan  expected  and  which 
the  council  of  generals  had  made  a  condition  of  the  cam 
paign.  The  operations  of  the  navy  at  Island  No.  10  and 
Port  Royal  and  Mobile  Bay  and  New  Orleans  were  highly 
useful  and  glorious;  but  at  none  of  these  places  was  naval 
action  so  much  needed  as  it  was  in  the  opening  of  the  York 
and  the  James.  If  these  measures  had  received  early  and 
adequate  attention,  there  would  have  been  no  Merrimac  and 
the  loss  of  the  Cumberland  and  the  Congress  would  have  been 
avoided;  when  the  advance  upon  Richmond  began  the  army 
would  have  advanced  by  the  James  River,  and  the  day  after 
leaving  Alexandria  it  would  have  landed  far  beyond  the  War 
wick  and  its  swamps,  doubtless  at  Harrison's  Landing,  in 
close  proximity  to  the  Confederate  capital.  For  McClellan 
always  preferred  the  James  to  the  York.  When  he  landed 
on  the  Peninsula  the  James  was  closed  to  the  Federal  navy. 
Sometimes  we  are  saved  from  the  penalty  of  a  blunder  merely 
from  the  fact  that  our  adversary  takes  it  as  assured  that 
what  should  be  done  at  a  certain  juncture  undoubtedly  will  be 
done.  The  wisdom  of  the  most  vigorous  cooperation  which 
our  efficient  navy  could  give  to  the  Peninsula  campaign  was 
so  evident  that  the  Confederates  in  their  deliberations  treated 
it  as  an  established  fact.  This  is  the  reason  that, — while  they 
detained  the  Union  army  to  the  last  moment,  in  order  that 
they  might  gain  accessions  to  their  own  army  from  every 
quarter, — they  did  not  fight  McClellan  to  the  death  at  York- 
town  and  on  the  Warwick.  No  more  favorable  field  for 
them  could  possibly  be  found,  if  the  navy  was  not  to  cooper 
ate.  But  they  saw  it  only  as  a  struggle  in  a  narrow  strip 
of  ground,  with  the  Union  army  in  front  and  the  Union  navy 
1  McClellan,  Own  Story,  246-250. 


1 68  McCLELLAN 

on  the  York  and  on  the  James  shelling  and  riddling  both 
flanks.  The  activity  and  the  success  of  the  navy  in  every 
aggressive  movement  left  no  doubt  as  to  what  would  happen 
here.  They  would  be  practically  surrounded,  routed,  bagged, 
and  Richmond  would  be  lost.  This  consideration  made  a 
position  of  almost  insuperable  advantage  appear  to  the  mind 
of  General  Lee  and  his  advisers  as  an  extremely  weak  one; 
and  so,  to  the  great  surprise  of  General  McClellan,  the  de 
cisive  battle  which  he  confidently  expected  here  was  not 
fought,  and  on  the  5th  of  May  he  passed  the  Warwick  with 
out  having  received  a  blow.  The  rebels  had  concluded  that 
the  struggle  for  Richmond  must  be  waged  on  a  field  removed 
from  navigable  rivers,  where  in  case  of  repulse  they  could 
retire  within  the  entrenchments  of  that  hilly  city. 

Accordingly,  when  Yorktown  was  deserted  the  Southern 
forces  withdrew  concurrently  from  all  the  strongholds  in 
that  section  of  Virginia.  Gloucester  Point,  Norfolk,  the  bat 
teries  at  the  mouth  of  the  James,  were  all  abandoned.  Nor 
folk  was  evacuated  on  the  loth  of  May,  and  on  the  nth  a 
force  from  Fortress  Monroe  accompanied  by  the  President 
and  the  Secretary  of  War  marched  into  it  with  much  eclat. 
Mr.  Flower,  in  his  life  of  Mr.  Stanton,  gives  a  stirring  picture 
of  this  bloodless  "capture."  2 

The  York  River  being  now  available,  Franklin's  division 
was  shipped  off  on  the  5th  of  May  to  West  Point.  The  aban 
donment  of  Norfolk  led  to  the  destruction  of  the  Merrimac 
in  the  Norfolk  navy-yard  by  her  crew  on  the  I2th  of  May. 
The  way  up  the  James  was  now  also  practically  clear,  and 
the  Monitor  and  the  gunboats  Galena,  Aroostook,  Naugatuck, 
and  Port  Royal  ascended  as  far  as  Fort  Darling,  seven  miles 
below  Richmond.  The  elevation  of  this  stronghold  on 
Drewry's  Bluff,  one  hundred  and  fifty  feet  above  the  river, 
made  it  invulnerable  against  their  attack;  and  after  a  gallant 
bombardment  they  withdrew. 

If  this  occupation  of  the  James  had  been  effected,  as  it 
easily  could  have  been,  directly  after  the  repulse  of  the 
Merrimac  on  March  9th  or  at  any  time  during  March  or 

3  Pp.  152,  155- 


McCLELLAN  169 

April,  General  McClellan  would  have  sent  his  army  directly 
up  the  James  to  Harrison's  Landing;  and  this  would  have 
relieved  him  of  many  handicaps,  and  would  possibly  have 
forced  the  hands  of  his  enemies  in  Washington;  but  this 
latter  is  by  no  means  certain.  Moreover,  Stanton's  intent 
of  thwarting  his  success  was  so  fixed  and  determined  that 
the  end  would  probably  have  been  the  same  anyway, — that  is, 
a  fatal  lack  of  support  on  the  part  of  the  Government,  which 
would  have  left  the  army  inadequate  for  its  prime  work,  the 
capture  of  the  rebel  capital. 

When  the  James  was  occupied,  however,  and  even  at  the 
instant  of  the  blowing  up  of  the  Merrimac,  Franklin  had  al 
ready  gone  up  the  York  and  disembarked  his  forces  at  West 
Point  near  White  House,  and  the  whole  army  was  well  on 
its  way  up  the  York  River. 

Still  McClellan  would  have  transferred  his  army  to  the 
James  as  soon  as  it  was  assembled,  about  May  the  i8th,  but 
for  the  interference  of  his  military  superiors  at  Washington. 
However,  we  must  not  anticipate.  On  the  4th  day  of  May, 
1862,  Yorktown  was  occupied  by  the  National  troops,  and 
on  the  5th  of  May  the  advance  reached  Williamsburg,  where 
the  first  struggle  occurred.  It  was  a  surprise  to  both  sides. 


CHAPTER    XXXI 

THE   FIRST   ENCOUNTER WILLIAMSBURG 

The  first  serious  encounter  of  the  opposing  armies  in  the 
Peninsula  was  accidental.  McClellan  rightly  divined  the  pur 
pose  of  Lee  and  Johnston,  which  was  to  defer  an  engage 
ment  until  the  Federals  approached  near  to  Richmond;  and, 
as  this  suited  him,  he  desired  his  vanguard  to  bring  on  no 
conflict  until  the  whole  army  was  united.  But  on  the  after 
noon  of  May  the  4th  Stoneman's  Cavalry  reached  Fort  Ma- 
gruder,  about  ten  miles  from  Yorktown.  This  was  an  ex 
tensive  fortification.  Only  the  rear-guard  of  Johnston's  army 
was  there.  Thinking  a  collision  inevitable,  Johnston  held  the 
fort  and  hurried  back  the  retiring  forces.  Stoneman  halted, 
awaiting  the  support  of  infantry,  and  before  they  were  on 
the  ground  it  was  dark;  so  the  attack  could  not  begin  until 
the  morning  of  the  5th.  It  should  not  have  begun  at  all.  It 
was  useless,  and  against  orders.  Fort  Magruder  was  located 
only  a  mile  east  of  Williamsburg.  Here  the  James  River  takes 
a  sharp  turn  to  the  northward,  leaving  a  narrow  neck  of 
land  between  it  and  the  York.  Trees  had  been  felled  in  great 
numbers,  with  their  tops  outward,  making  approach  exceed 
ingly  slow  and  difficult.  This  difficulty  was  augmented  greatly 
by  the  heavy  rainfall  of  the  night  of  the  4th  of  May,  which 
put  the  roads  in  a  condition  almost  impassable.  As  if  to 
demonstrate  with  especial  emphasis  the  almost  criminal  per 
versity  or  astounding  idiocy  of  starting  off  an  army  enfeebled 
in  numbers  under  such  prohibitive  conditions  of  earth  and 
weather,  it  had  rained  almost  without  cessation  from  the  mo 
ment  when  McClellan  set  foot  on  the  Peninsula. 

The  Confederate  forces  at  Williamsburg,  which  were 
only  a  portion  of  the  retiring  army,  should  convince  any  fair- 
minded  reader  how  baseless  and  absurd  is  the  assertion  that 
only  15,000  men  resisted  the  passage  of  the  Warwick  by  Mc- 

170 


McCLELLAN  171 

Clellan.  Longstreet's  division  of  six  brigades  and  D.  H. 
Hill's  division  of  five  brigades  resisted  the  attack  of  the  ad 
vance  force  of  the  Union  army.  Hooker's  division  of  three 
brigades  began  the  attack  in  front  on  the  morning  of  the  6th. 
On  him  the  enemy  concentrated  and  his  losses  were  heavy. 
Learning  of  the  engagement  that  had  taken  place  against  his 
instructions,  General  McClellan  had  sent  Kearney's  division 
to  assist  Hooker,  but  it  could  not  arrive  until  after  four 
o'clock  because  of  the  condition  of  the  roads.  It  then  ad 
vanced  with  fine  spirit,  and  Hooker's  men  withdrew.  Gen 
eral  Smith's  division  formed  the  Union  right;  about  noon 
Hancock's  brigade  found  and  seized  two  empty  redoubts 
which  the  enemy  had  overlooked,  and  General  McClellan,  see 
ing  the  advantage  of  Hancock's  position,  strongly  reinforced 
him.  This  was  the  key  of  the  situation,  and  the  rebels  tried 
in  vain  to  retake  it.  They  were  driven  back  in  confusion,  "and 
during  the  night  Longstreet  and  Hill  retired  to  join  the  body 
of  Johnston's  army  now  rapidly  marching  toward  the  Chicka- 
hominy." 

In  a  letter  dated  May  8th  General  Henry  M.  Naglee  says : 
"The  first  order  given  by  General  McClellan  was  to  send 
sufficient  force  to  Hancock  which  saved  us  from  sad  disaster. 
General  McClellan  had  ordered  a  reconnaissance  and  never 
dreamed  that  Sumner,  Keyes  and  Heintzelman  would  bring  on 
a  fight."  1 

On  the  1 6th  of  May,  1862,  against  great  obstacles  of 
weather  and  bog  the  advance  reached  White  House,  and 
General  McClellan  established  his  headquarters  there.  Be 
cause  of  the  miry  condition  of  the  roads,  due  to  the  incessant 
downpour,  it  took  forty-eight  hours  to  move  two  divisions  five 
miles.  The  i/th  and  i8th  were  spent  in  gathering  in  the 
troops  and  trains  and  in  reconnoitering  in  all  directions.  The 
whole  army  being  now  in  one  body,  McClellan,  but  for  the 
facts  we  are  about  to  state,  would  have  moved  at  once  to  the 
James,  where  practically  all  writers  admit  he  wished  to  be. 

On  the  1 8th  day  of  May  the  Secretary  of  War  issued  an 
order,  which  McClellan  with  much  reason  calls  "the  fatal 

1  Official  Record,  XI,  in,  150. 


172  McCLELLAN 

order,"  for  it  exposed  the  army  to  imminent  danger  of  de 
struction,  and  did  in  fact  fatally  handicap  the  campaign.  The 
senseless  timidity  of  Stanton  is  manifest  from  the  words  I 
have  italicized  in  his  report,  which  was  as  follows  \2 

"WASHINGTON,  May  18,  2  p.  M. 

"GENERAL:  Your  despatch  to  the  President,  asking  rein 
forcements,  has  been  received  and  carefully  considered. 

"The  President  is  not  willing  to  uncover  the  capital  en 
tirely;  and  it  is  believed  that,  even  if  this  were  prudent,  it 
would  require  more  time  to  effect  a  junction  between  your 
army  and  that  of  the  Rappahannock  by  the  way  of  the  Poto 
mac  and  York  River  than  by  a  land  march.  In  order,  there 
fore,  to  increase  the  strength  of  the  attack  upon  Richmond 
at  the  earliest  moment,  Gen.  McDowell  has  been  ordered  to 
march  upon  that  city  by  the  shortest  route. 

"He  is  ordered,  keeping  himself  always  in  position  to  save 
the  capital  from  all  possible  attack,  so  to  operate  as  to  put 
his  left  wing  in  communication  with  your  right  wing,  and 
you  are  instructed  to  co-operate  so  as  to  establish  this  com 
munication  as  soon  as  possible,  by  extending  your  right  wing 
to  the  north  of  Richmond. 

"It  is  believed  that  this  communication  can  be  safely  es 
tablished  either  North  or  South  of  the  Pamunkey  river. 

"In  any  event  you  will  be  able  to  prevent  the  main  body  of 
the  enemy's  forces  from  leaving  Richmond  and  falling  in  over 
whelming  force  upon  Gen.  McDowell.  He  will  move  with 
between  thirty-five  (35)  and  forty  thousand  (40,000)  men. 

"A  copy  of  the  instructions  to  Gen.  McDowell  are  with 
this.  The  specific  task  assigned  to  his  command  has  been  to 
provide  against  any  danger  to  the  capital  of  the  nation. 

"At  your  earnest  call  for  reinforcements  he  is  sent  for 
ward  to  co-operate  in  the  reduction  of  Richmond,  but  charged, 
in  attempting  this,  not  to  uncover  the  city  of  Washington,  and 
you  will  give  no  order,  either  before  or  after  your  junction, 
which  can  put  him  out  of  position  to  cover  this  city.  You  and 
he  will  communicate  with  each  other,  by  telegraph  or  other- 

*  Official  Record,  XI,  i,  27. 


McCLELLAN  173 

wise,  as  frequently  as  may  be  necessary  for  sufficient  co-opera 
tion.  When  Gen.  McDowell  is  in  position  on  your  right  his 
supplies  must  be  drawn  from  West  Point,  and  you  will  instruct 
your  staff-officers  to  be  prepared  to  supply  him  by  that  route. 

"The  President  desires  that  Gen.  McDowell  retain  the  com 
mand  of  the  Department  of  the  Rappahannock  and  of  the 
forces  with  which  he  moves  forward. 

"By  order  of  the  President. 

"EDWIN  M.  STANTON, 

"Secretary  of  War. 

"MAJ.-GEN.  CEO.  B.  MCCLELLAN." 

At  the  date  of  this  order  the  5th  and  6th  corps  were  at 
White  House ;  the  2cl,  the  3d,  and  the  4th  were  at  New  Kent 
Court  House.  "The  necessity  of  following  the  enemy  up 
until  he  was  fairly  across  the  Chickahominy  and  the  question 
of  supplies  had  naturally  brought  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
into  the  positions  just  described."  3 

This  order  of  May  i8th  was  never  revoked,  and  was 
treated  by  the  War  Department  as  in  full  force  as  late  as  the 
26th  of  June,  1862. 

The  order  had  two  malign  results :  first,  it  prevented  Me- 
Clellan  from  moving  at  once  to  the  James  and  forced  him  to 
keep  his  base  on  the  York;  second,  in  order  to  maintain  his 
communications  and  hold  the  positions  he  had  acquired  and 
at  the  same  time  extend  his  right  wing  to  meet  McDowell,  it 
forced  him  to  suffer  his  army  to  be  divided  by  the  Chicka 
hominy  River.  In  the  midst  of  heavy  rains  the  advance  reached 
the  river  on  the  2Oth  of  May.  They  found  all  the  bridges 
destroyed,  and  these,  numbering  twenty  or  more,  were  rebuilt 
with  McClellan's  usual  indefatigable  energy,  the  men  working 
cheerfully  in  the  rain  and  in  the  water  to  their  waists,  all  the 
while  exposed  to  the  guns  of  the  enemy. 

The  order  of  May  i8th  was  plainly  inspired  by  one  mo 
tive,  a  motive  similar  to  that  which  kept  McDowell  from 
going  to  Fortress  Monroe, — namely,  the  interposition  of  Mc- 
Clellan's  army  between  Richmond  and  Washington. 

•McClellan,  Own  Story,  342. 


CHAPTER    XXXII 

STRADDLING   THE    CHICKAHOMINY 

The  men  that  have  written  concerning  the  Civil  War  look 
upon  one  matter  with  practical  unanimity, — namely,  that  in 
urging  the  President  to  exercise  his  power  as  Commander  in 
Chief  of  the  army  Mr.  Stanton's  chief  object  was  to  have  the 
direction  of  the  war  devolve  upon  himself;  and  in  this  he  was 
successful.  The  first  step  was  the  assertion  of  a  paramount 
authority  over  the  General  in  Chief  in  the  war  orders  issued 
on  January  27th,  1862,  and  later.  The  second  was  the  re 
duction  of  McClellan's  rank  and  the  substitution  of  the  Secre 
tary  of  War  as  the  directing  head  of  operations. 

It  was  incumbent  upon  him  as  head  of  the  army  to  effect 
the  junction  of  McClellan  and  McDowell  as  swiftly  as  possible, 
so  that  McClellan  would  not  be  detained  for  one  unnecessary 
hour  with  an  extended  line,  divided  by  a  swollen  and  miry 
river. 

It  was  incumbent  upon  him  to  keep  advised  of  the  move 
ments  of  McClellan  and  McDowell,  and  to  arrange  so  that 
when  McClellan  had  reached  the  point  of  junction  McDowell 
would  be  there  also. 

Nor  would  there  have  been  the  slightest  difficulty  in  this. 
While  McClellan  was  blocked  below  the  Warwick  because 
of  the  failure  of  naval  cooperation  the  Confederate  forces 
were  confronting  him,  and  McDowell  had  the  whole  month  of 
April  in  which  to  move  southward  unmolested  to  the  trysting 
place. 

He  could  have  leisurely  selected  the  strongest  defensive 
position  to  be  found  in  that  realm  of  hills  and  natural  re 
doubts,  within  touching  distance  of  the  headwaters  of  the 
York,  and  there  strongly  improved  every  advantage  of  na 
ture;  and  he  could  have  immediately  united  with  Franklin's 

i74 


McCLELLAN  175 

division  when  it  reached  West  Point.  As  all  the  forces  of  the 
Confederacy  were  united,  so  all  the  Union  forces  in  Northern 
Virginia, — numbering,  as  variously  stated,  from  80,000  to 
100,000  men, — should  have  been  united  and  awaiting  Franklin 
the  moment  he  disembarked  at  West  Point.  There  was  no 
difficulty  in  this.  There  was  no  danger  in  it.  As  the  com 
paratively  weak  force  of  General  Franklin,  though  unforti 
fied,  was  not  attacked  by  the  rebels  in  full  force,  so  the  much 
greater  force,  fortified  and  prepared  for  an  attack,  would  not 
have  been.  The  resolution  of  the  Confederates  to  avoid  an 
engagement  near  navigable  waters  was  fixed.  With  the  ar 
rival  of  McClellan,  the  full  strength  of  the  Federal  armies 
would  have  been  combined,  and  this  great  host  would  never 
have  touched  the  Chickahominy.  It  would  have  been  trans 
ferred  at  once  to  the  James,  and  by  water,  if  McClellan  could 
have  had  his  way,  that  being  the  quickest  and  the  safest  way. 
But,  it  may  be  urged,  the  concentration  of  forces  at  West 
Point,  and  later  on  the  James,  would  have  left  the  way  to 
Washington  open  to  the  enemy.  This  is  the  swapping  idea 
again.  Washington  was  in  no  danger,  unless  the  rebels  aban 
doned  Richmond  to  McClellan;  and  if  they  were  willing  to 
abandon  it,  could  McDowell  stay  their  way?  If  the  rebels 
had  disregarded  McClellan,  they  could  have  fallen  with  over 
whelming  numbers  on  McDowell;  and  if  he  had  shut  himself 
up  in  Fredericksburg,  they  could  have  left  him  there  and 
marched  on  to  Washington. 

When  the  Confederates  retired  they  did  not  move  north 
ward,  but  retired  on  Richmond,  intending  to  fight  before  its 
walls.  So  this  gave  McDowell  twenty  days  more  in  which 
to  meet  McClellan.  That  is  what  McClellan  expected.  That 
is  what  would  have  happened  if  McClellan  had  had  control  of 
both  armies.  In  May,  1864,  General  Grant  was  moving 
toward  Richmond.  Butler  with  30,000  men  advanced  north 
ward  from  the  James  to  meet  him,  and  the  union  was  ac 
complished  without  the  least  difficulty. 

But  when  McClellan  reached  the  Chickahominy,  Mc 
Dowell  was  over  fifty  miles  away  at  Fredericksburg,  and  con 
tinued  to  remain  there,  although  McClellan  was  assured  that 


1 76  McCLELLAN 

he  was  coming  at  once.  He  should  not  have  been  corning. 
He  should  have  been  there,  and  his  own  letters  and  statements 
supply  convincing  proof  that  he  was  sincerely  eager  to  be 
there. 

When  the  Southern  forces  were  withdrawn  from  the  Pen 
insula,  it  was  to  await  the  onset  of  the  Federals  at  or  near 
Richmond,  where  the  navy  could  give  no  aid.  But  when 
McClellan's  army  had  reached  the  Chickahominy  and  halted 
there  the  reason  was  quickly  surmised,  and  measures  were 
soon  devised  to  forestall  the  junction  of  McDowell  with  Mc- 
Clellan.  The  amazing  timidity  of  the  civil  officials  who  con 
ducted  the  war  was  justly  a  matter  of  mirth  as  well  as  of 
contempt  at  Richmond.  Let  a  Southerner  rattle  a  pan  in 
Northern  Virginia  and  the  heroes  of  the  Capital  feared  that 
Washington  would  be  instantly  beleaguered.  At  a  cabinet 
meeting  held  upon  learning  of  the  destruction  of  the  Cumber 
land  and  the  Congress  the  head  of  the  War  Department  ex 
pressed  the  fear  that  a  shell  from  the  Merrimac  might  be 
hurled  into  the  room  where  they  sat  before  they  could  ad 
journ.  Mr.  Welles,  who  did  not  have  an  aspen  heart,  notes 
many  similar  instances  in  his  "Diary." 

Accordingly,  the  pans  were  rattled,  and  with  entire  and 
eminent  success.  The  movement  now  set  on  foot  was  in 
spired  by  the  pepper-box  policy  of  scattering  a  number  of 
weak  and  inefficient  detachments  over  Northern  Virginia,  in 
viting  attack,  defeat,  and  disgrace  to  the  Union  army.  Were 
there  similar  driblets  of  armed  bodies  distributed  over  North 
ern  Virginia  in  the  summer  and  fall  of  1864?  No.  Where 
were  they?  In  the  army  of  General  Sheridan.  And  were 
there  rebel  forces  scampering  over  the  country,  frightening 
the  wits  out  of  the  National  cabinet  ?  No.  Where  were  they  ? 
Gathered  into  the  army  of  General  Early,  who,  being  an  able, 
vigilant  and  skilful  leader,  knew  that  in  his  struggle  with 
"Fiery  Phil"  he  needed  every  man  of  them.  He  did  need 
them  all — and  more.  So  the  folly  of  the  "pepper-box"  sys 
tem  was  shown  in  Virginia  both  by  trying  it  and  by  trying 
its  opposite. 

If  the  Administration  had  supported  General  McClellan 


McCLELLAN  177 

with  whole-hearted  vigor  and  sincerity  from  the  outset,  there 
would  have  been  no  question  of  junction,  for  the  army  would 
never  have  been  divided ;  and  as  due  credit  to  General  Lee's 
sagacity  forbids  the  idea  that  the  Southern  army  would  have 
been  bagged  in  the  Peninsula,  the  united  Union  army  would 
have  been,  early  in  April,  encamped  upon  the  James  in  close 
proximity  to  Richmond,  ready  for  offensive  operations,  power 
ful  in  numbers,  and,  operating  on  more  favorable  ground, 
would  have  fought  a  great  battle  there;  all  the  rebel  strength 
accessible  would  have  been  collected  to  withstand  the  onset, 
and  the  successive  reverses  of  Banks  and  Fremont  and  Shields 
would  never  have  happened. 

Even  the  piety  of  gentlemen  who  were  never  seen  in  church 
was  a  factor  in  preventing  the  junction  of  the  Union  armies. 
If  McDowell  had  set  his  corps  in  motion  as  late  as  the  morn 
ing  of  the  25th  of  May,  the  armies  would  surely  have  met; 
and  he  would  have  done  so  but  for  orders  from  Washington 
directing  him  not  to  start  until  the  26th  because  the  25th 
was  Sunday.  He  started  at  last,  advanced  six  miles  south  of 
Fredericksburg,  and  was  only  thirty  miles  north  of  Hanover 
Court  House  when  he  received  orders  to  suspend  the  move 
ment,  for  the  pans  had  rattled  and  the  Administration  was 
terrified.  Washington  was  in  peril ! 


CHAPTER    XXXIII 

JACKSON'S  RUSE — BASELESS  PANIC — M'DOWELL  STILL  COMING 

To  produce  this  panic  and  stay  McDowell's  advance  a  de 
tachment  of  14,000  men  led  by  Stonewall  Jackson  fell  upon 
a  body  of  6,000  Union  troops  under  Schenk  and  Milroy  near 
the  town  of  McDowell  and  drove  them  back  upon  the  main 
body  of  Fremont's  army  of  10,000  men  at  Franklin.  Jack 
son  then  attacked  Banks,  who  had  from  16,000  to  20,000  men, 
at  Strasburg  and  Banks  retreated  to  Harper's  Ferry.  A  little 
later  Jackson  repulsed  Fremont  and  Shields,  who  were  trying 
to  unite,  and  then  returned  to  Richmond. 

Of  these  movements  Mr.  Swinton  says : 

"The  tidings  of  Jackson's  apparition  at  Winchester  on 
the  24th,  and  his  subsequent  advance  to  Harper's  Ferry,  fell 
like  a  thunderbolt  on  the  war-council  at  Washington.  The 
order  for  McDowell's  advance  from  Fredericksburg,  to  unite 
with  McClellan,  was  instantly  countermanded;  and  he  was 
directed  to  put  twenty  thousand  men  in  motion  at  once  for 
the  Shenandoah  Valley,  by  the  line  of  Manassas  Gap  Rail 
roads.  McDowell  obeyed,  but,  to  use  his  own  language,  'with 
a  heavy  heart,'  for  he  knew,  what  any  man  capable  of  survey 
ing  the  situation  with  a  soldier's  eye  must  have  known,  that 
the  movement  ordered  was  not  only  most  futile  in  itself,  but 
certain  to  paralyze  the  operations  of  the  main  army  and 
frustrate  that  campaign  against  Richmond  on  the  issue  of 
which  hung  the  fortunes  of  war.  In  vain  he  pointed  out  that 
it  was  impossible  for  him  either  to  succor  Banks  or  co-operate 
with  Fremont ;  that  his  line  of  advance  from  Fredericksburg  to 
Front  Royal  was  much  longer  than  the  enemy's  line  of  retreat ; 
that  it  would  take  him  a  week  or  ten  days  to  reach  the  Valley, 
and  that  by  this  time  the  occasion  for  his  services  would  have 

178 


McCLELLAN  179 

passed  by.  In  vain  General  McClellan  urged  the  real  motive 
of  the  raid — to  prevent  re-enforcements  from  reaching  him. 
Deaf  to  all  sounds  of  reason,  the  war-council  at  Washington, 
like  the  Dutch  States-General,  of  whom  Prince  Eugene  said, 
that  'always  interfering,  they  were  always  dying  with  fear,' 
heard  only  the  reverberations  of  the  guns  of  the  redoubtable 
Jackson.  To  head  off  Jackson,  if  possible  to  catch  Jackson, 
seemed  now  the  one  important  thing;  and  the  result  of  the 
cogitation  of  the  Washington  strategists  was  the  preparation 
of  what  the  President  called  a  'trap'  for  Jackson — a  'trap' 
for  the  wily  fox  who  was  master  of  every  gap  and  gorge 
in  the  Valley !  Now  this  pretty  scheme  involved  the  converg 
ing  movements  of  Fremont  from  the  west,  and  McDowell 
from  the  east,  upon  Strasburg.  The  two  columns  moved 
rapidly;  they  had  almost  effected  a  junction  on  the  3ist;  but 
that  very  day  Jackson,  falling  back  from  Harper's  Ferry, 
slipped  between  the  two,  and  made  good  his  retreat  up  the 
Valley,  leaving  his  opponents  to  follow  in  a  long  and  fruitless 
Chevy  Chase,  all  the  time  a  day  behind."  l 

On  May  24th,  having  just  returned  from  a  visit  to  Mc 
Dowell,  the  President  shook  off  the  influence  of  Stanton  for 
the  moment  and  wrote  a  cordial  and  encouraging  letter  to 
General  McClellan,  ending  as  follows :  "McDowell  and 
Shields  both  say  they  can  and  positively  will  move  Monday 
morning  (May  26th).  I  wish  you  to  move  cautiously  and 
safely.  You  will  have  command  of  McDowell  after  he  joins 
you  precisely  as  you  indicated  in  your  long  despatch  to  us  of 
the  2 1  st."  In  his  despatch  of  the  2ist  General  McClellan  had 
urged  the  necessity  of  the  full  control  by  one  general  of  the 
operations  against  Richmond.  "Jackson  was  the  first  who 
fully  realized  how  great  was  the  influence  which  could  be  ex 
erted  on  the  politicians  at  Washington  by  even  a  small  force 
within  a  striking  distance."  2  "Jackson's  late  opponents  were 
fearing  instant  attack,  when  he  was  fighting  before  Richmond, 
and  McDowell  alone  saw  that  the  right  thing  was  to  reinforce 

1  Army  of  the  Potomac,  125,  126;  and  see  De  Joinville's  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  112. 

'Formby,  Civil  War,  114. 


i8o  McCLELLAN 

McClellan  and  neglect  Jackson,  but  the  terrified  politicians 
would  have  none  of  it."  3 

There  was  joy  in  Richmond  over  Jackson's  success.  The 
ruse  had  won.  The  junction  of  the  Union  forces  was  at  least 
deferred. 

To  the  rulers  of  the  nation  this  should  have  meant  only 
a  slight  delay  at  the  worst.  The  forces  of  Banks,  Fremont, 
and  Shields  should  have  been  united  into  one  body,  making 
a  force  of  34,000  men,  to  neutralize  Jackson's  14,000,  leaving 
McDowell  free  to  join  McClellan,  or,  better  still,  they  too 
should  have  joined  McClellan,  making  74,000  men.  But 
astonishing  as  it  may  seem,  the  junction  being  interrupted, 
all  thought  of  it  was  therefore  to  be  abandoned,  and  the  Ad 
ministration  pursued  the  usual  reckless  and  maddening  course 
toward  the  commander  of  the  army, — the  course  of  goading 
him  to  instant  action  when  action  would  have  been  most 
foolish  and  suicidal.  Now  again  as  at  Yorktown,  as  if  to 
be  deprived  of  McDowell's  corps  was  the  one  thing  needed 
to  ensure  success,  the  President  wires  McClellan  on  May 
the  25th,  "I  think  the  time  is  near  where  you  must  either 
attack  Richmond  or  give  up  the  job  and  come  to  the  defence 
of  Washington."  4  There  was  something  infinitely  irritating 
in  this ;  it  was  apparently  so  unreasonable,  so  devoid  of  com 
mon  sense.  But  the  proof  grows  stronger  and  stronger  that 
it  was  not  Lincoln;  it  was  Stanton.  With  reports  coming  in 
constantly  from  Allan  Pinkerton  of  the  great  strength  of  the 
enemy,  the  "Great  War  Secretary"  would  have  been  an  idiot 
to  dream  that  McClellan  could  take  Richmond  with  only  two- 
thirds  of  his  expected  force.  The  Secretary  was  many  things, 
but  no  idiot.  Wolseley  thinks  he  was  crazy,  but  we  deny  even 
that  exoneration.  "McClellan  was  expecting  him  [McDowell] 
with  great  anxiety.  Without  his  aid  he  knew  he  could  not 
capture  Richmond."  5  "Had  McDowell  reinforced  McClellan 
there  is  little  doubt  that  the  Federal  army  would  have  been 


3Formby,  Civil  War,  118. 
*  Official  Record,  XT,  i.  32. 
5  Moore,  Great  Rebellion,  166. 


McCLELLAN  181 

successful."  6  "At  the  time  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was 
toiling  painfully  up  the  Peninsula  towards  Richmond,  the 
remaining  forces  in  Northern  Virginia  presented  the  extraor 
dinary  spectacle  of  three  distinct  armies,  planted  on  three 
separate  lines  of  operations,  under  three  independent  com 
manders.  The  highland  region  of  West  Virginia  had  been 
formed  into  the  'Mountain  Department'  under  command  of 
General  Fremont;  the  Valley  of  the  Shenandoah  constituted 
the  'Department  of  the  Shenandoah'  under  General  Banks ; 
and  the  region  covered  by  the  direct  lines  of  approach  to  Wash 
ington  had  been  erected  into  the  'Department  of  the  Rappa- 
hannock,'  and  assigned  to  General  McDowell  at  the  time  his 
corps  was  detached  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  About 
the  period  reached  by  the  narrative  of  events  on  the  Peninsula, 
these  armies  were  distributed  as  follows :  General  Fremont 
with  a  force  of  fifteen  thousand  men  at  Franklin,  General 
Banks  with  a  force  of  about  sixteen  thousand  men  at  Stras- 
burg,  and  General  McDowell  with  a  force  of  thirty  thousand 
men  at  Fredericksburg  on  the  Rappahannock.  It  need  hardly 
be  said  that  this  arrangement,  the  like  of  which  has  not  been 
seen  since  Napoleon  scandalized  the  Austrians  by  destroying 
in  succession  half  a  dozen  of  their  armies  distributed  after 
precisely  this  fashion — nor  indeed  was  ever  seen  before,  save 
in  periods  of  the  eclipse  of  all  military  judgment — was  in  vio 
lation  of  the  true  principles  of  war.  One  hardly  wishes  to 
inquire  by  whose  crude  and  fatuous  inspiration  these  things 
were  done ;  but  such  was  the  spectacle  presented  by  the  Union 
forces  in  Virginia."  7 

'Ibid.,  199. 

1  Swinton,  Army  of  Potomac,  122. 


CHAPTER    XXXIV 

M'CLELLAN  CLEARS  THE  WAY  FOR  M'DOWELL — HANOVER 
COURT  HOUSE 

On  May  26th  McClellan  was  again  informed  that  Mc 
Dowell  was  coming;  and  in  order  to  aid  and  facilitate  the 
junction  and  clear  the  way,  by  the  commander's  directions 
General  Fitz  John  Porter  started  with  his  corps  at  daylight 
on  the  27th,  in  heavy  rain  and  over  bad  roads,  and  marched 
sixteen  miles  to  Hanover  Court  House,  which  was  held  by 
General  Branch  with  13,000  Confederates.  General  Porter's 
force  was  of  about  equal  size.  After  a  preliminary  brush  at 
Peake's  Station,  two  miles  from  Hanover  Court  House,  the 
main  body  pressed  forward,  driving  a  force  of  the  rebels 
before  them  toward  the  last-named  place;  but  on  their  way 
the  rear  division  of  the  corps  was  attacked  by  the  main  body 
of  General  Branch's  command.  The  Union  army  immediately 
faced  about,  and  while  the  rear  divisions  withstood  the  onset 
the  forward  troops,  circling  through  the  woods  to  the  west 
ward,  fell  upon  the  enemy's  left  flank,  and  a  rout  quickly  fol 
lowed.  The  Union  loss  was  355,  the  Southern  loss  930. 

Of  the  result  of  this  action  General  Porter  himself  says: 
"On  our  return  to  camp  all  rejoiced  at  the  success  of  our  mis 
sion  in  securing  for  a  reasonable  time  our  flank  from  injury 
and  preparing  the  whole  army  for  a  rapid  advance  on  Rich 
mond,  and  also  by  rendering  McDowell's  presence  unnecessary 
for  the  defense  of  Washington,  giving  the  War  Department 
the  opportunity  of  sending  his  corps  by  water  to  join  us. 
If  that  had  been  done,  none  of  the  enemy  could  have  been 
detached  from  Richmond  to  threaten  Washington,  and  his 
forces  in  Northern  Virginia  would  have  been  called  to  defend 
Richmond.  But  a  mightier  power  interfered,  and  through 
years  of  trial  and  sufferings  delayed  the  happy  victory  we  then 

182 


McCLELLAN  183 

hoped  was  in  our  hands.  .  .  .  McClellan  had  been  forced 
into  this  faulty  position  on  the  Chickahominy  and  held  there 
by  the  oft-repeated  assurance  that  McDowell's  corps  of  40,- 
ooo  men,  then  at  Fredericksburg,  would  be  advanced  to  Rich 
mond  and  formed  on  his  immediate  right,  which  would  make 
that  wing  safe.  On  the  2;th  of  May,  under  promise  that 
McDowell  would  join  him  at  once,  McClellan  cleared  his  front 
of  all  opposition  to  his  rapid  march,  by  operations  at  Hanover 
Court  House.  If  McDowell  had  joined  McClellan  then,  it 
would  have  resulted  in  the  capture  of  Richmond.  That  junc 
tion  could  also  easily  have  been  brought  about  immediately 
after  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks,  and  even  then  Richmond  could 
have  been  taken.  But  the  Confederate  authorities  so  skilfully 
used  Jackson,  in  the  Valley  of  Virginia,  as  to  draw  off  Mc 
Dowell;  while  the  fears  of  the  administration,  then  aroused 
for  the  safety  of  Washington,  together  with  a  changed  policy, 
caused  him  to  be  held  back  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac; 
and,  although  orders  were  several  times  issued  requiring  Mc 
Dowell  to  unite  with  McClellan,  and  assurances  were  given 
as  late  as  June  26th  that  he  would  so  unite,  yet  he  never  ar 
rived,  and  the  right  wing  of  McClellan's  army,  then  left  ex 
posed,  became  the  object  of  attack.  ...  In  the  middle  of 
June  General  McClellan  intrusted  to  me  the  management  of 
affairs  on  the  North  bank  of  the  Chickahominy,  and  confided 
to  me  his  plans  as  well  as  his  hopes  and  apprehensions.  His 
plans  embraced  defensive  arrangements  against  an  attack  from 
Richmond  upon  our  weak  right  flank.  We  did  not  fear  the 
result  of  such  an  attack  if  made  by  the  forces  from  Rich 
mond  alone;  but  if,  in  addition,  we  were  to  be  attacked  by 
Jackson's  forces,  suspicions  of  whose  approach  were  already 
aroused,  we  felt  that  we  should  be  in  peril.  But  as  Jackson 
had  thus  far  prevented  McDowell  from  joining  us,  we  trusted 
that  McDowell,  Banks,  and  Fremont,  who  had  been  directed 
to  watch  Jackson,  would  be  able  to  prevent  him  from  joining 
Lee,  or,  at  least,  would  give  timely  warning  of  his  escape 
from  their  front  and  follow  close  upon  his  heels."  l 

The  way  was  now  clear  for  the  advance  of  the  coming 

1  Battles  and  Leaders,  II,  323,  324,  325. 


1 84  McCLELLAN 

army.  General  Porter  remained  in  the  neighborhood  of  Han 
over  Court  House  on  the  28th  and  29th,  and  it  would  have 
been  very  easy  for  McDowell's  troops  to  join  him  and  return 
with  him.  Having  struck  at  Banks  and  terrorized  the  un- 
Roman-like  civilians  at  Washington,  Jackson  flew  back  to 
Lee  to  join  in  an  attack  on  the  unsupported  and  abandoned 
McClellan,  whose  disadvantageous  situation  astride  the  river 
was  well  known.  Why  the  other  forces, — all  the  Union  forces 
in  Virginia, — were  not  likewise  immediately  concentrated 
and  advanced  southward  and  why  it  was  ever  thought  neces 
sary  to  add  20,000  of  McDowell's  army  to  the  34,000  other 
troops  in  Northern  Virginia  because  of  Jackson's  raid  with 
14,000  men,  it  is  hard  to  explain  except  upon  the  ground  of 
absurd  fear. 

And  when  Jackson  retired,  why  were  not  McDowell's 
men  hurried  back  to  him  and  the  forward  movement  re 
sumed  ?  No  reason  has  ever  been  given.  Mr.  Headley,  after 
stating  that  Jackson  failed  in  his  purpose  of  destroying  Banks's 
army,  adds :  "The  second  object,  however,  he  most  success 
fully  accomplished :  of  frightening  the  Secretary  of  War  out 
of  his  propriety.  He  had  achieved  no  substantial  victory  over 
Banks,  but  he  did  over  the  War  Department.  The  Secretary 
immediately  ordered  Fremont  to  move  across  the  mountains, 
and  cut  off  Jackson's  retreat,  and  McDowell  from  the  East  to 
detach  a  division  for  the  same  purpose,  while  he  telegraphed 
to  the  North  for  troops  to  be  sent  forward  in  all  haste,  as 
the  Capital  was  in  danger.  The  former  was  wise  action — the 
latter  absurd,  and  created  a  needless  panic.  The  entire  militia 
was  at  once  called  out  for  three  months,  though  only  a  part 
of  them  proceeded  to  Washington. 

"That  a  general,  with  the  capacity  that  Jackson  had 
showed  himself  to  possess,  would,  with  twenty  or  twenty-five 
thousand  men,  push  a  hundred  miles  from  the  base  of  his 
operations,  between  two  flanking  armies,  cross  the  Potomac, 
dash  on  Washington,  and  expect  ever  to  get  back  again,  was 
too  absurd  an  idea  to  be  entertained  for  a  moment."2 

There  was  no  reason  for  further  hesitation  save  the  amaz- 

1  Great  Rebellion,  I,  448,  449. 


McCLELLAN  185 

ing  panic  of  the  Washington  authorities.  There  was  no  force 
of  Confederates  about  that  time  in  Central  or  Northern  Vir 
ginia  save  that  of  General  Branch,  which  was  dislodged  on 
the  27th  of  May  by  General  Porter;  and  if  the  Union  forces 
in  Northern  Virginia  had  concentrated  and  moved  forward, 
the  history  of  the  Peninsula  Campaign  would  have  been  a  very 
different  story.  But  nothing  of  this  nature  happened,  and 
a  great  host  of  Union  soldiers  remained  idly  and  uselessly 
scattered  over  Northern  Virginia,  from  want  of  a  little  of 
the  right  kind  of  sense  and  of  courage  and  patriotism  and 
energy  in  their  civil  superiors  in  the  Capital,  while  the  utmost 
force  the  Confederates  could  gather  from  everywhere  piled  in 
a  solid  mass  upon  the  divided  and  extended  lines  of  McClellan 
in  the  morasses  of  the  Chickahominy. 

The  courage,  the  tenacity,  the  undismayed  cheerfulness 
of  General  McClellan,  in  view  of  the  situation  and  the  con 
ditions  surrounding  him,  were  never  surpassed.  He  was  the 
ideal  Greatheart,  and  surely  he  was  in  a  Slough  of  Despond. 
Encamped  in  a  morass;  the  spirit  of  his  men  chilled  by  their 
environment  and  by  constant  drenching  rains;  his  army  di 
vided  by  a  river  the  floods  of  which  kept  carrying  away  the 
bridges  and  so  endangering  the  connection  of  the  army;  held 
in  this  position,  which  invited  attack  and  imperiled  his  safety, 
by  an  order  which  was  never  revoked,  an  order  to  facilitate 
a  junction  with  McDowell's  army,  a  junction  that  was  daily 
expected  but  never  consummated, — all  this  was  heart-break 
ing. 

Mr.  Headley  thus  vividly  paints  the  situation :  "Some  of 
the  people,  misled  by  Stanton's  press  messages,  blamed  Mc 
Clellan;  others  upbraided  the  government  and  accused  it  of 
wantonly  imperilling  the  country  to  effect  the  ruin  of  McClel 
lan,  and  made  the  President  and  Secretary  of  War  little  better 
than  traitors."  3 

The  only  commendation  McClellan  ever  received  for  clear 
ing  the  way  for  McDowell  was  a  cynical,  depreciatory  note 
from  the  President,4  entirely  in  line  with  the  nagging  treat- 

3  The  Great  Rebellion,  I,  419,  420. 
*  Letters,  II,  263,  264. 


1 86  McCLELLAN 

ment  usually  accorded  to  the  general.  There  was  a  total 
absence  of  jubilation,  an  entire  want  of  cordial  congratula 
tion  upon  the  vigor  shown  and  the  completeness  of  his  suc 
cess. 

In  the  midst  of  this  record-breaking  season,  with  the  rain 
falling  in  torrents  almost  daily,  General  McClellan  displayed 
his  customary  energy  in  putting  up  and  maintaining  bridges 
over  the  flooded  river  and  in  entrenching  his  lines.  But  the 
swamps,  the  floods,  the  incessant  rains,  and  the  lack  of  sincere 
and  cordial  support,  with  a  great  host  of  idle  soldiers  so 
short  a  distance  away,  created  a  situation  dispiriting  to  the 
verge  of  madness ;  and  exposure,  overwork,  and  anxiety,  in 
spite  of  his  powerful  frame  and  naturally  robust  health,  more 
than  once  during  this  period  brought  on  a  swiftly  passing 
illness. 

McDowell  was  still  coming  when  Lee  on  the  31  st  of  May, 
with  all  the  concentrated  strength  of  his  greatly  superior 
numbers,  furiously  attacked  the  isolated  left  wing  of  the 
Union  army.  This  was  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks,  or  Seven 
Pines. 


CHAPTER    XXXV 

FAIR   OAKS 

The  Chickahominy  River  rises  about  fifteen  miles  north 
west  of  Richmond  and  runs  in  a  general  course  almost  due 
southeast,  coming  at  the  nearest  point  about  six  miles  from 
the  city.  In  this  vicinity  it  is  ordinarily  about  forty  feet  wide 
and  four  or  five  feet  deep;  but  it  runs  here  through  a  low 
swampy  section  and  on  the  coming  of  heavy  rains  floods  the 
country.  On  the  west  side  of  the  river  and  between  it  and 
Richmond  were  two  corps  of  the  Union  army, — those  of 
Keyes  and  Heintzelman.  The  advance  had  been  gradual  and 
cautious,  and  each  position  in  turn  had  been  fortified.  Keyes's 
corps  crossed  on  the  25th  of  May  at  Bottom's  Bridge.  This 
point  was  secured  by  strong  earthworks;  and  the  corps  then 
moved  on  to  a  point  about  two  miles  from  Seven  Pines  and 
nearly  three  miles  from  Fair  Oaks,  a  station  on  the  Richmond 
and  Yorktown  Railway.  Redoubts  were  erected  here,  and  it 
was  known  as  the  Third  Line  of  Defense. 

On  the  27th,  Casey's  division  reached  Seven  Pines,  which 
was  an  important  point  in  a  military  sense,  as  here  several 
roads  met ;  and  this  was  made  the  Second  Line.  The  division 
then  proceeded  a  mile  westward  on  the  Williamsburg  Road, 
and  had  made  good  progress  in  strengthening  this  position,  the 
First  Line,  against  a  front  attack,  but  had  not  had  time  yet 
to  protect  the  right  flank  against  an  advance  by  the  Nine  Mile 
road,  which  approached  the  right  and  rear  from  the  north 
east. 

While  this  advance  was  in  progress,  General  Heintzelman 
had  crossed  at  Bottom's  Bridge.  Kearney's  division  was  sta 
tioned  there  and  Hooker's  was  detached  to  guard  the  bridge 
over  the  White  Oak  Swamp,  three  miles  away  to  the  south. 
Sumner  was  about  to  cross  the  river  farther  up.  Almost 

187 


1 88  McCLELLAN 

incessant  rain  had  pursued  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  up  the 
Peninsula.  From  the  22d  to  the  25th  of  May  it  came  down 
with  unusual  fury.  Then  there  was  a  lull,  which  was  utilized 
in  replacing  the  bridges  swept  away  and  in  preparing  for  an 
advance  on  Richmond,  as  it  seemed  that  McDowell  was 
not  to  come.  "All  the  bridges  and  fords  along  the  Chicka- 
hominy  in  their  front  were  in  possession  of  the  Federals ;  and 
they  were  rapidly  constructing  new  bridges."  1 

If  there  had  been  no  interference  from  Washington,  there 
would  have  been  no  battle  of  Fair  Oaks.  In  the  first  place,  the 
Union  army  would  have  been  on  the  James ;  but  waiving  that, 
the  army,  if  on  the  Chickahominy,  would  not  have  been  astride 
of  it.  If  the  hope  of  McDowell  had  not  been  held  out  and 
the  army  forced  into  a  perilous  position,  it  would  have  been 
in  a  compact  body  and  would  have  struck  first.  It  was  the 
waiting  for  McDowell  under  a  positive  order  that  checked 
the  advance,  and  this  compulsory  delay  was  mistaken  for 
hesitation  and  timidity,  and  brought  on  an  attack.  The 
weather  played  a  prominent  role  in  this  fierce  drama.  Many 
careless  or  uninformed  writers,  knowing  that  there  were  on 
the  3 ist  of  May  only  two  bridges  over  that  part  of  the  river 
which  separated  the  two  corps  already  mentioned  from  the 
rest  of  the  army,  think  that  General  McClellan  showed  no 
wisdom  in  not  providing  for  more  ready  communication.  They 
are  unaware  that  more  than  twenty  bridges  were  built  under 
his  orders,  but  they  were  all  swept  away  by  the  unprecedented 
floods, — except  the  two  mentioned, — and  only  one,  the 
Grapevine  Bridge,  was  really  serviceable.  Moreover,  while 
the  rain  came  down  in  torrents,  the  work  of  intrenching  could 
not  continue;  otherwise  Casey's  division  would  have  been 
much  better  prepared  on  the  3ist  to  meet  the  brunt  of  the  rebel 
attack. 

Everything  favored  the  Confederates,  for,  as  General  Mc 
Clellan  tells  us,  "exposure  and  fatigue  had  brought  on  a  violent 
attack  of  illness,"  which  confined  him  to  bed  on  the  3<Dth 
and  during  the  morning  of  the  3ist.  To  the  Confederates  it 
seemed  as  if  the  Third  and  Fourth  corps  were  cut  off  from 

1  Battles  and  Leaders,  II,  223. 


McCLELLAN  189 

aid  and  could  not  escape  destruction.  General  Johnston's  plan 
was  to  attack  at  dawn,  at  4  A.  M.,  on  the  3ist.  The  divisions 
of  Longstreet  and  G.  W.  Smith  were  to  advance  by  the  Nine 
Mile  road  and  strike  the  weak  right  flank  of  Casey's  position. 
D.  H.  Hill's  division  was  to  advance  by  the  Williamsburg  road 
a  little  farther  to  the  West  and  engage  the  enemy  in  front, 
and  Huger's  division  was  to  proceed  by  the  Charles  City  road 
farther  South  and  come  upon  Casey's  left  flank.  But  Long- 
street  by  mistake  got  upon  the  Williamsburg  road  above  its 
junction  with  the  Charles  City  road,  and,  being  ahead  of 
Huger,  barred  him  from  getting  on  the  latter  road  and  as 
sumed  command  of  Hill  and  Huger,  If  he  had  been  on  the 
right  road,  he  would  have  been  under  General  Smith's  orders. 
As  the  result  of  the  bungling  of  Longstreet,  the  battle  did  not 
begin  until  one  o'clock.  Casey's  division  consisted  of  the 
brigades  of  Palmer,  Wessells  and  Naglee.  The  attacking 
force  directly  in  front,  under  D.  H.  Hill,  was  composed  of  the 
brigades  of  Rodes,  Rains,  Garland,  and  Anderson.  Garland, 
Anderson,  and  Rodes  made  a  furious  assault  on  the  works 
before  them,  while  Rains  made  a  detour  to  the  right,  and  the 
Federals  were  soon  exposed  to  a  flank  and  rear  fire,  as  well 
as  a  furious  assault  in  front.  Up  to  this  point  they  had  made 
a  stout  resistance,  but  they  were  then  driven  back  to  the  Sec 
ond  Line ;  and  as  the  brigade  of  R.  H.  Anderson  came  to  the 
assistance  of  D.  H.  Hill,  it  seemed  as  if  the  Union  troops 
would  be  speedily  swept  away,  though  General  Couch  with 
two  regiments  had  come  up  to  aid  in  their  defense.  The 
fresh  troops  resisted  stubbornly,  but  were  forced  back  about 
half  a  mile,  where  they  made  a  stand ;  and  being  at  this  point 
reinforced  by  General  Sumner  with  Sedgwick's  division,  the 
Federals  repulsed  the  enemy  with  great  loss,  and  finally  routed 
all  the  attacking  forces  as  darkness  closed  the  fight.  Berry's 
and  Jameson's  brigades,  of  Kearney's  division,  reached  the 
field  late  in  the  afternoon  and  did  good  service  on  the  Federal 
left.  Through  some  further  bungling,  of  General  Long- 
street  apparently,  the  five  brigades  on  the  Charles  City  road 
took  no  part  in  the  battle ;  those  on  the  Nine  Mile  road  came 
into  action  only  after  Stunner's  corps  had  reached  the  field, 


McCLELLAN 

and  in  the  attack  on  the  Federal  right  wing  their  losses  were 
heavy  and  they  were  obliged  to  fall  back.  It  was  here  that 
Generals  Johnston,  Hampton,  and  Pettigrew  were  all  wounded. 
The  attack  had  failed, — at  least  so  far. 

It  was  confidently  expected  by  General  Johnston  that  the 
river  would  prove  impassable ;  but  General  McClellan,  though 
in  bed,  having  learned  of  an  expected  attack,  directed  General 
Sumner  to  be  ready  to  cross  the  river  at  a  moment's  notice. 
There  were  two  divisions, — Richardson's  and  Sedgwick's, — 
each  of  which  had  built  a  bridge  opposite  to  itself.  At  one 
o'clock  each  was  at  its  bridge.  The  order  came  at  2  130  P.  M'., 
and  the  passage  at  once  began ;  but  it  was  found  that  only  the 
upper  or  "grapevine"  bridge  opposite  Sedgwick  was  available. 
The  farther  end  of  this  was  afloat,  but  when  filled  with  soldiers 
the  weight  forced  that  end  down  upon  its  base,  and  it  was  so 
held  in  place  until  the  corps  had  passed,  taking  one  battery 
with  them.  Scarcely  was  the  last  gun  over  when  the  timbers 
began  to  float  away.  But  for  the  timely  aid  of  Sedgwick's 
division,  the  forces  of  Heintzelman  and  Keyes  would  have 
been  in  great  peril.  An  array  of  twenty-four  guns  brought 
to  bear  in  an  open  field  upon  the  enemy  quickly  turned  the  tide. 


CHAPTER    XXXVI 

FAIR  OAKS THE  SECOND  DAY 

If  we  give  heed  to  those  who  were  not  present,  like  General 
Johnston,  or  to  those  who  were  present  but  would  like  to  for 
get  it,  like  General  Longstreet,  there  was  no  second  day; 
but  if  we  prefer  the  testimony  of  General  G.  W.  Smith,  who 
succeeded  to  the  chief  command  of  the  Southern  army  on  the 
afternoon  of  the  3ist  when  General  Johnston  was  severely 
wounded  and  carried  from  the  field,  and  if  we  listen  to  the 
Union  officers  whose  attention  General  Smith  occupied  very 
pressingly  on  the  first  of  June,  1862,  there  was  a  very  severe 
conflict  on  the  second  day,  which  General  Johnston  knew  noth 
ing  about  and  which  General  Longstreet  naturally  had  no  de 
sire  to  remember. 

On  the  morning  of  June  ist  the  Union  army  was  greatly 
strengthened.  Richardson's  division  with  three  batteries  was 
added  to  Sedgwick's,  and  General  Hooker's  division  had  come 
up  from  White  Oak  Swamp.  The  brunt  of  the  attack  con 
ducted  by  Longstreet  on  the  Confederate  right  was  borne  by 
Richardson,  who  was  soon  assisted  by  Hooker;  the  enemy 
was  driven  back  and  all  the  positions  lost  on  the  preceding 
day  were  now  regained. 

According  to  General  Smith,  Longstreet  was  the  marplot 
of  the  second  day,  as  he  had  been  of  the  first.  He  was  to 
lead  the  attack  by  a  determined  assault  on  the  Federal  left, 
to  be  followed  by  similar  action  by  Whiting's  brigade  on  the 
Federal  right.  The  fighting  began  at  5  A.  M.  Hours  passed 
and  there  was  no  sign  of  an  attack  in  full  force.  "Long- 
street's  troops  were  evidently  losing  ground  without  his  hav 
ing  made  an  attack  with  more  than  a  very  small  portion  of 
the  right  wing."1  About  10:30  A.  M.  appeals  for  aid  came 
thick  and  fast  from  him,  saying  that  he  must  retreat  unless 

1  Battles  and  Leaders,  II,  253. 

191 


192  McCLELLAN 

help  came.  But  we  are  told  that  "his  leading  troops  had 
fallen  back  sometime  before."  McLaws  was  sent  with  5,000 
more;  at  2  p.  M.  Longstreet  wanted  10,000  more;  but  the  fight 
was  over.  General  Smith  learned  later,  to  his  disgust,  that 
General  Longstreet  had  made  no  use  of  the  troops  under 
D.  H.  Hill, — thirteen  brigades.  He  tells  us  that  the  Confeder 
ates  held  the  redoubts  first  captured  until  sunrise  on  June  2d, 
and  then  retired  without  compulsion  to  their  former  camps. 

The  design  of  the  attack  had  failed;  and  the  character  of 
the  contest  for  the  two  days  is  indicated  by  the  fact  that  the 
total  Union  loss  was  5,031,  the  total  Southern  loss  6,134. 

The  high  estimation  which  the  Southern  leaders  enter 
tained  for  McClellan's  military  talents  has  been  abundantly 
recorded.  Their  acts  supply  the  best  evidence  of  it.  No  such 
rebel  army  was  ever  assembled  in  Virginia  at  any  other  time 
as  that  which  was  collected  from  every  quarter  to  oppose  Mc- 
Clellan.  Troops  were  hurried  in  from  the  Carolinas  and 
Georgia,  and  a  little  later  even  from  the  West,  for  the  defense 
of  Richmond. 

The  crisis  over,  they  hastened  back  to  the  various  points 
from  which  they  had  come. 

Throughout  the  two  days'  struggle  a  great  captive  balloon, 
high  in  the  air  above  McClellan's  headquarters,  enabled  trusty 
aids  to  survey  the  whole  vicinity  and  telegraph  every  move 
ment  of  the  enemy. 

The  battle  of  the  second  day  was  on  Sunday,  "a  day  of  rest 
to  the  millions,  who  rose  to  their  morning  devotions,  ere  the 
bell  summoned  them  to  the  place  of  prayer  and  praise,  but 
not  one  of  rest  to  the  tired  and  decimated  armies  which  the 
roll  of  the  drum  called  from  their  wet  beds  of  earth  to  the 
shock  of  battle."  2 

As  the  result  of  the  floods  of  the  3ist  of  May,  not  only 
had  the  bridges  to  be  rebuilt,  as  we  are  told,  but  the  timbers 
had  to  be  dragged  through  deep  mud  and  water,  while  the 
ground,  swampy  enough  before,  had  become  a  bottomless 
bog.  The  men  suffered  severely  from  the  deluge.  It  put 
their  camps  in  a  dreadful  condition,  and  when  hot  weather 

'Great  Rebellion,  I,  432. 


McCLELLAN  193 

followed  they  were  exposed  to  malaria.  It  was  a  practical 
proof  of  the  almost  criminal  recklessness  of  forcing  an  army 
to  wage  war  under  such  prohibitive  conditions.  But  they 
had  confidence  in  their  leader,  and  they  expected  every  day 
that  the  rainy  season  would  end  and  their  discomforts  be  over. 
It  is  said,  too,  that  at  this  time  the  people  generally  had  great 
confidence  in  McClellan,  but  feared  that  he  had  been  insuf 
ficiently  supplied  with  means.  No  one  in  the  army  dreamed 
of  the  possibility  that  this  great  scheme  of  operations  would 
be  abandoned  and  the  war  in  Virginia  begun  all  over  again. 

On  the  2d  of  June  the  commander  issued  a  proclamation 
complimenting  the  bravery  of  his  men  in  past  engagements 
and  calling  upon  them  to  make  one  last,  supreme,  decisive 
effort  in  the  great  battle  at  hand.  This  is  by  certain  writers 
supposed  to  be  solely  a  conditional  intention,  in  the  full  belief 
that  McDowell's  legions  would  be  no  longer  withheld.  But 
this  view  cannot  be  harmonized  with  McClellan's  private  let 
ters  to  his  wife.  From  these  letters  it  is  evident  that,  Mc 
Dowell  or  no  McDowell,  his  plan  was  laid  to  strike  as  soon  as 
the  elemental  conditions  would  permit.  For,  if  the  ground 
had  solidity  enough  to  give  him  the  full  use  of  his  artillery, 
he  felt  that,  thanks  to  himself,  his  strong  equipment  in  that 
line  largely  atoned  for  his  inadequacy  of  numbers.  But 
during  the  first  twenty  days  of  June  a  practically  continuous 
tempest  seemed  to  exclude  the  idea  that  there  would  ever 
come  a  surcease  of  earth-soaking  rain.  It  required  labor  and 
ingenuity  to  keep  the  field-guns  from  sinking  out  of  sight 
in  the  jelly-like  mud. 

With  this  great  factor  in  his  operations  paralyzed,  he 
could  not  have  moved,  even  if  McDowell  had  joined  him. 
Like  Napoleon,  he  had  to  wait  for  the  rain  to  stop  and  the 
earth  to  dry.  Unaware  of  or  forgetting  the  obstacles  created 
by  Jupiter  Pluvius,  one  writer  says  he  should  at  this  time  have 
attacked  Richmond,  as  he  was  within  five  miles  of  it ;  another 
asserts  that  this  was  his  chance  to  move  unmolested  to  the 
James.  But  he  could  not  do  this,  for  the  order  which  placed 
him  there  held  him  there  to  await  McDowell,  who  was  still 


194  McCLELLAN 

coming.     The   folly  of  an  assault  upon  Richmond  will  be 
made  clearly  evident. 

But  for  the  terrible  weather,  General  McClellan  could 
have  made  his  position  impregnable,  and  could  have  con 
structed  so  many  bridges  over  the  river  that  it  would  no  longer 
have  been  a  factor  in  the  movements  of  either  army;  but  the 
repeated  bridging  of  the  stream  kept  the  Union  forces  busy 
whenever  the  elements  made  work  possible.  No  time  need 
be  given  to  that  consideration,  however,  for  if  the  weather 
had  been  fit  either  for  working  or  fighting,  it  is  clear  to  any 
one  who  studies  the  movements,  the  despatches,  and,  more 
than  all,  the  private  letters  of  the  commander  that  he  would 
not  have  waited  long  for  McDowell.  He  would  have  struck 
and  relied  on  his  efficient  artillery  to  more  than  offset  the 
preponderance  of  numbers  against  him;  and  that  there  was  a 
great  preponderance  we  will  demonstrate  at  the  proper  time 
by  irresistible  proofs.  Handicap  after  handicap  had  been 
heaped  upon  him  ever  since  the  appearance  of  Mr.  Stanton 
in  the  arena  of  politics,  but  far  beyond  all  these  was  the  over 
whelming  downpour,  chilling  alike  the  bodies,  the  spirits,  and 
the  courage  of  the  most  resolute,  wrecking  every  plan,  and 
paralyzing  every  form  of  activity. 

While  holding  both  the  army  of  Lee  and  the  army  of 
McClellan  inert,  the  weather  should  for  this  very  reason  have 
encouraged  Mr.  Stanton  to  accede  to  the  oft-repeated  appeals 
of  the  Union  general  to  send  McDowell's  corps  to  him  by 
water.  For  this  he  was  constantly  importuning.  If  Mc 
Dowell  had  been  sent  to  West  Point  by  water  about  the  time 
when  Franklin  arrived  there,  or  in  the  flooding  days  of  May 
and  June,  or  to  Urbanna  and  thence  by  a  short  march  to  West 
Point,  the  united  army  could  with  ease  have  located  itself 
between  the  enemy  and  Washington.  Mr.  Ellis  says :  'The 
labor  and  loss  of  time  in  bridging  the  Chickahominy  would 
have  been  saved,  and  the  forces  being  concentrated,  there  is 
every  reason  to  believe  that  the  fall  of  Richmond  would  have 
followed.  The  ever  present  fear  of  the  capture  of  Washing 
ton,  prevented  the  President  from  complying  with  the  request 


McCLELLAN  195 

of  McClellan."  3  Speaking  of  the  result  of  the  dislodging 
of  the  enemy  at  Hanover  Court  House,  General  Porter  assures 
us  that  "our  movement  had  caused  the  rapid  retreat  to  Rich 
mond  of  Joseph  R.  Anderson's  command,  thereby  relieving 
McDowell  from  active  operations  in  Northern  Virginia,  as 
well  as  opening  the  way  for  him  to  join  us."  4  "It  was  ap 
parent  to  both  generals  that  Richmond  could  only  be  taken 
in  one  of  two  ways:  by  regular  approaches  or  by  assault. 

.  .  An  assault  would  require  superior  forces,  supported 
by  ample  reserves.  It  was  equally  apparent  that  an  attack 
could  readily  be  made  from  Richmond,  because  that  city's  well 
armed  and  manned  intrenchments  would  permit  its  defense 
by  a  small  number  of  men,  while  large  forces  could  be  con 
centrated  and  detached  for  offensive  operations."  5 

"Despite  delays,  drawn  battles,  losses  and  depletions  from 
natural  obstacles,  McClellan  had  succeeded  as  he  had  prom 
ised  in  reaching  the  vicinity  of  the  rebel  capital  and  thus 
relieving  Washington,  alarming  the  Southern  leaders  and 
raising  the  anticipations  of  the  North.  It  would  seem  that  on 
this  favored  outlook,  the  government  would  have  strained 
every  move  to  carry  the  campaign  successfully  through  by 
reinforcing  the  army."  6 

We  are  told  that  letters  were  flowing  into  Washington, 
begging  that  reinforcements  be  sent  on  with  all  haste  to  Mc 
Clellan  and  that  they  be  sent  while  hesitation  and  delay  marked 
the  action  of  the  Federal  government;  that  at  Richmond,  on 
the  contrary,  everything  was  moving  with  prodigious  energy, 
and  that  from  every  accessible  quarter,  even  from  North  and 
South  Carolina  and  Georgia,  regiments  were  rushing  for 
ward  with  desperate  speed.7  When  Lee  requested  that  all  the 
soldiers  in  and  about  Richmond  be  sent  to  him  except  two 
brigades  Mr.  Davis  replied,  "Confidence  in  you  overcomes 
the  view  which  would  otherwise  be  taken  of  the  exposed  con 
dition  of  Richmond,  and  the  troops  retained  for  the  defense 

8  History  of  the  United  States,  III,  995. 

*  Battles  and  Leaders,  321. 

5  Ibid.,  324. 

"Webb,  The  Peninsula,  120. 

THeadley,  Heroes  and  Battles  of  the  Civil  War,  500. 


196  McCLELLAN 

of  the  capital  are  surrendered  to  you  on  a  renewed  request." 
"This  reply  of  Mr.  Davis  makes  it  evident  that  on  the  Con 
federate  side  there  was  one  able  head  which  guided,  in  strong 
contrast  with  the  Federal  divisions  of  authority  and  the  inter 
ference  of  the  President  and  his  cabinet."  8 
8  Rhodes,  History  of  the  United  States,,  IV,  121. 


CHAPTER    XXXVII 

THE    POLICY    OF    STANTON SPEEDY    SUCCESS    NOT    DESIRED— 

THE  WAR  MUST  BE  PROLONGED 

The  confident  manner  in  which  McClellan  cleared  the  way 
for  McDowell  illustrates  his  aggressiveness,  and  indicates  be 
yond  doubt  that  if  it  had  been  desirable  for  McClellan  to 
join  McDowell  at  Fredericksburg,  this  would  have  been 
promptly  effected.  There  would  then  have  been  no  waiting 
at  all.  What  makes  the  terror  of  the  government  at  this 
time  appear  especially  amazing  and  culpable  is  the  fact  that 
a  captured  letter  from  General  Johnston  at  this  time  plainly 
stated  that  the  sole  object  of  Jackson's  raid  was  to  frighten 
the  Federal  authorities  and  thus  to  detain  McDowell  from 
McClellan. 

The  waiting  and  the  weather  and  the  attitude  of  the 
authorities  must  have  brought  a  man  of  McClellan's  spirit  to 
the  verge  of  madness.  Only  his  religious  spirit  sustained 
him. 

Even  timidity  is  a  praiseworthy  motive  of  action,  in  pref 
erence  to  that  which  is  presented  to  our  attention  by  the  fol 
lowing  anecdote.  About  this  time  it  is  related  that  Major 
Charles  Davies,  a  noted  author  of  mathematical  works  and 
at  one  time  professor  of  mathematics  at  West  Point,  was  a 
member  of  a  committee  sent  from  New  York  to  urge  a  more 
vigorous  support  of  McClellan.  The  committee  called  upon 
the  President.  Mr.  Stanton  was  with  him.  They  presented 
their  views  to  the  President,  but  it  was  Mr.  Stanton  who 
responded,  saying  that  the  great  end  of  the  war  was  to  uproot 
slavery,  and  that  if  it  should  be  brought  to  an  end  before  the 
nation  was  ready  for  that  event,  it  would  be  a  failure ;  in  other 
words,  that  the  war  must  be  prolonged  and  conducted  so  as  to 
achieve  that  object,  that  the  people  of  the  North  were  not  yet 
ready  to  accept  that  view,  and  that  it  would  not  do  to  permit 

197 


198  McCLELLAN 

General  McClellan  to  succeed  until  they  were;  that,  accord 
ingly,  it  was  not  the  policy  of  the  government  to  strengthen  him 
so  as  to  insure  his  success.  This  was  the  view  of  the  extreme 
Radicals.  The  above  story  was  told  by  Major  Davies  after 
the  war,  at  one  time  to  General  McClellan,  at  another  time  to 
General  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  of  the  Confederate  army.1  "The 
Radical  party  cared  nothing  for  the  success  of  the  war,  unless 
it  could  be  used  for  revenge  upon  the  Southern  people  and 
embrace  a  design  upon  the  institution  of  slavery.  Wendell 
Phillips,  a  famous  Radical  orator  in  the  North,  had  not  hesi 
tated  to  declare  that  he  would  deplore  a  victory  of  McClel 
lan,  because  a  sore  would  be  salved  over  and  it  would  be  the 
victory  of  a  slave  Union;  that  he  thanked  Beauregard  for 
marshalling  his  army  before  Washington  because  it  had  con 
ferred  upon  Congress  the  constitutional  power  to  abolish  slav 
ery."  2 

Mr.  Elson  skeptically  mentions  this  alleged  reason  for  not 
supporting  McClellan  and  gravely  adds:  "If  it  were  so,  we 
cannot  hesitate  to  give  it  our  approval."  3  This  declaration, 
made  quite  recently,  exhibits  the  wild  fanaticism  of  the  ex 
tremists.  McClellan,  being  conservative  in  his  views,  incurred 
their  deadliest  enmity.  Those  who  were  not  fully  with  them 
they  looked  upon  as  foes.  "They  therefore  determined  to  ruin 
me  in  any  event  and  by  any  means :  first  by  endeavoring  to 
force  me  into  premature  movements,  knowing  that  a  failure 
would  probably  end  my  military  career ;  afterward  by  with 
holding  the  means  necessary  to  achieve  success. 
Having  failed  to  force  me  to  advance  when  an  advance  would 
have  been  madness,  they  withheld  the  means  of  success  when 
I  was  in  contact  with  the  enemy,  and  finally  relieved  me  from 
command  when  the  game  was  in  my  hands.  They  determined 
that  I  should  not  succeed  and  carried  out  their  determination 
only  too  well,  at  a  fearful  sacrifice  of  blood,  time  and  treas- 


1  McClellan,  Own  Story,  150,   151. 

2  Pollard,  Lost  Cause,  299. 

8  History  of  the  United  States,  711. 
4  McClellan,  Own  Story,  150. 


McCLELLAN  199 

But  there  was  another  reason  with  Stanton,  a  potent  rea 
son,  which  was  more  practical, — the  continuance  of  the  exist 
ing  administration  must  be  promoted ;  the  party  must  be  fos 
tered  and  built  up.  To  that  object  he  gave  his  sagest  con 
sideration  and  surely  not  without  fruit. 

General  McClellan  held  the  military  sagacity  of  General 
Lee  in  the  highest  estimation;  and  as  the  days  passed,  and 
the  rain  still  came  pouring  down,  and  abundant  time  was  given 
his  opponent  to  consider  the  situation  of  the  Federal  army, 
McClellan  foresaw  what  was  likely  to  happen.  If  the  storms 
continued  and  McDowell  failed  to  arrive,  fate  would  set  him 
free  to  go  where  he  had  always  wished  to  go, — that  is,  to 
the  James.  On  June  the  4th  he  wrote  to  the  President. 

"June  4. — Please  inform  me  at  once  what  reinforcements, 
if  any,  I  can  count  upon  having  at  Fortress  Monroe  or  White 
House  within  the  next  three  days,  and  when  each  regiment 
may  be  expected  to  arrive.  It  is  of  the  utmost  importance 
that  I  should  know  this  immediately.  The  losses  in  the  battle 
of  the  3  ist  and  ist  will  amount  to  (7,000)  seven  thousand. 
Regard  this  as  confidential  for  the  present. 

"If  I  can  have  five  new  regiments  for  Fort  Monroe  and 
its  dependencies,  I  can  draw  three  more  old  regiments  from 
there  safely.  I  can  well  dispose  of  four  more  raw  regiments 
on  my  communications.  I  can  well  dispose  of  from  fifteen  to 
twenty  well-drilled  regiments  among  the  old  brigades  in  bring 
ing  them  up  to  their  original  effective  strength.  Recruits  are 
especially  necessary  for  the  regular  and  volunteer  batteries  of 
artillery,  as  well  as  for  the  regular  and  volunteer  regiments 
of  infantry.  After  the  losses  in  our  last  battle  I  trust  that  I 
will  no  longer  be  regarded  as  an  alarmist.  I  believe  we  have 
at  least  one  more  desperate  battle  to  fight. 

"In  reply  to  your  despatch  of  two  p.  M.  to-day,  I  have 
the  honor  to  state  that  the  Chickahominy  river  has  risen  so  as 
to  flood  the  entire  bottoms  to  the  depth  of  three  and  four 
feet.  I  am  pushing  forward  the  bridges  in  spite  of  this,  and 
the  men  are  working  night  and  day,  up  to  their  waists  in 
water,  to  complete  them. 


200  McCLELLAN 

"The  whole  face  of  the  country  is  a  perfect  bog,  entirely 
impassable  for  artillery,  or  even  cavalry,  except  directly  in 
the  narrow  roads,  which  renders  any  general  movements, 
either  of  this  or  the  rebel  army,  entirely  out  of  the  question 
until  we  have  more  favorable  weather. 

"I  am  glad  to  learn  that  you  are  pressing  forward  rein 
forcements  so  vigorously. 

"I  shall  be  in  perfect  readiness  to  move  forward  and  take 
Richmond  the  moment  McCall  reaches  here  and  the  ground 
will  admit  the  passage  of  artillery.  I  advanced  my  pickets 
about  a  mile  to-day,  driving  off  the  rebel  pickets  and  securing 
a  very  advantageous  position. 

"The  rebels  have  several  batteries  established,  command 
ing  the  debouches  from  two  of  our  bridges,  and  fire  upon  our 
working  parties  continually;  but  as  yet  they  have  killed  but 
very  few  of  our  men. 

"June  10. — I  have  again  information  that  Beauregard  has 
arrived,  and  that  some  of  his  troops  are  to  follow  him.  No 
great  reliance — perhaps  none  whatever — can  be  attached  to 
this;  but  it  is  possible,  and  ought  to  be  their  policy. 

"I  am  completely  checked  by  the  weather.  The  roads  and 
fields  are  literally  impassable  for  artillery,  almost  so  for  in 
fantry.  The  Chickahominy  is  in  a  dreadful  state;  we  have 
another  rainstorm  on  our  hands. 

"I  shall  attack  as  soon  as  the  weather  and  ground  will 
permit;  but  there  will  be  a  delay,  the  extent  of  which  no  one 
can  foresee,  for  the  season  is  altogether  abnormal. 

"In  view  of  these  circumstances,  I  present  for  your  con 
sideration  the  propriety  of  detaching  largely  from  Halleck's 
army  to  strengthen  this;  for  it  would  seem  that  Halleck  has 
now  no  large  organized  force  in  front  of  him,  while  we  have. 
If  this  cannot  be  done,  or  even  in  connection  with  it,  allow 
me  to  suggest  the  movement  of  a  heavy  column  from  Dalton 
upon  Atlanta.  If  but  the  one  can  be  done  it  would  better 
conform  to  military  principles  to  strengthen  this  army.  And 
even  although  the  reinforcements  might  not  arrive  in  season 
to  take  part  in  the  attack  upon  Richmond,  the  moral  effect 


McCLELLAN  201 

would  be  great,  and  they  would  furnish  valuable  assistance  in 
ulterior  movements. 

"I  wish  to  be  distinctly  understood  that,  whenever  the 
weather  permits,  I  will  attack  with  whatever  force  I  may 
have,  although  a  larger  force  would  enable  me  to  gain  more 
decisive  results. 

"I  would  be  glad  to  have  McCall's  infantry  sent  forward 
by  water  at  once,  without  waiting  for  his  artillery  and  cav 
alry.  ;, 

"If  General  Prim  returns  via  Washington,  please  converse 
with  him  as  to  the  condition  of  affairs  here."  5 

On  the  5th  he  wrote  to  Mrs.  McClellan :  "June  5,  9  A.  M. 
(Thursday),  New  Bridge. — We  have  had  a  terrible  time  dur 
ing  the  last  few  days:  torrents  of  rain  constantly  falling; 
ground  a  sea  of  mud ;  the  Chickahominy  a  booming  river ; 
bridges  swept  away;  the  railroad  pretty  much  used  up — in 
short,  about  all  the  troubles  that  armies  fall  heir  to,  except 
defeat!  But  I  am  so  grateful  that  God  gave  us  the  victory 
that  I  will  not  complain  of  minor  evils.  The  enemy  must 
have  been  very  badly  whipped  not  to  have  renewed  his  attack 
under  the  very  favorable  circumstances  of  the  last  few  days."  6 

On  June  the  i8th,  anticipating  that  McDowell  would  come 
neither  by  land  nor  water  and  that  the  great  army  of  Lee 
would  cut  him  off  from  West  Point,  he  arranged  to  have 
the  vessels  in  the  York  convey  his  supplies  to  the  James.  But 
he  was  not  free  yet,  for  McDowell  was  still  "coming" ;  and 
the  order  which  anchored  him  on  the  Chickahominy  was  still 
in  force. 


5  McClellan,  Own  Story,  386,  387,  388. 
'Ibid.,  399- 


CHAPTER    XXXVIII 

FIVE   MILES   FROM   RICHMOND 

The  anticipation  that  McDowell  would  not  come  and  that 
his  communications  would  be  severed  did  not  prevent  Mc- 
Clellan  from  resolving  to  strike  as  soon  as  he  could  efficiently 
use  his  guns.  There  being  a  little  respite  from  the  elements 
on  the  1 5th,  he  wrote  on  that  day  to  his  wife: 

"We  have  had  several  skirmishes.  The  rebels  have  at 
tacked  our  pickets  on  several  points,  but  were  everywhere 
beaten  back  with  the  loss  of  several  killed  and  a  respectable 
number  of  prisoners.  ...  I  do  not  think  our  rain  of 
to-day  will  do  much  harm.  The  chances  now  are  that  I  will 
make  the  first  advance  on  Tuesday  or  Wednesday.  By  that 
time  I  think  the  ground  will  be  fit  for  the  movements  of  artil 
lery  and  that  all  our  bridges  will  be  completed.  I  think  the 
rebels  will  make  a  desperate  fight,  but  I  feel  sure  that  wre  will 
gain  our  point.  Look  on  the  maps  I  sent  you  a  day  or  two 
ago,  and  find  'Old  Tavern,'  on  the  road  from  New  Bridge  to 
Richmond;  it  is  in  that  vicinity  that  the  next  battle  will  be 
fought.  I  think  that  they  see  it  in  that  light,  and  that  they 
are  fully  prepared  to  make  a  desperate  resistance.  I  shall 
make  the  first  battle  mainly  an  artillery  combat.  As  soon  as 
I  gain  possession  of  the  'Old  Tavern'  I  will  push  them  in 
upon  Richmond  and  behind  their  works;  then  I  will  bring  up 
my  heavy  guns,  shell  the  city,  and  carry  it  by  assault.  I  speak 
very  confidently,  but  if  you  could  see  the  faces  of  the  troops 
as  I  ride  among  them  you  would  share  my  confidence.  They 
will  do  anything  I  tell  them  to  do.  ...  The  next  bat 
tle  will  doubtless  be  a  desperate  one,  but  I  think  that  I  can 
so  use  our  artillery  as  to  make  the  loss  of  life  on  our  side 
comparatively  small."  1 

1  McClellan,  Own  Story,  405. 

202 


M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  N  203 

On  Wednesday  the  25th  day  of  June  hostilities  were  re 
sumed  by  an  advance  of  the  left  wing  about  a  mile.  Of  this 
engagement,  known  as  Oak  Grove,  a  very  brief  description 
will  answer  every  purpose.  In  front  of  the  first  line  of  re 
doubts  on  the  Williamsburg  and  Richmond  road  was  a  broad, 
clear  field ;  then  came  a  space  of  swampy  timber  land,  and  then 
a  second  field  just  beyond,  at  the  farther  side  of  which  were 
the  entrenchments  of  the  enemy.  Between  eight  and  nine  on 
the  morning  of  the  25th  General  Heintzelman's  corps  started 
out  to  occupy  this  second  field.  The  enemy  was  in  strong 
force  and  resisted  tenaciously,  and  the  fight  lasted  until  sun 
set  ;  but  the  rebels  were  driven  from  the  coveted  position.  Its 
occupation  was  desired  to  support  the  attack  on  Old  Tavern 
that  was  to  be  made  a  day  or  two  later. 

As  the  result  of  this  advance,  the  extreme  left  wing  was 
now  only  five  miles  from  Richmond.  From  the  captive  army- 
balloon  at  night  the  gleaming  of  the  street  lights  in  the  Pride 
of  the  Confederacy  could  be  plainly  seen,  and  by  day  the  foli 
age  and  verdure  of  many  parks  which  stand  high  in  that  City 
of  Hills  and  many  prominent  buildings  could  be  easily  dis 
tinguished,  while  to  the  people  of  the  city  the  word  "Union," 
in  great  letters  on  the  balloon,  bore  a  frequent  menace. 

Five  miles  from  Richmond!  No  other  Union  army  was 
ever  so  near  again  until  the  Confederates  abandoned  it.  Not 
only  was  this  army  there,  but  there  in  excellent  condition  and 
dauntless  spirit,  and  there  too  in  spite  of  bottomless  mire  and 
incessant  rain.  At  Williamsburg,  at  West  Point,  at  Hanover 
Court  House,  and  at  Fair  Oaks, — excepting  only  Casey's  men, 
who  did  but  lead  them  into  a  greater  surprise  a  little  later, — 
the  Confederates  must  have  wondered  where  were  the  cravens 
of  the  Potomac.  In  spite  of  the  great  numbers  of  the  enemy, 
if  the  elements  had  been  propitious,  McClellan  would  have  ad 
vanced  upon  Richmond.  Even  without  McDowell  he  would 
have  struck.  He  was  about  to  strike.  The  same  pluck  which 
had  brought  him  there  would  have  brought  him  farther;  but 
the  spongy  soil  was  kept  saturated,  and  his  artillery,  his  great 
reliance  against  superior  numbers,  was  useless  to  him.  He 
must  wait,  and  meantime  many  Bluchers  were  gathering,  and 


204  M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  N 

his    Grouchy, — McDowell, — as    fate   decreed,   was   never  to 
arrive. 

Five  miles  from  Richmond — how  much  is  in  that  phrase! 
What  a  practical  appreciation  of  the  military  skill  of  the  Fed 
eral  commander  it  conveys.  It  was  like  the  evacuation  of 
Manassas  and  the  Potomac;  of  Yorktown  and  Norfolk  and 
Gloucester.  From  what  other  commander  of  that  army  did 
Lee  retire?  Here  was  a  Union  army  intact  and  powerful,  at 
the  very  gates  of  the  Southern  capital.  Why  was  it  allowed 
to  get  there,  and  in  such  fine  condition?  It  was  the  compli 
ment,  not  of  words  but  of  acts,  paid  by  the  Confederates  to 
McClellan's  military  genius.  While,  through  the  influence 
of  Stanton,  a  considerable  number  of  people  were  led  to  won 
der  if  McClellan  could  wisely  be  entrusted  with  a  regiment  or 
even  a  company,  the  ablest  generals  of  Dixie  felt  that  he  was 
so  formidable  and  dangerous  that  the  struggle  with  him  must 
be  made  only  in  the  most  favorable  environment  and  with  the 
greatest  aggregation  of  forces  which  could  possibly  be  col 
lected.  Find,  if  you  can,  when  such  another  Union  army, 
intact  or  in  any  condition,  was  ever  so  close  to  Richmond 
until  it  was  evacuated.  Certainly  Pope,  Burnside,  Hooker, 
or  Meade  were  never  so  close  while  they  were  at  the  head  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  Not  even  General  Grant  ap 
proached  so  near;  and  the  wreckage  of  a  great  army  which 
arrived  at  the  James  on  June  i6th,  1864,  as  will  be  hereafter 
explained  was  very  different  from  the  army  which  lay  en 
camped  before  Richmond  from  May  the  2oth  to  June  the  26th, 
1862,  waiting  for  McDowell  to  come  or  the  rains  to  cease. 
Five  miles  from  Richmond!  If  the  weather  had  only  been 
propitious  from  the  time  of  his  arrival !  But  they  who  pushed 
him  out  in  the  rain  invited  this  condition  and  tempted  fate 
to  prolong  it.  Why  was  not  McDowell  given  to  McClellan 
by  water  or  by  land  in  this  last  long  stretch  of  days  from 
June  the  loth  to  June  the  26th,  while  the  attention  of  the 
Southerners  was  wholly  engrossed  with  the  gathering  of  the 
clans  who  were  to  overwhelm  and  crush  the  Union  army, 
and  while  not  even  a  Southern  cow-bell  tinkled  in  Northern 
Virginia  to  create  a  panic  in  the  gentle  breasts  of  the  Wash- 


McCLELLAN  205 

ingtonians?  There  was  no  straw  in  the  way,  and  McDowell 
was  bravely  and  patriotically  fretting  to  be  with  the  main 
army.  His  troops,  as  we  have  seen,  had  once  started  and 
marched  eight  miles,  but  were  recalled  by  orders  emanating 
from  Washington, — eight  miles  south  of  Fredericksburg ; 
fifteen  miles  from  Hanover  Court  House.  If  he  had  advised 
McClellan  of  his  advance,  McClellan  would  have  met  him  at 
the  end  of  the  first  day's  march. 

At  this  juncture  we  have  clear  proof  of  the  cunning  and 
perfidy  of  Mr.  Stanton.  Fully  advised  by  McClellan's  des 
patches  of  the  dispiriting  difficulties  of  rain  and  flood  and 
their  attendant  evils,  against  which  McClellan  was  battling 
in  the  Virginian  bogs;  knowing  of  the  extraordinary  forces 
collecting  to  defend  Richmond ;  and  keeping,  and  continuing  to 
keep,  away  from  McClellan  the  forces  which  alone  could  en 
sure  a  successful  assault,  he  as  the  national  press  agent  circu 
lated  the  report  through  all  the  journals  of  the  nation  that 
Richmond  was  about  to  fall.  But  for  Stanton  the  army  would 
have  been  united  and  would  have  been  much  larger  and  better 
equipped;  but  for  him  it  would  not  have  been  battling  with 
bogs  and  floods  and  rain.  He  had  every  reason  to  expect  a 
disaster  or  at  least  a  repulse.  Such  a  result  was  not  merely 
to  be  expected  by  him.  He  had  ensured  it.  Yet  he  so  repre 
sented  the  situation  that  many  great  journals  of  the  nation 
had  fireworks  fixed  upon  their  buildings  ready  to  be  touched 
off  the  instant  the  news  was  flashed  to  them,  and  great  prepara 
tions  were  made  to  celebrate  the  floating  of  our  flag  over  the 
ramparts  of  Richmond,  and  on  the  nearly  approaching  Fourth 
of  July  was  to  be  celebrated  the  fall  of  the  Southern  Capital 
and  the  death-blow  to  the  rebellion.  No  more  crafty  plot  than 
this  for  the  overthrow  and  ruin  of  a  patriotic  and  able  gen 
eral  was  ever  conceived.  With  such  an  impression  every 
where,  disaster,  repulse,  or  even  much  delay  would  naturally 
stir  up  strong  adverse  feeling. 

The  Comte  de  Paris  intimates  that  it  was  a  perfidious 
scheme  of  Stanton's,  designed  to  excite  public  opinion  against 
McClellan.2  Our  present  knowledge  of  Stanton's  hostility  to 

3  History  of  the  Civil  War,  II,  112. 


2o6  McCLELLAN 

McClellan,  proven  by  the  testimony  of  his  co-secretaries  and 
even  by  his  own  letters,  tends  to  confirm  this  view. 

The  War  Secretary's  chief  idolater,  Mr.  Flower,  assures 
us  that  Mr.  Stanton  never  permitted  reporters  to  come  to  the 
War  Department.  That  is  no  doubt  true,  but  it  is  the  state 
ment  of  a  negative  pregnant.  How  he  dealt  with  the  press 
is  of  no  importance.  That  his  object  in  centering  the  wires 
in  his  office  was  to  be  the  autocrat  of  war  intelligence,  to  pub 
lish  what  he  pleased  and  revise  it  as  he  pleased,  appears  clearly 
from  Mr.  Flower's  biography.3 

The  Compte  de  Paris  says :  "The  government,  still  cher 
ishing  a  secret  jealousy  of  McClellan,  seldom  communicated 
to  the  public  the  tidings  it  received  from  him."  4  "The  gov 
ernment  sought  to  conceal  facts  which  made  the  chief  re 
sponsibility  for  reverses  fall  upon  itself.  It  persistently  re 
fused  to  give  the  text  of  McClellan's  despatches  to  the  papers 
and  when  the  whole  series  of  official  documents  were  given 
to  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  it  permitted  itself 
to  mutilate  the  text  of  its  correspondence  with  the  general, 
without  making  any  mention  of  the  omissions."  5 

On  the  25th,  evidently  disgusted,  and  indignant  at  the 
failure  of  the  Administration  to  reinforce  him  when  half  of 
the  forces  senselessly  scattered  over  Northern  Virginia  would 
have  enabled  him  within  a  few  days  to  hoist  the  Stars  and 
Stripes  over  the  Confederate  Capital,  he  sent  this  telegram 
to  Mr.  Stanton: 

"HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

"CAMP  LINCOLN,  June  25,  1862, — 6:15  p.  M. 
"I  have  just  returned  from  the  field,  and  find  your  dispatch 
in  regard  to  Jackson.     Several  contrabands  just  in,  giving 
information  confirming  the  supposition  that  Jackson's  advance 
is  at  or  near  Hanover  Court  House,  and  that  Beauregard  ar 
rived,  with  strong  re-enforcements,  in  Richmond  yesterday. 
"I  incline  to  think  that  Jackson  will  attack  my  right  and 

'Flower,  Stanton,  XXXVIII,  XXXIX. 
*  History  of  the  Civil  War,  II,  73. 
8  Ibid.,  112. 


McCLELLAN  207 

rear.  The  rebel  force  is  stated  at  200,000,  including  Jackson 
and  Beauregard.  I  shall  have  to  contend  against  vastly  supe 
rior  odds  if  these  reports  be  true;  but  this  army  will  do  all  in 
the  power  of  men  to  hold  their  position  and  repulse  any  at 
tack. 

"I  regret  my  great  inferiority  in  numbers,  but  feel  that  I 
am  in  no  way  responsible  for  it,  as  I  have  not  failed  to  repre 
sent  repeatedly  the  necessity  of  re-enforcements;  that  this  was 
the  decisive  point,  and  that  all  the  available  means  of  the  Gov 
ernment  should  be  concentrated  here.  I  will  do  all  that  a 
general  can  do  with  the  splendid  army  I  have  the  honor  to 
command,  and  if  it  is  destroyed  by  overwhelming  numbers, 
can  at  least  die  with  it  and  share  its  fate.  But  if  the  result  of 
the  action,  which  will  probably  occur  to-morrow,  or  within  a 
short  time,  is  a  disaster,  the  responsibility  cannot  be  thrown 
on  my  shoulders;  it  must  rest  where  it  belongs. 

"Since  I  commenced  this  I  have  received  additional  in 
telligence  confirming  the  supposition  in  regard  to  Jackson's 
movements  and  Beauregard's  arrival.  I  shall  probably  be  at 
tacked  to-morrow,  and  now  go  to  the  other  side  of  the  Chicka- 
hominy  to  arrange  for  the  defense  on  that  side.  I  feel  that 
there  is  no  use  in  again  asking  for  re-enforcements. 

"CEO.    B.    McCLELLAN, 

"Major-General." 

In  this  telegram,  as  the  reader  has  noted,  the  general 
urgently  pressed  upon  the  Secretary  that  of  all  the  military 
field  of  operation  this  was  the  decisive  point;  that  the  South 
erners  so  recognized  it  and  were  confronting  him  with  a 
great  army,  and  that,  following  their  example,  all  the  avail 
able  means  of  the  Government  should  be  concentrated  there. 
The  wisdom  of  this  course  is  now  too  obvious  for  debate. 
The  Government  had  ample  troops  in  the  Eastern  Military  Dis 
trict  to  make  his  army  irresistible.  General  Imboden  asserts 
that  there  were  90,000  Union  soldiers  scattered  over  Northern 
Virginia  at  that  time,  who  the  Confederates  naturally  ex 
pected  would  rush  to  McClellan  if  allowed  to  do  so,  and  the 


208  McCLELLAN 

editors  of  Battles  and  Leaders6  seem  to  concede  that  there 
were  80,000.  But  beyond  this,  the  garrison  of  Washington 
should  have  been  drawn  upon  (as  it  was  for  General  Grant) 
and  Burnside  hurried  up  the  Pamunkey  to  meet  the  emer 
gency.  The  only  sure  way  to  protect  every  other  point  was 
to  strengthen  McClellan.  That  such  prompt  action,  in  ac 
cordance  with  McClellan's  repeated  appeals,  would  have  ex 
tinguished  the  rebellion  in  1862  no  thoughtful  author,  North 
ern  or  Southern,  has  now  any  doubt. 

McClellan  was  astride  the  Chickahominy, — under  protest, 
reluctantly,  by  force  of  an  order  from  which  he  was  in  daily 
expectation  of  release, — and  he  swiftly  seized  the  first  oppor 
tunity  to  escape  from  so  perilous  a  position  to  one  of  his  own 
selection. 

And  yet  many  thoughtless  writers  condemn  the  position 
as  a  mark  of  military  incapacity, — treating  it  as  if  it  had 
been  of  his  own  choosing.  No  doubt  this  view  came  from 
Mr.  Stanton.  It  was  Stanton  who  forced  McClellan  there 
by  a  peremptory  order  and  then  charged  him  with  incapacity 
for  being  there. 

In  June,  as  in  May,  the  flooding  rains  continued.  On  the 
3d  the  President,  fearing  disaster  from  the  continuous  down 
pour,  wired  McClellan.  On  June  2d  the  general  was  told 
again  that  McDowell  was  coming.  And  now  it  seems  as  if 
the  inclement  weather  was  in  some  degree  melting  the  heart 
of  the  general's  enemies  in  the  Capital,  for  on  June  the  5th 
Mr.  Stanton  tells  him  that  he  will  ship  some  of  McDowell's 
force  and  five  new  regiments.  This  meant  McCall's  division 
and  the  new  regiments.  On  the  7th  floods  covered  the  coun 
try;  but  work  on  the  bridges  was  diligently  pushed,  the  men 
standing  in  water  to  their  waists.  McClellan  was  resolved 
to  attack  Richmond  as  soon  as  McCall  should  arrive  and  the 
roads  become  usable,  but  on  the  loth  all  plans  were  completely 
checkmated  by  weather  which  made  roads  and  fields  im 
passable,  as  the  rain  fell  heavily  almost  every  day.  On  June 
the  8th  eleven  regiments  came,  4,000  men.  On  June  the  loth 
McCall  arrived  with  9,500  men;  on  June  the  nth  Mr.  Stan- 

-II,  285. 


McCLELLAN  209 

ton  wired  that  the  residue  of  McDowell's  corps  would  also 
join  him,  overland.  By  June  the  25th  all  the  bridges  and  en 
trenchments  were  completed,  and  an  advance  of  the  picket 
line  of  the  left  wing  was  ordered,  preparatory  to  a  general 
forward  movement  on  McDowell's  arrival.  Why  he  did  not 
come  no  apologist  for  the  Administration,  or  more  precisely 
for  Mr.  Stanton,  has  ever  been  able  to  explain.  On  the  26th, 
at  6  P.  M.,  he  was  still  coming.  Why  he  did  not  come  even 
then  has  never  been  told.  But  the  bloody  week  of  battle  was 
then  fully  entered  upon.  It  began  with  an  engagement  at  Oak 
Grove  on  Wednesday,  June  25,  1862.  On  the  26th  at  12:30 
p.  M.  McClellan's  pickets  on  his  right  wing  were  driven  in;  at 
3  the  grand  assault  of  the  battle  of  Beaver  Dam  was  begun, 
and  one  of  the  longest,  fiercest  continuous  struggles  of  the 
war  was  in  full  career. 


CHAPTER    XXXIX 

THE  WEEK  OF  BATTLE BEAVER  DAM OFF  FOR  THE  JAMES 

GAINES'S  MILL 

At  6  P.  M.  of  Thursday  the  26th  of  June  came  the  last 
notice  to  McClellan  that  McDowell  was  coming. 

But  three  hours  earlier  had  come  the  hot  onset  of  the  most 
valiant  sons  of  the  South.  The  week  of  battle  had  already 
commenced.  To  be  strictly  correct,  it  had  begun  with  the 
engagement  at  Oak  Grove  on  the  25th,  for  that  was  a  stubborn 
struggle,  as  we  have  seen,  lasting  a  whole  day;  and  counting 
Oak  Grove,  there  was  a  week  of  fighting. 

It  was  no  surprise, — in  its  coming,  in  its  continuance,  or 
in  its  fierceness. 

In  that  season  of  almost  incessant  rain  the  26th  of  June 
was  so  bright  and  lovely  that  the  Federal  generals  looked 
forward  confidently  to  the  first  blow  at  Richmond,  which  was 
fixed  for  the  27th,  if  the  weather  proved  gracious. 

General  Porter  says :  "On  the  25th  the  pickets  of  the  left 
main  army  south  of  the  Chickahominy  were  pushed  forward 
under  strong  opposition,  and,  after  sharp  fighting,  gained  con 
siderable  ground,  so  as  to  enable  the  Second  and  Third  Corps 
(Sumner's  and  Heintzelman's)  to  support  the  attack  on  Old 
Tavern  which  it  was  intended  to  make  next  day  with  the 
Sixth  Corps  (Franklin's).  The  result  of  the  fighting  was 
to  convince  the  corps  commanders  engaged  that  there  had 
been  no  reduction  of  forces  in  their  front  to  take  part  in  any 
movement  upon  our  right  flank." 

But  the  fertile  mind  of  the  commander  as  early  as  June 
23d  foresaw  that  the  anticipated  attack  on  his  right  wing, 
if  it  should  come  before  he  could  strike,  might  present  an  open 
ing  by  leaving  a  slender  force  between  him  and  Richmond; 
and,  accordingly,  on  that  day  he  issued  this  order  to  General 

210 


McCLELLAN  211 

Porter :  "Your  dispositions  of  your  troops  are  approved  by 
the  commanding  general.  ...  If  you  are  attacked,  be 
careful  to  state  as  promptly  as  possible  the  number,  composi 
tion,  and  position  of  the  enemy.  The  troops  on  this  side  will 
be  held  ready  either  to  support  you  directly  or  to  attack  the 
enemy  in  their  front.  If  the  force  attacking  you  is  large, 
the  general  would  prefer  the  latter  course,  counting  upon 
your  skill  and  the  admirable  troops  under  your  command  to 
hold  their  own  against  superior  numbers  long  enough  for 
him  to  make  the  decisive  movement  which  will  determine  the 
fate  of  Richmond."  l 

Porter's  corps  was  posted  behind  strong  redoubts  on  the 
Eastern  bluffs  of  Beaver  Dam  Creek,  close  to  its  union  with 
the  Chickahominy.  The  stream  was  three  to  four  feet  deep 
and  fringed  with  swamps  in  conformity  with  the  settled  cus 
tom  of  streams  in  that  locality.  Its  passage  was  difficult  for 
men ;  impossible  for  artillery.  The  plains  in  front  forced  an 
assaulting  force  to  present  both  front  and  flank  to  the  Federal 
fire. 

General  Reynolds's  division  commanded  the  road  leading 
from  Mechanicsville,  half  a  mile  in  front,  to  Bethesda  Church, 
which  lay  behind  and  to  the  northeast,  while  General  Sey 
mour's  division  was  farther  south  across  the  road  leading 
from  Ellerson's  Mill  to  Gaines's  Mill.  This  brought  Sey 
mour's  left  near  to  the  mouth  and  Reynolds's  right  near  to 
the  head  of  the  creek.  These  bodies  made  up  what  was  called 
the  Pennsylvania  Reserves,  under  the  command  of  General 
McCall.  Behind  Seymour  was  stationed  the  brigade  of  Gen 
eral  George  C.  Meade ;  behind  Reynolds  was  General  Griffin's 
brigade.  Generals  Martindale,  Butterfield,  and  Sykes  were 
also  on  the  field. 

Incidentally  General  Porter,  in  his  account  of  the  battle, 
illustrates  the  advanced  methods  and  military  acumen  of  Gen 
eral  McClellan,  as  the  result  of  which  every  part  of  the  army 
was  in  touch  with  every  other  part  and  with  the  commander. 
"Sitting  for  hours  near  the  telegraph  operator  at  my  quarters, 
prior  to  the  attack,  I  listened  to  the  constant  and  rapid  ticking 

l  Battles  and  Leaders,  II,  32& 


212  McCLELLAN 

of  his  instrument  and  was  kept  informed,  by  the  various  inter 
communicating  messages  at  the  headquarters  of  the  army,  of 
the  condition  of  affairs  in  front  of  the  three  corps  furthest  to 
the  left."  General  A.  P.  Hill's  division  of  the  Confederate 
army  came  upon  Porter's  outposts  at  Meadow  Bridge  over  the 
Chickahominy,  three  miles  up  the  river,  about  noon.  The 
boom  of  a  Federal  cannon  at  two  o'clock  informed  General 
Porter  that  the  foe  was  crossing  the  Chickahominy,  and  a 
warm  reception  was  promptly  arranged  for  him. 

It  was  about  an  hour  later  that  the  enemy  in  great  bodies 
under  Generals  Longstreet,  D.  H.  Hill,  and  A.  P.  Hill  actually 
crossed  the  river,  making  use  of  the  Mechanicsville  Bridge, 
Meadow  Bridge,  and  others.  After  reaching  Mechanicsville 
the  forces  of  D.  H.  Hill  and  Longstreet  took  the  Bethesda 
road,  which  brought  them  against  General  Reynolds's  position. 
Apparently  they  did  not  realize  the  power  of  the  numerous 
batteries  which  the  master  of  artillery  had  arrayed  for  the 
defense  of  his  right  wing.  Converging  upon  the  advancing 
columns  were  all  the  guns  of  Reynolds  and  Seymour  and  the 
batteries  of  Kern,  Cooper,  Smead,  DeHart,  Easton,  and  Ed 
wards.  The  assaulting  columns  "moved  on  with  animation 
and  confidence,  as  if  going  to  parade  or  engaging  in  a  sham 
battle."  They  were  encouraged  in  this  perhaps  by  the  stillness 
of  the  bluffs,  for  the  guns  were  dumb  until  the  heads  of  the 
assaulting  forces  were  close  to  the  creek.  Then  came  a  hell 
of  converging  fire  of  both  artillery  and  infantry  from  the 
whole  Union  line,  so  swift,  so  deadly,  that  it  seemed  to  con 
sume  the  hostile  divisions  in  an  instant,  and  the  amazed  sur 
vivors  hastened  back  beyond  Mechanicsville,  as  if  expecting 
immediate  pursuit. 

The  column  under  A.  P.  Hill  was  not  more  fortunate. 
Its  assault  upon  Seymour  was  two  hours  later.  This  wide 
separation  of  the  attacks  was  surely  not  intentional.  It  en 
abled  all  the  Federal  fire  to  be  concentrated  first  upon  the  ad 
vance  by  the  upper  road,  and  next,  long  afterward,  upon 
the  advance  by  the  lower  road ;  it  enabled  the  Union  soldiers 
to  supply  themselves  anew  with  ammunition,  as  they  had 
consumed  all  they  had  in  the  first  onset ;  then,  too,  it  gave  them 


McCLELLAN  213 

time  for  rest  and  refreshment,  so  that  they  met  the  second 
assault  with  renewed  energy  and  vigor;  but,  above  all,  was 
the  advantage  of  using  their  full  united  strength  against  a  sec 
tion  only  of  the  enemy.  A.  P.  Hill's  division  suffered  even 
more  severely  than  their  comrades  of  the  upper  road,  but  they 
were  more  pertinacious,  for,  greatly  strengthened,  they  made 
a  second  effort  much  later  in  the  afternoon  and  with  such 
dash  and  bravery  that  some  reached  the  stream.  But  their 
courage  was  wasted,  and  those  whom  fate  permitted  to  live, 
fell  back  in  baffled  fury.  Then  night  came.  The  battle  was 
over,  and  in  its  wake  came  the  natural  sequel  of  such  a  strug 
gle.  The  shrieks  of  the  wounded  and  the  moans  of  the  dying 
filled  all  the  night  with  horror.  The  Federal  forces  at  Beaver 
Dam  numbered  30,000,  the  Confederates  65,000;  the  former 
lost  256  men,  the  latter  1,484  men. 

Beaver  Dam  was  a  bloody  repulse  for  the  Confederates. 

As  it  was  clear  that  the  whole  force  of  the  Confederate 
army  was  not  massed  there,  and  as  there  was  no  evidence  of 
any  weakening  of  the  lines  in  front  of  Keyes,  Heint?elman, 
Sumner,  and  Franklin,  there  was  no  encouragement  to  attempt 
the  carrying  out  of  the  second  programme, — the  advance  of 
the  left  wing  upon  Richmond. 

The  attack  at  Beaver  Dam  set  McClellan  free,  under  the 
law  of  military  necessity,  from  Stanton's  order  of  May  the 
1 8th.  The  right  wing  and  the  right  rear  of  his  army  were 
threatened,  which  meant  the  intervention  of  the  rebel  army 
between  him  and  his  base  of  supplies. 

Should  he  await  a  second  attack  or  start  for  the  James 
at  once?  He  saw  the  great  likelihood  of  a  rear  attack  on 
the  following  day,  and,  having  pointed  out  to  General  Porter 
a  favorable  new  position  east  of  Powhite  Creek,  six  miles 
down  the  Chickahominy,  he  later  sent  directions  to  move 
there.  McClellan  left  General  Barnard,  the  chief  military 
engineer,  to  advise  as  to  details.  When  the  latter  was  leaving, 
General  Porter  expressed  a  desire  for  a  supply  of  axes  to 
slash  the  timber  at  certain  points,  so  that  the  artillery  would 
have  an  unimpeded  command  of  every  avenue  of  approach, 
as  it  had  had  at  Beaver  Dam.  General  Barnard  promised  that 


214  McCLELLAN 

he  himself  would  furnish  the  axes.  He  was  also  entrusted 
with  a  message  to  General  McClellan,  urging  the  imperative 
need  of  reinforcements.  General  Porter,  because  of  the  ex 
cellent  reputation  borne  by  General  Barnard  as  an  engineer 
and  because  of  his  high  rank,  confidently  expected  that  these 
requests  would  be  faithfully  transmitted. 

General  Barnard  did  not  supply  any  axes  and  did  not 
carry  the  message  to  McClellan.  In  his  official  report  2  he 
states  that  when  he  returned  to  headquarters  he  learned  that 
the  commander  was  reposing,  and  he  then  went  to  his  own  tent 
and  remained  there  until  the  afternoon.  The  serious  effect  of 
his  amazing  negligence  will  appear  a  little  later. 

The  new  field  of  battle  was  on  the  east  bank  of  a  little 
creek  extending  like  the  arc  of  a  circle  from  the  Chickahominy 
to  Elder  Swamp.  The  order  to  move  came  at  3  A.  MV  and  be 
fore  sunrise  the  Fifth  Corps  was  on  the  new  battle-ground. 

2  Official  Record,  XI,  i,  118. 


CHAPTER    XL 

GAINES'S  MILL THE  UNITED  ARMY 

The  position  was  strong;  but  for  absolute  defense  against 
a  great  force  it  required  more  men  than  General  Porter  had. 
During  the  removal  to  the  new  scene  of  battle  he  telegraphed 
to  the  commander :  "I  hope  to  do  without  aid,  though  I  request 
that  Franklin  or  some  other  commander  be  held  ready  to  rein 
force  me.  The  enemy  is  so  close  that  I  expect  to  be  hard 
pressed  in  front.  I  hope  to  have  a  portion  in  position  to  cover 
the  retreat.  This  is  a  delicate  movement,  but  relying  on  the 
good  qualities  of  the  commanders  of  divisions  and  brigades, 
I  expect  to  get  back  and  hold  the  new  line." 

General  Porter's  troops  were  arranged  in  the  formation 
from  left  to  right,  as  follows :  Butterfield,  Martindale,  and 
Griffin,  with  Robertson's,  Allen's,  Weeden's,  and  Martin's  bat 
teries,  of  Morell's  division,  forming  the  left  wing;  Warren 
and  Buchanan,  with  Edward's,  Weed's,  TidbalFs,  and  Kings- 
bury's  batteries,  of  Sykes's  division,  forming  the  right  wing. 
Some  distance  behind  Morell  were  Meade,  Seymour,  and  Rey 
nolds,  with  Kern's,  Easton's,  DeHart's,  and  Cooper's  batter 
ies,  of  McCall's  division.  The  credulous  reader  who  has  been 
led  by  various  writers  into  the  notion  that  the  Confederates 
never  used  anything  in  warfare  so  harsh  and  cruel  as  ord 
nance,  that  they  confined  themselves  to  wooden  cannon,  as  we 
are  gravely  told  was  the  case  at  Manassas  and  Yorktown, 
will  be  interested  in  looking  at  the  plan  of  any  battle  in  Vir 
ginia  from  Bull  Run  on,  to  observe  the  great  num 
ber  of  the  rebel  batteries  and  the  evident  importance  which 
was  given  to  this  feature  in  every  plan  of  attack.  'Twas  a 
merry  quip,  to  charge  the  generals  of  Dixie  with  excluding 
artillery  from  their  military  appliances,  when  we  reflect  that 
all  these  leaders,  both  of  the  North  and  of  the  South,  gained 

215 


216  McCLELLAN 

their  ideas  of  conducting  war  while  they  were  comrades, 
schoolfellows,  boon  companions,  chums,  in  many  instances 
sitting  together  on  the  same  benches  and  listening  to  the  same 
instructors,  all  on  the  banks  of  the  Hudson;  that  they  were 
all  of  that  class  much  derided  by  Mr.  Stanton  and  his  fol 
lowers, — graduates  of  West  Point, — and  that  West  Point  was 
always  a  strong  advocate  of  artillery.  Little  did  those  warm 
hearted  boys  think  in  their  days  of  military  training  that  they 
were  learning  to  destroy  one  another. 

When  the  Confederate  forces  were  placed  in  position,  Long- 
street  with  a  part  of  Jackson's  troops  were  on  the  right;  Whit 
ing  and  A.  P.  Hill  held  the  center;  and  D.  H.  Hill,  Ewell, 
and  the  main  portion  of  Jackson's  troops,  the  left.  Thus  D.  H. 
Hill  confronted  Sykes.  Of  this  General  Hill  says :  "One  of 
the  saddest  things  connected  with  the  miserable,  fratricidal 
war,  was  the  breaking  up  of  ties  of  friendship  and  of  blood. 
The  troops  opposing  mine  on  that  murderous  field  that  day, 
were  the  regulars  of  General  George  Sykes,  a  Southerner  by 
birth,  and  my  roommate  at  West  Point: — a  man  admired  by 
all  for  his  honor,  courage,  and  frankness,  and  peculiarly  en 
deared  to  me  by  his  social  qualities."  * 

The  battle  began  on  the  Federal  left  about  two  o'clock 
and  raged  for  two  hours,  with  great  loss  to  the  enemy.  For 
the  next  two  hours  the  attack  was  chiefly  on  the  Federal  right, 
with  a  like  result;  but  about  6:30  P.  M.  a  grand  assault  was 
made  all  along  the  line  at  once,  and  was  everywhere  repulsed 
until  after  sunset.  Porter's  men  were  now  nearly  exhausted 
and  almost  without  ammunition.  Slocum's  division  had  ar 
rived  about  four  o'clock,  and  the  three  brigades  were  placed 
in  various  separate  positions  where  they  could  be  most  service 
able.  The  Confederates  had  discovered  that  Morell's  center 
was  the  most  hopeful  point  of  attack,  because  here  the  Fed 
eral  artillery  had  less  play,  as  the  woods  held  by  the  enemy 
came  closer  to  the  Federal  line  and  the  remaining  space  was 
too  little  to  get  the  full  benefit  of  the  discharge.  On  this  point, 
then,  its  forces  were  mainly  concentrated  for  a  final  effort. 
It  was  an  assault  all  along  the  line,  but  with  the  greatest 

1  Battles  and  Leaders,  II,  359- 


McCLELLAN  217 

fierceness  at  this  particular  point.  It  was  everywhere  repulsed ; 
but,  in  the  last  thin  light  of  the  day,  fresh  regiments  were 
now  massed  and  poured  in  in  swift  succession  and  were  again 
thrown  back  at  all  points  but  this ;  and  here  Morell's  line  was 
broken,  which  necessitated  a  retirement  both  of  Morell's  and 
Sykes's  divisions  to  the  second  line,  just  behind  the  Adams 
House.  The  brigades  of  Meagher  and  French  came  in  good 
time  to  assist  Sykes's  division  in  covering  this  retirement, 
which  had  not  at  all  the  aspect  of  a  panic;  and  the  enemy 
were  not  able  to  pursue  the  advantage  farther  nor  to  prevent 
the  withdrawal  of  all  but  nineteen  guns.  During  the  night 
the  movement  toward  the  James  was  resumed,  all  the  forces 
being  brought  across  the  river,  and  the  whole  army  was  now 
once  more  united. 

At  the  battle  of  Gaines's  Mill  there  were  129  Confederate 
regiments,  19  batteries,  and  about  65,000  men;  and  50  Union 
regiments,  20  batteries  (not  all  engaged),  and  about  30,000 
men.  The  result  of  General  Barnard's  failure  to  supply  the 
axes  asked  for  and  promised  is  made  plain  by  the  above  ac 
count  of  the  battle. 

Colonel  Powell,  who  was  there,  is  of  the  opinion  that  "the 
results  reached  leave  no  room  for  doubt  that  had  the  rein 
forcements  requested  by  General  Porter,  through  General  John 
G.  Barnard,  been  received  in  time  for  assignment  to  position 
and  particularly  had  the  axes  promised  (but  not  sent)  by 
General  Barnard  been  available  for  use  in  the  necessary 
defensive  preparations,  the  line  would  have  been  maintained 
to  the  irreparable  damage  of  the  enemy.  Having  held  at  bay 
for  six  hours  at  least  twice  their  own  force,  there  is  no  one 
who  can  doubt  that  if  the  axes  had  been  furnished  and  the 
timber  under  which  the  enemy  massed  for  attack  been  slashed, 
a  complete  repulse  of  the  Confederates  would  have  followed."  2 

As  an  illustration  of  what  boldness  may  achieve,  Colonel 
Thomas  Cass,  with  the  9th  Massachusetts  Volunteers,  "held 
up"  all  that  part  of  the  Confederate  army  advancing  under 
General  A.  P.  Hill  against  Morell  from  12:30  p.  M.  until 
nearly  2  o'clock,  and  large  bodies  of  troops  had  to  be  brought 

"Fifth  Army  Corps,  122. 


2i8  McCLELLAN 

into  action  to  overcome  the  insolent  defiance  of  this  stubborn 
band  of  Irish-Americans. 

General  McClellan  first  learned  of  General  Porter's  re 
quest  for  troops  at  2  p.  M.  and  ordered  up  Slocum's  division 
at  once.  It  was  too  late  then  to  use  the  axes,  and  his  active 
efforts  to  supply  further  reinforcements  are  set  out  in  his 
Own  Story.3  The  two  generals  were  in  constant  communica 
tion  by  wire  throughout  the  battle.  French  and  Meagher  were 
ordered  up  about  five  o'clock.  The  other  corps  commanders,— 
Sumner,  Keyes,  Heintzelman,  and  Franklin, — were  strongly 
apprehensive  of  an  attack  on  the  Federal  left  wing  and  dis 
inclined  to  release  any  troops.  It  is  characteristic  of  McClel- 
lan's  wise  foresight  that  by  his  orders  three  batteries  of  Gen 
eral  W.  F.  Smith's  division  played  during  the  battle  with  much 
effect  upon  the  attacking  forces  from  the  opposite  bank  of 
the  Chickahominy,  and  from  their  favorable  position  signaled 
suggestions  to  General  Porter  as  to  the  fire  of  his  own  bat 
teries. 

3  420,  421. 


CHAPTER    XLI 

ONE    DAY'S    RESPITE THE    FOE    MISLED M'CLELLAN    DE 
NOUNCES   STANTON 

McClellan  was  moving  toward  the  James.  He  was  not 
retreating,  nor  was  he  flying  there  with  a  routed  host  of  men, 
abandoning  artillery  and  trains  and  supplies  and  dropping 
their  guns  and  knapsacks  as  they  ran.  He  was  going  where 
he  had  always  wished  to  go.  He  was  moving  toward  the 
James  in  the  presence  of,  and  despite  the  fiercest  efforts  of,  an 
army  much  greater  than  his  own  in  numbers,  as  we  shall 
prove,  and  made  up  of  superb  fighting  material.  He  was  mov 
ing  toward  the  James,  not  over  a  hard,  smooth  plain,  but  over 
a  swampy  country  most  difficult  to  traverse,  and  bringing  with 
him  safe  to  the  end  of  the  journey  the  tents  and  equipments 
and  supplies  and  ordnance  and  all  the  usual  impedimenta  of  a 
large  army, — over  4,000  wagons,  350  guns,  and  2,500  cattle 
(not  one  of  which  escaped), — a  daring  enterprise,  admirably 
executed,  as  even  the  most  virulent  critics  admit.  "The  pre 
sumption  in  favor  of  the  idea  that  McClellan's  right  was  ex 
tended  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Chickahominy  for  the  purpose 
of  connecting  with  McDowell's  force  when  the  latter  should 
move  down  from  the  Rappahannock,  is  so  strong  that,  even 
if  we  did  not  have  the  emphatic  statements  of  McClellan  him 
self  and  his  confidants  in  support  of  it,  the  minor  evidence  to 
the  opposite  effect  does  not  appear  sufficient  to  overthrow  it. 
The  unfortunate  position  of  the  army  was  due  to  two  counter 
acting  influences  at  work, — one  being  McClellan's  desire  to 
move  to  the  James,  and  the  other  the  desire  of  the  civil  au 
thorities  for  a  more  or  less  direct  covering  of  Washington. 
Lee's  attack  on  McClellan's  right  set  the  Union  commander 
free  to  go  where  he  wanted  to  go.  Lee's  attack  on  the  Penn 
sylvania  Reserves  at  Mechanicsville  was  made  on  June  26. 

219 


220  M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  N 

But  on  the  i8th  McClellan  had  ordered  supplies  sent  up  the 
James.  The  movement  to  the  James  was  already  under  way 
when  Lee  attacked  at  Mechanicsville,  a  Union  victory  which 
certainly  gave  McClellan  no  cause  to  hurry."  1  On  the  night 
of  the  27th  of  June  for  the  first  time  the  commander  gathered 
his  chiefs  about  him  and  explained  his  plans. 

Unreflecting  writers  say  that  as  the  battle  of  Beaver  Dam 
was  so  successful,  why  did  he  withdraw?  The  answer  is  obvi 
ous.  McClellan  under  the  order  of  May  i8th  was  bound  to 
remain  where  he  was  until  attacked.  He  could  not  anticipate 
an  attack  and  withdraw  to  West  Point.  Moreover,  that  would 
have  been  equivalent  to  being  driven  back  and  would  have  sup 
plied  a  pretext  for  recalling  the  army;  and  after  he  was 
actually  attacked  it  would  have  been  fatal  to  the  army  to  at 
tempt  a  movement  in  that  direction,  for  the  enemy  was  be 
tween  him  and  his  goal  and  disaster  would  have  been  in 
evitable.  But  let  us  suppose  that  he  could  accomplish  such  a 
movement  without  loss  and  without  reproach.  What  good 
would  have  come  of  it?  His  military  genius  very  early 
recognized  what  is  now  universally  admitted,  that  the  true 
base  of  action  against  Richmond  was  on  the  James.  This  was 
afterward  demonstrated,  for  it  was  from  there  finally  that 
the  quietus  was  put  to  the  rebellion.  So  why  should  he  have 
retreated  when  he  felt  confident  that  he  could  successfully 
advance  his  army  to  the  position  he  had  longed  for, — the 
Mount  of  Victory,  surely,  if  the  civil  powers  had  only  listened 
to  him  ? 

In  a  report  that  General  Johnston  sent  to  Richmond  on  the 
1 4th  of  May,  1862,  he  concludes  his  views  on  the  military 
situation  with  these  prophetic  words:  "The  danger  is  on 
the  south  side  of  the  James  River."  2 

McClellan  was  abandoned  to  his  fate,  his  requests  disre 
garded.  He  was  left  unsupported,  when  McDowell  could 
easily  have  reached  him  by  water  and  even  by  land. 

All  the  indignities,  all  the  malevolence  of  Stanton,  had 


*Dial,  XXXI,  320,  321. 

*  Battles  and  Leaders,  II,  222. 


McCLELLAN  221 

been  borne  by  McClellan  with  a  patience  which  was  misplaced 
and  misunderstood. 

The  result  of  an  inadequate  force,  as  he  had  always  pointed 
out  and  as  the  sequel  proved  would  be  the  case,  was  an  unneces 
sary  sacrifice  of  men.  If  the  army  of  McDowell  had  reached 
him  in  proper  time,  the  week  of  battle  would  never  have  come 
to  him.  It  was  his  abandoned  and  tempting  position  which  led 
to  it,  and  which  caused  the  loss  of  so  many  thousands  of  the 
brave  fellows  who  loved  him  and  whom  he  loved  with  the 
greatest  tenderness.  On  June  23d  he  wrote  to  his  wife : 
"You  may  be  sure  that  no  man  in  this  army  is  so  anxious  as  its 
general  to  finish  the  campaign.  Every  poor  fellow  that  is 
killed  or  wounded  almost  haunts  me."  3  After  three  fierce 
battles  at  Fair  Oaks,  Beaver  Dam,  and  Gaines's  Mill  he  could 
not  help  feeling  that  he  owed  to  the  hostile  attitude  of  Stan- 
ton  the  death  of  the  thousands  who  had  been  killed.  At  this 
time  he  was  thoroughly  convinced  of  the  personal  enmity  of 
the  Secretary  of  War,  and,  despite  the  latter's  crafty  duplicity, 
fresh  proofs  came  frequently.  McClellan  urged  the  concentra 
tion  of  all  the  forces  in  Northern  Virginia.  They  should  have 
been  united  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  under  McClellan's 
command,  as  is  obvious  now.  His  advice  was  followed. 
The  troops  of  Northern  Virginia  were  united,  but  the  com 
mand  was  given  to  General  John  Pope,  who  was  known  to 
have  no  sympathy  with  McClellan's  views.  And  this  appoint 
ment  made  on  June  26th  meant,  as  McClellan  said,  that  Mc 
Dowell  was  not  to  come  at  all, — an  opinion  that  was  fully  veri 
fied  later.  Stanton,  in  McClellan's  mind,  was  morally  re 
sponsible  for  the  great  slaughter  of  soldiers  not  only  because 
he  had  withheld  McDowell,  but  also,  and  chiefly  because  he 
had  forced  the  army  into  a  position  so  extended  and  weak 
that  the  Confederates  were  incited  to  the  fiercest  efforts  be 
cause  of  their  belief  that  the  army  could  not  possibly  escape 
destruction. 

Under  such  circumstances,  and  impelled  by  such  madden 
ing  provocation  and,  above  all,  by  the  sight  of  the  dead  and 
the  screams  of  the  wounded  on  the  night  of  the  battle  of 
3  McClellan,  Own  Story,  408. 


222  McCLELLAN 

Gaines's  Mill,  he  prepared  a  despatch,  which  was  sent  off  a 
little  after  midnight  (being  then  the  28th), — as  follows: 

"HEADQUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 
"SAVAGE  STATION, 

"June  28,  1862,  12:20  A.  M. 
"HoN.  E.  M.  STANTON,  Secretary  of  War : 

"I  now  know  the  full  history  of  the  day.  On  this  side  of 
the  river  (the  right  bank)  we  repulsed  several  strong  attacks. 
On  the  left  bank  our  men  did  all  that  men  could  do,  all  that 
soldiers  could  accomplish,  but  they  were  overwhelmed  by 
vastly  superior  numbers,  even  after  I  brought  my  last  reserves 
into  action.  The  loss  on  both  sides  is  terrible.  I  believe  it 
will  prove  to  be  the  most  desperate  battle  of  the  war.  The 
sad  remnants  of  my  men  behave  as  men.  Those  battalions 
who  fought  most  bravely  and  suffered  most  are  still  in  the 
best  order.  My  regulars  were  superb,  and  I  count  upon  what 
are  left  to  turn  another  battle  in  company  with  their  gallant 
comrades  of  the  volunteers.  Had  I  twenty  thousand  (20,- 
ooo),  or  even  ten  thousand  (10,000),  fresh  troops  to  use  to 
morrow-,  I  could  take  Richmond :  but  I  have  not  a  man  in  re 
serve,  and  shall  be  glad  to  cover  my  retreat  and  save  the  ma 
terial  and  personnel  of  the  army. 

"If  we  have  lost  the  day  we  have  yet  preserved  our  honor, 
and  no  one  need  blush  for  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  I  have 
lost  this  battle  because  my  force  was  too  small. 

"I  again  repeat  that  I  am  not  responsible  for  this,  and  I 
say  it  with  the  earnestness  of  a  general  who  feels  in  his  heart 
the  loss  of  every  brave  man  who  has  been  needlessly  sacrificed 
to-day.  I  still  hope  to  retrieve  our  fortunes ;  but  to  do  this, 
the  government  must  view  the  matter  in  the  same  earnest 
light  that  I  do.  You  must  send  me  very  large  reinforcements, 
and  send  them  at  once.  I  shall  draw  back  to  this  side  of  the 
Chickahominy,  and  think  I  can  withdraw  all  our  material. 
Please  understand  that  in  this  battle  we  have  lost  nothing  but 
men,  and  those  the  best  we  have. 

"In  addition  to  what  I  have  already  said,  I  only  wish  to 
say  to  the  President  that  I  think  he  is  wrong  in  regarding 


Me CL ELL AN  223 

me  as  ungenerous  when  I  said  that  my  force  was  too  weak. 
I  merely  intimated  a  truth  which  to-day  has  been  too  plainly 
proved.  If,  at  this  instant,  I  could  dispose  of  ten  thousand 
(10,000)  fresh  men,  I  could  gain  the  victory  to-morrow. 

"I  know  that  a  few  thousand  more  men  would  have 
changed  this  battle  from  a  defeat  to  a  victory.  As  it  is,  the 
government  must  not  and  cannot  hold  me  responsible  for  the 
result. 

"I  feel  too  earnestly  to-night.  I  have  seen  too  many  dead 
and  wounded  comrades  to  feel  otherwise  than  that  the  govern 
ment  has  not  sustained  this  army.  If  you  do  not  do  so  now 
the  game  is  lost. 

"If  I  save  this  army  now,  I  tell  you  plainly  that  I  owe 
no  thanks  to  you  or  to  any  other  persons  in  Washington. 

"You  have  done  your  best  to  sacrifice  this  army. 

"G.   B.   MCCLELLAN."  4 

This  telegram  has  been  severely  criticised,  because  of  mis 
understanding  or  political  fanaticism.  It  seems  to  me  that  any 
unbiased  and  judicious  reader  would  say  that  it  is  clearly  evi 
dent  that  the  writer  was  an  energetic,  forceful,  aggressive  man. 
The  motive  of  the  telegram  is  found  in  this  sentence,  "I 
again  repeat  that  I  am  not  responsible  for  this,  and  I  say  it 
with  the  earnestness  of  a  general  who  feels  in  his  heart  the  loss 
of  every  brave  man  who  has  been  needlessly  sacrificed  to-day." 

The  telegram  is  brave,  manly,  noble.  How  any  one  can 
consider  wanting  in  courage,  in  spirit,  and  in  aggressiveness 
the  man  who  could  write  such  a  message  to  another  who  held 
him  in  his  power  passes  my  comprehension.  From  a  lawyer's 
standpoint,  all  it  lacks  is  craft;  that  is,  worldly  wisdom,  which, 
while  it  would  have  confessed  his  vassalage,  would  also 
have  brought  home  to  his  masters  his  recognition  of 
their  responsibilities  and  of  their  precarious  tenure  of  the 
authority  they  were  abusing.  An  experienced  lawyer,  keep 
ing  in  mind  that  he  was  dealing  with  men  who  owed  their  ele 
vated  stations  to  their  astuteness  as  lawyers,  would  have  di 
rected  his  attention  to  the  easily  demonstrable  fact  that  the 
4  Official  Record,  XI,  i,  61. 


224  McCLELLAN 

communications  which  he  received  from  Washington  were 
composed  much  more  for  the  press  and  for  the  people  than 
for  him.  They  were  in  many  instances  lawyers'  briefs,  to 
make  him  appear  at  fault  for  the  inevitable  result  of  their 
own  acts.  They  were  not  directions  so  much  as  arguments. 
If  McClellan  had  been  guided  by  a  Stantonian  adviser,  his 
telegram  would  have  been  equally  astute.  It  would  have  said 
nothing  of  responsibilities,  but  it  would  have  shown  the  re 
sponsibilities  of  the  Government;  and  instead  of  making  a 
blunt  statement  that  Stanton  had  done  his  best  to  sacrifice 
the  army  it  would  have  demonstrated,  by  a  skilful  array  of 
indisputable  facts,  that  but  for  the  idiocy  or  cowardice  or 
treason  of  his  civil  superiors  the  war  would  probably  have 
been  at  an  end  more  than  two  months  before.  It  would  have 
made  clear  to  the  public  the  various  hostile  acts  of  the  War 
Department  and  their  injurious  effects  upon  the  public  wel 
fare.  It  would  have  shown  the  slackness  and  folly  of  the  Gov 
ernment  in  not  following  his  advice  to  raise  an  ample  army 
quickly,  and  that  as  the  result  of  that  slackness  and  folly  he 
was  now  in  a  hostile  country  and  greatly  outnumbered. 

It  would  have  shown  the  necessity  of  one  head  for  all  the 
armies;  it  would  have  shown  that  but  for  the  loss  of  his  su 
preme  control  as  general-in-chief  he  would  have  kept  the  rebel 
forces  busy  everywhere,  instead  of  letting  them  concentrate 
extraordinary  strength  for  a  time  at  Richmond ;  that  he  would 
have  gathered  all  the  forces  at  Baltimore  and  Washington  and 
Fortress  Monroe  (save  small  garrisons)  and  throughout  Vir 
ginia  into  one  army;  and  that,  keeping  his  plan  of  advance 
secret,  he  would  have  landed  at  Urbanna  while  Johnston  was 
still  at  Manassas  and  cut  his  communications.  Without  put 
ting  his  charges  in  plain  words,  McClellan  should  nevertheless 
have  clearly  pictured  the  disingenuous,  uncandid,  and  furtive 
acts  of  those  that  composed  the  Administration;  their  want 
of  dignity  and  common  courtesy;  the  acts  inimical  to  the  public 
good  that  had  been  done  without  consulting  him  and  without 
notifying  him  that  they  were  in  contemplation;  the  taking 
away  of  his  office  as  general-in-chief  when  he  most  needed 
that  authority,  as  if  he  did  not  deserve  to  hold  so  high  a  posi- 


McCLELLAN  225 

tion,  when  in  fact  he  had  nearly  lost  his  life  by  his  labors  in 
creating  the  best  army  this  country  had  ever  possessed.  His 
letter  would  have  shown  that  his  army  organization  had  been 
interfered  with  and  that  unfriendly  corps  commanders  had 
been  appointed  without  his  knowledge.  It  would  have  shown 
the  folly  and  the  perils  of  the  overland  route  to  Richmond  and 
the  unpatriotic  and  disingenuous  measures  taken  to  compel 
him  to  adopt  it.  It  would  have  shown  the  death-blow  given 
to  all  his  calculations  by  the  detachment  of  one-third  of  the 
army,  when  it  should  have  been  doubled  instead  of  being 
divided.  It  would  have  shown  that  he  was  deprived  of  a 
factor  equally  indispensable  to  undelayed  progress  in  the  loss 
of  naval  aid,  when  a  simple  direction  from  the  President  to 
the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  would  have  secured  such  aid;  and 
finally  it  would  have  shown  that  the  Government  had  closed 
the  recruiting  offices  at  a  time  when  clearly  additions  to  his 
force  were  necessary,  as  he  had  been  robbed  of  one-third  of 
his  men ;  and  that,  even  though  he  had  had  the  full  number  he 
expected,  it  was  plain  that  the  Government  should  have  stood 
ready  to  keep  his  regiments  replenished  with  fresh  recruits 
as  the  ravages  of  battle  reduced  them. 

Then,  again,  that  telegram  should  have  pictured  the  army 
at  the  gates  of  Richmond,  despite  all  obstacles,  handicaps,  and 
disheartening  discouragements  of  rain  and  bog;  it  should 
have  repeated  the  order  which  put  him  in  a  position  courting 
destruction;  it  should  have  shown  that  inasmuch  as  15,000  of 
his  force  had  swrept  away  all  obstructions  and  could  have 
joined  McDowell  without  the  slightest  trouble,  so  McDowell 
with  equal  ease  could  have  joined  him,  and  that  then  the 
Union  army  would  at  once  have  become  a  compact  body, 
there  would  have  been  no  isolated  left  wing,  the  battle  of 
Fair  Oaks  would  never  have  been  fought,  the  Union  army 
would  have  struck  the  first  blow,  and  the  fall  of  Richmond 
would  have  been  quick  and  inevitable,  with  small  loss  to  his 
army.  The  telegram  should  have  been  like  Mark  Antony's 
address,  courteous  but  irresistible.  The  Government  would 
not  have  dared  to  plead  guilty  to  the  indictment,  and  the  only 
avenue  of  disproof  open  to  it  would  have  been  an  earnest  and 


226  McCLELLAN 

cordial  support,  which  would  have  ensured  a  glorious  conclu 
sion  of  the  campaign. 

McClellan  was  neither  lawyer  enough  nor  politician  enough 
to  write  such  a  telegram.  That  its  influence  would  have  been 
dynamic  is  shown  by  the  effect  of  his  message  even  as  it 
was. 

Some  historians  are  persuaded  that  Mr.  Stanton's  enmity 
to  the  commander  dates  from,  and  was  created  by,  this 
telegram.  Mr.  Flower,  on  the  contrary,  convinces  us  of  his 
earnest  belief,  at  least,  on  very  plausible  grounds,  that  Mr. 
Stantoif  never  knew  of  the  offensive  concluding  sentence. 
But  with  substantial  unanimity  the  writers  agree  that  Stanton 
was  averse  to  McClellan  from  the  moment,  or  almost  from 
the  moment,  he  entered  office.  The  evidence  of  this  has  been 
already  given.  On  the  other  hand,  Mr.  Flower,  despite  his 
good  faith,  is  probably  mistaken,  as  we  discover  from  Mr. 
Welles :  "With  the  change  in  the  War  Department  in  Janu 
ary,  1862,  came  the  hostility  of  Secretary  Stanton  to  McClel 
lan,  then  general-in-chief."  5 

That  McClellan  outwitted  his  adversary,  who  was  thereby 
thrown  off  the  scent  for  a  whole  day,  is  admitted  by  the  South 
ern  historians.6  "The  Rebels  had  cut  off  McClellan's  supplies 
from  White  House  and  confidently  calculated  on  cutting  off 
his  retreat."  7  "The  Confederates  made  a  disastrous  mistake. 
They  thought  that  McClellan  would  retreat  by  the  route  he 
came,  and  so  remained  where  they  were  for  twenty-four 
hours."  8 

Try  to  imagine  McClellan's  feelings  on  this  day,  filled  as 
he  was  with  hot  indignation  and  just  resentment  because  the 
weakness  or  the  fear  or  the  hostility  of  the  Government  had 
kept  McDowell's  corps  from  him,  when,  as  is  now  admitted 
with  practical  unanimity,  there  was  nothing  to  prevent  their 
union  and  every  reason  to  believe  that  Richmond  would  have 
been  swiftly  captured.  All  the  Federal  troops  scattered  over 

6  Lincoln  and  Seward,  479- 

8  Pollard,  Lost  Cause,  294;  Eggleston,  War  in  the  Confederate  States, 
I,  409. 

7  Eggleston,  War  in  the  Confederate  States,  I,  402. 
*  Ibid.,  409. 


McCLELLAN  227 

Virginia  should  have  been  united  with  his  army  in  any  way 
he  might  direct.  These  troops  should  all  have  been  sent  with 
him,  but  waiving  that  point,  as  the  constant  panic  of  the  rulers 
of  the  people  stood  in  the  way  of  it,  they  should  have  been 
hurried  to  him  overland  all  the  more  energetically. 

A  most  interesting  feature,  which  we  will  elaborate  in 
speaking  of  the  campaign  as  a  whole,  was  the  discovery  by 
the  Government  while  it  was  in  progress  that  the  march  to  the 
James  was  a  deliberately  planned  movement,  not  a  repulse  nor 
a  retreat.  This  fact  and  the  effect  of  it  seem  to  have  been 
wholly  overlooked  by  the  writers  on  the  Peninsula  Campaign. 
When  the  Confederates  found  on  the  morning  of  the  27th 
that  the  Union  army  was  leaving  Beaver  Dam,  in  spite  of  the 
successful  result  of  the  battle  there,  the  action  could  have  had 
but  one  meaning  for  them:  notwithstanding  their  victory 
"the  Yanks"  were  demoralized.  This  conviction  inspired 
the  attacking  columns  to  extraordinary  persistence  at  Gaines's 
Mill,  and,  having  driven  the  Federals  back  some  distance, 
and  the  latter  having  during  the  night  retired  a  second  time, 
the  Confederates  naturally  concluded  that  McClellan's  army 
would  next  attempt  to  reach  West  Point  or  Fortress  Monroe, 
and  accordingly  the  28th  of  June  was  wasted  by  General  Lee 
in  an  effort  to  intercept  the  expected  retreat.  The  foe  was 
misled,  and  this  gave  the  Union  army  twenty- four  hours'  start 
toward  the  James,  as  the  historians  say ;  but  it  was  more  than 
that,  for  such  fierce  fighting  as  took  place  at  Beaver  Dam 
and  Gaines's  Mill  was  not  seen  again  until  two  days  later  at 
Glendale.  This  was  a  respite  brought  about  by  McClellan's 
military  sagacity. 


CHAPTER    XLII 

SUNDAY,     JUNE     2gTH ALLEN'S     FIELD SAVAGE     STATION 

MONDAY,    JUNE    3OTH,    GLENDALE    OR    FRAZIER's    FARM 

These  were  days  and  nights  when  McClellan's  wonderful 
administrative  ability  and  capacity  for  detail  shone  most  bril 
liantly.  He  worked  unsparingly  both  day  and  night, — direct 
ing  battles,  directing  marches  and  the  movements  of  trains, 
forestalling,  with  a  sagacity  which  was  approved  by  the  re 
sults,  the  interference  of  the  enemy  with  his  plans ;  now  super 
vising  a  battle,  and  in  constant  touch  through  his  admirable 
telegraphic  arrangements  with  all  his  generals  in  every  quar- 
ter ;  now  blocking  an  avenue  of  approach  to  the  Confederates ; 
now  on  the  James,  conferring  with  the  naval  squadron;  now 
on  Malvern  Hill,  planning  the  crowning  struggle.  Nothing 
was  neglected ;  nothing  slighted.  He  was  wise,  prudent,  brave, 
skilful,  with  a  mind  which  grasped  everything  down  to  the 
minutest  detail  and  with  an  energy  which  governed  all. 

But  minute  particulars  as  to  the  movement  of  the  army 
would  be  neither  of  value  nor  of  interest  to  the  reader. 

The  28th  was  spent  in  getting  the  trains  over  Live  Oak 
Swamp.  An  attack  from  the  full  force  of  the  Southern  army 
during  this  tedious  and  delicate  undertaking  would  have  been 
exceedingly  undesirable.  A  trifling  engagement  between  a 
few  regiments  at  Golding's  Farm  was  the  only  thing  that 
broke  the  quiet  of  the  day. 

General  Keyes's  corps  took  the  advance  to  the  James,  fol 
lowed  by  General  Porter. 

On  Sunday,  the  2Qth  of  June,  active  hostilities  were  re 
sumed,  when  General  Sumner,  who  occupied  the  post  nearest  to 
Richmond,  withdrew  at  daylight  and  halted  at  Allen's  Field, 
between  Orchard  and  Savage  Stations.  Here  a  vigorous  as 
sault  was  made  about  9  A.  M.,  first  on  the  right  wing  held 

228 


McCLELLAN  229 

by  Sedgwick,  and  then  on  the  left  wing  held  by  Richardson. 
This  double  assault  was  thrice  repeated,  but  without  any  suc 
cess,  the  enemy  being  forced  back  in  disorder  at  every  charge. 

Early  on  the  29th  General  Keyes's  corps,  being  relieved 
at  Savage  Station  by  General  Slocum,  started  for  the  James 
River,  and  reached  there  early  on  the  morning  of  the  3Oth. 

About  noon  of  the  29th  Generals  Sumner  and  Franklin 
united  their  forces  at  Savage  Station  in  anticipation  of  an 
attack  in  force.  If  General  Heintzelman  had  held  the  Wil- 
liamsburg  road  as  directed  by  General  McClellan,  the  advance 
of  the  enemy  would  have  been  barred;  but  through  some 
misapprehension  he  withdrew,  and  this  left  the  way  open  to 
them.  The  expected  onset  came  about  4  P.  M.  and  continued 
with  great  vigor  until  the  coming  on  of  night,  when  the 
enemy  retired,  having  made  no  impression.  Here  the  tables 
were  turned  on  "Prince  John"  Magruder,  for  Sumner,  whose 
corps  enabled  the  army  trains  to  pass  over  White  Oak  Swamp 
unmolested,  kept  up  such  a  clatter  that  it  seemed  to  the  Con 
federates  that  the  whole  Federal  army  was  in  front  of  them. 

On  the  morning  of  the  3Oth  of  June  General  Franklin 
was  stationed  at  the  Southern  end  of  the  bridge  at  White 
Oak  Swamp,  with  Richardson's  division  and  Naglee's  brigade 
added  to  his  own  corps,  by  General  McClellan's  sagacious 
prevision,  to  block  the  approach  of  any  Confederate  force 
from  that  direction  or  along  the  Charles  City  road.  This 
prudent  measure  crippled  the  Confederate  operations  of  the 
day,  for  Jackson  and  D.  H.  Hill  and  Huger  were  to  fall  upon 
the  rear  of  the  Federal  forces  under  Sumner  and  Heintzel 
man  at  Glendale  (Frazier's  Farm)  while  Longstreet  and  A. 
P.  Hill  assailed  the  Union  front.  But  having  a  prior  engage 
ment  with  General  Franklin,  the  redoubtable  Jackson  found 
it  impossible  to  be  present;  for,  despite  the  most  persistent 
efforts  continued  from  noon  until  dark,  he  could  not  pass  the 
swamp,  and  Huger  was  blocked  on  the  road.  As  the  result, 
Generals  Jackson  and  D.  H.  Hill  and  Huger,  with  their  five 
divisions,  were  unavoidably  absent  from  the  fourth  great 
battle  of  the  campaign. 

While  General  Franklin  was  riding  toward  the  swamp  that 


230  McCLELLAN 

morning,  as  he  says,  a  terrible  artillery  fire  opened  from  the 
opposite  side,  the  severity  of  which  he  had  never  heard 
equaled.  It  was  the  first  intimation  of  Jackson's  arrival  and 
it  came  from  a  masked  battery  of  thirty-one  guns  located  in 
the  dense  woods.  The  trees  around  General  Franklin  seemed 
torn  to  pieces  by  round  shot  and  exploding  shells.1 

An  interesting  incident  comes  to  us  from  General  D.  H. 
Hill.  The  Federals  fired  one  volley  from  their  field-guns 
and  made  off.  Mumford's  2d  Virginia  Cavalry  crossed  the 
swamp,  and  Generals  Jackson  and  Hill  crossed  with  them,  to 
discover  where  the  enemy  had  gone.  As  General  Hill  quaintly 
puts  it,  they  soon  found  out.  The  Union  batteries  had  merely 
retired  to  a  strip  of  woods,  where  they  were  perfectly  shel 
tered  from  the  rebel  cannonade  and  yet  could  sweep  the  broken 
bridge  and  all  approaches.  The  cavalry  regiment  were  treated 
to  a  terrific  shower  of  grape  and  canister,  and  returned  to  their 
own  side  of  the  swamp  with  more  speed  than  dignity.  "Fast 
riding  in  the  wrong  direction,"  quoth  General  Hill,  "is  not 
military,  but  is  sometimes  healthy."  2 

No  more  attempts  were  made  to  cross  the  swamp  on  that 
day.  It  was  cooler  on  the  other  side.  While  these  five  divi 
sions  were  so  detained  Longstreet  and  A.  P.  Hill  were  hurry 
ing  along  the  Long  Bridge  road  to  seize  the  Quaker  road, 
on  which  the  Federal  army  and  its  trains  were  moving 
toward  the  James.  If  this  movement  had  succeeded,  the 
Union  Army  would  have  been  cut  in  two;  but  about  a  mile 
from  the  Quaker  road  General  McClellan  had  placed  an  ob 
struction.  It  was  Heintzelman's  corps  and  Sunnier,  with 
Sedgwick's  division.  McCall's  division  was  in  advance  of 
all,  and  was  overwhelmed  and  driven  back  by  the  great  mass 
of  the  enemy  pouring  upon  him.  As  the  latter  was  in  pur 
suit,  Hooker's  division,  which  was  on  McCall's  left,  attacked 
the  right  flank  of  the  hostile  force  and,  being  then  assisted 
by  General  Sumner  on  the  opposite  flank,  repulsed  the  at 
tack.  Troops  returning  from  White  Oak  Swamp  were  in 
time  to  give  valuable  aid. 

1  Battles  and  Leaders,  II,  377,  378. 
3  Ibid.,  387,  388. 


McCLELLAN  231 

This  is  described  by  General  Simmer  as  a  very  furious 
contest,  lasting  from  three  o'clock  until  dark,  and  "the  en 
emy  was  routed  at  all  points  and  driven  from  the  field."  3 
That  night  all  the  troops  from  White  Oak  Swamp  and  Glen- 
dale  reached  Malvern  Hill. 

Referring  to  the  action  at  Glendale,  Swinton  says :  "While 
these  events  were  passing  at  Glendale,  Jackson,  detained  by 
the  vigorous  opposition  he  met  on  the  other  side  of  White  Oak 
Swamp,  could  only  hear  the  tell-tale  guns :  he  was  impotent 
to  help.  Thus  it  was  that  McClellan,  holding  paralyzed,  as  it 
were,  the  powerful  corps  of  Jackson  with  his  right  hand,  with 
his  left  was  free  to  deal  blows  at  the  force  menacing  his 
flanks.  The  action  at  Glendale  insured  the  integrity  of  the 
army,  imperilled  till  that  hour.  During  the  night  the  troops 
that  had  checked  Jackson  and  repulsed  Longstreet,  silently 
withdrew,  and  when  Lee  was  next  able  to  strike,  it  was  at  a 
united  army,  strongly  posted  on  the  heights  of  Malvern,  with 
assured  communication  with  its  new  base  on  the  James."  4 


3  Official  Record,  XI,  167. 
*  Army  of  the  Potomac,  159. 


CHAPTER    XLIII 

MALVERN   HILL THE  FINAL  STRUGGLE 

Some  days  before  the  army  reached  the  James,  General 
McClellan  had  inspected  the  vicinity  of  the  river  and,  an 
ticipating  pursuit,  had  fixed  upon  Malvern  Hill  as  a  suitable 
place  to  assemble  his  weary  but  now  united  army,  to  meet 
the  last  desperate  effort  to  overpower  him.  This  was  his  first 
chance  in  the  Peninsula  to  select  his  ground  and  use  all  his 
troops.  Having  been  controlled  by  Mr.  Stanton's  order  of 
May  1 8th,  which  had  forced  him  into  a  false  and  weak  posi 
tion,  he  had  waged  battle  on  the  Chickahominy,  always  and 
unavoidably,  with  only  a  part  of  his  army  and  against  greatly 
superior  numbers.  If  there  had  been  no  order  of  May  i8th 
and  no  hope  held  out  of  the  coming  of  McDowell,  he  would 
have  gone  to  the  James  long  before,  and  so  would  have 
avoided  the  floods  and  swamps  of  the  Chickahominy,  the  en 
feebling  of  the  army  from  disease  and  overwork,  and  the  sacri 
fice  of  thousands,  which  had  resulted  from  the  senseless  order. 
If  the  army  which  landed  on  the  Peninsula  had  been  then' 
with  him,  fresh  and  undiminished,  and,  better  still,  if  the 
full  army  of  156,000  men  upon  which  he  had  based  his 
plans  had  been  around  him  ready  for  battle,  with  what  high 
hopes  he  would  have  awaited  the  onset!  As  it  was,  he  could 
only  pray  that  he  might  be  able  to  hurl  back  the  heavy  force 
which  he  felt  sure  would  be  dashed  upon  his  left  wing  and  so 
win  rest  and  recuperation  for  his  exhausted  men. 

Malvern  Hill  is  a  bare  plateau,  having  an  elevation  of 
about  sixty  feet  and  being  about  a  mile  wide.  Turkey  Creek 
borders  it  on  the  west,  and  also  on  the  south,  about  half  a 
mile  from  the  James.  Here  was  a  bend  and  widening  of  the 
river,  which  gave  an  excellent  opportunity  for  the  gunboats  to 
assemble  and  aid  in  repelling  an  attack  upon  the  Federal  left 

232 


M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  N  233 

flank.  This  was  a  position  admirably  selected,  as  the  critics 
agree.  If  General  Lee  had  rightly  interpreted  the  withdrawal 
of  McClellan  from  Beaver  Dam  and  Gaines's  Mill,  this  excel 
lent  engineer  and  able  general  would  have  forestalled  him  at 
Malvern  before  the  Union  army,  with  its  heavy  trains,  could 
have  reached  it;  but  the  day  lost  on  the  false  scent  prevented 
this. 

Even  as  it  was,  however.  Porter  had  scarcely  occupied  it, 
as  directed  by  the  commander,  when  an  attempt  was  made 
to  dislodge  him.  But  as  the  Southerners  had  found  at  Beaver 
Dam,  Fitz  John  Porter  was  of  a  stubborn  breed  and  "a  very 
poor  hand  at  running."  He  knew  that  "Little  Mac"  expected 
him  to  hold  that  hill,  and  he  held  it. 

The  Union  left  and  centre  occupied  Malvern  Hill ;  the 
right  lay  in  a  wooded  region  curving  like  the  arc  of  a  circle 
to  the  river,  below  Haxall's.  General  McClellan  rightly 
judged  that  the  force  of  the  assailants  would  be  chiefly  ex 
pended  upon  the  left  flank.  Here,  therefore,  he  massed  his 
troops  and  artillery.  Here  was  Porter's  corps,  with  his  guns 
well  posted.  On  higher  ground  was  the  artillery  of  the 
reserve,  and  on  the  crest  of  the  hill  ten  siege  guns.  This  pre 
sented  a  formidable  array  of  ordnance.  'Tier  upon  tier"  the 
hill  was  "bristling  with  guns,"  as  General  D.  H.  Hill  describes 
it.  Next  to  Porter  and  to  his  right  was  Couch ;  then  Seclgwick 
and  Richardson;  then  Smith  and  Slocum;  then  the  rest  of 
Keyes's  corps,  extending  to  the  James.  McCall's  division  was 
behind  Porter  and  Couch. 

On  the  morning  of  the  first  of  July,  Lee,  Longstreet,  and 
D.  H.  Hill  met  at  Willis  Church  on  the  Quaker  road  near 
Frazier's  Farm.  General  Hill  gave  the  commander  a  descrip 
tion  of  Malvern  Hill,  adding,  "If  General  McClellan  is  there 
in  force,  we  had  better  let  him  alone."  Longstreet  treated 
this  suggestion  with  scorn,  saying  laughingly,  "Don't  get 
scared,  now  that  we  have  got  him  whipped."  This  idea  em 
boldened  Lee  to  make  the  assault.1  Observe  the  sequel. 
Longstreet,  who  urged  the  advance,  should  have  been  ordered 
to  the  assault,  but  he  took  no  part  in  the  battle;  while  D.  H. 
1  Battles  and  Leaders,  391. 


234  McCLELLAN 

Hill,  who  tried  to  dissuade  Lee  from  the  attack,  was  directed 
to  make  it,  and  like  a  brave  soldier  did  his  utmost  to  win 
success. 

The  serious  attack  began  at  three  o'clock,  when  a  brisk 
artillery  fire  was  followed  by  an  assault  by  General  Anderson, 
of  D.  H.  Hill's  division,  on  Couch's  front.  Couch's  men  re 
served  their  fire  until  the  enemy  was  quite  near,  when  they 
poured  in  swift  volleys,  driving  the  enemy  back  seven  or 
eight  hundred  yards.  About  four  o'clock  the  first  act  was 
over,  but  not  the  battle.  About  six  o'clock  a  furious  cannon 
ade  began,  directed  against  Porter  and  Couch,  and  then,  suc 
cessively,  D.  H.  Hill,  Magruder,  and  Huger  hurled  their 
columns  against  the  Union  center  and  left,  but  the  fearful 
fire  of  the  Union  batteries  and  the  effective  aid  of  the  in 
fantry  foiled  every  attempt  to  capture  the  hill,  and  with  appall 
ing  slaughter  of  the  attacking  forces;  yet  the  brave  and  per 
sistent  efforts  did  not  end  until  nine  o'clock.  The  repulse 
was  absolute,  the  Union  victory  complete.  Some  of  his  lieu 
tenants  urged  that  Malvern  Hill  be  held  and  the  enemy  pur 
sued,  but  the  commander  had  wiser  views.  "Victorious 
though  the  army  was  on  the  field  of  Malvern,  the  position 
was  one  that  could  not  be  held,  for  the  army  was  under  the 
imperious  necessity  of  reaching  its  supplies.  During  the  night 
accordingly  the  troops  were  withdrawn  to  Harrison's  Bar  on 
the  James."  2  Most  of  the  trains  were  already  there,  having 
pursued  their  march  on  the  night  of  the  3Oth  of  June  and  on 
the  ist  of  July.  The  exhaustion  of  food,  forage,  and  ammuni 
tion  made  it  necessary  for  the  gallant  but  worn-out  army  to 
follow  as  soon  as  the  battle  ended. 

The  guarding  of  the  trains  was  committed  to  General 
Keyes, — a  difficult  task  that  was  admirably  accomplished. 
The  army  wagons  and  vehicles  of  every  kind  would  have  cov 
ered  forty  miles,  if  they  had  been  extended  in  a  continuous 
line.  From  this  consideration,  the  enterprise  of  bringing  them 
safely  from  the  Chickahominy  can  be  more  fully  realized. 

3  Swinton,  Army  of  the  Potomac,  164. 


CHAPTER    XLIV 

A    GLORIOUS    FIGHT 

Probably  nothing  in  the  whole  career  of  Mr.  Stanton  ever 
operated  so  perfectly  to  his  satisfaction  as  his  successful  dis 
paragement  of  the  battles  of  the  Peninsula  Campaign.  When 
we  consider  the  numbers  engaged,  the  condition  of  the  terri 
tory  in  which  the  warfare  was  waged,  the  fury  and  persistence 
of  the  attacks,  and  the  firmness  and  gallantry  of  the  defence, 
and  when,  further,  we  consider  that  here  for  the  only  time 
during  the  war  a  Union  commander  contended  against  a  heavy 
preponderance  of  numbers  and  yet  inflicted  upon  his  adversary 
a  great  preponderance  of  loss,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  history 
of  the  war  has  no  more  notable  battles  to  record,  and,  above 
all,  none  so  glorious  to  the  cause  of  the  Union,  in  view  of  all 
the  conditions.  At  Shiloh  the  largest  number  engaged  was 
87,000;  at  Chickamauga  110,000;  at  Gettysburg  150,000;  at 
Chattanooga  100,000;  while  in  the  seven  days'  struggle  the 
aggregate  of  the  opposing  armies,  as  we  shall  see,  was  over 
225,000  men. 

In  view  of  all  this,  the  scant  attention  paid  to  these  fierce 
battles  between  the  largest  armies  which  ever  met  on  this 
continent,  in  contrast  with  the  treatment  of  the  other  battles 
mentioned,  demonstrates  the  absolute  success  of  Mr.  Stanton's 
efforts. 

The  battles  of  this  campaign  were  a  surprise  to  the  sol 
diers  of  Dixie.  How  was  it  that  those  whose  total  lack  of 
valor  was  but  a  few  months  before  a  subject  of  ridicule 
and  sneers  could  be  so  transformed?  Every  fight,  every  skir 
mish,  had  served  to  confirm  and  intensify  their  contempt  for 
the  hares  of  the  Potomac;  the  courage  shown  at  Williamsburg, 
West  Point,  and  Hanover  Court  House  was  probably  at 
tributed  to  the  exceptional  bravery  of  special  brigades. 

235 


236  McCLELLAN 

At  Fair  Oaks  they  seemed  to  find  the  hares  again  in 
Casey's  men;  and  the  final  failure  no  doubt  was  credited  by 
the  rebels  to  the  bungling  of  their  own  leaders,  in  not  properly 
utilizing  all  their  forces.  Nothing  stimulates  an  effort  to  con 
quer  so  much  as  a  firm  conviction  that  the  opponent  is  weak 
and  cowardly.  It  was  incredible  that  the  men  who  had  flown 
before  them  on  the  Potomac  could  withstand  them  now.  Here 
lies  the  reason  why  the  attacks  were  so  desperate  and  per 
sistent,  in  spite  of  bloody  repulses,  day  after  day  for  six 
days, — seven  days  of  fighting, — if  we  begin  with  Oak  Grove. 

"The  splendid  fighting  of  his  men  was  a  tribute  to  the  skill 
and  genius  with  which  he  had  created  an  effective  army  out 
of  what  he  had  described  as  'regiments  cowering  on  the  banks 
of  the  Potomac,  some  perfectly  raw,  others  dispirited  by  re 
cent  defeat,  others  going  home.'  Out  of  a  disorganized  and 
demoralized  mass  reinforced  by  utterly  untrained  civilians, 
McClellan  had  within  a  few  months  created  an  army  capable 
of  stubbornly  contesting  every  inch  of  ground  even  when 
effecting  a  retreat,  the  very  thought  of  which  might  well  have 
disorganized  an  army."  1  In  the  seven  days'  struggle  the 
army  entered  upon  "a  fight  which  knew  no  ceasing  night  or 
day."  2  The  author  tells  us  that  this  was  due  solely  to  Mc- 
Clellan's  discipline  and  dominant  influence.  "Here  was  Mc- 
Clellan's  reward;  here  was  his  glory.  This  army  of  his  a 
few  months  before  .  .  ' .  would  have  broken  into  a  panic- 
stricken  rout."  3 

There  is  no  more  persistent  and  baseless  error  than  the 
assertion  by  many  writers  that  in  his  long  fight  with  Lee  the 
Union  commander  had  vastly  superior  forces,  and  by  others 
that  he  had  a  slight  preponderance  of  numbers.  The  most 
recent  writer  on  this  period  wanders  furthest  in  assuring  us 
that  McClellan  had  about  100,000  men  and  that  Lee  had 
30,000  less.  I  am  satisfied  that  even  in  a  statement  so  wild 
as  this  there  is  no  malice  nor  deliberate  mendacity,  but  the 
injury  to  truth  is  none  the  less  grave  and  lamentable,  and 


1  Eggleston,  History  of  the  Confederate  War,  I,  403. 
3  Ibid.,  404. 
"Ibid.,  404. 


McCLELLAN  237 

it  springs  from  a  wholly  insufficient  research  into  easily  ac 
cessible  authorities.  The  marvel  is  where  he  could  have  found 
any  inspiration  for  so  baseless  a  statement.  Surely  not  in  the 
pages  of  Mr.  Rhodes,  to  whom  he  pays  a  well-merited  tribute,4 
nor  in  those  of  Mr.  Swinton,  nor  of  General  Webb,  nor  of 
General  Dodge,  nor  of  Colonel  Powell,  nor  of  any  of  the  many 
other  writers  mentioned  in  this  work.  While  Mr.  Stanton's 
influence  was  alive  and  active,  the  view  was  widely  dissem 
inated  that  McClellan's  army  largely  outnumbered  Lee's,  but 
more  recently  the  general  impression  has  been  that  the  armies 
were  about  equal,  the  advantage  in  numbers  being  with  Mc- 
Clellan. 

In  Livermore's  Numbers  and  Losses  in  the  Civil  War 
(1901)  the  numbers  of  the  two  armies  at  the  beginning  of 
the  seven  days  is  given  as  follows:  Lee,  95,481 ;  McClellan, 
83,345.  The  difference  is  so  small  in  proportion  to  the  size 
of  the  armies  that  according  to  this  author  and  many  others 
the  two  armies  might  be  regarded  as  practically  equal ;  and,  to 
be  conservative,  I  shall  so  assume  in  presenting  my  conclu 
sions  notwithstanding  the  apparently  irresistible  evidence 
which  I  will  now  present  that  McClellan  was  entirely 
right  in  his  belief  that  he  was  greatly  overmatched  in  num 
bers.  In  the  first  place,  the  surrounding  facts  make  it  ex 
ceedingly  probable.  We  have  seen  in  Chapter  VI  that  while 
Johnston  was  still  at  Manassas  his  army  was  reputed  to  be 
100,000  strong.  Let  us  assume  that  it  was  only  50,000  strong. 
At  the  same  time  there  were  20,000  to  30,000  troops  at  York- 
town,  Gloucester,  and  Norfolk  as  various  Southern  writers 
say,  and  of  course  some  thousands  at  Richmond;  but  we  will 
assume  that  there  were  then  only  50,000  Confederates  in  all 
Virginia.  Johnston  left  Manassas  on  the  9th  of  March  to 
meet  McClellan's  expected  coast  advance,  and  in  that  same 
month,  as  we  have  learned,  the  Governor  of  Virginia  called 
out  the  militia,  100,000  strong;  but  let  us  suppose  that  this 
brought  only  50,000  men  into  the  ranks.  We  have,  then, 
at  least  100,000  men;  but  this  was  not  all.  The  Confederate 
leaders  wisely  felt  that  the  situation  was  intensely  critical, 

4  History  of  the  United  States,  IV,  44- 


238  McCLELLAN 

and  they  called  in  troops  from  everywhere  in  Dixie,  follow 
ing  General  Johnston's  advice  that  "all  their  available  forces 
should  be  united  near  Richmond  ...  the  great  army 
thus  formed  ...  to  fall  with  its  full  force  upon  McClel- 
lan  when  the  Federal  army  was  expecting  to  besiege  only  the 
troops  it  had  followed  from  Yorktown."  5  He  tells  us  that 
37,000  men  came  from  Georgia  and  the  Carolinas.  That 
would  make  137,000  men,  it  seems  probable  from  this  very  con 
servative  calculation,  or  in  the  ratio  of  nearly  3  to  2,  at  the 
very  least  estimate.  During  those  weary,  maddening  weeks 
while  he  was  waiting  in  the  mud  and  rain  for  McDowell,  Mc- 
Clellan  got  constant  tidings  of  the  gathering  of  the  Southern 
clans. 

On  June  the  i6th  General  Mansfield  wrote  to  the  com 
mander  that  a  deserter,  just  arrived,  had  reported  that  Rich 
mond  was  strongly  fortified,  that  it  was  defended  by  130,000 
men,  and  that  an  Englishman,  lately  in  from  there,  thought 
they  had  150,000  men.6  On  June  the  i7th  the  Richmond  Dis 
patch  published  a  telegram  from  Montgomery,  Alabama,  con 
taining  this  statement:  "General  Beauregard  and  staff  are 
here  on  their  way  to  Richmond.  We  hear  that  a  large  part  of 
the  Army  of  the  Mississippi  will  soon  follow  the  General."  7 
On  June  the  25th  General  Porter  wrote,  "A  contraband  who 
came  into  our  lines  under  the  fire  of  our  guns  to-day,  says  he 
saw  Beauregard  and  his  troops  arrive  in  Richmond."  8  Cer 
tainly  there  can  be  no  better  witness  as  to  the  size  of  the  rebel 
army  than  one  of  its  leaders.  From  General  Joseph  E.  John 
son  we  learn  that  on  May  3ist,  1862,  the  effective  strength  of 
that  army  was  73,928,°  and  that  to  this  were  added  15,000 
men  from  North  Carolina,  22,000  men  from  South  Carolina 
and  Georgia,  and  Jackson's  division  of  16,000  men, — 53,000  in 
all,  making  the  grand  total  1 26,92s.1  ° 

Those  who  were  so  gullible  as  to  be  misled  by  the  "Quaker 

5  Battles  and  Leaders,  II,  203. 
0  Official  Record,  XI,  m,  231. 
T  Ibid.,  240. 
'Ibid.,  253- 

9  Battles  and  Leaders,  II,  209. 

10  Ibid.,  217. 


McCLELLAN  239 

Gun"  stories  of  Manassas  and  Yorktown  will  be  interested 
in  these  details  :  the  Confederate  army  contained  173  regiments 
and  12  battalions  of  infantry,  71  batteries  and  12  regiments 
of  cavalry;  the  Union  army  consisted  of  150  regiments  of 
infantry,  two  regiments  and  i  battalion  of  engineers,  i  regi 
ment  of  heavy  or  siege  artillery,  58  batteries  and  10  regiments 
of  cavalry.11  On  July  the  ist  General  Dix  telegraphed  to 
the  Secretary  of  War,  "Nearly  the  whole  power  of  the  in 
surgent  states  is  concentrated  at  Richmond."  12 

This  will  convince  any  one  who  is  open  to  conviction  of 
the  only  point  that  is  material, — namely,  that  the  Union  army 
was  very  considerably  the  weaker,  even  in  nominal  strength. 
But  there  is  another  factor.  The  Confederate  force  men 
tioned  was  entirely  available  for  battle;  it  had  no  communi 
cations  to  protect,  no  trains  to  guard.  Many  thousands  of 
McClellan's  army  were  required  to  guard  West  Point,  White 
House,  and  all  the  way  to  the  Chickahominy,  and  to  operate, 
care  for,  and  defend  the  cattle,  mules,  wagons,  and  supplies 
on  the  Chickahominy.  The  number  required  for  these  pur 
poses  has  been  put  as  high  as  20,000.  Without  settling  the 
precise  loss  of  righting  strength  so  occasioned,  it  is  clear  that 
these  necessities  very  appreciably  diminished  the  battle  ranks 
of  the  Federal  host. 

To  appraise  rightly  the  credit  due  to  McClellan  in  his  mili 
tary  operations  up  to  this  time,  we  should  contrast  the  con 
ditions  surrounding  him  with  those  under  which  others  fought 
in  the  Old  Dominion  and  the  outcome  of  the  struggles.  Burn- 
side  at  Fredericksburg  had  127,000,  Lee  100,000;  Hooker  at 
Chancellorsville  had  132,000  men  and  400  guns,  Lee  55,000 
men,  according  to  Swinton.13 

According  to  some  authors,  Grant  when  he  started  had 
187,000  men, — 140,000  with  him,  30,000  under  Butler,  who 
joined  the  main  army  on  the  Rapidan,  and  two  auxiliary 
forces  under  his  command;  10,000  led  by  Crook;  and  7,000 
by  Sigel.  Lee's  army  rolls  at  the  same  time  showed  a  force 

"  Ibid.,  187. 

"Official  Record,  XI,  in.  283. 
13  Army  of  the  Potomac,  409-413. 


240  M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  N 

present  for  duty  of  52,626.  To  have  been  on  a  footing  with 
Generals  Burnside  and  Hooker,  McClellan  should  have  had 
an  army  twice  as  large  as  Lee's.  According  to  Johnston,  this 
would  have  meant  252,000  men.  To  have  been  on  a  footing 
with  General  Grant  he  should  have  had  a  colossal  force  of 
more  than  334,000  men  and  all  effectives.  These  other  com 
manders,  moreover,  fought  under  favorable  conditions  of 
earth  and  weather.  They  had  neither  bogs  nor  dispiriting 
rains  and  floods  to  abate  their  ardor,  and  they  enjoyed  the 
cordial  and  vigorous  support  of  the  Administration;  yet  to 
every  one  of  them  came  sore  disaster,  and  to  General  Grant 
most  of  all.  We  will  dwell  on  this  at  greater  length  at  an 
other  time.  McClellan  was  the  only  commander  who  ever 
met  Lee  on  the  road  to  Richmond  with  a  lesser  or  an  equal 
force;  yet  he  is  the  only  commander  who  emerged  from  the 
struggle  with  credit,  threw  the  greater  burden  of  loss  upon  his 
antagonist,  and  had  as  the  result  a  proud,  confident,  and  idol 
izing  army,  more  eager  and  better  fitted  for  fighting  than 
before  the  grapple.  Seeing  the  great  preponderance  of  num 
bers  which  the  Administration  rightly  thought  necessary  for 
prudent  campaigning  under  even  so  determined  and  so  suc 
cessful  a  leader  as  General  Grant  against  the  ablest  fighting 
force  of  the  Confederacy,  how  is  it  to  be  excused  for  forcing 
or  even  permitting  military  operations  to  be  prosecuted  by 
General  McClellan  with  numbers  and  under  conditions  so 
perilous  to  the  success  of  the  national  cause? 


CHAPTER    XLV 

THE    MEED   OF    PRAISE 

There  is  no  discord  in  the  recognition  of  the  historians 
of  the  Civil  War  that  McClellan's  transfer  of  the  army  to  the 
James  was  sagacious  in  its  conception  and  masterly  in  its 
execution, — an  object  lesson  of  bold  and  skilful  generalship. 

"His  change  of  base  was  a  most  difficult  operation  carried 
out  with  consummate  skill."  1  Colonel  Powell's  opinion  is  as 
follows :  "Fortunately  for  the  country,  on  plans  wisely  con 
sidered  in  advance,  the  army  entered  upon  the  movement, 
which  it  was  destined  to  repeat  two  years  later  with  skeleton 
ranks  and  battered  standards,  vindicating  the  judgment  .  .  . 
that  first  perceived,  advocated  and  occupied  the  line  which  led 
to  the  triumph  of  the  national  arms."  2  General  D.  H.  Hill,  of 
the  Confederate  army,  says :  "With  consummate  skill  he  had 
crossed  his  vast  train  of  5,000  wagons  and  his  immense  parks 
of  artillery  safely  over  White  Oak  Swamp,  but  he  was  more 
exposed  now  than  at  any  time  in  his  flank  march.  [Observe 
that  this  Confederate  leader  does  not  call  it  a  retreat.]  Three 
columns  of  attack  were  converging  upon  him,  and  a  strong 
corps  was  pressing  upon  his  rear.  Escape  seemed  impossible 
for  him,  but  he  did  escape,  at  the  same  time  inflicting  heavy 
damage  upon  his  pursuers."  3 

The  proof  which  this  day  at  Glendale, — or  Frazier's  Farm, 
as  the  Confederates  called  it, — affords  of  McClellan's  military 
genius  has  entirely  escaped  the  attention  of  writers  generally. 
It  comes  to  us  with  admirable  grace  from  the  brave  and  can 
did  foeman  just  mentioned.  He  points  out  the  fact  that  Gen 
eral  Lee's  plans  for  the  day  were  faultless.4  He  speaks  of 

1  American  Civil  War,  123. 
3  Fifth  Army  Corps,  126,  127. 
'Battles  and  Leaders,  II,  388. 
*  Ibid.,  388. 

241 


242  McCLELLAN 

meeting  him  on  the  following  day,  and  adds,  "He  bore  grandly 
his  terrible  disappointment  of  the  day  before,  and  made  no  al 
lusion  to  it."  5  It  is  now  admitted  that  this  was  the  most  crit 
ical  moment  in  the  march  to  the  James  and  that  at  this  point 
the  Federal  army  was  most  vulnerable.  And  it  is  evident  that 
many  authors  regard  it  as  an  illustration  of  amazing  good 
fortune  that  the  army  was  not  destroyed. 

This  view  does  gross  injustice  to  McClellan's  wise  previ 
sion  and  military  sagacity.  McClellan  knew  Lee  well  and  gave 
him  credit  for  splendid  generalship ;  and  made  his  own  prepa 
rations  accordingly.  General  Hill  says,  "Throughout  this  cam 
paign  we  attacked  just  when  and  where  the  enemy  wished  us 
to  attack."  6  This  is  but  another  way  of  saying  that  McClel 
lan  always  divined  what  the  enemy  would  do  and  was  ready 
for  it.  The  day  at  Frazier's  Farm  was  one  of  the  most  notable 
examples  in  all  history  of  the  highest  order  of  generalship. 
The  Southern  generals  are  all  agreed  that  the  Union  army 
ought  to  have  been  destroyed.  Why  was  it  not?  Because 
McClellan  was  not  quite  willing.  We  have  noted  Mr.  Swin- 
ton's  strong  figure  of  McClellan  holding  the  gallant  Jackson 
paralyzed  with  one  hand  while  he  dealt  vigorous  blows  at 
Longstreet  and  Hill  with  the  other.  But  we  need  a  many- 
handed  leader  to  represent  McClellan's  activities  through 
which  five  divisions  of  the  rebel  army  were  that  day  rendered 
impotent.7  They  heard  the  firing,  and  chafed  with  impatience 
to  be  with  their  comrades;  but  they  were  shut  out  from  par 
ticipation,  and  so  Lee's  plans  went  adrift.  Was  it  by  chance 
that  the  three  divisions  of  Jackson  and  one  of  D.  H.  Hill 
were  held  beyond  White  Oak  Swamp?  Surely  not.  It  was 
because  of  McClellan's  shrewd  foresight  in  planting  Franklin 
where  he  could  bar  their  advance.  Huger,  with  another  divi 
sion,  was  on  the  Charles  City  road.  Was  it  by  McClellan's 
good  luck  that  he  took  no  part  in  the  fight  ?  No ;  it  was 
because  by  McClellan's  orders  the  road  was  so  impeded  by 
trees  that  had  been  felled  and  thrown  across  it  that  Huger 


6  Battles  and  Leaders,  II,  391. 
'Ibid.,  395- 
1  Ibid.,  388. 


McCLELLAN  243 

deemed  it  impracticable  to  force  an  advance,  as  Franklin  also 
commanded  that  approach.  Magruder  and  Holmes,  with  their 
two  divisions,  were  upon  the  New  Market  road,  on  their  way 
to  occupy  Malvern  Hill.  They  arrived  at  10:30  A.  M.  ;  but 
McClellan  had  divined  that  too,  as  we  have  seen,  and  Porter 
was  ahead  of  them.  So  while  McClellan  with  one  hand  pom 
meled  Longstreet  and  A.  P.  Hill  at  Fraziers  Farm,  with  an 
other  he  throttled  Jackson  and  D.  H.  Hill  with  four  divisions 
at  White  Oak  Swamp,  with  another  tied  up  Huger  with  his 
division  on  the  Charles  City  road,  and  with  still  another  balked 
the  two  divisions  of  Magruder  and  Holmes  at  Malvern  Hill. 
And  while  all  these  Southern  war  tigers  gnashed  their  teeth 
in  impotent  rage,  just  beyond  the  reach  of  their  claws  the 
"forty  miles  of  wagons"  and  great  herds  of  cattle  and  parks 
of  artillery  moved  slowly  and  with  difficulty,  but  undisturbed, 
along  the  miry  Quaker  road  to  Haxall,  on  the  James.  It  is 
interesting  to  read  of  the  excuses  and  theories  given  for  the 
failure  of  the  fiery  and  aggressive  Jackson  to  get  to  Frazier's 
Farm  on  the  3Oth.  He  was  exhausted,  he  was  not  himself 
that  day,  and  so  on.  He  was  the  same  brave,  forceful  fighter 
as  ever,  as  one  may  see  from  D.  H.  Hill's  account  of  the 
day,8  but  he  could  not  get  past  Franklin ;  that  was  all. 

Of  the  general  movement  the  Comte  de  Paris  writes: 
"Such  was  the  bold  and  masterly  plan  conceived  by  McClel 
lan  in  response  to  the  movement  of  his  opponent,  which  he. 
had  divined  before  it  commenced.  ...  In  relinquishing 
the  idea  of  covering  the  York  River  road,  he  deceived  all  the 
calculations  of  the  enemy.  To  venture  thus  with  an  army  of 
more  than  a  hundred  thousand  men  into  a  series  of  operations, 
in  the  midst  of  which,  whether  victorious  or  vanquished,  it  was 
destined  for  some  time  to  see  its  communications  cut  by  the 
enemy,  was  certainly  one  of  the  boldest  resolutions  which  can 
be  adopted  by  a  general  in  war."  9 

Lord  Wolseley,  the  renowned  English  general,  pays  Mc 
Clellan  this  glowing  tribute :  "The  retreat  to  the  James  was 
an  exceedingly  ably  conducted  operation,  carried  out  under 

9  Ibid.,  366,  383. 

9  Civil  War  in  America,  II,  88,  89. 


244  McCLELLAN 

great  difficulties,  and,  above  all,  in  the  presence  of  such  op 
ponents  as  Lee  and  Jackson."  10 

Let  us  now  hear  from  his  chief  lieutenant,  General  Porter : 
"Before  the  battle  of  Gaines's  Mill  (already  described  by  me 
in  these  pages)  a  change  of  base  from  the  York  to  the  James 
River  had  been  anticipated  and  prepared  for  by  General  Mc- 
Clellan.  After  the  battle  this  change  became  a  necessity, 
in  presence  of  a  strong  and  aggressive  foe,  who  had  already 
turned  our  right,  cut  our  connection  with  the  York  River,  and 
was  also  in  large  force  behind  the  intrenchments  between  us 
and  Richmond.  The  transfer  was  begun  the  moment  our  posi 
tion  became  perilous.  It  now  involved  a  series  of  battles  by 
day  and  marches  by  night,  which  brought  into  relief  the  able 
talents,  active  foresight,  and  tenacity  of  purpose  of  our  com 
mander,  the  unity  of  action  on  his  part  of  his  subordinates, 
and  the  great  bravery,  firmness,  and  confidence  in  their  supe 
riors  on  the  part  of  the  rank  and  file. 

"These  conflicts  from  the  beginning  of  the  Seven  Days' 
fighting  were  the  engagement  at  Oak  Grove,  the  battles  of 
Beaver  Dam  and  Gaines's  Mill,  the  engagements  at  Golding's 
and  Garnett's  farms,  and  at  Allen's  farm,  or  Peach  Orchard ; 
the  battle  of  Savage's  Station ;  the  artillery  duel  at  White  Oak 
Swamp;  the  battle  of  Glendale  (or  Charles  City  cross-roads)  ; 
the  action  of  Turkey  Creek,  and  the  battle  of  Malvern  Hill. 
Each  was  a  success  to  our  army,  the  engagement  of  Malvern 
Hill  being  the  most  decisive.  The  result  of  the  movement  was 
that  on  the  2d  of  July,  our  army  was  safely  established  at 
Harrison's  Landing,  on  the  James,  in  accordance  with  General 
McClellan's  design."  ll 

Among  the  others  who  have  lauded  the  skill  and  fighting 
qualities  shown  by  "Little  Mac"  in  his  march  to  the  James 
are  Generals  Webb,  in  The  Peninsula;  Humphrey,  in  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac;  Sykes;  McMahon,  in  the  Peninsular  Cam 
paign;  Averill;  General  Imboden,  C.  S.  A.;  Jefferson  Davis; 
the  Prince  de  Joinville,  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac;  Le 
Compte  in  La  Guerre  des  Etats  Unis;  Hillard,  in  the  Life  and 

10  North  American  Review,  CXLVIII,  174. 
"Battles  and  Leaders,  II,  406. 


McCLELLAN  245 

Campaigns  of  McClcllan;  and  Palmer,  in  the  Second  Army 
Corps.  Count  Von  Moltke  was  also  one  of  the  warmest  ad 
mirers  of  McClellan's  military  skill. 

It  is  agreed  with  practical  unanimity  that,  in  spite  of  the 
rain,  the  mud,  the  lack  of  naval  aid,  and  the  consequent  com 
pulsory  delay  which  enabled  the  rebels  to  bring  in  large  forces 
from  other  states,  and  in  spite  of  the  enforced  straddling  of 
the  Chickahominy  and  the  long  continuance  thereon,  McClel- 
lan  would  certainly  have  taken  Richmond,  if  McDowell  had 
joined  him. 

"Had  McDowell  .  .  .  reinforced  McClellan,  there  is 
little  doubt  that  the  Federal  arms  would  have  been  success 
ful."  12  Even  the  Southern  historian,  Mr.  Eggleston,  admits 
that  if  McClellan  and  McDowell  had  been  permitted  to  unite 
McClellan  would  have  been  able  within  three  or  four  days  to 
overcome  all  opposition  and  to  capture  Richmond.13  The  Con 
federate  general  Whiting  told  General  Imboden  in  effect  the 
same  thing, — namely,  that  but  for  Jackson's  maneuvres  Mc 
Clellan  would  have  captured  Richmond.14 

The  similar  view  of  General  Imboden  himself,  another 
Confederate,  we  have  already  quoted. 

Upon  what  is  this  general  belief  based?  Above  all,  upon 
the  military  capacity  shown  by  McClellan  in  the  seven  days' 
fight,  and  therefore  this  general  belief  is  a  commendation  of 
his  capacity. 

This  general  belief,  then,  having  been  accepted  as  wrell 
founded,  it  is  a  complete  vindication  of  McClellan's  judg 
ment  and  the  wisdom  of  his  plans;  for  if  at  the  end  of  June, 
with  the  aid  of  McDowell,  he  could  have  captured  Richmond, 
how  much  more  surely  he  could  have  achieved  the  same  result 
in  April,  if  McDowell  had  been  sent  with  him  and  the  neces 
sary  naval  force  had  been  supplied  to  avert  delay  at  York- 
town;  for  then  the  rebel  army  was  at  least  53,000  smaller. 


"Moore,  History  of  the  Great  Rebellion,  109. 
"  History  of  the  Confederate  War,  I,  287. 
14  Battles  and  Leaders,  II,  297. 


CHAPTER    XLVI 
WHERE  is  M'CLELLAN? 

From  the  27th  of  June  until  McClellan  reached  the  James, 
Stanton  got  only  occasional  news  of  him,  and  in  this  fact 
we  discover  one  of  the  most  interesting  phases  of  the  Civil 
War. 

McClellan  had  every  reason  to  think  that  the  Administra 
tion's  fears  would  never  sanction  a  voluntary  consent  for 
the  army  to  move  to  the  James;  and  he  no  doubt  quickly 
concluded  that  the  sole  reason  for  the  enforced  extension  of 
his  right  wing  north  of  Richmond  was  to  keep  it  between 
that  city  and  Washington.  It  was  only  a  new  phase  of  the 
overland  route  mania.  So  feeling  that  a  voluntary  change 
of  base  would  not  be  favored,  he  was  inspired  by  the  circum 
stances  and  the  necessities  of  the  situation  to  resort  to  diplo 
macy.  He  would  not  march  nor  advance  to  the  James;  he 
would  retreat  or  be  driven  back  to  the  James.  He  would 
secure  his  desire,  but  apparently  would  be  forced  to  it. 

On  June  the  28th,  in  reply  to  McClellan's  denunciatory 
telegram  of  June  the  28th  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  the  Presi 
dent  wrote  as  follows : 

"WASHINGTON,,  June  26,  1862. 
"MAJOR-GENERAL  MCCLELLAN  : 

"Your  three  dispatches  of  yesterday  in  relation  to  the 
affair,  ending  with  the  statement  that  you  completely  suc 
ceeded  in  making  your  point,  are  very  gratifying. 

"The  later  one  of  6:15  p.  MV  suggesting  the  probability  of 
your  being  overwhelmed  by  200,000,  and  talking  of  where  the 
responsibility  will  belong,  pains  me  very  much.  I  give  you 
all  I  can,  and  act  on  the  presumption  that  you  will  do  the  best 
you  can  with  what  you  have,  while  you  continue,  ungener 
ously  I  think,  to  assume  that  I  could  give  you  more  if  I 

246 


McCLELLAN  247 

would.      I   have  omitted   and  shall  omit  no  opportunity  to 
send  you  re-enforcements  whenever  I  possibly  can. 

"A.  LINCOLN. 

"P.  S. — General  Pope  thinks  if  you  fall  back  it  would  be 
much  better  toward  York  River  than  toward  the  James.  As 
Pope  now  has  charge  of  the  capital,  please  confer  with  him 
through  the  telegraph."  l 

We  have  shown  that  the  imaginary  inability  to  supply  rein 
forcements  was  the  sheerest  nonsense.  One  hundred  thousand 
men  could,  and  should,  have  been  sent  to  him ;  and  the  stronger 
McClellan's  army  had  been  made  the  surer  it  would  have 
been  that  not  a  rebel  company  would  have  dared  to  leave 
Richmond  to  annoy  Washington.  Every  man  would  have 
been  needed  there.  This  letter  conveyed  to  McClellan  the 
first  hint  of  Stanton's  latest  maneuver :  that  he  was  soon  to 
be  supplanted  by  General  Pope,  who  was  then  to  command  the 
united  forces  of  Northern  Virginia.  Pope  had  been  brought 
to  Washington  for  that  purpose,  "and  eventually  to  supersede 
McClellan."  2 

The  President  ordered  McClellan  to  confer  with  Pope 
as  to  the  movements  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac;  but 
fate  spared  him  that  humiliation. 

This  letter  voiced  the  disinclination  of  the  civil  authorities 
to  have  the  army  retire  beyond  Richmond. 

On  the  27th  a  telegram  had  gone  to  the  War  Department, 
containing  this  statement,  "We  shall  endeavor  to  hold  our 
own,  and  if  compelled  to  fall  back  shall  do  it  in  good  order, 
upon  James  river,  if  possible."  3 

On  the  same  day  he  sent  a  despatch  to  Commodore  Golds- 
borough,  in  which  he  said,  "We  have  met  a  severe  repulse 
to-day,  having  been  attacked  by  greatly  superior  numbers,  and 
I  am  obliged  to  fall  back  between  the  Chickahominy  and  the 
James  River."  4 

1  Official  record,  XI,  in,  259. 
*  Battles  and  Leaders,  II,  427  n. 

3  Official  Record,  XI,  m,  265. 

4  Ibid.,  267. 


248  McCLELLAN 

The  President's  postscript  was  intended  to  divert  McClel- 
lan's  mind  from  the  James  as  a  haven  of  refuge. 

Having  received  no  answer  to  his  telegram  Lincoln  wired 
to  General  Dix  at  Fortress  Monroe :  "Communication  with 
McClellan  at  White  House  cut  off.  Strain  every  nerve  to 
open  communication  with  him  by  James  River  or  any  other 
way  you  can.  Report  to  me."  He  also  wired  to  Goldsborough 
to  render  every  assistance  possible, — if  he  had  only  given  that 
direction  to  the  Navy  Department  in  March ! — and  to  Burnside 
to  hurry  to  the  James  with  any  reinforcements  he  could  spare.5 
On  the  same  day  Stanton  also  advised  Burnside  as  follows: 
"We  have  intelligence  that  General  McClellan  has  been  at 
tacked  in  large  force  and  compelled  to  fall  back  toward  the 
James  River.  We  are  not  advised  of  his  exact  condition."  6 
The  authorities  were  anxious.  A  new  view  of  the  situation 
was  forcing  itself  upon  them.  If  through  their  policy  of  scat 
tering  instead  of  uniting  the  national  forces  the  chief  Union 
army  of  the  East  should  be  destroyed,  where  then  would  be 
the  safety  of  Washington  and  how  long  would  the  army  they 
had  kept  away  from  McClellan,  and  which  if  sent  would  have 
made  him  irresistible,  delay  the  march  of  the  triumphant 
rebels  on  the  seat  of  government?  On  the  29th  came  their 
first  solace  in  a  dispatch  from  Ingalls,  Assistant  Quartermas 
ter  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  to  Meigs,  the  Quartermaster- 
General  at  Washington,  revealing  the  instructions  given  at 
White  House. 

On  June  the  2Qth  the  following  despatch  was  sent  to  Sec 
retary  Seward,  in  New  York : 

"WAR  DEPARTMENT,  June  29,  1862, — 6  p.  M. 
"HON.  WM.  H.  SEWARD, 

"Astor  House,  New  York: 

"Not  much  more  than  when  you  left.  Fulton,  of  Baltimore 
American,  is  now  with  us.  He  left  White  House  at  1 1  A.  M. 
yesterday.  He  conversed  fully  with  a  paymaster  who  was 
with  Porter's  force  during  the  fight  of  Friday,  and  fell  back 

5  Official  Record,  XI,  in,  270. 
"Ibid.,  271. 


McCLELLAN  249 

to  nearer  McClellan's  quarters  just  a  little  sooner  than  Porter 
did,  seeing  the  whole  of  it.  Staid  on  the  Richmond  side  of 
the  Chickahominy  overnight,  and  left  for  White  House  at  5 
A.  M.  Saturday.  He  says  Porter  retired  in  perfect  order  under 
protection  of  guns  arranged  for  the  purpose,  under  orders  and 
not  from  necessity,  and,  with  all  other  of  our  forces  except 
what  was  left  on  purpose  to  go  to  White  House,  was  safely 
in  pontoons  over  the  Chickahominy  before  morning,  and  that 
there  was  heavy  firing  on  the  Richmond  side,  begun  at  5  and 
ceased  at  7  A.  M.  Saturday.  On  the  whole,  I  think  we  have 
had  the  better  of  it  up  to  that  point  of  time.  What  has  hap 
pened  since  we  still  know  not,  as  we  have  no  communication 
with  General  McClellan.  A  dispatch  from  Colonel  Ingalls 
shows  that  he  thinks  McClellan  is  fighting  with  the  enemy 
at  Richmond  to-day  and  will  be  to-morrow.  We  have  no 
means  of  knowing  upon  what  Colonel  Ingalls  founds  his  opin 
ion.  All  confirmed  about  saving  all  property.  Not  a  single 
unwounded  straggler  came  back  to  the  White  House  from  the 
field,  and  the  number  of  wounded  reaching  there  up  to  1 1  A.  M. 
Saturday  was  not  large. 

"A.  LINCOLN. 

"To  what  the  President  has  above  stated  I  will  only  add 
one  or  two  points  that  may  be  satisfactory  for  you  to  know. 

"First.  All  the  sick  and  wounded  were  safely  removed 
from  the  White  House;  not  a  man  left  behind. 

"Second.  A  dispatch  from  Burnside  shows  that  he  is  in 
condition  to  afford  efficient  support  and  is  probably  doing  so. 

"Third.  The  dispatch  of  Colonel  Ingalls  impresses  me 
with  the  conviction  that  the  movement  was  made  by  General 
McClellan  to  concentrate  on  Richmond,  and  was  successful 
to  the  latest  point  of  which  we  have  any  information. 

"Fourth.  Mr.  Fulton  says  that  on  Friday  night  between 
12  and  i  o'clock  General  McClellan  telegraphed  Commo 
dore  Goldsborough  that  the  result  of  the  movement  was  satis 
factory  to  him. 

"Fifth.     From  these  and  the  facts  stated  by  the  President 


250  McCLELLAN 

my  inference  is  that  General  McClellan  will  probably  be  in 
Richmond  within  two  days. 

"EDWIN  M.  STANTON, 

"Secretary  of  War."  7 

On  the  3Oth  several  other  illuminating  messages  were  for 
warded  to  Mr.  Seward: 

"WAR  DEPARTMENT,  June  30,  1862. 
"HoN.  WM.  H.  SEWARD,  New  York: 

"We  are  yet  without  communication  with  General  Mc 
Clellan,  and  this  absence  of  news  is  our  point  of  anxiety.  Up 
to  the  latest  point  to  which  we  are  posted  he  effected  every 
thing  in  such  exact  accordance  with  his  plan,  contingently 
announced  to  us  before  the  battle  began,  that  we  feel  justified 
to  hope  that  he  has  not  failed  since.  He  had  a  severe  engage 
ment  in  getting  the  part  of  his  army  on  this  side  of  the  Chicka- 
hominy  over  to  the  other  side,  in  which  the  enemy  lost  cer 
tainly  as  much  as  we  did.  We  are  not  dissatisfied  with  this, 
only  that  the  loss  of  enemies  does  not  compensate  for  the  loss 
of  friends.  The  enemy  cannot  come  below  White  House; 
certainly  is  not  there  now,  and  probably  has  abandoned  the 
whole  line.  Dix's  pickets  are  at  New  Kent  Court-House. 

"A.  LINCOLN." 

"WAR  DEPARTMENT,  June  30,  1862. 
"HoN.  WM.  H.  SEWARD,  Astor  House,  New  York: 

"General  McClellan's  line  is  established  at  Turkey  Island, 
on  the  James  River.  Our  gunboats  are  there.  Nothing  disas 
trous  has  happened  to  him  since  communication  was  broken 
off.  The  whole  movement  appears  to  be  successful  so  far 
as  we  can  judge,  but  it  seems  as  if  he  meant  to  begin  in 
trenching. 

"EDWIN  M.  STANTON, 

"Secretary  of  War." 

7  Official  Record,  XI,  in,  274. 


McCLELLAN  251 

''WAR  DEPARTMENT,  June  30,  1862, — 7  p.  M. 
"HoN.  WM.  H.  SEWARD,  Astor  House,  New  York : 

"We  have  received  nothing  of  consequence  since  my  last 
message  stating  that  General  McClellan's  communication  with 
the  gunboats  was  established.  His  depot  on  the  James  River 
is  at  Turkey  Island  Point.  Stoneman's  and  Casey's  forces  are 
on  the  way  to  join  him  from  Fort  Monroe.  Without  losing  a 
man,  they  were  the  last  to  leave  White  House.  The  enemy 
have  not  advanced  beyond  White  House.  Halleck  promises 
to  send  the  force  asked  from  him,  and  I  have  sent  Tucker  to 
Corinth  to  arrange  the  transportation.  We  have  news  from 
Vicksburg.  Farragut  and  Ellet's  ram  fleet  are  there,  acting 
together.  The  Mississippi  is  clear  from  Memphis  to  Vicks 
burg,  and  we  shall  soon  have  that.  Goldsborough  gives  a 
report  that  Stonewall  Jackson  was  killed  Friday.  Pope  is 
hard  at  work  organizing  his  force.  Sigel  takes  Fremont's 
corps  instead  of  King,  who  preferred  to  keep  command  of 
his  own  division.  You  shall  have  all  the  reliable  news  as  fast 
as  it  comes.  Dix  is  at  work  to  establish  a  new  telegraph  line 
between  him  and  McClellan.  Everything  is  moving  briskly 
and  favorably.  If  the  governors  will  give  us  promptly  100,- 
ooo  men,  the  war  will  be  over.  Mark  the  hour  your  tele 
grams  are  sent. 

"EDWIN  M.  STANTON, 

"Secretary  of  War."  8 

On  the  3Oth  a  dispatch  was  sent  to  General  Wool  also,  in 
these  words: 

"WAR  DEPARTMENT,  Washington  City, 

"June  30,  1862. 
"MAJOR-GENERAL  WOOL: 

"McClellan  has  moved  his  whole  force  across  the  Chicka- 
hominy  and  rests  on  James  River,  being  supported  by  our 
gunboats.  The  position  is  favorable,  and  looks  more  like  tak- 

*  Ibid.,  276,  277. 


252  McCLELLAN 

ing  Richmond  than  any  time  before.     I  will  send  you  some 
service  money. 

"EDWIN  M.  STANTON, 

"Secretary  of  War."9 

This  was  a  very  busy  day  at  the  army  headquarters  in 
Washington,  for  repeated  communications  passed  between 
the  President  and  the  Secretary  on  one  hand  and  General 
Dix  on  the  other,  in  the  course  of  which  the  general  said, 
"We  have  no  doubt  that  McClellan  intended  to  abandon  the 
White  House."  10 

In  the  first  recognition  of  the  peril  in  which  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  stood,  and,  above  all,  of  the  peril  to  Washington 
which  would  surely  follow  the  army's  destruction,  Stanton 
wired  Halleck  at  Corinth  on  June  the  28th : 

"WAR  DEPARTMENT,  June  28th,  1862. 
"MAJOR-GENERAL  HALLECK,  Corinth: 

"The  enemy  have  concentrated  in  such  force  at  Richmond 
as  to  render  it  absolutely  necessary,  in  the  opinion  of  the 
President,  for  you  immediately  to  detach  25,000  of  your  force 
and  forward  it  by  the  nearest  and  quickest  route,  by  way  of 
Baltimore  and  Washington,  to  Richmond.  (It  is  believed 
that  the  quickest  route  would  be  by  way  of  Columbus,  Ky., 
and  up  the  Ohio  River.  But  in  detaching  your  force  the 
President  directs  that  it  be  done  in  such  way  as  to  enable 
you  to  hold  your  ground  and  not  interfere  with  the  movement 
against  Chattanooga  and  East  Tennessee.  This  condition 
being  observed,  the  forces  to  be  detached  and  the  route  they 
are  to  be  sent  is  left  to  your  own  judgment.) 

"The  direction  to  send  these  forces  immediately  is  rendered 
imperative  by  a  serious  reverse  suffered  by  General  McClel 
lan  before  Richmond  yesterday,  the  full  extent  of  which  is 
not  yet  known. 

"You  will  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  this  dispatch,  stating 
the  day  and  hour  it  is  received,  and  inform  me  what  your 

9  Official  Record,  XI,  in,  277. 
rf.,  278. 


M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  N  253 

action  will  be,  so  that  we  may  take  measures  to  aid  in  river 
and  railroad  transportation. 

"EDWIN  M.  STANTON, 

"Secretary  of  War."  n 

But  on  the  3Oth  the  President's  (or  the  Secretary's)  mind 
was  to  some  extent  relieved,  and  another  despatch  to  Halleck 
contained  only  a  request,  to  which  the  reply  was  predestined 
from  the  very  form  of  the  request  to  be  a  negative. 

"WASHINGTON,  D.  C., 

"June  30,    1862. 
"MAJOR-GENERAL  HALLECK, 

"Corinth,  Miss. : 

"Would  be  very  glad  of  25,000  infantry;  no  artillery  or 
cavalry;  but  please  do  not  send  a  man  if  it  endangers  any 
place  you  deem  important  to  hold,  or  if  it  forces  you  to  give  up 
or  weaken  or  delay  the  expectations  against  Chattanooga.  To 
take  and  hold  the  railroad  at  or  east  of  Cleveland,  in  East 
Tennessee,  I  think  fully  as  important  as  the  taking  and  holding 
of  Richmond. 

"A.  LINCOLN."  12 

The  method  of  avoiding  the  request  is  pointed  out  in  the 
request  itself,  and  Halleck  avails  himself  of  it  by  assenting 
cheerfully,  but  pointing  out  the  long  delay  necessary  to  get  the 
troops  to  Washington  and  the  inevitable  abandonment  or  cur 
tailment  of  the  Chattanooga  expedition.  Whereupon  at  3 
p.  M.  comes  the  swift  injunction  that  the  expedition  must  on 
no  account  be  given  up,  adding:  "The  first  reports  from 
Richmond  were  more  discouraging  than  the  truth  warranted. 
If  the  advantage  is  not  on  our  side,  it  is  balanced.  General 
McClellan  has  moved  his  whole  force  onto  the  line  of  the 
James  and  is  supported  by  our  gunboats.  But  he  must  be 
largely  strengthened  before  advancing,  and  hence  the  call 
on  you,  which  I  am  glad  you  have  answered  so  promptly. 
Let  me  know  to  what  point  on  the  river  you  will  send  your 

11  Ibid.,  271. 
13  Ibid.,  279. 


254  McCLELLAN 

forces,  so  as  to  provide  immediately  for  transportation."  1S 
Of  course  upon  such  a  mandate  the  troops  never  came. 

On  the  30th  of  June  and  on  the  ist  of  July  McClellan  sent 

in  urgent  appeals  for  reinforcement. 

On  the  ist  of  July  came  this  cordial  answer  from  Mr. 

Stanton : 

"WAR  DEPARTMENT,  Washington,  D.  C, 

"July  i,  1862. 
"MAJOR-GENERAL  MCCLELLAN  : 

"Your  telegram  of  last  night  has  been  received,  and  will 
be  answered  by  the  President.  We  have  sent  you  5,000  from 
McDowell's  corps  since  Saturday  that  have  reached  Fort  Mon 
roe  already,  and  I  hope  will  be  of  use  to  you.  Halleck  has 
been  ordered  to  send  a  corps  of  his  army,  25,000  infantry,  and 
answered  that  he  will  do  so.  Tucker  is  on  the  road  to  Corinth 
to  arrange  the  transportation.  I  hope  to  have  them  with  you 
within  two  weeks.  Hold  your  ground  and  you  will  be  in 
Richmond  before  the  month  is  over. 

"EDWIN  M.  STANTON, 

"Secretary  of  War."  14 

The  exhaustion  of  the  soldiers  was  absolute.  There  was 
barely  an  atom  of  vitality  left  in  them,  because  of  the  sleepless 
labor  and  fighting  of  that  terrible  week,  and  their  leader  was 
hardly  less  overcome.  His  tireless,  sleepless  work  in  transfer 
ring  his  army  and  his  anxiety  for  its  safety  because  of  its  con 
dition  brought  him  to  the  verge  of  a  collapse,  as  his  dispatches 
of  the  3Oth  of  June  and  the  ist  of  July  clearly  show.  Oh 
for  a  few  thousand  fresh  men  to  relieve  his  weary  men !  Oh 
for  50,000  men  with  which  to  destroy  that  great  horde  of 
foes! 


13  Official  Record,  XI,  in,  279,  280. 
"/«(*.,  281. 


CHAPTER    XLVII 

WAS  A  DASH   ON   RICHMOND   FEASIBLE? 

That  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  should  have  been  en 
camped  for  over  five  weeks  within  a  few  miles  of  Richmond 
in  May  and  June,  1862,  and  should  never  have  assaulted  it 
creates  a  sense  of  mortification  which,  with  many  who  have 
not  sufficiently  ascertained  and  considered  the  facts,  easily 
merges  into  dissatisfaction  and  adverse  criticism.  This  is 
especially  true  of  those  who  fancy  that  the  fighters  of  Lee, 
instead  of  being  30,000  more  than  those  of  McClellan,  were 
30,000  less. 

Under  favorable  conditions,  so  great  was  his  reliance  upon 
his  artillery  in  equalizing  forces  that  he  would  have  struck 
very  quickly  after  the  army  was  assembled  before  Richmond. 
But  as  Napoleon  waited  five  hours  at  Waterloo  for  the  ground 
to  harden,  so  McClellan  waited  five  weeks  in  vain  on  the 
Chickahominy  for  the  earth  to  get  hard  enough  for  him  to 
maneuver  his  guns.  No  complaint  is  made  that  he  did  not 
attack  at  this  time,  when  the  whole  Confederate  army  stood 
between  him  and  the  prize.  But  when  his  right  wing  was 
attacked  at  Beaver  Dam  and  Gaines's  Mill,  it  is  thought  by 
some, — upon  the  supposition  that  the  great  mass  of  the  rebel 
troops  were  beyond  the  Chickahominy  from  Richmond  and 
that  "only  a  thin  veil  of  troops"  intervened  between  the  Fed 
eral  left  wing  and  the  Capital  City  of  the  enemy, — that  ad 
vantage  should  then  have  been  taken  of  such  an  opportunity 
and  that  while  Porter  sturdily  held  the  attacking  forces  at  bay 
the  other  corps  of  the  Union  army  should  have  rushed  into 
Richmond.  Color  is  given  to  this  view  by  the  outright  state 
ment  of  General  D.  H.  Hill  that  this  enterprise  could  easily 
have  been  carried  out.  But  there  is  very  weighty  conflicting 
evidence.  General  Johnston,  adverting  to  Mr.  Davis' s  claim 

255 


256  McCLELLAN 

that  a  similar  project  was  on  foot  in  the  latter  part  of  May, 
1862,  says  of  it:  "It  is  certain  that  General  Lee  could  have 
had  no  such  hopes  from  this  plan,  nor  have  been  a  party  to 
it ;  for  it  would  not  only  have  sent  our  army  where  there  was 
no  enemy,  but  left  open  the  way  to  Richmond.  For  the  Mead 
ow  Bridge  is  two  and  a  half  miles  from  Mechanicsville,  and 
that  place  about  six  miles  above  the  Federal  right.  ...  So 
after  two-thirds  of  our  troops  had  crossed  the  Chickahominy, 
the  Federal  army  could  have  marched  straight  to  Richmond 
opposed  by  not  more  than  one-fifth  of  its  number  in  Magru- 
der's  and  D.  H.  Hill's  divisions.  This  plan  is  probably  the 
wildest  on  record."  1  Certainly  a  plan  which  would  have 
left  the  way  open  to  Richmond  would  have  seemed  as  wild 
a  few  weeks  later  as  it  did  then. 

Moreover,  the  circumstantial  evidence  in  the  case  is 
heavily  against  "the  thin  veil."  Heintzelman,  Sumner,  Frank 
lin,  and  Keyes  were  so  sure  that  the  enemy  confronted  them 
in  strong  force  that  they  were  loath  to  part  with  any  troops 
to  aid  Porter.  Again,  taking  General  D.  H.  Hill's  statement 
that  there  were  50,000  Confederates  engaged  in  the  attack 
on  the  Union  right  wing,  that  would  leave  more  than  76,000, 
according  to  General  J.  E.  Johnston,  between  the  Federals  and 
Richmond;  and  upon  every  estimate  it  is  clear  that  at  least 
half  of  the  rebel  host  was  there. 

In  such  a  problem  prudence  demands  that  the  most  un 
favorable  estimate  should  be  assumed  to  be  correct. 

On  the  score  of  numbers  solely,  then,  the  circumstances 
did  not  approve  or  justify  an  assault,  but  many  have  con 
demned  the  wisdom  of  such  an  attempt  even  upon  the  hypothe 
sis  that  Keyes,  Sumner,  Heintzelman,  and  Franklin  could 
have  readily  overpowered  the  force  confronting  them.  Let 
us  first,  however,  hear  from  McClellan  himself,  speaking  of 
June  the  27th,  the  date  of  the  fierce  struggle  at  Gaines's 
Mill: 

"Had  the  First  corps  effected  its  promised  junction,  we 
might  have  turned  the  head-waters  of  the  Chickahominy  and 
attacked  Richmond  from  the  north  and  northwest,  while  we 

1  Battles  and  Leaders,  II,  210. 


M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  N  257 

preserved  our  line  of  supply  from  West  Point;  but  with  the 
force  actually  at  my  disposal  such  an  attempt  would  simply 
have  exposed  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  destruction  in  de 
tail,  and  the  total  loss  of  its  communications.  It  is  hardly 
necessary  to  say  that  the  country  in  which  we  operated  could 
supply  nothing  for  the  wants  of  the  army,  and  that  were  our 
communications  with  the  depots  cut  and  held  by  the  enemy 
nothing  but  starvation  awaited  us.''  ~  "I  concurred  fully  with 
the  President  in  his  injunction,  contained  in  his  telegram  of  the 
24th,  that  it  was  necessary,  with  my  limited  force,  to  move 
cautiously  and  safely." 

"As  the  entrenchments  around  Richmond  were  strong  and 
heavily  garrisoned,  it  would  have  been  an  act  of  madness  and 
folly  had  I  temporarily  abandoned  my  communications  and 
thrown  the  entire  army  across  the  stream,  trusting  to  the 
chances  of  carrying  the  place  by  assault  before  the  troops 
had  exhausted  the  supplies  carried  with  them."  3 

The  Comte  de  Paris  stoutly  rejects  the  wisdom  of  the 
enterprise,  upon  the  ground  that,  assuming  its  immediate  suc 
cess,  it  offered  "no  tangible  and  lasting  advantage.  McClellan 
would  have  been  besieged  and  lost  his  base  on  the  James/' 4 
There  is  no  suggestion  of  favorable  opportunity  to  be  found  in 
the  writings  of  the  Southern  historians,  Eggleston,  Pollard,  or 
Davis.  Franklin  warmly  defends  McClellan's  prudence  in  not 
venturing  upon  the  assault.  Yet  Franklin  did  not  know  the 
obstacles  to  success  as  well  as  we  do;  and  he  supposed  when 
he  wrote  that  the  intervening  force  was  not  as  formidable 
as  it  had  seemed  to  be,  and  as  it  really  was. 

"Prudence  would  not  allow  the  venture,"  argues  Franklin.5 
General  Averill  too  condemns  it.6  Mr.  Rhodes  declares 
against  the  wisdom  of  such  an  attack.7  "Nothing  would  have 
pleased  Lee  and  Davis  more."  8 

a  McClellan,  Own  Story,  362,  363. 

'Ibid.,  364. 

*  Civil  War  in  America,  II,  105. 

ft  Ibid.,  382. 

9  Ibid.,  431. 

T  History  of  the  United  States,  IV,  33- 

8  Ibid. 


258  McCLELLAN 

The  official  report  of  Allan  Pinkerton,  chief  of  the  secret 
service  bureau  of  the  government,  showed  125,000  men  at  this 
time  between  the  Union  army  and  Richmond.9  Prudence  de 
manded  that  McClellan  should  assume  this  report  to  be  true, 
even  though  it  seemed  to  him  exaggerated.  Mr.  Moore  as 
serts  that  "with  the  right  wing  unprotected,  and  powerful  and 
well  defended  fortifications  before  them,  McClellan  and  his 
corps  commanders  knew  that  an  assault  upon  Richmond  could 
not  fail  to  be  disastrous."  10  Mr.  Tenney  considers  the  ques 
tion  fully  and  presents  the  arguments  against  such  an  assault 
very  cogently.  "McClellan  was  in  no  condition  to  risk  any 
thing.  He  had  fought  the  enemy  in  equal  or  superior  numbers 
[at  Fair  Oaks]  and  they  had  retired  in  confusion.  If  the 
corps  of  McDowell  were  on  hand  now,  he  might  have  taken 
Richmond,  but  without  it  the  commanding  general  was  not 
strong  enough  to  risk  an  immediate  assault."  n  He  further 
argues  that  prudence  forbade  the  attempt,  and  that  even  if  it 
had  been  successful,  disaster  would  have  swiftly  followed 
the  apparent  advantage.  As  to  an  attack  after  Fair  Oaks, 
McClellan,  having  shown  the  reoccupation  of  the  ground 
from  which  Keyes's  troops  were  first  driven,  adds : 

"Our  troops  pushed  forward  as  far  as  the  lines  held  by 
them  on  the  3ist  before  the  attarck.  On  the  battlefield  there 
were  found  many  of  our  own  and  the  Confederate  wounded, 
arms,  caissons,  wagons,  subsistence  stores,  and  forage,  aban 
doned  by  the  enemy  in  his  rout.  The  state  of  the  roads  and 
impossibility  of  manoeuvring  artillery  prevented  further  pur 
suit.  On  the  next  morning  a  reconnoissance  was  sent  for 
ward,  which  pressed  back  the  pickets  of  the  enemy  to  within 
five  miles  of  Richmond ;  but  again  the  impossibility  of  forcing 
even  a  few  batteries  forward  precluded  our  holding  perma 
nently  this  position.  The  lines  held  previous  to  the  battle 
were  therefore  resumed.  .  .  . 

"The  only  available  means,  therefore,  of  uniting  our  forces 
at  Fair  Oaks  for  an  advance  on  Richmond  soon  after  the 


"Webb,  The  Peninsula,  188. 

10  History  of  the  Great  Rebellion,  168. 

11  Military  and  Naval  History  of  the  Rebellion,  244. 


McCLELLAN  259 

battle  was  to  march  the  troops  from  Mechanicsville  and  other 
points  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Chickahominy,  down  to  Bot 
tom's  bridge,  and  thence  over  the  Williamsburg  road  to  the 
position  near  Fair  Oaks,  a  distance  of  about  twenty-three 
miles.  In  the  condition  of  the  roads  at  that  time  this  march 
could  not  have  been  made  with  artillery  in  less  than  two 
days,  by  which  time  the  enemy  would  have  been  secure  within 
his  entrenchments  around  Richmond.  In  short,  the  idea  of 
uniting  the  two  wings  of  the  army  in  time  to  make  a  vigorous 
pursuit  of  the  enemy,  with  the  prospect  of  overtaking  him 
before  he  reached  Richmond,  only  five  miles  distant  from  the 
field  of  battle,  is  simply  absurd,  and  was,  I  presume,  never 
for  a  moment  seriously  entertained  by  any  one  connected  with 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  An  advance  involving  the  separa 
tion  of  the  two  wings  by  the  impassable  Chickahominy  would 
have  exposed  each  to  defeat  in  detail.  Therefore  I  held  the 
position  already  gained,  and  completed  our  crossings  as  rap 
idly  as  possible."  12 

As  to  the  feasibility  of  an  assault,  General  Porter  is  an 
adverse  witness :  "It  was  apparent  to  both  generals  that  Rich 
mond  could  only  be  taken  in  one  of  two  ways :  by  regular 
approaches,  or  by  assault.  An  assault  would  require  superior 
forces,  supported  by  ample  reserves.  It  was  equally  ap 
parent  that  an  attack  could  readily  be  made  from  Richmond, 
because  that  city's  well  armed  and  manned  intrenchments 
would  permit  its  defense  by  a  small  number  of  men,  while 
large  forces  could  be  concentrated  and  detached  for  of 
fensive  operations."  13 

Colonel  Powell's  argument  seems  conclusive :  "Richmond 
could  only  be  captured  by  regular  approaches  or  by  direct 
assault.  Regular  approaches  required  time  and  a  well  secured 
base  of  supplies.  An  assault  required  superior  forces  and 
ample  reserves.  The  Army  of  the  Potomac,  depleted  by 
casualty  and  sickness,  with  reinforcements  withheld  and 
promises  unfulfilled,  was  lacking  in  the  essentials  for  either 

13  McClellan,  Own  Story,  384,  385. 
**  Battles  and  Leaders,  II,  324. 


260  McCLELLAN 

course."  14  "Under  the  circumstances,  as  no  aid  could  be 
expected  and  the  right  wing  was  in  danger  of  being  crushed, 
to  have  ordered  to  the  assault  of  Richmond  troops  commanded 
by  those  who  were  apprehensive  of  their  ability  to  defend  their 
own  intrenchments  was  impossible."  15 

It  is  obvious  from  all  these  capable  witnesses,  and  from 
the  facts  made  known  to  us  by  them,  that  it  would  have 
been  imprudent  and  even  foolhardy,  considering  everything, 
to  have  essayed  an  attack  on  Richmond  at  that  time.  If  the 
rains  had  stopped  and  the  ground  become  fit  to  give  him  the 
full  use  of  his  artillery,  the  case  would  have  been  far  different. 

"Fifth  Army  Corps,  74. 
"Ibid.,  125. 


CHAPTER    XLVIII 

THE    FATAL    LETTER 

An  ill-considered  and  indiscreet  expression  of  opinion 
may  sometimes  ruin  a  career  which  would  otherwise  reach 
the  highest  eminence. 

It  is  claimed  that  all  the  ambitions  of  Daniel  Webster  were 
blasted  by  a  single  speech  made  on  the  ninth  of  March,  1850; 
that  the  result  of  that  single  effort,  in  the  tense  state  of  public 
feeling,  was  to  shut  out  all  the  glorious  prospect  which  lay 
before  him. 

The  impression  is  widespread  that  it  was  without  any 
previous  intimation  of  his  intention  that  General  McClellan, 
on  the  occasion  of  the  President's  visit  to  his  army  on  July 
8th,  1862,  handed  him  the  letter  which  I  shall  now  discuss. 
The  General  says :  "He  read  it  in  my  presence,  but  made 
no  comments  upon  it,  merely  saying,  when  he  had  finished  it, 
that  he  was  obliged  to  me  for  it  or  words  to  that  effect.  I  do 
not  think  that  he  alluded  further  to  it  during  his  visit  or  at 
any  time  after  that."  1  Many  praise  the  indulgence  and  for 
bearance  of  Mr.  Lincoln  in  submitting,  as  they  view  it,  to 
an  act  of  inexcusable  intermeddling  without  a  word  of  re 
proof.  But  the  absence  of  rebuke  does  not  seem  so  remark 
able  when  we  know  that  the  letter  was  presented  to  the  Presi 
dent  upon  his  invitation. 

On  the  2Oth  of  June,  in  a  despatch  to  the  President,  Gen 
eral  McClellan  inserted  this  suggestion :  "I  would  be  glad 
to  have  permission  to  lay  before  your  Excellency,  by  letter  or 
telegraph,  my  views  as  to  the  present  state  of  military  affairs 
throughout  the  whole  country."  2  On  the  evening  of  the 
2 ist  of  June  the  President  responded :  "If  it  would  not  divert 

1  McClellan,  Own  Story,  487. 
*  Official  Record,  XI,  i,  48. 

261 


262  McCLELLAN 

too  much  of  your  time  and  attention  from  the  army  under 
your  immediate  command,  I  would  be  glad  to  have  your 
views  as  to  the  present  state  of  military  affairs  throughout 
the  whole  country,  as  you  say  you  would  be  glad  to  give 
them."  3 

Until  the  army  was  installed  in  safety  on  the  James  there 
was  no  time  to  give  to  the  contemplated  purpose,  but  at  his 
first  leisure  McClellan  prepared  the  famous  document  and 
delivered  it  to  Mr.  Lincoln. 

Mr.  Pollard,  the  author  of  The  Lost  Cause,  believes  that 
McClellan's  letter  "must  forever  remain  a  monument  of 
honor  to  his  name."  4  "The  text  of  the  letter  deserves  to  be 
carefully  studied  as  the  exposition  of  the  declarations  of  a 
party  in  the  North  that  was  for  limiting  the  objects  of  war  to 
its  original  declaration  and  conducting  it  on  humane  and 
honorable  principles." 

The  text  of  the  letter  follows : 

"HEADQUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 
"CAMP  NEAR  HARRISON'S  LANDING,  VA., 

"July  7,  1862. 
"MR.  PRESIDENT: 

"You  have  been  fully  informed  that  the  rebel  army  is  in 
the  front,  with  the  purpose  of  overwhelming  us  by  attacking 
our  positions  or  reducing  us  by  blocking  our  river  commu 
nications.  I  cannot  but  regard  our  condition  as  critical,  and 
I  earnestly  desire,  in  view  of  possible  contingencies,  to  lay 
before  your  Excellency,  for  your  private  consideration,  my 
general  views  concerning  the  existing  state  of  the  rebellion, 
although  they  do  not  strictly  relate  to  the  situation  of  this 
army  or  strictly  come  within  the  scope  of  my  official  duties. 
These  views  amount  to  convictions,  and  are  deeply  impressed 
upon  my  mind  and  heart.  Our  course  must  never  be 
abandoned;  it  is  the  cause  of  free  institutions  and  self-gov 
ernment.  The  constitution  and  the  union  must  be  preserved, 
whatever  may  be  the  cost  in  time,  treasure,  and  blood.  If 

8  Official  Record,  XI,  i,  48. 
'298. 


McCLELLAN  263 

secession  is  successful,  other  dissolutions  are  clearly  to  be  seen 
in  the  future.  Let  neither  military  disaster,  political  faction, 
nor  foreign  war  shake  your  settled  purpose  to  enforce  the 
equal  operation  of  the  laws  of  the  United  States  upon  the 
people  of  every  state. 

"The  time  has  come  when  the  government  must  determine 
upon  a  civil  and  military  policy  covering  the  whole  ground 
of  our  national  trouble. 

"The  responsibility  of  determining,  declaring,  and  sup 
porting  such  civil  and  military  policy,  and  of  directing  the 
whole  course  of  national  affairs  in  regard  to  the  rebellion, 
must  now  be  assumed  and  exercised  by  you,  or  our  cause  will 
be  lost.  The  constitution  gives  you  power  sufficient  even  for 
the  present  terrible  exigency. 

"This  rebellion  has  assumed  the  character  of  war;  as 
such  it  should  be  regarded,  and  it  should  be  conducted  upon 
the  highest  principles  known  to  Christian  civilization.  It 
should  not  be  a  war  looking  to  the  subjugation  of  the  people 
of  any  state  in  any  event.  It  should  not  be  at  all  a  war  upon 
population,  but  against  armed  forces  and  political  organiza 
tions.  Neither  confiscation  of  property,  political  execution 
of  persons,  territorial  organization  of  states,  or  forcible  aboli 
tion  of  slavery  should  be  contemplated  for  a  moment.  In 
prosecuting  the  war  all  private  property  and  unarmed  persons 
should  be  strictly  protected,  subject  only  to  the  necessity  of 
military  operations.  All  private  property  taken  for  military 
use  should  be  paid  or  receipted  for ;  pillage  and  waste  should 
be  treated  as  high  crimes ;  all  unnecessary  trespass  sternly  pro 
hibited,  and  offensive  demeanor  by  the  military  towards  citi 
zens  promptly  rebuked.  Military  arrests  should  not  be  tol 
erated,  except  in  places  where  active  hostilities  exist,  and 
oaths  not  required  by  enactments  constitutionally  made  should 
be  neither  demanded  nor  received.  Military  government 
should  be  confined  to  the  preservation  of  public  order  and 
the  protection  of  political  rights.  Military  power  should 
not  be  allowed  to  interfere  with  the  relations  of  servitude, 
either  by  supporting  or  impairing  the  authority  of  the  master, 
except  for  repressing  disorder,  as  in  other  cases.  Slaves  con- 


264  McCLELLAN 

traband  under  the  act  of  Congress,  seeking  military  protec 
tion,  should  receive  it.  The  right  of  the  government  to  ap 
propriate  permanently  to  its  own  service  claims  to  slave  labor 
should  be  asserted,  and  the  right  of  the  owner  to  compensa 
tion  therefor  should  be  recognized. 

"This  principle  might  be  extended,  upon  grounds  of  mili 
tary  necessity  and  security,  to  all  the  slaves  within  a  par 
ticular  state,  thus  working  manumission  in  such  state;  and 
in  Missouri,  perhaps  in  Western  Virginia  also,  and  possibly 
even  in  Maryland,  the  expediency  of  such  a  measure  is  only 
a  question  of  time. 

"A  system  of  policy  thus  constitutional  and  conservative, 
and  pervaded  by  the  influences  of  Christianity  and  freedom, 
would  receive  the  support  of  almost  all  truly  loyal  men,  would 
deeply  impress  the  rebel  masses  and  all  foreign  nations,  and 
it  might  be  humbly  hoped  that  it  would  commend  itself  to 
the  favor  of  the  Almighty. 

"Unless  the  principles  governing  the  future  conduct  of 
our  struggle  shall  be  made  known  and  approved,  the  effort 
to  obtain  requisite  forces  will  be  almost  hopeless.  A  declara 
tion  of  radical  views,  especially  upon  slavery,  will  rapidly 
disintegrate  our  present  armies.  The  policy  of  the  govern 
ment  must  be  supported  by  concentrations  of  military  power. 
The  national  forces  should  not  be  dispersed  in  expeditions, 
posts  of  occupation,  and  numerous  armies,  but  should  be 
mainly  collected  into  masses  and  brought  to  bear  upon  the 
armies  of  the  Confederate  States.  Those  armies  thoroughly 
defeated,  the  political  structure  which  they  support  would 
soon  cease  to  exist. 

"In  carrying  out  any  system  of  policy  which  you  may 
form,  you  will  require  a  commander-in-chief  of  the  army, 
one  who  possesses  your  confidence,  understands  your  views, 
and  who  is  competent  to  execute  your  orders  by  directing 
the  military  forces  of  the  nation  to  the  accomplishment  of 
the  objects  by  you  proposed.  I  do  not  ask  that  place  for  my 
self.  I  am  willing  to  serve  you  in  such  position  as  you  may 
assign  me,  and  I  will  do  so  as  faithfully  as  ever  subordinate 
served  superior. 


McCLELLAN  265 

"I  may  be  on  the  brink  of  eternity;  and  as  I  hope  for 
giveness  from  my  Maker,  I  have  written  this  letter  with 
sincerity  towards  you  and  from  love  for  my  country. 

"Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"CEO.    B.    McCLELLAN, 

"Maj.-Gen.  Commanding."  5 

It  seems  to  me  that  any  one  must  be  saturated  with  par 
tisan  prejudice  who  can  read  that  letter  without  admiration 
for  its  author.  It  reveals  a  very  high  degree  of  literary 
capacity.  It  is  distinguished  because  of  its  force  of  ex 
pression,  its  accuracy  of  diction,  and  its  precision  of  state 
ment,  while  the  views  set  forth  are  wise  and  commendable. 

His  protest  against  the  confiscation  of  property  and  the 
territorial  organization  of  states  seems  prophetic  of  the  dark 
days  of  reconstruction. 

His  views  of  waging  war  are  those  of  a  soldier, — of  a 
soldier  who  is  at  the  same  time  a  gentleman,  not  a  savage. 
The  military  policy  urged  is  the  very  opposite  of  the  puerile 
one  which  the  government  had  been  following.  "The  policy 
of  the  government  must  be  supported  by  concentrations  of 
military  power.  The  National  forces  should  not  be  dis 
persed  in  expeditions,  posts  of  occupation,  and  numerous 
armies,  but  should  mainly  be  collected  into  masses,  and 
brought  to  bear  upon  the  armies  of  the  Confederate  States." 

He  asserts  the  necessity  of  a  competent  general-in-chief. 

The  soundness  and  the  sagacity  of  all  these  views  but  one 
received  a  little  later  a  practical  approval  by  adoption  on  the 
part  of  the  government,  and  that  one  no  doubt  would  have 
been  likewise  adopted,  if  no  partisan  interest  had  barred  the 
way. 

But  by  far  the  most  important  feature  of  this  letter  is 
the  suggestion  of  the  manumission  of  slaves  in  a  state,  on 
the  ground  of  military  necessity.  Here,  it  may  well  be 
claimed,  was  the  seed  which,  implanted  in  the  minds  of  Mr. 
Stanton  and  Mr.  Lincoln,  blossomed  into  general  emancipa 
tion  on  the  ground  of  military  necessity;  for  until  about  this 
time  Mr.  Lincoln  was  firmly  of  the  opinion  that  emancipa- 
0  Official  Record,  XI,  in,  73. 


266  McCLELLAN 

tion  was  unconstitutional,  and  shortly  after  this  time, — in 
September,  1862, — he  stoutly  defended  his  power  on  the 
ground  of  military  necessity.  These  coincidences  are  too  won 
derful  to  have  been  accidental. 

Mr.  Flower  insists  that  Stanton  was  the  true  father  of 
emancipation;  and  it  is  quite  possible  that,  in  studying  this 
letter  to  bring  trouble  upon  its  author,  his  astute  mind  saw 
that  a  grand  scheme  could  be  built  upon  this  doctrine  of 
military  necessity,  which  would  result  in  his  continuance  in 
power.  The  liberation  and  enfranchisement  of  the  blacks  was 
no  grand  humanitarian  project  for  the  liberation  of  a  race, 
but  merely  a  sage  device  to  retain  the  authority  for  which 
his  soul  hungered,  although,  as  an  incident,  it  involved  the 
liberation  of  a  race  from  slavery,  which  was  good,  and  also 
its  immediate  enfranchisement  without  preparation  or  capacity 
for  it,  which  was  bad.  As  another  incident,  it  involved  the 
disfranchisement  and  immeasurable  humiliation  and  degra 
dation  of  a  spirited  and  brilliant  race,  which  disfranchise 
ment  was  cruel  and  infamous,  and  will  soon  be  vehemently 
condemned  by  every  American. 

The  suggestion  that  the  conduct  of  the  war  needed  a 
general-in-chief  gave  Stanton  a  pretext  to  spread  the  report 
through  the  North  that  Halleck  had  been  appointed  at  McClel- 
lan's  request;  and  Mrs.  McClellan  evidently  wrote  to  ask 
if  advice  so  foolish  had  been  actually  given,  for  McClellan 
writes  to  his  wife  in  his  letter  of  July  27,  1862 :  "You  ask 
me  whether  I  advised  the  President  to  appoint  Halleck? 
The  letter  of  which  I  sent  you  a  copy  [the  letter  of  July 
the  7th]  is  all  that  ever  passed  on  the  subject,  either  directly 
or  indirectly;  not  another  word  more  than  is  there  was  ever 
written.  We  never  conversed  on  the  subject;  I  was  never 
informed  of  his  views  or  intentions,  and  even  now  have  not 
been  officially  informed  of  the  appointment.  I  only  know 
it  through  the  newspapers.  In  all  these  things  the  President 
and  those  around  him  have  acted  so  as  to  make  the  matter 
as  offensive  as  possible."  6  This  indicates  Stanton's  pretense 
and  how  baseless  it  was. 

'  McClellan,  Own  Story,  456. 


McCLELLAN  267 

Partisan  enemies  for  a  long  time  claimed  that  the  Harri 
son  Bar  letter  was  written  for  political  purposes,  but  more 
recent  writers  reject  this  idea  as  unworthy  of  consideration. 
The  letter  was  not  made  public  by  McClellan  until  his  report 
was  issued  in  August,  1863, — more  than  a  year  later.  What 
ever  knowledge  was  had  of  it  at  the  time  came  through  the 
President.  Mr.  Flower  in  his  life  of  Stanton  makes  no 
mention  of  it. 

The  letter,  it  will  be  seen,  had  no  influence  upon  McClel- 
lan's  fortunes.  What  befell  him  was  already  ordained — by 
Mr.  Stanton. 


CHAPTER    XLIX 

ON    THE   JAMES THE    PRIZE    AT    HAND 

The  exhaustion  of  the  army  was  indeed  complete.  Every 
atom  of  energy  had  been  wrung  out  of  it  by  the  labor  and 
fighting  of  the  preceding  week. 

Installed  in  its  quarters  at  Harrison's  Landing,  it  was 
almost  crazy  for  rest  and  in  no  fit  condition  even  to  intrench. 
And  their  commander  was  as  tired  as  the  soldiers  were;  and 
in  addition,  seeing  the  condition  of  his  men,  he  was  full  of 
anxiety  for  their  safety,  as  he  correctly  judged  that  the 
enemy,  because  of  their  greater  numbers,  could  bring  fresh 
troops  upon  him.  A  few  passages  from  his  letters  to  his 
wife  about  this  time  will  be  of  interest :  "June  30,  7  p.  M., 
Turkey  Bridge.  Well,  but  worn  out;  no  sleep  for  many 
days.  We  have  been  fighting  for  many  days,  and  are 
still  at  it.  ...  We  have  fought  every  day  for  five 
days.  .  .  ." 

"July  i,  Haxall's  Plantation.  .  .  .  The  whole  army  is 
here;  worn  out  and  war-worn,  after  a  week  of  daily  battles. 
I  have  still  very  great  confidence  in  them,  and  they  in  me. 
The  dear  fellows  cheer  me  as  of  old  as  they  march  to  certain 
death,  and  I  feel  prouder  of  them  than  ever." 

"July  2,  ...  Berkeley,  James  River.  ...  I 
have  only  energy  enough  left  to  scrawl  you  a  few  lines  to  say 
that  I  have  the  whole  army  here,  with  all  its  material  and  guns. 
We  are  all  worn  out  and  haggard.  .  .  .  My  men  need  re 
pose,  and  I  hope  will  be  allowed  to  enjoy  it  to-morrow.  Your 
poor  uncle  was  killed  at  Gaines's  Mill  on  Friday  last.  We  are 
well  but  very  tired "  1 

His  despatches  on  the  3Oth  of  June  and  on  the  ist  of 
July  reflected  his  anxiety.  What  he  felt  the  Confederates 

1  McClellan,  Own  Story,  442. 

268 


McCLELLAN  269 

could  do  he  naturally  expected  they  would  do;  but  in  his 
physical  and  mental  weariness,  which  for  the  moment 
amounted  almost  to  a  collapse,  he  did  not  put  a  proper  valua 
tion  on  his  own  skill,  nor  did  he  realize  how  thoroughly 
the  fearful  slaughter  at  Malvern  Hill  had  dampened  the 
spirit  of  the  bravest  among  the  Confederates.  During  all 
the  time  the  Union  army  remained  on  the  James  in  1862 
no  general  attack  upon  it  was  ever  made.  General  Lee  was 
not  seeking  another  Malvern  Hill.  One  was  more  than 
enough.  There  were  some  desultory  annoyances  from  de 
tachments  for  a  few  days,  some  attempts  to  harass  the  gun 
boats,  and  then  the  war  on  the  James  was  ended  for  the  space 
of  two  years. 

Rest,  freedom  from  attack,  the  realization  that  though 
they  had  received  hard  blows  they  had  given  still  harder  ones 
and  that  the  enemy,  despite  superior  strength,  wanted  no  more 
of  them,  quickly  filled  the  soldiers  with  confidence  in  their 
leader  and  themselves  and  with  eagerness  to  renew  the  combat 
as  soon  as  favorable  numbers  would  lend  hope  to  the  en 
terprise. 

On  July  the  9th  the  General  wrote  to  his  wife  referring  to 
the  President's  visit  on  July  the  8th,  of  which  we  will  speak 
later:  "He  found  the  army  anything  but  demoralized  or 
dispirited;  in  excellent  spirits."  2  On  July  the  loth  he  wrote: 
"If  properly  supported,  I  will  yet  take  Richmond.  Am  not 
in  the  least  discouraged,"  and  again  on  July  the  I3th:  "I 
flatter  myself  that  the  army  is  a  greater  thorn  in  the  side  of 
the  rebellion  than  ever,  and  I  most  certainly  (with  God's 
blessing)  intend  to  take  Richmond  with  it.  I  trust  that  we 
have  passed  through  our  darkest  time  and  that  God  will 
smile  upon  us  and  give  us  victory."  3 

In  a  letter  of  July  5th  to  Adjutant-General  Lorenzo 
Thomas, — which  meant  in  effect  to  Mr.  Stanton, — General 
McClellan  says :  "My  men  are  in  excellent  spirits.  A  short 
time  will  fully  rest  them.  .  .  .  You  may  rest  assured, 

'McClellan,  Own  Story,  446. 
9  Ibid.,  448. 


270  M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  N 

General,  that  Richmond  shall  yet  be  taken  if  I  am  properly 
supported."  4 

On  July  the  i8th  Colonel  Ingalls,  the  local  quartermaster, 
wrote  to  General  Meigs  in  Washington :  "The  army  is  a 
magnificent  one  to-day.  All  we  require  now  is  more  men 
and  generals  full  of  health  and  desire  to  go  into  Richmond. 
We  must  and  soon  can  go  forward.  The  army  must  not  go 
back  one  foot.  The  commanding  general  is  in  excellent 
health  and  full  of  confidence,  and  is  the  'pride  and  boast' 
of  his  men."  5  On  July  the  6th  General  Dix  shrewdly  wrote 
to  the  Secretary  of  War:  "The  army  occupies  a  strong  po 
sition  and  I  think  you  may  dismiss  all  apprehension  in  regard 
to  its  safety.  The  forbearance  of  the  enemy  for  five  days  is 
the  best  evidence  that  they  have  suffered  severely  and  are  in 
no  condition  to  attack."  6 

While  the  army  was  cut  off  from  communication  with 
Washington,  the  greatest  anxiety  was  felt  as  to  its  safety. 
The  urgent  calls  of  McClellan,  as  well  as  the  direct  reports 
of  the  secret  service  bureau,  informed  the  Government  of 
the  great  force  gathered  at  Richmond;  and  the  realization 
now  came  to  those  in  power  that  if  this  army  whose  fate 
was  hidden  from  them  should  be  destroyed,  the  corps  of 
McDowell,  which  they  had  kept  from  him,  would  be  no  pro 
tection.  The  victorious  Virginians  would  quickly  overwhelm 
it  and  rush  upon  the  capital,  and  when  they  found  that  the 
army  was  safe  their  relief  was  so  great  that  they  could  not 
conceal  it.  They  lauded  McClellan  and  his  men;  they  prom 
ised  troops  galore.  On  June  the  3Oth  Stanton  wired  to 
Seward  at  New  York,  "If  the  governors  will  give  us  promptly 
100,000  men,  the  war  will  be  over."  7  On  the  same  day 
he  despatched  to  General  Wool,  "The  position  is  favorable 
and  looks  more  like  taking  Richmond  than  ever."  8 

On  July  the  ist  McClellan  despatched  this  communication 
to  the  War  Department : 

*  Official  Record,  XI,  ni,  298,  299. 

5  Ibid.,  326,  327. 

6  IbM.,  304. 
*Ibid.,  277. 
*Ibid. 


McCLELLAN  271 

"HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

"HAXALL'S  PLANTATION,  July  i,  1862. 
"BRIG.-GEN.  LORENZO  THOMAS, 

"Adjutant-General  U.  S.  Army. 

"GENERAL:  My  whole  army  is  here,  with  all  its  guns 
and  material.  The  battle  of  yesterday  was  very  severe,  but 
the  enemy  was  repulsed  and  severely  punished.  After  dark 
the  troops  retired  to  this  position.  My  men  are  completely 
exhausted,  and  I  dread  the  result  if  we  are  attacked  to-day  by 
fresh  troops.  If  possible,  I  shall  retire  to-night  to  Harrison's 
Bar,  where  the  gunboats  can  render  more  aid  in  covering  our 
position.  Permit  me  to  urge  that  not  an  hour  should  be  lost 
in  sending  me  fresh  troops.  More  gunboats  are  much  needed. 

"I  hope  that  the  enemy  was  so  severely  handled  yesterday 
as  to  render  him  careful  in  his  movements  to-day.  I  now 
pray  for  time.  My  men  have  proved  themselves  equals  of 
any  troops  in  the  world,  but  they  are  worn-out.  Our  losses 
have  been  very  great.  I  doubt  whether  more  severe  battles 
have  ever  been  fought.  We  have  failed  to  win  only  because 
overpowered  by  superior  numbers. 
"Very  truly  yours, 

"CEO.   B.    McCLELLAN, 

"Major-General  Commanding."  9 

The  attitude  of  the  President  at  this  time  and  the  fact 
that  he  appreciated  the  safety  of  the  army  are  shown  in  the 
following  correspondence : 

"WASHINGTON,  July  i,  1862,  3:30  P.  M. 
"It  is  impossible  to  re-enforce  you  for  your  present  emer 
gency.  If  we  had  a  million  of  men,  we  could  not  get  them 
to  you  in  time.  We  have  not  the  men  to  send.  If  you  are 
not  strong  enough  to  face  the  enemy  you  must  find  a  place  of 
security,  and  wait,  rest,  and  repair.  Maintain  your  ground  if 
you  can,  but  save  the  army  at  all  events,  even  if  you  fall  back 
to  Fort  Monroe.  We  still  have  strength  enough  in  the  coun 
try  and  will  bring  it  out. 

"A.  LINCOLN." 

9  Official  Record,  XI,  in,  282. 


272  McCLELLAN 

On  the  2d  of  July  he  says:  "If  you  think  you  are  not 
strong  enough  to  take  Richmond  just  now,  I  do  not  ask  you 
to.  Try  just  now  to  save  the  army,  material,  and  personnel, 
and  I  will  strengthen  it  for  the  offensive  again  as  fast  as  I 
can.  The  governors  of  eighteen  States  offer  me  a  new  levy 
of  300,000,  which  I  accept"  10 

"WASHINGTON,  July  3,  1862,  3  p.  M. 
"Yours  of  5  130  yesterday  is  just  received.    I  am  satisfied 
that  yourself,  officers,  and  men  have  done  the  best  you  could. 
All  accounts  say  better  fighting  was  never  done.     Ten  thou 
sand  thanks  for  it. 

"A.  LINCOLN.11 

"MAJ.-GEN.  GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN;" 

"WASHINGTON,  July  5,  1862,  9  A.  M. 

"A  thousand  thanks  for  the  relief  your  two  dispatches,  of 
12  and  I  P.  M.  yesterday,  gave  me.  Be  assured  the  heroism 
and  skill  of  yourself  and  officers  and  men  is,  and  forever  will 
be,  appreciated. 

"If  you  can  hold  your  present  position,  we  shall  hive  the 
enemy  yet. 

"A.    LINCOLN.12 

"MAJ.-GEN.  GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN, 

"Commanding  Army  of  the  Potomac." 

The  relief  and  the  delight  of  the  Secretary  of  War  that  the 
army  was  secure  were  so  great  that  he  waxed  affectionate. 

"WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
"WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  July  5,  1862. 
"MAJ.-GEN.  GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN: 

"I  have  nominated  for  promotion  General  Sumner  as 
brevet  major-general  of  the  regular  service  and  major-gen 
eral  of  volunteers;  Generals  Heintzelman,  Keyes,  and  Porter 


"Official  Record,  XI,  i,  71. 
nlbid. 

.,  72- 


McCLELLAN  273 

as  brevet  brigadiers  in  the  regular  service  and  major-generals 
of  volunteers.  The  gallantry  of  every  officer  and  man  in 
your  noble  army  shall  be  suitably  acknowledged. 

''General  Marcy  is  here.  He  will  take  you  cheering  news. 
Be  assured  that  you  shall  have  the  support  of  this  Depart 
ment  and  the  Government  as  cordially  and  faithfully  as  was 
ever  rendered  by  man  to  man,  and  if  we  should  ever  live  to 
see  each  other  face  to  face  you  will  be  satisfied  that  you  have 
never  had  from  me  anything  but  the  most  confiding  integrity. 

"EDWIN  M.  STANTO-N, 

"Secretary  of  War."  13 

"WAR  DEPARTMENT,  WASHINGTON  CITY,  D.  C., 

"July  5,  1862. 

"DEAR  GENERAL:  I  have  had  a  talk  with  Gen.  Marcy, 
and  meant  to  have  written  you  by  him,  but  am  called  to  the 
country,  where  Mrs.  Stanton  is  with  her  children,  to  see  one 
of  them  die. 

"I  can  therefore  only  say,  my  dear  general,  in  this  brief 
moment,  that  there  is  no  cause  in  my  heart  or  conduct  for 
the  cloud  that  wicked  men  have  raised  between  us  for  their 
own  base  and  selfish  purpose.  No  man  had  ever  truer  friend 
than  I  have  been  to  you  and  shall  continue  to  be. 

"You  are  seldom  absent  from  my  thoughts,  and  I  am 
ready  to  make  any  sacrifice  to  aid  you.  Time  allows  me  to 
say  no  more  than  that  I  pray  Almighty  God  to  deliver  you 
and  your  army  from  all  peril  and  lead  you  on  to  victory. 

"Yours  truly, 

"EDWIN  M.  STANTON."  14 

Here  was  a  great  opportunity,  to  be  availed  of  diplo 
matically.  McClellan  should  have  met  the  Secretary's  pro 
fessions  of  friendship  with  assurances  of  the  deepest  satisfac 
tion,  and  of  the  most  glowing  confidence  that  the  end  of  the 
war  was  close  at  hand;  he  should  have  pointed  out  that  all 
that  was  needed  to  capture  Richmond  and  to  crush  the  rebel- 

13  Official  Record,  XI,  HI,  298. 

14  McClellan,  Own  Story,  476- 


274  McCLELLAN 

lion  before  the  month  was  over  was  his  active  cooperation  and 
support  in  reinforcing  the  army,  and  that  this  was  the  natural 
agency  through  which  the  Lord  would  operate  "to  lead  the 
army  on  to  victory." 

But  General  McClellan  was  too  magnanimous,  as  well  as 
too  innocent  of  politics,  to  dream  of  such  a  reply. 

This  was  his  response  :15 

"HEADQUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 
"CAMP  NEAR  HARRISON'S  LANDING,  VA.,  July  8,  1862. 

"Dear  Sir :  Your  letter  of  the  5th  instant  by  Gen.  Marcy 
has  made  a  deep  impression  on  my  mind.  Let  me,  in  the 
first  place,  express  my  sympathy  with  you  in  the  sickness 
of  your  child,  which  I  trust  may  not  prove  fatal. 

"I  shall  be  better  understood  by  you,  and  our  friendly 
relations  will  become  more  fixed,  if  I  am  permitted  to  recur 
briefly  to  the  past. 

"When  you  were  appointed  Secretary  of  War  I  considered 
you  my  intimate  friend  and  confidential  adviser.  Of  all  men 
in  the  nation  you  were  my  choice  for  that  position. 

"It  was  the  unquestionable  prerogative  of  the  President 
to  determine  the  military  policy  of  the  administration  and  to 
select  the  commanders  who  should  carry  out  the  measures 
of  the  government.  To  any  action  of  this  nature  I  could,  of 
course,  take  no  personal  exception. 

"But  from  the  time  you  took  office  your  official  conduct 
towards  me  as  commander-in-chief  of  the  army  of  the  United 
States,  and  afterwards  as  commander  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  was  marked  by  repeated  acts  done  in  such  manner 
as  to  be  deeply  offensive  to  my  feelings  and  calculated  to  affect 
me  injuriously  in  public  estimation. 

"After  commencing  the  present  campaign  your  concur 
rence  in  the  withholding  of  a  large  portion  of  my  force,  so 
essential  to  the  success  of  my  plans,  led  me  to  believe  that 
your  mind  was  warped  by  a  bitter  personal  prejudice  against 
me. 

"Your  letter  compels  me  to  believe  that  T  have  been  mis- 

15  McClellan,  Own  Story,  477- 


M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  N  275 

taken  in  regard  to  your  real  feelings  and  opinions,  and  that 
your  conduct,  so  unaccountable  to  my  own  fallible  judgment, 
must  have  proceeded  from  views  and  motives  which  I  did 
not  understand.  I  have  made  this  frank  statement  because  I 
thought  that  it  would  best  accord  with  the  spirit  of  your 
communication. 

"It  is  with  a  feeling  of  great  relief  that  I  now  say  to 
you  that  I  shall  at  once  resume  on  my  part  the  same  cordial 
confidence  which  once  characterized  our  intercourse. 

"You  have  more  than  once  told  me  that  together  we  could 
save  this  country.  It  is  yet  not  too  late  to  do  so. 

"To  accomplish  this  there  must  be  between  us  the  most 
entire  harmony  of  thought  and  action,  and  such  I  offer  you. 

"The  crisis  through  which  we  are  passing  is  a  terrible 
one. 

"I  have  briefly  given  in  a  confidential  letter  to  the  Presi 
dent  my  views  (please  ask  to  see  it)  as  to  the  policy  which 
ought  to  govern  this  contest  on  our  part. 

"You  and  I  during  last  summer  so  often  talked  over  the 
whole  subject  that  I  have  only  expressed  the  opinions  then 
agreed  upon  between  us. 

"The  nation  will  support  no  other  policy.  None  other  will 
call  forth  its  energies  in  time  to  save  our  cause.  For  none 
other  will  our  armies  continue  to  fight. 

"I  have  been  perfectly  frank  with  you.  Let  no  cloud 
hereafter  arise  between  us. 

"Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"GEORGE  B.   MCCLELLAN, 

"Maj.-Gen.  Commanding. 
"HON.  E.  M.  STANTON, 
"Secretary  of  War." 

In  the  first  glow  of  gratitude  for  the  safety  of  the  army 
and  the  consequent  safety  of  Washington  the  Administra 
tion  undoubtedly  intended  to  reinforce  McClellan.  While  the 
first  series  of  despatches  to  Halleck  gave  him  a  loophole  for 
refusal,  the  one  that  follows  was  unequivocal : 


276  McCLELLAN 

"WAR  DEPARTMENT, 

"July  4,  1862. 
"MAJOR-GENERAL  HALLECK,  Corinth,  Miss. : 

"You  do  not  know  how  much  you  would  oblige  us  if, 
without  abandoning  any  of  your  position  or  plans,  you  could 
promptly  send  us  even  10,000  infantry.  Can  you  not?  Some 
part  of  the  Corinth  army  is  certainly  fighting  McClellan  in 
front  of  Richmond.  Prisoners  are  in  our  hands  from  the 
late  Corinth  army. 

"A.  LINCOLN." 

The  despatch  just  given,  it  will  be  noted,  indicates  the  ex 
tent  of  the  gathering  of  forces  to  oppose  McClellan. 

On  the  same  day  came  the  following  telegram  from  Gen 
eral  Marcy: 

"WAR  DEPARTMENT,  WASHINGTON,  D.  C. 

"July  4,  1862. 
"GENERAL  MCCLELLAN, 

"Commanding  Army  of  the  Potomac : 
"I  have  seen  the  President  and  Secretary  of  War.  Ten 
thousand  men  from  Hunter,  10,000  from  Burnside,  and 
11,000  from  here  have  been  ordered  to  re-enforce  you  as  soon 
as  possible.  Halleck  has  been  urged  by  the  President  to  send 
you  at  once  10,000  men  from  Corinth. 

"The  President  and  Secretary  speak  very  kindly  of  you 
and  find  no  fault. 

"I  will  remain  here  until  I  hear  from  you. 

"R.  B.  MARCY, 

"Chief  of  Staff."  16 

Orders  were  also  sent  to  General  Burnside  at  Roanoke 
Island  and  to  General  Hunter  at  Hilton  Head  to  hasten  to 
McClellan  with  all  the  troops  they  could  bring.17 

Delighted  with  the  spirit  of  his  men,  their  trust  in  and 
affection  for  himself,  and  their  eagerness  to  meet  the  enemy 

16  McClellan,  Own  Story,  294. 
"Ibid.,  290. 


McCLELLAN  277 

on  equal  terms,  and  confident  through  the  promises  and  so 
far  through  the  acts  of  the  government  that  the  army  would 
be  strongly  reinforced  and  that  a  triumphant  close  of  the 
campaign  was  near,  on  the  4th  of  July  the  commander  issued 
this  proclamation: 

"HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

"CAMP  NEAR  HARRISON'S  LANDING,  VA., 

"July  4,  1862. 
"SOLDIERS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC: 

"Your  achievements  of  the  last  ten  days  have  illustrated 
the  valor  and  endurance  of  the  American  soldier.  Attacked 
by  vastly  superior  forces,  and  without  hope  of  re-enforce 
ments,  you  have  succeeded  in  changing  your  base  of  operations 
by  a  flank  movement,  always  regarded  as  the  most  hazardous 
of  military  expedients.  You  have  saved  all  your  material, 
all  your  trains,  and  all  your  guns,  except  a  few  lost  in  battle, 
taking  in  return  guns  and  colors  from  the  enemy.  Upon 
your  march  you  have  been  assailed  day  after  day  with  des 
perate  fury  by  men  of  the  same  race  and  nation  skillfully 
massed  and  led;  and  under  every  disadvantage  of  numbers, 
and  necessarily  of  position  also,  you  have  in  every  conflict 
beaten  back  your  foes  with  enormous  slaughter. 

"Your  conduct  ranks  you  among  the  celebrated  armies 
of  history.  No  one  will  now  question  that  each  of  you  may 
always  say  with  pride,  'I  belonged  to  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac!' 

"You  have  reached  this  new  base  complete  in  organi 
zation  and  unimpaired  in  spirit.  The  enemy  may  at  any  mo 
ment  attack  you.  We  are  prepared  to  receive  them.  I  have 
personally  established  your  lines.  Let  them  come,  and  we 
will  convert  their  repulse  into  a  final  defeat.  Your  govern 
ment  is  strengthening  you  with  the  resources  of  a  great 
people. 

"On  this  our  nation's  birthday  we  declare  to  our  foes, 
who  are  rebels  against  the  best  interests  of  mankind,  that 
this  army  shall  enter  the  capital  of  their  so-called  Confeder 
acy;  that  our  national  constitution  shall  prevail,  and  that  the 


278  M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  N 

union,  which  can  alone  insure  internal  peace  and  external 
security  to  each  state,  must  and  shall  be  preserved,  cost  what 
it  may  in  time,  treasure,  and  blood. 

"CEO.   B.    McCLELLAN, 

"Major-General  Commanding."  18 
18  McClellan,  Own  Story,  299. 


CHAPTER    L 

THE    TRUE    BASE    OF    OPERATIONS FALSE    HOPES    OF    AID 

That  the  south  bank  of  the  James  was  the  true  base  of 
operations  against  Richmond  is  no  longer  a  subject  of  debate. 
It  is  also  admitted  that  McClellan  arrived  at  this  conclusion 
very  early  in  his  study  of  the  situation  and  clung  to  it  te 
naciously  forever  afterward.  His  antagonist  General  John 
ston  recognized  the  fact,  as  we  have  seen.  General  Grant  too 
preferred  this  plan  of  advance ;  but  rinding  that  the  opposition 
to  it  was  ineradicable,  he  concluded  doubtless  that  the  full  and 
hearty  support  of  the  Government  would  more  than  offset 
all  the  objections  to  the  overland  route  by  supplying  an  army 
which,  as  he  thought,  would  crush  Lee's  force  by  the  very 
weight  of  numbers. 

It  seems  as  evident  to  a  civilian  as  to  a  military  man  that 
Richmond,  in  order  to  get  supplies  for  its  normal  population 
and  the  protecting  army,  could  not  draw  from  the  North.  It 
must  look  to  the  South  and  West;  and  therefore  its  danger 
was  from  an  army  so  located  to  the  south  of  Richmond  as  to 
be  impregnable,  and  so  close  as  to  be  able  quickly  to  intervene 
between  the  city  and  its  source  of  sustenance  and  to  spring 
upon  Richmond  at  any  instant,  if  its  garrison  was  depleted 
in  order  to  threaten  the  Federal  capital  or  to  make  an  advance 
toward  the  north  for  any  reason.  The  James,  a  broad,  navi 
gable  river,  at  this  time  in  possession  of  the  Union  war  vessels, 
supplied  such  a  base  for  operations  at  Harrison's  Bar;  and 
as  soon  as  the  army  was  safely  installed  there,  it  was  more 
to  be  dreaded  and  was  in  fact  more  dreaded  by  the  Confed 
erates  than  ever  before.  That  which  was  the  natural  and 
only  rational  course  to  take  they  expected  would  be  imme 
diately  taken;  and  as  the  actions  of  Federal  authorities  were 
well  known  to  them,  for  "everything  leaked  out,"  as  Lord 
Wolseley  assures  us,  their  alarm  increased  when  they  learned 

279 


280  M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  N 

that  measures  to  reinforce  the  army  were  promptly  being 
taken. 

At  that  lucid  moment,  grateful  for  the  preservation  of  the 
army,  the  Administration  had  no  other  thought  than  to  en 
large  the  army  with  energetic  promptness,  that  it  might  swiftly 
resume  aggressive  operations.  In  the  clearer  vision  of  that 
too  brief  period  of  sanity,  it  was  recognized  that  to  strengthen 
McClellan  was  to  protect  Washington.  Five  thousand  men 
were  sent  at  once.  Burnside  arrived  a  little  later  at  Fortress 
Monroe  and  there  halted,  awaiting  orders.  There  too  came 
Hunter,  and  between  them  about  20,000  men  would  have  been 
added  to  McClellan's  army.  But  the  simplest  and  surest  step 
open  to  them  was  not  seen  or,  if  seen,  was  rejected  from  lack 
of  courage.  It  was  this :  as  soon  as  the  safety  and  location  of 
McClellan's  army  was  ascertained  the  now  united  army  under 
General  Pope  should  have  been  rushed  to  him  in  transports 
from  Fredericksburg.  But  this  action  was  not  even  the  sub 
ject  of  discussion. 

Pope  did  not  desire  it,  for  it  would  have  lessened  his 
authority.  The  Government  desired  it  still  less,  for  it  would 
have  opened  the  way  to  Washington.  This  implies  that  Pope's 
army  barred  the  way.  There  is  a  mystifying  jugglery  as  to 
figures  that  relate  to  the  army  during  the  war.  In  a  letter  to 
General  McClellan,  dated  July  4,  1862,  General  Pope  states 
that  his  whole  army,  which  was  the  aggregation  of  several 
which  a  few  days  before  had  numbered  more  than  74,000 
men,  amounted  to  only  43,000  men.  In  this  letter  General 
Pope  says,  "If  my  command  be  embarked  and  sent  to  you 
by  James  River,  the  enemy  would  be  in  Washington  before 
it  had  half  accomplished  the  journey."  l  Of  itself,  Pope's 
force  afforded  no  obstacle  to  an  advance  of  Lee's  overwhelm 
ingly  superior  army  upon  the  national  capital.  Added  to  Mc 
Clellan's  numbers,  the  united  army  of  the  Potomac  would 
have  put  Richmond  in  such  peril  as  to  have  brought  to  it  and 
kept  in  its  vicinity  every  available  soldier  of  the  Confederacy. 
This  was  not  a  speculative  question  merely.  The  demonstra 
tion  was  being  given  day  after  day  at  that  very  time  in  the 
1  Official  Record,  XI,  in,  295. 


McCLELLAN  281 

quietude  of  the  great  Southern  army  of  Virginia,  as  all  the 
days  of  July  and  half  of  the  days  of  August  sped  away  with 
out  movement  or  action,  and  even  the  tireless  Jackson  re 
clined  upon  his  oars.  It  was  a  superb  illustration  of  over 
weening  conceit  to  assume  that  this  peaceful  condition  was  due 
to  the  interposition  of  General  Pope  and  his  army.  We  have 
the  most  irresistible  proof  to  the  contrary.  The  sole  ques 
tion,  the  paralyzing  question,  was :  What  is  McClellan  going 
to  do  next? 

The  matter  seemed  to  be  settled.  The  arrival  of  the  first 
instalment  of  fresh  troops,  the  knowledge  that  Burnside  and 
Hunter  were  coming,  and  that  by  enlistment  or  otherwise  it 
was  intended  at  last  to  give  his  army  adequate  numbers  left 
no  room  for  doubt  that  the  Administration  had  at  last  de 
termined  to  give  McClellan  the  cordial  support  which  had  been 
so  long  withheld. 

On  July  the  7th  General  Burnside  arrived  at  Fortress  Mon 
roe  from  New  Berne  with  8,000  men,  and  reported  his  pres 
ence  to  Mr.  Stanton.  On  the  same  day  the  Secretary  directed 
General  Dix,  under  whose  command  Burnside  then  was,  that 
"no  cavalry  or  other  force  should  move  from  Fort  Monroe 
until  the  President  arrives."  2  On  July  the  8th  Mr.  Lincoln 
visited  the  army.  The  detention  of  Burnside  and  the  visit  of 
the  President  evidently  came  from  the  same  inspiration.  But 
McClellan  saw  nothing  sinister  in  the  President's  call,  al 
though  he  chafed  under  the  delay.  He  certainly  had  strong 
reasons  for  feeling  assured  that  the  Government  intended  to 
assist  him,  as  far  as  its  view  of  "due  regard  to  all  other 
points"  would  permit. 

But  the  surrounding  circumstances  dispel  all  doubt  that, 
despite  appearances  and  assertions  to  the  contrary,  Stanton 
about  this  very  time  began  to  intrigue  more  actively  than 
ever  for  the  overthrow  of  McClellan.  For  a  few  days  after 
he  had  received  the  earnest  and  fervent  professions  of  the 
letters  of  July  5th,  McClellan  must  have  felt  elated  at  the 
prospect  presented  to  him;  but  as  the  days  passed  and  no 
help  came  he  must  have  become  discouraged  again. 

•Ibid.,  305. 


CHAPTER    LI 

THE    CLOUDS    GATHER THE     CONSPIRATORS    AT     WORK 

The  authorities  in  general  recognize  how  pleased  the  Ad 
ministration  was  to  discover  that  the  army  was  safe  and  that, 
apparently,  it  truly  intended  at  the  time  and  for  some  days 
later  to  reinforce  that  army  immediately;  and  that  the  Ad 
ministration  was  able  to  reinforce  it  is  equally  undoubted.  It 
is  recognized  too  that  about  the  6th  or  7th  of  July  came  a 
change  in  the  attitude  of  the  Administration,  without  any 
apparent  cause.  This  change  is  ascribed  by  some  writers  to 
the  bitter  letter  of  McClellan  to  Stanton  on  June  the  28th, 
containing  this  terrible  indictment,  "You  have  done  your  best 
to  sacrifice  this  army."  But  the  attitude  of  the  Government 
about  the  first  of  July  and  Stanton's  letter  of  July  5th  refute 
this  theory.  Others  believe  that  the  Harrison's  Bar  letter 
produced  a  coolness.  This  is  more  plausible,  and  would  tend 
strongly  to  persuade  us,  until  we  reflect  that  the  attitude  of 
the  Government  now  under  discussion  was  not  a  new  one. 
It  was  merely  a  return  to  an  old  one. 

On  a  second  thought,  a  more  mature  reflection,  doubtless 
Mr.  Stanton  became  imbued  with  the  idea  that  in  his  alarm  at 
the  supposed  peril  of  the  army  and  his  relief  and  joy  to  find 
it  safe  he  had  been  too  hasty  in  resolving  to  reinforce  it. 
What  would  this  action  probably  have  resulted  in  ?  As  he  him 
self  had  predicted,  it  would  probably  have  secured  the  cap 
ture  of  Richmond  within  the  month,  and  the  sure  and  in 
evitable  corollary  of  that  success  would  have  been  the  glorifica 
tion  of  McClellan  and  the  death  of  the  young  party  which 
the  "Autocrat  of  Rebellion,  Emancipation,  and  Reconstruc 
tion"  had  been  so  assiduously  fostering.  The  contemplated 
action  would  have  been  political  madness.  McClellan  must 

282 


McCLELLAN  283 

not  capture  Richmond!  But  after  their  outspoken  recognition 
of  the  advantages  of  the  present  situation,  their  unequivocal 
declaration  of  intent  to  hurry  troops  to  the  James,  and  the 
measures  already  taken  to  carry  out  that  intent,  how  could 
this  course  have  been  decently  departed  from?  If  we  may 
safely  conjecture  the  answer,  judging  from  the  attitude  of 
the  Government  from  that  time  on,  it  was  this :  "Delay 
action  and  let  time  determine."  The  suspension  of  Burnside's 
progress  toward  Harrison's  Landing  was  the  first  act  of  re 
newed  hostility,  but  its  purpose  was  covert  and  not  avowed ; 
and  from  this  time  on  fate  seemed  to  direct  events  entirely 
to  the  Secretary's  liking. 

On  the  loth  of  July  the  following  communication  was 
sent  to  the  President : 

"HEADQUARTERS, 

"HARRISON'S  BAR,  July  10,  1862. 
"His  EXCELLENCY  THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  : 

"Sir:  After  some  inquiry,  I  find  that  my  opinions  agree 
essentially  with  the  opinions  of  several  officers  whom  I  regard 
as  the  most  able  in  this  army,  at  the  head  of  which  is  General 
Barnard,  of  the  Engineers.  I  therefore  venture  to  address  a 
letter  to  your  Excellency. 

"The  simple  failure  of  this  army  to  reach  Richmond  has 
given  a  serious  aspect  to  our  affairs,  and  after  much  reflection 
1  have  considered  the  subject  of  first  importance  to  be  the 
position  which  this  army  ought  to  occupy  during  the  next 
two  months. 

"Can  this  army  remain  here  encamped  at  Harrison's  Bar? 

"Clearly  not,  since  the  confinement  to  a  small  space,  the 
heat,  and  sickliness  of  this  camp  would  nearly  destroy  the 
army  in  two  months,  though  no  armed  force  should  assail 
it.  Moreover,  the  enemy  being  in  possession  of  both  banks 
of  the  James  River  above  and  below  us,  he  will  shortly  find 
the  means  to  cut  us  off  from  our  supplies,  or  shut  us  up  by 
means  of  fortifications  and  his  abundant  artillery,  in  such  a 
manner  as  will  give  him  time,  ample  time,  to  capture  Wash 
ington  before  we  could  possibly  go  to  its  rescue. 


284  McCLELLAN 

"Can  this  army  leave  its  present  camp  to  go  and  attack 
Richmond  ? 

"No;  it  cannot.  To  make  this  army  strong  enough  to 
march  on  Richmond  with  any  hope  of  success,  it  must  be  re- 
enforced  by  at  least  100,000  good  troops.  No  officer  here, 
whose  opinion  is  worth  one  penny,  will  recommend  a  less 
number.  To  bring  troops  freshly  raised  at  the  North  to  this 
country  in  the  months  of  July,  August,,  and  September  would 
be  to  cast  our  resources  into  the  sea.  The  raw  troops  would 
melt  away  and  be  ruined  forever. 

"Some  of  our  officers  think  that  to  remove  this  army  to 
the  neighborhood  of  Washington  would  be  a  virtual  abandon 
ment  of  our  cause.  I  cannot  regard  the  matter  in  that  light 
at  all.  This  army  has  not  been  defeated  in  battle,  nor  has  it 
been  repulsed  in  this  campaign  as  often  as  it  has  repulsed  the 
enemy.  It  is  now  in  a  strong  position,  with  all  its  baggage. 
Sickness,  and  the  approach  of  a  more  sickly  season,  together 
with  the  superiority  in  numbers  and  sanitary  advantages  on 
the  part  of  the  enemy,  render  it  proper  and  advisable  that  we 
should  return  to  our  capital  and  a  healthy  country.  Did  not 
the  Confederates  return  to  their  capital  from  Manassas,  and 
afterward  from  Williamsburg  did  they  not  retreat  in  confu 
sion?  In  the  West  the  two  armies  have  often  been  successful 
and  unsuccessful,  and  have  each  frequently  retreated  in  Mis 
souri  and  elsewhere.  Those  fluctuations  have  in  the  end  inured 
to  our  advantage. 

"To  shut  up  this  army  on  the  James  River  is  to  make  cer 
tain  its  destruction  or  its  neutralization  within  the  next  two 
months,  and  then  the  North  will  be  at  the  mercy  of  the  South 
and  the  sport  of  the  caprice  of  Europe. 

"Bring  this  army  back  to  the  neighborhood  of  Washing 
ton,  to  spacious,  healthy  camps,  pass  some  laws  which  I  could 
suggest,  and  at  the  end  of  three  months  it  will  be  worth  much 
more  against  an  enemy  than  it  was  last  March.  The  laws  I 
refer  to  would  force  our  able-bodied  men  to  join  the  army 
and  to  remain  with  it;  would  stop  rogues  and  pettifoggers 
from  using  the  courts  of  law  to  rob  such  as  are  absent  fight- 


McCLELLAN  285 

irig,  and  would  constrain  to  the  public  service  all  supplies  and 
means  of  transportation  at  a  reasonable  price. 

"When  a  large  army  reaches,  or  is  placed  in,  a  position 
where  it  cannot  hold  the  enemy  in  check  nor  operate  effectively 
against  him,  it  is  a  military  axiom  to  move  that  army  without 
delay.  With  a  large,  well-appointed  army  in  any  camp  from 
which  it  can  be  employed,  we  may  bid  defiance  to  our  enemies. 
This  army  cannot  be  employed  here,  and  the  enemy  may 
close  its  egress,  for  which  reasons  and  many  others  I  respect 
fully  recommend  that  immediate  instructions  may  be  issued 
for  its  withdrawal. 

"All  the  available  gunboats  and  men-of-war  ought  to  assist 
in  the  movement,  which  ought  to  be  made  within  the  next 
forty-eight  hours. 

"I  have  the  honor  to  be,  respectfully,  your  Excellency's 
most  obedient  servant, 

"E.  D.  KEYES, 
"Brigadier-General,  Fourth  Army  Corps."  l 

General  John  G.  Barnard  is  referred  to  as  holding  the 
same  views. 

But  on  July  2d  General  Barnard  had  written  the  following 
letter  to  General  McClellan  : 

"HEADQUARTERS,  July  2,  1862. 

"DEAR  GENERAL:  It  seems  to  me  the  only  salvation  is 
for  this  army  to  be  ready  promptly  to  reassume  the  offensive. 

"For  this  we  must  immediately  push  our  forces  further 
forward,  or  we  are  bagged.  Besides  being  able  to  shell  us  out, 
the  enemy  will  entrench  us  in,  and,  shutting  us  up  here  with 
a  small  force,  be  off  for  Washington. 

"The  fresh  troops  (how  many?)  now  here  or  on  the  river 
ought  to  enable  us  to  push  out  at  once  and  to  assume  an  of 
fensive  as  soon  as  our  old  army  can  be  rested. 

"But  we  need  large  reinforcements.  The  state  of  affairs 
is  concealed  in  Washington  to  hide  their  own  blunders,  and 
the  country  will  not  respond  to  the  crisis  unless  it  is  known. 
1  Official  Record,  XI,  in,  313,  314. 


286  M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  N 

We  need  20,000  more  men  to  fill  up  the  ranks  and  form  new 
regiments. 

"A  large  part  of  Halleck's  force,  all  that  can  be  withdrawn, 
should  come  from  the  West. 

"There  is  no  use  in  writing.  Should  you  not  send  at  once 
an  officer  who  will  not  be  afraid  to  speak?  And  though  such 
a  messenger  does  not  open  his  lips  except  to  Lincoln  and 
Stanton,  the  public  will  soon  know  that  there  is  something 
concealed.  It  should  be  done  by  all  means. 

"To-day  we  must  get  ourselves  enough  out  to  save  being 
shut  in.  There  is  no  use  in  entrenching  a  line  of  no  real  util 
ity,  and  what  Duane  can  do  to-day  will  only  wear  out  his  men 
for  nothing. 

"It  is  troops  alone  that  can  help  us  to-day.  By  to-morrow 
we  will  be  able  to  know  where  to  entrench. 

"We  must  have  fresh  troops  immediately  in  large  num 
bers,  and  I  would,  if  necessary,  abandon  Norfolk  and  New 
Berne  to  get  them,  and  all  the  useless  coast  of  South  Carolina 
and  Georgia,  holding  only  Fort  Pulaski. 

"Pensacola  is  of  no  use,  but  I  suppose  may  be  held  with 
few  troops. 

"Yours,  etc., 

"J.  G.  BARNARD."  2 

On  the  20th  of  July  General  Keyes  wrote  again,  this  time 
to  General  Meigs,  but  it  was  all  fish  for  the  same  net  and 
worked  into  Stanton's  hands. 

"HEADQUARTERS  FOURTH  CORPS, 

"HARRISON'S  BAR,  July  21,  1862. 
"BRIG.-GEN.  M.  C.  MEIGS, 

"Quartermaster-General  U.  S.  Army: 
"MY  DEAR  GENERAL:     In  times  of  crisis  I  always  think 
of  corresponding  with  you.     I  do  not  know  the  amount  of 
your  influence  at  this  time,  but  whether  you  possess  much  or 
little,  you  ought  now  to  exert  all  you  possess  to  guard  the  state, 
from  the  dangers  that  threaten  it. 
'  McClellan,  Own  Story,  483,  484. 


McCLELLAN  287 

"You  and  I  agreed  in  March  and  April,  1861,  that  it  was 
proper  to  make  war  vigorously.  We  agreed  after  the  battle 
of  Bull  Run  that  the  Capital  and  the  North  were  in  danger, 
and,  I  doubt  not,  you  will  agree  with  me  that  both  are  in  far 
greater  danger  now  than  at  that  time.  The  South  has  been 
made  a  unit  by  the  mere  continuance  of  the  war,  and  their 
antipathies  have  been  increased  by  our  legislation,  while  the 
North  has  been  made  weak  by  divided  counsels  and  an  ig 
norance  on  the  part  of  most  persons  of  the  cause  of  the  war. 

"This  army  has  lost  golden  opportunities.  If  I  could  see 
you  I  would  tell  you  how  we  lost  them ;  but,  being  lost,  repin 
ing  will  do  no  good,  and  we  must  endeavor  to  avoid  the 
ruin  which  now  threatens  us. 

"I  will  tell  you  some  things  which  you  may  regard  as 
facts :  My  corps  has  taken  prisoners  of  contrabands  from 
the  enemy  as  many  as  half  the  number  of  days  in  the  last 
three  months.  I  have  not  failed  with  eye  and  voice  to  make 
searching  examinations  of  all,  and  I  am  convinced  that  the 
officers  and  men  of  the  Southern  army  are  at  this  moment 
much  more  vigorous  in  health  and  more  able  for  that  reason 
to  march  and  to  fight  than  our  army  is. 

"The  South  is  not  deficient  in  plain  food  in  abundance. 
It  is  my  opinion  that  their  grain  on  hand  and  growing  is 
enough  for  two  years'  supply.  To  think  of  starving  them 
out  is  simply  absurd,  unless  we  can  destroy  their  rails  and 
water  lines  of  communication,  when  their  armies  would  starve 
simply  on  account  of  the  badness  of  the  Virginia  roads  in 
wet  weather. 

"This  army  is  able  to  hold  its  present  position,  but  cannot 
assume  the  offensive  without  a  re-enforcement  of  at  least  ioo,- 

000  men.     That  is  the  least  number  any  man  will  estimate 
whose  opinion  is  worth  more  than  a  dream. 

"The  newspapers  will  tell  you  that  the  health  of  this  army 
is  improving.  It  is  only  apparently  improving.  Comparative 
rest  has  produced  a  seeming  improvement  during  the  last  three 
weeks.  I  speak  from  no  hearsay  nor  from  any  man's  theory  ; 

1  go  every  day  and  inspect  several  regiments.     If  any  other 
officers  do  this,  I  do  not  know  their  names.     I  find  that  a  ma- 


288  McCLELLAN 

jority  of  the  generals  are  beginning  to  droop.  I  find  the  men 
are  becoming  weaker  by  the  day — their  minds  and  bodies  are 
growing  weak  together — and,  though  I  despise  most  theories, 
I  will  say  that  to  pen  up  more  than  100,000  men  and  animals 
in  a  space  so  small  that  you  can  find  no  point  of  that  space 
which  is  one  mile  distant  from  its  outside  boundary  on  the 
James  River  in  the  months  of  July,  August,  and  September 
is  to  secure  disease,  weakness,  and  nostalgia  as  a  certain  crop. 

"Our  enemies  are  not  fools,  and  they  will  soon  find  means 
to  shut  up  the  James  River  below  us  or  make  its  navigation 
enormously  expensive  to  us.  They  will  find  the  means  also 
to  annoy  us  in  other  ways,  and  unless  we  receive  vast  re- 
enforcements,  they  will  succeed  in  ruining  this  whole  army; 
and  this  army  lost,  the.  North  is  necessarily  from  that  moment 
at  the  mercy  of  the  South. 

"Some  persons  affirm  that  it  will  have  a  bad  moral  effect 
or  a  bad  political  effect  to  withdraw  this  army,  but  will  the 
effect  be  worse  than  to  remain  here  and  do  nothing?  We 
can  neither  operate  against  the  enemy  nor  build  up  our  own 
army  on  this  spot.  Then  why  do  we  stay  here  ? 

"The  South  has  already  put  forth  all  its  strength  and 
will  continue  to  do  so.  We  have  not,  and  we  must  bide  our 
time  and  employ  our  means  to  the  best  advantage. 

"Do  you  fear  intervention?  It  will  not  be  less  to  be 
feared  if  we  have  an  army  where  it  can  be  employed  than  to 
have  one  where  it  cannot  be  employed. 

"Do  you  fear  cost?  It  will  cost  just  as  much  (and  more 
if  you  estimate  for  sickness)  to  maintain  the  army  and  build 
it  up  here  as  it  would  to  carry  it  away  to  a  healthy  district 
and  build  it  up,  to  return  the  whole  to  the  James  River  next 
October. 

"If  the  movement  begins  to-morrow  or  the  next  day,  or 
even  one  week  hence,  I  think  this  army  could  be  removed 
in  safety;  after  that  its  removal  would  be  of  doubtful  possi 
bility.  If,  therefore,  you  value  the  safety  of  this  country, 
do  one  of  two  things  without  delay,  remove  this  army  or  send 
to  it  a  re-enforcement  of  100,000  men. 

"If  this  army  should  be  taken  to  some  place  between  the 


McCLELLAN  289 

enemy  and  our  own  possessions,  we  might  allege  health  as  a 
motive  for  the  movement,  bid  defiance  to  the  South,  and  by 
and  by  to  England  and  France  also,  but  by  remaining  here 
in  our  present  condition  we  submit  to  chance  the  very  ark 
of  our  safety. 

"Please  let  me  hear  from  you. 

"Your  friend, 

"E.  D.  KEYES. 

"P.  S. — I  have  kept  the  foregoing  two  days  to  determine 
whether  or  not  I  should  change  my  opinion  and  retain  it.  I 
have  concluded,  however,  to  send  it;  the  sickliness  of  this 
country  in  August  and  September  being  one  of  the  strongest 
reasons  for  withdrawing." 

"(Indorsement.) 

"July  28,  1862. 
"Respectfully  referred  to  Major-General  Halleck. 

"M.  C.  MEIGS, 
"Quartermaster-General."  3 

An  English,  German  or  French  officer  who  dared  so  to 
interfere  would  be  court-martialed  for  disloyalty  to  his  com 
mander. 

For  some  reason  that  has  never  been  explained,  General 
Wool,  who  was  commandant  at  Fortress  Monroe  at  the  com 
ing  of  McClellan,  conceived  an  inimical  feeling  toward  the 
General  which  is  exhibited  in  various  letters  obviously  in 
tended  to  work  injury  without  displaying  any  hostility.  These 
letters  are  dated,  respectively,  April  7,*  April  n,5  May  io,6 
May  I9.7  His  letter  of  May  24  is  especially  cunning  and 
vicious.8 

On  June  the  ist  General  Wool  and  General  Dix  changed 
positions  by  order  of  the  War  Department,  so  General  Wool 
was  now  at  Baltimore ;  but  he  did  not  lose  interest  in  the  com 
mander,  as  his  letter  of  July  the  2ist  shows: 


3  Official  Record,  XI,  nr,  331,  332.         'Ibid.,  174- 

*  Ibid.,  76.  7  Ibid.,  181,  182. 

6  Ibid.,  88.  '  Ibid.,  189,  190. 


290  McCLELLAN 

"BALTIMORE,  July  21,  1862. 
"HoN.  E.  M.  STANTON  : 

"MY  DEAR  FRIEND:  I  hope  you  will  allow  me  to  con 
sider  you  as  such.  'Coming  events  cast  their  shadows  before 
them.'  The  rebels  are  not  without  well-founded  hopes  that 
England  and  France  will  interfere  in  their  behalf.  The  late 
disaster  to  our  arms  at  Richmond  and  the  position  of  Major- 
General  McClellan's  army  will  aid  them  much  in  their  antici 
pations.  The  rebels  will  do  all  in  their  power  to  keep  Mc- 
Clellan  where  he  is  with  his  army,  in  the  hope  that  death  and 
desertion  will  so  thin  his  ranks  that  by  fall  his  army  will 
be  reduced  one-half.  Altogether  our  position  is  far  from 
being  an  agreeable  one.  We  ought  to  be  up  and  doing.  We 
want  troops,  and  must  have  them.  Measures  ought  to  be 
adopted  to  apprehend  and  send  back  to  their  regiments  the 
thousands  of  deserters  scattered  throughout  the  country. 
These  with  the  men  on  furlough  would  make  a  respectable 
army. 

"It  is  said  that  the  rebels  would  willingly  exchange  Rich 
mond  for  Washington.  Our  generals  have  not  shown  much 
tact  in  acquiring  information  in  regard  to  the  movements  of 
the  rebel  armies.  The  latter  disappear  from  before  them 
with  all  the  material  of  war  without  their  knowing  it  for 
days,  as  was  the  case  at  Manassas,  Yorktown,  and  Corinth. 
They  have  been  too  often  assailed  by  large  forces  without 
the  slightest  knowledge  of  their  approach,  and  of  course  disas 
ter  follows,  as  in  the  case  of  Generals  Grant,  Shields,  and 
Banks.  Our  generals  do  not  appear  to  understand  the  strata 
gems  of  war,  and  they  leave  their  rear  and  depots  of  supplies 
unprotected  and  unguarded,  as  in  the  case  of  McClellan's 
rear  being  attacked,  when  he  lost  much  property,  as  also  in  the 
case  when  Jackson  returned  to  Richmond.  We  find  them  too 
often  surprised,  as  in  the  case  of  Fair  Oaks  and  Grant  near 
Corinth,  and  but  for  the  timely  arrival  of  gunboats  the  army 
of  the  latter  would  have  been  captured, 

"I  do  not  mention  these  things  because  I  desire  the  com 
mand  of  an  army.  Far  from  it.  I  assure  you  I  am  content 
to  perform  any  duty  you  may  think  proper  to  assign  to  me. 


McCLELLAN'  291 

My  only  wish  and  desire  is  to  put  down  this  infamous  rebel 
lion,  and  to  have  the  instigators  punished  as  they  deserve  to 
be.  Whoever  may  accomplish  this,  and  whether  it  be  Mc 
Clellan,  Halleck,  Pope,  or  any  one  else,  I  will  be  at  least  one 
of  the  first  to  rejoice  and  to  do  honor  to  the  conqueror. 

"In  conclusion,  allow  me  to  call  your  attention  to  the 
bounty  about  to  be  paid  to  those  who  may  enlist  in  the  service. 
I  believe  it  will  amount  to  something  like  $90  to  each  man, 
including  $50  by  the  states.  New  York  gives  $50  in  addition 
to  what  the  United  States  gives.  In  drawing  up  your  instruc 
tions  for  myself,  I  hope  you  will  allow  the  $50  to  be  given 
by  New  York. 

"Always  and  faithfully  yours, 

"JOHN  E.  WOOL, 

"Major-General."9 

In  no  country  but  ours  could  such  letters  be  written  with 
impunity  and  such  impunity  is  not  to  our  credit.  It  does  not 
appear  that  General  McClellan  ever  suspected  the  enmity  of 
General  Wool  or  ever  knew  of  any  of  the  above  letters  written 
by  Wool  and  Keyes. 

One  of  the  most  notable  features  of  this  period  is  the 
care  which  Stanton  took  to  keep  his  hostile  acts  concealed; 
yet  no  author  who  writes  of  this  period  hesitates  to  fix  the 
responsibility  of  the  attitude  of  the  Government  entirely  upon 
the  wily  Secretary. 

A  bright  plan  now  occurred  to  him, — namely,  that  of  hav 
ing  a  nominal  general-in-chief,  one  who  in  return  for  the 
honor  and  the  salary  would  bear  all  blame,  while  in  fact  he 
would  be  only  the  clerk  of  Mr.  Stanton.  Accordingly,  on 
July  the  nth,  1862,  General  Halleck  was  appointed.  In  the 
Harrison's  Bar  letter  General  McClellan  had  said  that  there 
should  be  one  head  of  all  the  armies.  So  Mr.  Stanton  stated 
to  the  press,  and  the  press  stated  to  the  people,  that  General 
Halleck  was  appointed  on  the  direct  advice  of  General  Mc 
Clellan,  as  if  McClellan  had  been  a  highly  influential  counsel 
lor  of  state  and  had  urged  the  selection  of  Halleck! 
9  Official  Record,  XI,  HI,  330. 


292  McCLELLAN 

No  man  was  ever  so  hotly  denounced  for  incompetency 
as  the  new  general-in-chief ;  but  the  incompetency  was  that 
of  his  master,  Mr.  Stanton.  Halleck  had  no  plans,  originated 
nothing,  conceived  nothing.  That  Stanton  was  in  fact  the 
general-in-chief  is  boastfully  shown  by  his  biographers,  Mr. 
Flower  and  Mr.  Gorham,  and  from  another  point  of  view  by 
Mr.  Welles — in  his  published  diary. 

On  July  the  8th  the  President  visited  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac.  His  purpose  in  going  is  clearly  indicated  by  the 
manner  in  which  he  spent  his  time  while  there.  It  is  to  be 
regretted  that  it  cannot  be  said  that  he  went  there  as  a  prudent 
but  unbiased  executive  to  make  an  open,  straightforward  ex 
amination, — in  good  faith  to  ascertain  if  the  contemplated 
increase  of  the  army  was  really  as  advisable  as  it  had  been 
represented  to  be.  For,  if  such  had  been  the  case,  a  full  con 
ference  with  the  commander  would  have  been  the  first  step; 
and  if  it  had  been  a  question  as  to  the  health  of  the  army 
and  what  would  be  the  result  of  its  remaining  through  the 
summer,  the  chief  medical  authority  of  the  army,  Dr.  Jona 
than  Letterman,  would  have  been  first  consulted. 

The  President  went  there  as  an  adverse  attorney  might 
go,  to  gather  evidence  to  fortify  a  predetermined  conclusion 
and  to  overthrow  the  commander's  wishes  and  expectations. 
The  President  did  not  consult  the  commander,  nor  did  he 
inform  him  of  the  object  of  his  visit.  The  President  did  not 
consult  Dr.  Letterman  or  any  other  medical  authority.  All 
such  persons  were  apparently  assumed  to  be  antagonists,  and 
were  not  admitted  into  the  President's  confidence.  Unac 
companied  by  the  commander  he  called  upon  the  various  gen 
erals  separately,  and  got  from  each  of  them  an  opinion  as  to 
what  should  be  done  with  the  army,  upon  the  hypothesis 
that  it  was  not  to  be  reinforced  for  a  long  and  indefinite  time. 
Basing  their  views  solely  upon  that  hypothesis,  a  few  said 
that  if  they  were  to  have  no  reinforcements,  then,  for  sani 
tary  reasons,  the  army  should  be  withdrawn.  But  the  answers 
so  elicited  the  authorities  treated  as  urgent  and  unconditional 
appeals  for  the  withdrawal  of  the  army.  Even  General  Frank 
lin,  understanding  that  the  army  was  not  to  be  reinforced, 


McCLELLAN  293 

said  that  he  thought  it  should  be  withdrawn.  He  told  Mr. 
Swinton  long  afterward,  as  did  General  Newton  also,  that  if 
reinforcements  had  been  expected  he  would  have  been  alto 
gether  in  favor  of  remaining.10 

This  proviso  made  so  little  impression  upon  the  mind  of 
the  President  that  when  a  few  months  later  Generals  Franklin 
and  Smith  strongly  urged  operations  from  the  James  as  a 
base, — a  view  they  had  always  held, — Mr.  Lincoln  expressed 
surprise,  and  in  effect  charged  General  Franklin  with  having 
changed  his  views. 

As  the  days  sped  on,  the  Government  should  have  been 
convinced  that  the  surest  defense  and  protection  of  Washing 
ton  lay  in  the  presence  of  the  Union  army  on  the  James. 
The  great  army  of  Lee  was  inert  and  paralyzed.  That  the 
Union  army  was  in  peril  because  of  unsanitary  conditions 
is  disproved  by  the  report  of  Dr.  Letterman  of  July  i8th, 
1862,  in  which  he  gives  this  opinion:  "The  diseases  prevalent 
in  our  army  are  generally  of  a  mild  type  and  are  not  in 
creasing.  Their  chief  causes  are,  in  my  opinion,  the  want  of 
proper  food  (and  that  improperly  prepared),  exposure  to  the 
malaria  of  swamps  and  the  inclemencies  of  the  weather,  ex 
cessive  fatigue  and  want  of  natural  rest,  combined  with  great 
excitement  of  several  days'  duration,  and  the  exhaustion  con 
sequent  thereon."  ll  In  other  words,  the  army's  condition  was 
no  cause  for  alarm,  and  was  chiefly  the  result,  not  of  the 
present  location,  but  of  the  hardships  of  the  Peninsula  cam 
paign. 

The  proof  most  convincing  and  most  readily  grasped  lies 
in  the  well-known  fact  that  in  the  middle  of  June,  1864,  what 
was  left  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  reached  the  James  in  a 
most  unfavorable  condition  to  resist  disease,  and  remained 
there  until  the  following  April,  without  any  question  of  peril 
from  disease  ever  becoming  the  subject  of  discussion. 

On  the  occasion  of  the  visit  of  the  President,  some  ques 
tions  were  asked  of  General  McClellan  as  if  he  had  been 
merely  one  of  many  independent  witnesses,  all  of  equal  grade, 

10  Army  of  the  Potomac,  171,  n. 

11  Official  Record,  XI,  m,  349. 


McCLELLAN 

instead  of  his  being  the  only  one  who  could  fully  enlighten 
the  Administration  and  supply  the  reasons  and  arguments  for 
action.  One  who  is  having  a  house  built  does  not  go  to  the 
mechanics  employed  upon  it  to  discuss  the  plans ;  he  confers 
only  with  the  architect. 

If  the  evidence  secured  by  Mr.  Lincoln  on  his  visit  to  the 
James  had  supplied  a  plausible  pretext,  McClellan  would  surely 
have  been  called  home  at  once ;  but  Heintzelman  and  Sumner, 
two  of  the  corps  commanders  forced  upon  McClellan,  disap 
pointed  Stanton's  hopes,  and  were  as  cordial  in  support  of  the 
commander's  views  as  was  General  Porter.  General  Sumner 
stoutly  declared  that  to  take  the  army  away  was  "to  give 
up  the  cause,"  and  that  the  prospective  condition  of  health 
was  as  good  there  as  in  any  part  of  Eastern  Virginia.  Gen 
eral  Heintzelman  said  that  to  take  the  army  away  would  be 
ruinous  to  the  country  and  that  the  prospective  condition  of 
health  was  excellent.  General  Keyes,  the  third  of  the  corps 
commanders  selected  by  Stanton  because  they  were  against 
McClellan's  coast  plan,  was,  as  his  letters  show,  in  favor  of 
bringing  the  army  back  only  for  the  summer  and  then  return 
ing  to  the  James.  General  Porter  said  that  the  present  and 
prospective  condition  of  health  was  good,  and  when  asked 
as  to  whether  the  removal  of  the  army  could  be  safely  ef 
fected,  replied :  "Impossible.  Move  the  army  and  ruin  the 
country."  12  Franklin  favored  removal,  Mr.  Rhodes  assures 
us  too,  only  upon  the  understanding  that  the  army  was  not 
to  be  reinforced. 

To  the  general  reader  this  underground  method  of  oper 
ating  is  so  repellent,  so  lacking  in  fairness,  justice,  and  candor 
when  exhibited  in  any  one,  but  above  all  in  a  public  official 
dealing  with  public  affairs,  that,  taking  the  idealistic  view  of 
Mr.  Lincoln's  character,  it  seems  incredible  that  he  could  have 
engaged  in  it.  Those  familiar  with  the  game  of  politics,  how 
ever,  know  that  its  ethics  are  peculiar,  and  that  a  man  may  be 
honest,  kind,  and  exemplary  in  every  other  relation  of  life, 
yet,  as  a  politician,  he  may  do  what  seem  to  the  ordinary  citi 
zen  utterly  irreconcilable  things.  The  rule  is :  "Destroy 

"Lincoln,  Letters,  II,  275-277. 


McCLELLAN  295 

your  rival;  he  would  destroy  you,  if  he  could."  And  Stanton 
had  persuaded  the  President  that  McClellan  was  a  dangerous 
political  rival. 

As  we  have  seen,  Mr.  Lincoln  used  his  patronage  to  win 
over  his  enemies,  to  make  them  his  friends.  Those  that  were 
already  his  friends,  even  the  most  worthy,  got  little  or  noth 
ing.  As  he  viewed  it,  what  he  could  get  gratuitously  it  was 
folly  to  pay  for.13  Mr.  Lincoln  and  Mr.  Herndon  maneu 
vered  to  get  a  political  article  into  a  Springfield  paper  which 
nearly  ruined  the  editor,  as  it  was  directly  contrary  to  his 
views.14 

On  the  Qth  of  August,  1864,  Mr.  Lincoln  wrote  to  General 
Banks  as  follows : 

"EXECUTIVE  MANSION, 
"WASHINGTON,  August  9,  1864. 
"MAJOR-GENERAL  BANKS  : 

"I  have  just  seen  the  new  constitution  adopted  by  the  Con 
vention  of  Louisiana ;  and  I  am  anxious  that  it  shall  be  ratified 
by  the  people.  I  will  thank  you  to  let  the  civil  officers  in 
Louisiana,  holding  under  me,  know  that  this  is  my  wish,  and 
let  me  know  at  once  who  of  them  openly  declare  for  the  con 
stitution,  and  who  of  them,  if  any,  decline  to  so  declare. 

"Yours  truly, 

"A.  LINCOLN."  16 

The  coercive  influence  of  the  Executive  was  thus  used  to 
bring  about  a  desired  political  result,  and  following  up  the 
later  correspondence,  it  looks  as  if  General  Banks  resigned 
because  he  did  not  like  such  military  work. 

As  it  was  known  to  all  that  the  Government  could  easily 
and  quickly  reinforce  the  army,  if  it  decided  so  to  do,  and 
as  the  days  passed  and  the  reinforcements  did  not  come,  the 
alarm  was  sounded  throughout  the  army  that  all  their  trudg 
ing  through  the  mud,  all  their  exposure  to  the  elements,  all 


13  Herndon,  Abraham  Lincoln,  243,  244. 

14  Ibid.,  II,  38,  39- 
16  Letters,  I,  42,  43. 


296  McCLELLAN 

the  bloodshed  and  lives  offered  up,  especially  in  that  terrible 
week  of  carnage, — all  this  was  now,  when  the  fruit  of  it  was 
ripe  for  the  picking  and  within  easy  reach,  to  be  thrown  away, 
and  they  were  to  return  to  Washington  and  fight  their  way 
back  to  Richmond  again  upon  a  new  and  sanguinary  line. 

It  was  felt  that  Stanton  for  some  sinister  purpose  in 
tended  to  remove  the  army,  and  was  only  awaiting  a  plausible 
pretext  upon  which  to  base  the  action. 


CHAPTER    LII 

THE    STRUGGLE    TO    REMAIN 

When  the  significance  of  the  delay  fully  dawned  upon  the 
army,  the  surprise,  grief,  and  indignation  at  the  attitude  of 
the  Government  was  intense.  It  seemed  as  if  the  lives  of 
soldiers  counted  for  nothing.  The  army  had  won  a  great 
advantage,  and  won  it  at  the  price  of  more  than  15,000  lives. 
That  advantage  was  now  to  be  wrested  from  it,  and  its  labors 
and  bloodshed  were  to  begin  anew.  The  calamity  about  to 
befall  the  army  was  not,  however,  to  come  upon  it  without 
a  noble  struggle  against  what  was  morally  an  act  of  darkest 
treason.  If  military  etiquette  had  permitted  the  army  to  send 
a  protest  and  a  petition,  the  fondness  shown  for  McClellan 
by  the  army  at  all  times  left  no  doubt  as  to  the  fervor  of 
the  appeal  or  the  warmth  of  the  remonstrance.  We  have  al 
ready  quoted  from  the  strong  and  confident  letter  of  Colonel 
Ingalls  to  General  Meigs,  expressing  the  certainty  of  success 
when  the  army  should  be  properly  reinforced. 

Commodore  Wilkes  on  the  5th  of  August  sent  the  follow 
ing  patriotic  and  glowing  letter  to  his  superior,  the  Secretary 
of  the  Navy: 

"FORT  MONROE,  VA., 
"August  5,  1862, — i  A.  M. 
"GIDEON  WELLES,  Secretary  of  the  Navy : 

"I  have  had  submitted  to  me  the  orders  sent  to  General 
McClellan,  and  I  must  say  I  never  was  more  astonished  than 
at  their  contents.  The  withdrawal  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac  would  be  the  most  suicidal  act  that  any  administration 
could  commit,  and  be  attended  with  every  disaster  that  could 
befall  our  army — causing  its  utter  demoralization  and  total 

297 


298  M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  N 

destruction  and  the  waste  of  all  its  vast  equipage — and  I  must 
say.  if  anything  can,  would  entirely  ruin  the  Union  cause 
by  its  entire  destruction.  I  can  now  speak  advisedly  upon 
its  position  and  that  of  the  naval  force  which  I  -command. 
My  standpoint  of  view  is  different  from  that  of  any  other 
person  in  the  country,  and  although  I  have  not  ventured,  as 
others,  to  express  the  opinions  I  entertain,  I  deem  it  impera 
tive  on  me  now  to  state  what  they  are. 

"The  naval  force  has  now  under  its  control  the  supply  of 
the  army,  and  I  indulge  in  no  fears  of  keeping  it  entirely  free 
from  any  serious  impediment.  The  force  I  have  is  not  entirely 
sufficient  to  begin  active  operations,  but  the  moment  I  receive 
the  additional  vessels  the  Department  is  to  supply  me  I  am 
ready  for  active  offensive  operations,  and  with  the  aid  of  the 
army  on  the  north  bank  of  the  James  River  I  have  no  doubt 
that  Richmond  can  be  taken.  It  may  require  hard  knocks, 
but  success,  I  think,  is  finally  certain.  \Yhen  Fort  Darling 
is  taken  the  way  will  be  open,  and  a  combined  attack  from  the 
north  shore  by  the  army  and  navy  forces  will  be  difficult,  nay 
impossible,  to  resist.  My  information  relative  to  the  difficul 
ties  to  be  encountered  is  consistent,  and.  I  think,  trustworthy, 
and  my  officers  and  men  are  all  in  spirits,  and  full  of  energy 
to  undertake  their  part  of  the  sen-ice.  An  abandonment  of 
the  army  position  would  have  a  great  effect  to  destroy  the 
animus  of  the  whole  fleet.  The  aid  I  could  give  General 
McClellan  in  a  retrograde  movement  would  be  comparatively 
trifling,  and  I  have  no  transportation  to  offer.  The  situation 
of  the  army  is  secure  under  any  event.  Its  position  now  is 
strong;  the  several  corps  are  again  re-established,  and  all  are 
in  excellent  spirits  for  the  coming  campaign  and  the  invest 
ment  and  taking  of  Richmond.  My  information  is  that  the 
enemy  are  concentrating  their  forces  near  and  around  Peters 
burg,  and  there  has  been  a  great  withdrawal  of  troops  from 
Richmond.  I  think  the  general  impression  among  the  rebels 
is  that  it  is  McClellan's  intention  to  throw  his  force  across 
the  river,  and  while  they  are  under  this  delusion  the  true  move 
ment  may  be  made  on  Richmond  along  the  north  bank  of  the 
James  River  as  soon  as  the  communication  by  railroad  is 


McCLELLAN  299 

destroyed,  which  it  is  my  intention  to  effect:  and  had  I  been 
furnished  with  the  scout  canoes,  to  enable  me  to  reach  them  by 
the  creeks,  the  bridges  and  railroads  would  have  been  ere  this 
broken  up  and  destroyed.  I  expressed  to  you  my  woful  disap 
pointment  when  I  saw  the  character  of  the  boats  sent  me.  I 
shall  say  nothing  further  on  this  at  present,  but  it  will  readily 
be  seen  on  an  inspection  of  the  map  how  completely  this 
would  operate  to  prevent  the  enemy's  force  from  returning  to 
support  those  in  Richmond.  A  combined  movement  by  Gen 
eral  Pope  with  concentrated  force  and  General  McClellan 
at  the  same  time  would  effect  this  much-desired  object.  I  have 
no  doubt,  supported  as  the  latter  would  be  by  the  naval  force 
under  my  command  acting  in  harmonious  co-operation. 

"Thus  much  for  the  onward  progress.  Xow  let  me  con 
sider  the  retreat  and  abandonment  of  the  position.  In  the  first 
place,  an  entire  demoralization  of  the  troops  and  their  officers 
would  take  place.  There  is  no  transportation  adequate  to  the 
move,  and  all  the  splendid  equipage  gathered  at  a  vast  expense 
would  necessarily  have  to  be  destroyed  to  prevent  falling  into 
the  hands  of  the  enemy,  and  as  soon  as  the  rebels  discovered, 
if  not  captured,  and  an  entire  disgrace  fall  upon  the  Union 
cause,  and  well  it  might  be  said  this  great  cause  had  been 
deserted. 

"As  to  the  time  it  would  take  is  another  consideration,  and 
this  could  not  be  less  than  five  or  six  weeks  at  the  least,  if  it 
were  done  by  water,  and  the  rebels,  apprised  of  the  moment, 
would  rush  to  the  banks  of  the  James  River  and  cause  such 
annoyances  that  would  make  even  that  route  very  precarious, 
and  a  series  of  attacks  on  our  part  necessary  to  destroy  their 
batteries,  which  would  be  fully  equal  to  what  is  to  be  en 
countered  toward  Richmond.  Another  course  is  the  only 
one  possible  in  my  view,  and  that  is  a  retreat  by  land.  The 
Chickahominy  and  all  its  sad  details  of  battle  again  fought 
over,  and  by  the  time  the  army  reached  its  transports  at  Fort 
Monroe,  or  higher  up.  its  morale,  spirit,  and  energy  would  be 
entirely  gone,  and  instead  of  being  able  to  re-enforce  [the] 
other  army  in  the  field  by  the  Rappahannock,  it  would  have 


300  McCLELLAN 

wastedj  itself  away.  Indeed,  it  would  be  a  sad  beacon  for  the 
country  and  its  armies  to  mourn  over,  and  to  raise  the  hopes 
and  strength  of  the  rebels  be  the  greatest  blow  that  the  Union 
cause  has  ever  felt.  I  trust  in  God  this  direful  act  will  not  be 
carried  out — our  noble  cause  will  be  ruined  if  it  is — <and  that 
we  may  be  left  here  to  wend  our  way  to  Richmond.  General 
McClellan  is  confident  as  I  am  in  the  result — the  capture  of  the 
rebel  capital,  and  of  maintaining  the  honor,  safety,  and  glory 
of  the  Union  and  its  army. 

"I  pray  you  lay  these  views  before  the  President,  with  a 
hopeful  wish  on  my  part  that  they  will  be  impressed  on  his 
mind  as  forcibly  as  they  are  on  mine.  Truthful  and  conscien 
tious  I  know  them  to  be,  and  a  firm  conviction  on  my  part,  as 
well  as  General  McClellan' s,  of  the  disaster  which  must  follow 
in  the  one  case  and  a  glorious  termination  in  the  other. 

"Respectfully, 

"CHARLES  WILKES, 

"Commodore."  l 

At  this  critical  juncture,  with  so  much  at  stake,  there  was 
no  Cabinet  discussion  of  the  situation.  An  open,  frank  com 
parison  of  views  would  often  have  prevented  errors.  Mr. 
Welles  tells  us  how  very  rare  such  meetings  were.  The  Secre 
tary  of  the  Navy  understood  that  the  movement  could  spring 
from  nothing  but  Stanton's  determination  to  get  rid  of  Mc 
Clellan,  and  expressed  his  protest  in  one  cogent  sentence : 
"The  object  in  bringing  that  army  back  to  Washington,  in 
order  to  start  a  new  march  overland  and  regain  the  abandoned 
position,  I  did  not  understand,  unless  it  was  to  get  rid  of  Mc 
Clellan."  2 

The  first  direct  notice  to  McClellan  that  the  Government 
had  resumed  its  attitude  of  coldness  and  hostility  was  in  the 
letter  from  the  President,  dated  July  13,  1862,  in  which  he 
says: 

1  Official  Record,  XI,  in,  356. 
*  Lincoln  and  Seward,  193. 


McCLELLAN  301 

"EXECUTIVE  MANSION, 

"WASHINGTON,  July  13,  1862. 
"MAJOR-GENERAL  MCCLELLAN  : 

"Mv  DEAR  SIR  :  I  am  told  that  over  160,000  men  have 
gone  into  your  army  on  the  Peninsula.  When  I  was  with  you 
the  other  day  we  made  out  86,500  remaining,  leaving  73,500 
to  be  accounted  for.  I  believe  23,500  will  cover  all  the  killed, 
wounded,  and  missing  in  all  your  battles  and  skirmishes, 
leaving  50,000  who  have  left  otherwise.  Not  more  than 
5,000  of  these  have  died,  leaving  45,000  of  your  army  still 
alive  and  not  with  it.  I  believe  half  or  two-thirds  of  them  are 
fit  for  duty  to-day.  Have  you  any  more  perfect  knowledge 
of  this  than  I  have?  If  I  am  right,  and  you  had  these  men 
with  you,  you  could  go  into  Richmond  in  the  next  three  days. 
How  can  they  be  got  to  you,  and  how  can  they  be  prevented 
ffom  getting  away  in  such  numbers  for  the  future  ? 

"A.    LINCOLN."3 

This  is  a  nagging  letter,  an  exasperating  letter.  It  is  a 
silly  letter,  which,  if  he  had  been  left  to  himself,  the  common 
sense  of  the  President  would  have  prevented  him  from  send 
ing.  It  was  sent  under  pressure.  The  machinery  for  getting 
back  absentees  lies,  not  with  the  general  in  the  field,  but  with 
the  War  Department.  A  time  when  immediate  reinforce 
ments  were  urgently  needed  and  could  have  been  easily  sup 
plied  was  no  time  for  the  discussion  of  questions  of  that  na 
ture.  General  McClellan  had  already  been  urging  the  War 
Department  to  provide  a  remedy,  as  his  reply  shows : 

"HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

"July  15,  1862.     (Received  8  P.  M.) 
"His  EXCELLENCY  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN,  President : 

"Your  telegram  of  yesterday  (July  13)  has  been  received. 
The  difference  between  the  effective  force  of  troops  and  that 
expressed  in  returns  is  considerable  in  every  army.  All  com 
manders  find  the  actual  strength  less  than  the  strength  repre 
sented  on  paper.  I  have  not  my  own  returns  for  the  tri- 
•/««*.,  319- 


302  McCLELLAN 

monthly  period  since  arriving  at  Fort  Monroe  at  hand  at 
this  moment,  but  even  on  paper  I  will  not,  I  am  confident,  be 
found  to  have  received  160,000  officers  and  men  present,  al 
though  present  and  absent  my  returns  will  be  accountable  for 
that  number.  You  can  arrive  at  the  numbers  of  absentees, 
however,  better  by  my  return  of  July  10,  which  will  be  ready 
to  send  shortly.  I  find  from  official  reports  that  I  have  present 
for  duty :  Officers,  3,125  ;  enlisted  men,  85,450;  in  all  present 
for  duty,  88,665 ;  absent  by  authority,  34,472 ;  without  au 
thority,  3,778;  present  and  absent,  144,407. 

"The  number  of  officers  and  men  present  sick  is  16,619. 
The  medical  director  will  fully  explain  the  cause  of  this 
amount  of  sickness,  which  I  hope  will  begin  to  decrease 
shortly.  Thus  the  number  of  men  really  absent  is  38,250. 
Unquestionably  of  the  number  present,  some  are  absent — say 
40,000  will  cover  the  absentees.  I  quite  agree  with  you  that 
more  than  one-half  of  these  men  are  probably  fit  for  duty 
to-day.  I  have  frequently  called  the  attention  lately  of  the 
War  Department  to  the  evil  of  absenteeism.  I  think  that  the 
exciting  of  the  public  press  to  persistent  attack  upon  officers 
and  soldiers  absent  from  the  army,  the  employment  of  deputy 
marshals  to  arrest  and  send  back  deserters,  summary  dismissal 
of  officers  whose  names  are  reported  for  being  absent  without 
leave,  and  the  publication  of  their  names,  will  exhaust  the 
remedies  applicable  by  the  War  Department. 

"It  is  to  be  remembered  that  many  of  those  absent  by 
authority  are  those  who  have  got  off  either  sick  or  wounded 
or  under  pretense  of  sickness  or  wounds,  and  having  originally 
the  pretext  of  authority,  are  still  reported  absent  by  authority. 
If  I  could  receive  back  the  absentees  and  could  get  my  sick 
men  up,  I  would  need  but  small  re-enforcements  to  enable  me 
to  take  Richmond.  After  the  battle  of  Williamsburg,  Fair 
Oaks,  etc.,  most  of  these  men  got  off.  Well  men  got  on  board 
hospital  boats  taking  care  of  sick,  etc.  There  is  always  con 
fusion  and  haste  in  shipping  and  taking  care  of  wounded  after 
a  battle.  There  is  no  time  for  nice  examination  of  permits 
to  pass  here  or  there. 

"I  can  now  control  people  getting  away  better,   for  the 


M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  N  303 

natural  opportunities  are  better.  Leakages  by  desertion  occur 
in  every  army  and  will  occur  here  of  course,  but  I  do  not  at 
all,  however,  anticipate  anything  like  a  recurrence  of  what 
has  taken  place. 

"GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN. 

"Major-General."  4 

Mr.  Rhodes  recognizes  that  the  Administration's  change  of 
feeling  took  place  during  the  first  week  of  July,  and  that  this 
fact  is  evidenced  by  a  letter  from  Seward  to  Weed  of  that 
date,  in  which  he  said :  "Most  painful  doubts  exist  whether 
the  army  however  reinforced  can  make  a  successful  or  hopeful 
attack  on  Richmond.  If  that  is  correct,  reinforcements  sent 
there  will  only  aggravate  the  impotence  of  the  position. 
.  .  It  is  also  feared  that  the  rebels,  holding  McClellan 
there,  will  organize  a  new  and  vigorous  campaign  against 
Washington."  5 

Both  the  contents  of  this  letter  and  the  date  of  it  show 
that  it  was  not  the  Harrison's  Bar  letter  which  effected  the 
change  of  attitude.  Mr.  Rhodes  tells  us  that  he  could  not 
ascertain  what  caused  it.  Surely  not;  his  optimistic  view 
of  the  motives  of  Mr.  Stanton  shut  him  out  from  the  truth. 
Assuming  that  Mr.  Stanton  was  a  wise,  brave,  and  noble 
man,  seeking  solely  the  best  interests  of  the  Union,  his  change 
of  attitude  is  indeed  inexplicable. 

On  July  the  7th  General  McClellan  wired  the  President : 
"My  men  in  splendid  spirits  and  anxious  to  try  it  again."  G 

From  the  nth  to  the  3Oth  of  July  the  correspondence,  as 
we  have  seen,  shows  that  McClellan  wished  to  remain. 

On  the  3Oth  of  July  the  commander  received  the  following 
letter : 

"WASHINGTON,  July  30,  1862, — 8  p.  M. 
"In  order  to  enable  you  to  move  in  any  direction,  it  is 
necessary  to  relieve  you  of  your  sick.     The  Surgeon-General 

4  Lincoln  and  Seward,  321. 

6  History  of  the  United  States,  IV,  96. 

8  Official  Record,  XI,  i,  73. 


304  M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  X 

has  therefore  been  directed  to  make  arrangements  for  them 
at  other  places,  and  the  Quartermaster-General  to  provide 
transportation.  I  hope  yon  will  send  them  away  as  quickly 
as  |mMl)*?,  and  advise  me  of  their  removal. 

"H.  W.  HALLECK. 

•'Major-General. 
"Maj.-Gen.  George  B.  McClellan." 

This  letter  holds  out  the  hope  that  the  reinforcing  of  the 
army  is  still  under  consideration,  but  the  order  of  removal  was 
then  already  made  and  held  conrraifd,  The  removal  of  the 
sick  was  the  first  act  in  the  removal  of  the  army.  To  the 
majority  of  the  foregoing  letters  of  General  McClellan  that 
were  written  after  July  I3th  the  President  did  not  vouchsafe 
die  courtesy  of  an  answer.  It  was  dearly  Stanton's  plan  to 
omdnii  everything  himself,  at  the  same  time  throwing  the 
whole  responsibility  on  Haikck.  He  had  found  that  the  veil 
of  using  die  Ifrc&idciAl  was  far  too  thin.  The  whole  coumry 
saw  through  it  and  charged  the  military  polio.-  of  the  ad 
ministration  wholly  to  the  Secretary  of  War.  How  little  Hal- 
leek  had  to  do  with  the  conduct  of  the  war  the  most  cursory 
reading  of  the  pages  of  Mr.  Gorham  or  Mr.  Flower  will 
quickly  reveal  When  General  Halleck  appeared  upon  the 
in  the  ™«MI^  of  July  the  President  retired  from  the 
That  was  the  apparent  change,  but  in  fact  the  same 
hand  moved  the  pieces  upon  the  military  chess-board  at  all 
tines  after  January  2Oth,  1862:  and  the  conviction  will  con- 
stantly  gather  strength  that  through  him  the  nation,  despite 
afl  its  atltagih  and  resources,  narrowly  escaped  destruction. 
and  that  the  appalling  cost  of  the  war  thereafter  in  life  and 
muuqy  was  chieflv  due  to  him. 

Earnestly  and  urgently  and  patriotically  pleading  with  the 
Ihc&idtut  to  adopt  tint  course  wheiein  the  sequel  has  proven 
lay  the  salvation  of  the  Union,  and  finding  his  arguments  dis- 
and  his  yrl  •••«•*  met  with  almost  absolute  silence. 


McQdbn  addressed  his  *$$****  on-  and  after  July  the  28th  to 
Ottml  Record,  XL  i,  76,  77. 


McCLELLAN  305 

General  Halleck.  But  it  made  no  difference  to  whom  they 
were  sent, — Halleck,  Lincoln,  or  Stanton, — they  went  into  the 
same  pigeonhole  and  were  dealt  with  by  the  same  astute  foe 
of  McClellan  and  of  the  nation's  welfare, — Edwin  M.  Stan- 
ton. 


CHAPTER    LIII 

THE   STRUGGLE    CONTINUES HALLECK    COMES 

General  Halleck  arrived  in  Washington  on  the  23d  of  July, 
1862,  and  on  the  25th  visited  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  The 
result,  as  it  seemed  to  McClellan,  is  expressed  in  his  letter  of 
July  25th  to  his  wife,  "I  think  Halleck  will  support  me  and 
give  me  the  means  to  take  Richmond."  l  This  implies  to  those 
who  know  the  real  intent  of  the  Administration  at  this  time 
that  Halleck  simulated  an  approval  of  McClellan' s  views, 
doubtless  under  instructions  from  Stanton.  Observe  how  dif 
ferently  Halleck  pictured  this  interview. 

"Memorandum  for  the  Secretary  of  War. 

"WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  July  27,  1862. 

"In  accordance  with  the  directions  of  the  President,  I  left 
here  on  the  afternoon  of  the  24th  and  reached  the  camp  of 
General  McClellan  on  the  afternoon  of  the  25th. 

"I  stated  to  the  general  that  the  object  of  my  visit  was 
to  ascertain  from  him  his  views  and  wishes  in  regard  to  future 
operations.  He  said  that  he  proposed  to  cross  the  James 
River  at  that  point,  attack  Petersburg,  and  cut  off  the  enemy's 
communications  by  that  route  south,  making  no  further  dem 
onstration  for  the  present  against  Richmond.  I  stated  to  him 
very  frankly  my  views  in  regard  to  the  danger  and  imprac 
ticability  of  the  plan,  to  most  of  which  he  finally  agreed. 

"I  then  told  him  that  it  seemed  to  me  a  military  necessity 
to  concentrate  his  forces  with  those  of  General  Pope  on  some 
point  where  they  could  at  the  same  time  cover  Washington 
and  operate  against  Richmond,  unless  he  felt  strong  enough 
to  attack  the  latter  place,  with  a  strong  probability  of  success, 

1  McClellan,  Own  Story,  455. 

306 


M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  N  307 

with  the  re-enforcements  which  could  be  given  to  him.  He 
expressed  the  opinion  that  with  30,000  re-enforcements  he 
could  attack  Richmond  with  'a  good  chance  of  success/  I 
replied  that  I  was  authorized  by  the  President  to  promise  only 
20,000,  and  that  if  he  could  not  take  Richmond  with  that  num 
ber  we  must  devise  some  plan  for  withdrawing  his  troops  from 
their  present  position  to  some  point  where  they  could  unite 
with  those  of  General  Pope  without  exposing  Washington. 
He  thought  there  would  be  no  serious  difficulty  in  withdraw 
ing  his  forces  for  that  purpose,  but  the  movement  he  said 
would  have  a  demoralizing  influence  on  his  own  troops,  and 
suggested  the  propriety  of  their  holding  their  present  position 
till  sufficient  re-enforcements  could  be  collected.  I  told  him 
that  I  had  no  authority  to  consider  that  proposition,  and  that 
he  must  decide  between  advising  the  withdrawal  of  his  forces 
to  some  point  to  be  agreed  upon  to  meet  General  Pope  or  to 
advance  on  Richmond  with  the  re-enforcements  which  the 
President  had  decided  upon ;  that  he  had  decided  that  question 
by  fixing  his  re-enforcements  at  20,000,  and  I  could  promise 
no  addition  to  that  number. 

"I  inferred  from  his  remarks  that  under  these  circum 
stances  he  would  prefer  to  withdraw  and  unite  with  General 
Pope :  but  I  advised  him  to  consult  his  officers  and  give  me  a 
final  answer  in  the  morning.  He  did  so,  and  the  next  morning 
informed  me  that  he  would  attack  Richmond  with  the  re- 
enforcements  promised.  He  would  not  say  that  he  thought 
the  probabilities  of  success  were  in  his  favor,  but  that  there 
was  'a  chance,'  and  he  was  'willing  to  try  it.' 

"In  regard  to  the  force  of  the  enemy,  he  expressed  the 
opinion  that  it  was  not  less  than  200,000,  and  I  found  that  in 
this  estimate  most  of  his  officers  agreed.  His  own  effective 
force  was,  officers  and  men,  about  90,000,  which,  with  20,000 
re-enforcements,  would  make  110,000. 

"I  had  no  time  or  opportunity  to  investigate  the  facts  upon 
which  these  estimates  were  based,  and  therefore  can  give  no 
opinion  as  to  their  correctness. 

"His  officers,  as  I  understood,  were  about  equally  divided 


3o8  McCLELLAN 

in  opinion  in  regard  to  the  policy  of  withdrawing  or  of  risk 
ing  an  attack  on  Richmond. 

"H.  W.  HALLECK, 

"General-in-Chief."  2 

These  details  of  the  interview  are  so  utterly  at  variance 
with  McClellan's  numerous  letters  touching  the  same  matters 
as  to  raise  the  strongest  suspicion  of  their  correctness,  and  to 
make  us  regret  that  we  have  no  detailed  statement  of  the  inter 
view  from  the  commander  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  The 
work  upon  his  Own  Story  was  evidently  little  more  than  half 
done  when  he  died.  Like  Carlyle's  French  Revolution,  his 
first  manuscript  was  destroyed,  but,  unlike  Carlyle,  McClel- 
lan  did  not  live  long  enough  fully  to  repair  his  loss. 

Mr.  Swinton  quotes  from  this  statement  of  General  Hal- 
leek  and  comments  upon  it  as  follows :  "I  stated  to  him 
[McClellan]  that  the  object  of  my  visit  was  to  ascertain  from 
him  his  views  and  wishes  in  regard  to  future  operations.  He 
said  that  he  proposed  to  cross  the  James  River  at  that  point 
[Harrison's  Landing.  General  Grant,  two  years  afterwards, 
crossed  a  few  miles  below],  attack  Petersburg,  and  cut  off 
the  enemy's  communications  by  that  route  South,  making  no 
further  demonstration,  for  the  present,  against  Richmond.  I 
stated  to  him  very  frankly  my  views  in  regard  to  the  danger 
and  impracticability  of  the  plan.  .  .  ."  3  "It  would  appear 
that  General  Grant  had  less  respect  for  General  Halleck's  views 
of  'the  danger  and  impracticability  of  the  plan,'  seeing  that 
two  years  afterwards  he  adopted  that  precise  plan,  and  took 
Richmond  and  destroyed  Lee  by  it!  Nor  can  it  be  said  that 
circumstances,  so  far  as  regards  the  defense  of  Washington, 
differed  in  the  one  case  from  those  in  the  other — excepting 
that  they  were  such  as  to  warrant  the  adoption  of  the  plan 
by  General  McClellan  much  more  than  by  General  Grant — 
for  in  1862  there  were  ten  men  left  behind  for  the  defense  of 
Washington  to  one  in  1864."  4 

2  Official  Record,  XI,  m,  337- 

3  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  I,  454. 
*  Army  of  the  Potomac,  168,  n. 


McCLELLAN  309 

The  situation  as  Mr.  Swinton  saw  it  was  then  as  follows : 
"In  transferring  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  the  James  River, 
the  fundamental  idea  of  its  commander  was  to  secure  a  line  of 
operations  whereby,  with  a  refreshed  and  re-enforced  army, 
a  new  campaign,  under  more  promising  auspices,  might  be 
undertaken.  The  position  of  the  army,  at  once  threatening 
the  communications  of  Richmond  and  enabling  it  to  spring 
on  the  rear  of  the  Confederate  force  should  it  attempt  an  ag 
gressive  movement  northward,  seemed  the  most  advantageous 
possible,  whether  for  offensive  operations  or  for  insuring  the 
safety  of  the  national  capital.  General  McClellan  brought 
back  to  Harrison's  Landing  between  eighty-five  thousand  and 
ninety  thousand  men;  and  his  view  was,  that  all  the  resources 
at  the  command  of  the  government  should  be  at  once  for 
warded  to  him.  Having  the  James  River  now  open,  a  line 
of  supplies,  he  had  formed  the  bold  design  of  transferring 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  the  south  bank  of  that  river,  and 
operating  against  the  communications  of  Richmond  by  way 
of  Petersburg."  5 

The  historian  adds :  "There  appears  at  first  to  have  been 
an  intention  on  the  part  of  the  administration  to  adopt  this 
judicious  course." 

On  the  26th  of  July  the  following  communication  was 
sent  to  the  new  general-in-chief : 

"HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

"BERKELEY,  July  26,  1862. 
"MAJ.-GEN.  H.  W.  HALLECK, 

"Commanding  U.  S.  Army : 

"GENERAL:  I  have  seen  to-day  nearly  a  thousand  of  our 
sick  and  wounded  just  returned  from  Richmond.  Some 
refugees  have  also  arrived  and  a  number  of  surgeons  and 
chaplains  taken  prisoners  at  Bull  Run.  All  of  these  who  have 
enjoyed  any  opportunities  of  observation  unite  in  stating  that 
re-enforcements  are  pouring  into  Richmond  from  the  South. 

"Dr.  L.  H.  Stone,  U.  S.  Army,  saw  at  Charlotte  from 
7,000  to  8,000  troops  en  route  to  Richmond.     He  and  others 
6  Ibid.,  167. 


3io  McCLELLAN 

unite  in  stating  that  it  is  quite  positive  that  the  troops  on 
James  Island  (Charlotte)  have  arrived  in  Richmond  and  that 
the  Southern  states  are  being  drained  of  their  garrisons  to 
re-enforce  the  army  in  my  front.  It  is  said  that  the  troops 
of  Beauregard's  old  army  are  also  en  route  hither.  This 
last  is  not  positive,  and  I  hope  to  learn  the  truth  in  regard  to  it 
to-morrow. 

'Three  regiments — one  South  Carolina,  one  North  Caro 
lina,  and  one  Georgia — reached  Richmond  yesterday.  Sup 
plies  are  being  rapidly  pushed  in  by  all  routes.  It  would  ap 
pear  that  Longstreet  is  in  front  of  Richmond  on  this  side  of 
the  James;  D.  H.  Hill  at  Fort  Darling  and  vicinity. 

"Our  cavalry  pickets  on  Charles  City  road  were  driven  in 
to-day  by  a  heavy  force  of  cavalry  and  some  artillery.  Aver- 
ill  started  after  them  with  a  sufficient  force.  I  have  not  yet 
heard  the  result. 

"Allow  me  to  urge  most  strongly  that  all  the  troops  of 
Burnside  and  Hunter,  together  with  all  that  can  possibly  be 
spared  from  other  points,  be  sent  to  me  at  once.  I  am  sure 
that  you  will  agree  with  me  that  the  true  defense  of  Wash 
ington  consists  in  a  rapid  and  heavy  blow  given  by  this  army 
upon  Richmond. 

"Can  you  not  possibly  draw  15,000  or  20,000  men  from 
the  West  to  re-enforce  me  temporarily?  They  can  return  the 
moment  we  gain  Richmond.  Please  give  weight  to  this  sug 
gestion;  I  am  sure  it  merits  it. 

"I  have  the  honor  to  be,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient 
servant, 

"CEO.  B.   McCLELLAN, 

"Major-General  Commanding."  ° 

Stanton's  letters  of  approval  and  affection  dated  July  5th 
should  be  remembered.  As  Mr.  Rhodes  admits,  nothing  could 
have  been  warmer  than  Stanton's  expression  of  confidence 
and  assurance  of  support.7  Yet,  about  the  middle  of  July, 
Chase  and  Stanton  advised  the  President  to  remove  McClel- 


6  Official  Record,  XI,  in,  333,  334. 
97- 


McCLELLAN 

Ian  and  send  Pope  to  the  James.  This  was  not  done,  but  the 
command  of  the  army  was  offered  to  Burnside,  who  refused 
it.8  Pope  told  Chase  about  the  same  time  that  he  had  urged 
the  President  to  displace  McClellan. 

A  rumor  having  reached  Washington  that  the  enemy  were 
moving  southward  with  their  main  force,  leaving  a  small  force 
in  Richmond,  General  Halleck  suggested  that  McClellan  press 
the  rebels  in  order  to  verify  the  report. 

Accordingly,  a  few  days  later  McClellan  reoccupied  Mal- 
vern  Hill  and  drove  the  rebels  toward  Richmond. 

On  the  2d  of  August  General  Dix,  in  a  letter  to  General 
Halleck  from  Fortress  Monroe,  said : 

"I  trust  the  importance  of  this  command  (though  I  could 
have  no  personal  objection)  may  not  be  increased  by  the  with 
drawal  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac;  a  measure,  as  I  learn, 
still  under  consideration.  I  cannot  err,  I  am  sure,  when  I  say 
it  would  be  nearly  fatal.  It  would  break  the  spirit  of  the  coun 
try,  now  exceedingly  depressed  in  some  quarters,  and  go  very 
far  to  insure  intervention  from  abroad.  If  we  can  ever  reach 
Richmond,  it  seems  to  me  the  object  can  be  best  effected  from 
the  position  we  now  occupy.  At  all  events  I  feel  a  painful 
conviction  that  we  cannot  bear  a  retrograde  movement  at  this 
moment.  I  have  conversed  freely  with  General  Burnside  on 
this  subject  before  you  were  here  and  since  his  return,  and 
he  concurs  with  me  entirely. 

"Excuse  these  suggestions,  and  believe  me,  respectfully 
and  truly,  yours, 

"JOHN  A.  Dix, 

"Major-General."  9 

I  find  no  answer  to  this  manly  and  patriotic  letter,  but  no 
doubt  it  was  communicated  by  General  Halleck  to  his  supe 
riors.  It  was  far  too  late  to  change  the  fixed  plans  of  the 
Administration;  but  if  it  had  been  three  weeks  earlier,  it  would 
have  been  equally  ignored.  It  was  useless  to  appeal  to  Hal 
leck.  He  was  merely  a  lever  moved  by  the  hand  of  Stanton. 

*Ibid.,  96,  103. 
9  Ibid.,  347,  348. 


312  McCLELLAN 

The  following  communication,  evidently  spontaneous,  I  re 
gard  of  high  value  to  the  student  of  this  period: 

"WASHINGTON,  July  30,  1862. 
"MAJ.-GEN.  GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN, 

"Commanding,  etc.,  Army  of  the  Potomac: 

"My  DEAR  GENERAL  :  You  are  probably  aware  that  I  hold 
my  present  position  contrary  to  my  own  wishes,  and  that  I  did 
everything  in  my  power  to  avoid  coming  to  Washington ;  but 
after  declining  several  invitations  from  the  President  I  re 
ceived  the  order  of  the  nth  instant,  which  left  me  no  option. 

"I  have  always  had  strong  personal  objections  to  min 
gling  in  the  politico-military  affairs  of  Washington.  I  never 
liked  the  place,  and  I  really  believed  I  could  be  much  more 
useful  in  the  West  than  here.  I  had  acquired  some  reputa 
tion  there,  but  here  I  could  hope  for  none,  and  I  greatly 
feared  that  whatever  I  might  do  I  should  receive  more  abuse 
than  thanks.  There  seemed  to  be  a  disposition  in  the  public 
press  to  cry  down  any  one  who  attempted  to  serve  the  country 
instead  of  party.  This  was  particularly  the  case  with  you, 
as  I  understood,  and  I  could  not  doubt  that  it  would  be  in  a 
few  weeks  the  case  with  me.  Under  these  circumstances  I 
could  not  see  how  I  could  be  of  much  use  here.  Nevertheless, 
being  ordered,  I  was  obliged  to  come. 

"In  whatever  has  occurred  heretofore  you  have  had  my 
full  approbation  and  cordial  support.  There  was  no  one  in  the 
army  under  whom  I  could  serve  with  greater  pleasure,  and 
I  now  ask  from  you  that  same  support  and  co-operation  and 
that  same  free  interchange  of  opinions  as  in  former  days. 
If  we  disagree  in  opinion,  I  know  that  we  \vill  do  so  hon 
estly  and  without  unkind  feelings.  The  country  demands  of 
us  that  we  act  together  and  with  cordiality.  I  believe  we  can 
and  will  do  so.  Indeed  we  must  do  so  if  we  expect  to  put 
down  the  rebellion.  If  we  permit  personal  jealousies  to  inter 
fere  for  a  single  moment  with  our  operations  we  shall  not 
only  injure  the  cause  but  ruin  ourselves.  But  I  am  satisfied 
that  neither  of  us  will  do  this,  and  that  we  will  work  together 
with  all  our  might  and  bring  the  war  to  an  early  termination. 


McCLELLAN  313 

"I  have  written  to  you  frankly,  assuring  you  of  my  friend 
ship  and  confidence,  believing  that  my  letter  would  be  received 
with  the  same  kind  feelings  in  which  it  is  written. 

"Yours  truly, 

"H.  W.  HALLECK."  10 

To  this  General  McClellan  made  a  very  able  and  inter 
esting  reply. 

"HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

"BERKELEY,  Aug.  i,  1862. 
"MAJ.-GEN.  H.  W.  HALLECK, 

"Commanding  U.  S.  Army : 

"MY  DEAR  GENERAL  :  Your  kind  and  very  welcome  let 
ter  of  the  3Oth  reached  me  this  evening. 

"My  own  experience  enables  me  to  appreciate  most  fully 
the  difficulties  and  unpleasant  features  of  your  position.  I 
have  passed  through  it  all  and  most  cordially  sympathize  with 
you,  for  I  regard  your  place,  under  present  circumstances,  as 
one  of  the  most  unpleasant  under  the  Government.  Of  one 
thing,  however,  you  may  be  sure,  and  that  is  of  my  full  and 
cordial  support  in  all  things. 

"Had  I  been  consulted  as  to  who  was  to  take  my  place  I 
would  have  advised  your  appointment.  So  far  as  you  are 
concerned  I  feel  toward  you  and  shall  act  precisely  as  if  I 
had  urged  you  for  the  place  you  hold.  There  is  not  one  par 
ticle  of  feeling  or  jealousy  in  my  heart  toward  you.  Set  your 
mind  perfectly  at  rest  on  that  score.  No  one  of  your  old 
and  tried  friends  will  work  with  you  more  cordially  and  more 
honestly  than  I  shall. 

"If  we  are  permitted  to  do  so,  I  believe  that  together  we 
can  save  this  unhappy  country  and  bring  this  war  to  a  com 
paratively  early  termination.  The  doubt  in  my  mind  is 
whether  the  selfish  politicians  will  allow  us  to  do  so.  I  fear 
the  results  of  the  civil  policy  inaugurated  by  recent  acts  of 
Congress  and  practically  enunciated  by  General  Pope  in  his 
series  of  orders  to  the  Army  of  Virginia. 

"It  is  my  opinion  that  this  contest  should  be  conducted 

10  Official  Record,  XI,  in,  343. 


314  McCLELLAN 

by  us  as  a  war,  and  as  a  war  between  civilized  nations;  that 
our  efforts  should  be  directed  toward  crushing  the  armed 
masses  of  the  rebels,  not  against  the  people ;  but  that  the  latter 
should,  so  far  as  military  necessities  permit,  be  protected  in 
their  constitutional,  civil,  and  personal  rights. 

"I  think  that  the  question  of  slavery  should  not  enter  into 
this  war.  Solely  making  military  uses  of  their  slaves,  we 
should  avoid  any  proclamations  of  general  emancipation,  and 
should  protect  inoffensive  citizens  in  the  possession  of  that, 
as  well  as  of  other  kinds  of  property.  If  we  do  not  actively 
protect  them  in  this  respect,  we  should  at  least  avoid  taking 
an  active  part  on  the  other  side,  and  let  the  negro  take  care 
of  himself. 

"The  people  of  the  South  should  understand  that  we  are 
not  making  war  upon  the  institution  of  slavery,  but  that  if 
they  submit  to  the  Constitution  and  laws  of  the  Union  they 
will  be  protected  in  their  constitutional  rights  of  every  nature. 
I  think  that  pillaging  and  outrages  on  persons  ought  not  to  be 
tolerated;  that  private  property  and  persons  should  enjoy  all 
the  protection  we  can  afford  them  compatible  with  the  necessi 
ties  of  our  position.  I  would  have  the  conduct  of  the  Union 
troops  present  a  strong  contrast  with  that  of  the  rebel  armies, 
and  prove  by  our  actions  that  the  Government  is,  as  we  pro 
fess  it  to  be,  benign  and  beneficent;  that  wherever  its  power 
extends,  protection  and  security  exist  for  all  who  do  not  take 
an  active  part  against  us.  Peculiar  circumstances  may  force 
us  to  depart  from  these  principles  in  exceptional  cases;  but  I 
would  have  these  departures  the  exceptions,  not  the  rule. 
I  and  the  army  under  my  command  are  fighting  to  restore  the 
Union  and  supremacy  of  its  laws,  not  for  revenge.  I  there 
fore  deprecate  and  view  with  infinite  dread,  any  policy  which 
tends  to  render  impossible  the  reconstruction  of  the  Union, 
and  to  make  this  contest  simply  a  useless  effusion  of  blood. 

"We  need  more  men!  The  old  regiments  of  this  army 
should  be  promptly  filled  by  immediate  drafting,  if  necessary. 
We  should  present  such  an  overwhelming  force  as  to  make 
success  certain,  be  able  to  follow  it  up,  and  to  convince  the 
people  of  the  South  that  resistance  is  useless. 


McCLELLAN  315 

"I  know  that  our  ideas  as  to  the  concentration  of  forces 
agree  perfectly.  I  believe  that  the  principles  I  have  expressed 
in  this  letter  accord  with  your  own  views.  I  sincerely  hope 
that  we  do  not  differ  widely. 

"You  see  I  have  met  you  in  your  own  spirit  of  frankness, 
and  I  would  be  glad  to  have  your  views  on  these  points,  that 
I  may  know  what  I  am  doing.  We  must  have  a  full  under 
standing  on  all  points,  and  I  regard  the  civil  or  political  ques 
tions  as  inseparable  from  the  military  in  this  contest. 

"It  is  unnecessary  for  me  to  repeat  my  objections  to  the 
idea  of  withdrawing  this  army  from  its  present  position. 
Every  day's  reflection  but  serves  to  strengthen  my  conviction 
that  the  true  policy  is  to  re-enforce  this  army  at  the  earliest 
possible  moment  by  every  available  man  and  to  allow  it  to 
resume  the  offensive  with  the  least  possible  delay. 

"I  am,  general,  your  sincere  friend, 

"GEO.    B.    McCLELLAN."11 

No  unbiased  mind  can  reflect  upon  the  contents  of  that 
letter  without  being  impressed  with  the  elevated  character  and 
splendid  ability  of  the  writer.  It  is  a  statesmanlike  production 
of  high  merit.  When  Malvern  Hill  was  reoccupied  General 
Sumner  sent  the  following  letter  to  a  friend  in  Washington : 

"CAMP  ON  JAMES  RIVER, 

"August  5,  1862. 
"GENERAL  JOHN  COCHRANE, 

"Washington,  D.  C. : 

"We  have  retaken  Malvern  Hill  today,  and  from  the  way 
I  am  told  the  enemy  behaved,  I  am  convinced  that  if  we  had 
a  re-enforcement  of  20,000  men  we  could  walk  straight  into 
Richmond.  Do  represent  this  in  the  right  quarter. 

"E.  V.  SUMNER, 

"Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  Army. 
"Approved. 

"R.  B.  MARCY, 

"Chief  of  Staff."  12 


11  Official  Record,  XI,  in,  345,  346. 
13  Ibid.,  356. 


316  McCLELLAN 

On  the  same  day,  in  a  letter  to  General  Halleck,  McClel- 
lan  said  :  "This  is  a  very  advantageous  position  to  cover  an 
advance  on  Richmond,  only  fourteen  and  three-quarter  miles 
distant,  and  I  feel  confident  that  with  re-enforcements  I  could 
march  this  army  there  in  five  days."  13 

The  curt  and  plainly  untrue  reply  was  doubtless  sent 
through  Halleck  rather  than  by  him. 


DEPARTMENT, 
"WASHINGTON  CITY,  August  5,   1862. 
"MAJOR-GENERAL  MCCLELLAN,  Berkeley  : 
"I  have  no  re-enforcements  to  send  you. 

"H.  W.  HALLECK, 

"General-in-Chief."  14 

McClellan  surmised  the  situation  at  Washington  and  the 
probable  fate  of  the  army  long  before  this,  as  a  few  extracts 
from  his  letters  to  his  wife  will  show  : 

He  wrote  on  July  the  loth,  "I  do  not  know  what  paltry 
trick  the  administration  will  play  next";15  on  July  the  I3th, 
"I  have  no  faith  in  the  administration";16  on  July  the  I7th: 
"You  need  not  be  at  all  alarmed  as  to  my  being  deceived  by 
them.  I  know  that  they  are  ready  to  sacrifice  me  at  any 
moment.  I  shall  not  be  at  all  surprised  to  have  some  other 
general  made  commander  of  the  whole  army,  or  even  to  be 
superseded  here."  1T  On  July  the  i8th  he  wrote,  "I  am  in 
clined  now  to  think  that  the  President  will  make  Halleck  com 
mander  of  the  army,  and  that  the  first  pretext  will  be  seized 
to  supersede  me  in  command  of  this  army."  18 

Certainly  he  had  the  gift  of  prophecy,  for  both  of  the 
events  he  predicted,  to  the  great  sorrow  of  the  country,  came 
to  pass.  On  July  the  igth  he  wrote  to  a  friend  in  New  York 
to  look  up  a  situation  for  him,  and  on  the  23d  he  wrote  : 

13  Official  Record,  I,  78. 

14/Wrf.,XI,  m,  359- 

15  McClellan,  Own  Story,  446. 

"Ibid.,  447. 

"  Ibid.,  449. 

18  Ibid.,  450. 


McCLELLAN  317 

"There  is  now  no  doubt  about  Halleck  being  made  commander 
in  chief.  The  other  change  will,  I  feel  sure,  follow  in  a  few 
days,  perhaps  a  week."  19 

But  when  Halleck  came  on  the  25th  he  was  evidently 
filled  with  the  true  Stantonian  inspiration,  as  he  was  so  cor 
dial  in  his  concurrence  with  the  commander's  views  that  Mc- 
Clellan  that  same  day  wrote  to  his  wife:  "I  think  Halleck 
will  support  me  and  give  me  the  means  to  take  Richmond. 
.  .  .  I  am  not  to  be  relieved  from  the  command  of  this 
army — at  least  that  does  not  seem  to  be  the  present  inten 
tion.  .  .  ."20 

A  few  days  later  he  returned  to  his  former  belief,  and  on 
July  the  3Oth  informed  Mrs.  McClellan:  "I  have  positive 
information  to-day  that  the  command  of  this  army  was 
pressed  upon  Burnside  and  that  he  peremptorily  declined  it. 
.  .  .  I  still  think  from  all  that  comes  to  me,  that  the 
chances  are  at  least  that  I  will  be  superseded."  21 

Abundant  time  was  taken  to  decide  upon  the  proper  re 
sponse  to  the  commander's  letters  of  August  the  ist,  and  when 
the  reply  came,  it  was  cordial,  conciliatory,  and  alluring. 

"HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY, 

"WASHINGTON,  August  7,  1862. 
"MAJOR  GENERAL  MCCLELLAN,  Berkeley : 

"Mv  DEAR  GENERAL:  Your  private  letter  of  the  ist  in 
stant  was  received  a  day  or  two  ago,  but  I  have  been  too  busy 
to  answer  it  sooner. 

"If  you  still  wish  it,  I  will  order  Barnard  here,  but  I  can 
not  give  you  another  engineer  officer  unless  you  take  Benham, 
for  you  already  have  a  larger  proportion  than  any  one  else. 
I  had,  most  of  the  time,  out  West  only  two,  and  you,  with  no 
larger  force,  have  a  dozen  engineer  officers. 

"I  fully  agree  with  you  in  regard  to  the  manner  in  which 
the  war  should  be  conducted,  and  I  believe  the  present  policy 
of  the  President  to  be  conservative. 


"Ibid.,  454- 
20  Ibid.,  455- 
31  Ibid.,  458. 


3i8  McCLELLAN 

"I  think  some  of  General  Pope's  orders  very  injudicious, 
and  have  so  advised  him ;  but  as  I  understand  they  were  shown 
to  the  President  before  they  were  issued  I  felt  unwilling  to  ask 
him  to  countermand  them.  An  oath  of  allegiance  taken 
through  force  is  not  binding,  and  to  put  over  the  lines  those 
who  do  not  take  it  is  only  adding  numbers  to  the  rebel  army. 
What  he  has  made  the  general  rule  should  be  only  the  excep 
tion,  and  I  have  so  advised  him. 

"I  deeply  regret  that  you  cannot  agree  with  me  as  to  the 
necessity  of  reuniting  the  old  Army  of  the  Potomac.  I,  how 
ever,  have  taken  the  responsibility  of  doing  so,  and  am  to  risk 
my  reputation  on  it.  As  I  told  you  when  at  your  camp,  it  is 
my  intention  that  you  shall  command  all  the  troops  in  Vir 
ginia  as  soon  as  we  can  get  them  together ;  and  with  the  army 
thus  concentrated  I  am  certain  that  you  can  take  Richmond. 
I  must  beg  of  you,  general,  to  hurry  along  this  movement. 
Your  reputation  as  well  as  mine  may  be  involved  in  its  rapid 
execution. 

"I  cannot  regard  Pope  and  Burnside  as  safe  until  you  re- 
enforce  them.  Moreover,  I  wish  them  to  be  under  your  im 
mediate  command  for  reasons  which  it  is  not  necessary  to 
specify.  As  things  now  are,  with  separate  commands,  there 
will  be  no  concert  of  action,  and  we  daily  risk  being  attacked 
and  defeated  in  detail.  I  would  write  you  more  fully,  but 
nearly  all  my  time  is  occupied  with  the  new  drafts  and  enlist 
ments.  They  are  doing  well,  but  several  weeks  must  elapse 
before  we  can  get  the  troops  into  the  field. 

"Bragg  seems  to  be  concentrating  a  large  force  against 
Buell,  and  the  latter  is  asking  for  re-enforcements.  When 
he  will  reach  Chattanooga  is  a  problem  I  am  unable  to  solve. 

"Yours  truly, 

"H.  W.  HALLECK."  22 

It  will  be  observed  that  this  letter  presents  the  President  in 
a  bad  light, — as  assenting  to  the  barbarous  orders  of  General 
Pope.  Mr.  Rhodes  adverts  to  the  same  fact,  almost  with 

n  Official  Record,  XI,  in,  359. 


McCLELLAN  319 

horror.23  This  incident  does  not  disturb  my  view  of  Mr. 
Lincoln's  naturally  humane  disposition.  His  retention  of  the 
orders  for  twenty-four  hours  is  a  redeeming  feature.  It 
shows  his  reluctance.  But  the  whole  matter  leaves  no  doubt 
that  the  President  was  not  a  free  agent;  that  he  was  in  the 
hands  of  Stanton  and  his  co-conspirators.  It  will  also  be 
observed  in  the  letter  that  General  Halleck  assumes  the  whole 
responsibility  of  the  removal  of  the  army,  as  if  the  project 
had  been  conceived  by  himself.  This  is  his  first  exercise  of 
the  function  of  scapegoat, — the  sole  purpose  of  his  office. 
But  no  one  is  misled  by  it.  Not  a  single  writer  gives  any 
attention  to  this  avowal  or  even  refers  to  it.  Where  the 
mainspring  of  the  removal  lay  was  too  well  understood  from 
the  beginning.  It  was  plainly  intended  that  McClellan  should 
understand  that  he  was  surely  to  have  command  of  the 
united  forces  in  Virginia.  Every  historian  speaks  of  this  as 
a  promise,24  but  the  letter  expresses  only  an  intention,  a  wish, 
which  the  Government  might  or  might  not  comply  with.  The 
sequel  proves  incontestably  that  there  was  no  thought  of 
giving  General  McClellan  such  command,  that  the  purpose 
was  never  seriously  entertained,  and  that,  on  the  contrary, 
the  settled  purpose  of  his  loving  friend  Mr.  Stanton  was  to 
get  rid  of  him,  after  having  used  his  military  talent  in  safely 
carrying  out  the  dangerous  enterprise  of  withdrawing  the 
army.  So  the  letter  was  a  bait,  a  lure  held  out  to  secure  Mc- 
Clellan's  assent  to  the  contemplated  movement.  It  implies 
a  dread  lest  he  might  divine  the  purpose  to  destroy  him,  reveal 
it  to  his  army,  and  defy  the  authorities.  He  did  at  least 
strongly  suspect  it,  as  his  letters  have  told  us ;  and  undoubtedly 
only  the  religious  element  in  his  nature  overcame  the  urgent 
temptation  to  resist. 

In  the  hands  of  a  Cromwell  or  a  Napoleon  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  at  this  time  would  have  been  an  imminent  peril 
to  Stanton  and  his  plots.  That  such  men  would  have  resisted 
is  certain. 


23  Rhodes,  History  of  the  United  States,  IV,  101. 
"Ibid.,  IV,  114. 


CHAPTER    LIV 

THE  SITUATION A  FIERCE  TEMPTATION 

There  is  no  good  in  mincing  words  about  the  situation. 
The  Army  of  the  Potomac,  both  officers  and  men,  with  almost 
absolute  unanimity,  as  well  as  the  naval  officers  on  the  James 
and  the  commander  at  Fortress  Monroe,  felt  that  it  was  a 
patriotic  duty  to  enlarge  the  army,  and  that  nothing  else 
was  needed  to  end  the  war  then  and  there. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  authorities,  in  disregarding  their 
clear  duty  and  in  removing  the  army,  were  taking  an  action 
which  was  hostile  to  the  safety  of  the  union,  and  which  was 
at  once,  and  not  without  cogent  reasons,  stigmatized  as  trai 
torous.  The  reasons  for  the  movement,  as  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  intimates,  were  political,  not  military.  It  was  a  means 
devised  by  Stanton  to  get  rid  of  McClellan.  General  Mc- 
Mahon  in  his  history  of  the  campaign  hints  that  the  army 
understood  this.  If  the  3,000  officers  and  over  60,000  men 
sacrificed  in  the  march  from  Culpeper  to  Richmond  two 
years  later  could  have  foreseen  what  the  removal  would 
bring  upon  them,  nothing  could  have  withheld  them  from 
revolt. 

A  word  from  McClellan  would  have  sufficed.  Cromwell 
would  have  spoken  it.  Napoleon  would  have  spoken  it. 
Either  of  the  men  whose  bayonets  cleared  the  legislative  halls 
of  England  and  of  France  would  have  torn  the  mask  from 
the  motives  of  the  civilian  conspirators,  turned  a  strong  light 
on  their  actions,  and  exposed  to  public  view  all  their  designs, 
showing  how  disastrous  they  were,  that  they  would  lead  in 
evitably  to  incalculable  sacrifice  of  treasure  and  of  life,  and 
that  these  conspirators  were  unfaithful  to  the  nation's  wel 
fare. 

And  then  what  ?  I  feel  sure  that  General  Grant,  Mr.  Stan- 
ton's  co-secretary  Gideon  Welles,  and  myself, — as  a  jury  of 

320 


McCLELLAN  321 

three, — would  have  rendered  a  unanimous  opinion  as  to  the 
result  of  such  resistant  action, — namely,  that  Stanton  would 
have  abandoned  his  design.  And  each  of  us  would  have 
rested  his  conclusion  upon  the  same  basis, — namely,  the  super- 
sensitive,  incurable,  and  astounding  timidity  of  the  Secretary 
of  War.  Even  as  it  was,  with  one  so  innocent  of  craft  and 
guile  as  McClellan,  Mr.  Stanton  was  on  the  verge  of  panic 
from  fright,  lest  the  army  would  refuse  to  return,  or,  return 
ing,  would  take  control  of  the  capital,  and,  viewing  him  as 
a  more  dangerous  enemy  to  them  and  to  the  Union  than  even 
Robert  E.  Lee,  would  deal  out  summary  justice  to  him.  His 
false  and  deluding  intimation  through  Halleck  that  McClel 
lan  would  have  supreme  command  of  the  united  armies 
could  mean  nothing  else.  It  would  not  have  been  necessary 
to  march  upon  Washington  nor  to  issue  any  blazon  of  de 
fiance.  The  most  delicate  conveyance  of  the  thought  that  the 
army  felt  that  its  safety  required  that  it  should  be  strength 
ened,  that  an  attempted  withdrawal  would  put  it  in  extreme 
peril  of  destruction,  that  there  was  far  less  danger  in  advanc 
ing  upon  Richmond  than  in  attempting  to  retire  to  Washing 
ton,  that  as  soon  as  a  third  or  a  half  of  the  army  had  set  out 
the  residue  would  be  overwhelmed  or  escape  only  with  great 
loss  of  life,  that  it  was  for  this  the  main  body  of  the  rebels 
had  been  for  more  than  a  month  and  were  yet  remaining  quiet 
at  Richmond,  and  finally  that  the  rebels  flushed  with  their 
success  against  the  retreating  army,  would  rout  Pope  and  his 
insufficient  reinforcements  and  capture  the  national  capital, 
would  have  been  amply  sufficient.  I  can  imagine  Cromwell 
bluntly  refusing  to  join  in  such  treachery  to  the  nation's  wel 
fare  and  affirming  it  to  be  his  duty  to  his  country  to  deal 
sternly  with  all  traitors  equally,  whether  masked  or  open; 
and  I  can  imagine  Napoleon  suavely  inoculating  "the  grim 
Secretary"  with  a  more  terrible  panic  than  that  which  Stone 
wall  Jackson  had  given  him,  by  the  adroit  suggestion  that  it 
would  be  highly  inexpedient  to  bring  the  army  into  the  vi 
cinity  of  Washington,  because  of  its  recognition  of  its  own 
strength,  because  of  its  intense  feeling  that  its  losses  were 
mainly  due  to  the  hostile  attitude  of  the  Government  in  taking 


322  McCLELLAN 

away  one-third  of  its  strength  at  the  outset  and  in  failing  to 
give  it  earnest  support  later,  and  above  all,  because  of  the 
fact  that  the  Government,  regardless  of  their  lives,  now  pur 
posed  that  they  should  drench  the  soil  of  Virginia  all  the 
way  from  Washington  to  Richmond  with  their  blood  in  order 
to  regain  what  the  Government  was  about  to  throw  away. 

The  result  of  such  an  attitude  cannot  be  open  to  serious 
question.  The  doughty  Secretary,  with  the  dagger  in  his 
vest,  would  have  sought  the  approval  of  such  a  commander 
more  sedulously  than  ever  suitor  wooed  the  darling  of  his 
heart,  and  it  would  have  been  interesting  to  see  how  swiftly 
reinforcements  would  have  come  from  those  who  had  told 
McClellan  they  had  none  to  send  him. 

What  convinces  me,  above  all,  is  the  ingratiating  tone  of 
Mr.  Stanton's  letters  of  July  the  5th,  at  a  time  when,  as  is 
now  recognized  by  every  thoughtful  student  of  that  period, 
his  hatred  of  the  General  was  intense  and  bitter.  Keeping 
that  virulent  enmity  in  mind,  no  one,  unless  under  the  spell, 
can  critically  read  those  letters  without  concluding  that  the 
heart  of  the  Secretary  was  far  more  responsive  to  fear  than 
to  love,  and  that  the  lightest  intimation  of  possible  peril  to 
himself,  if  the  army  should  not  be  heartily  supported,  would 
have  made  him  an  eager  and  compliant  supporter  of  the  com 
mander, — an  attentive  and  submissive  vassal.  Taken  with 
their  actual  settings,  the  letters  can  bear  no  other  import. 

On  July  the  3Oth  General  Halleck  communicated  to  Mc 
Clellan  a  rumor  that  the  rebels  were  retiring  southward  and 
that  the  force  in  Richmond  was  very  small ;  and  he  suggested 
that  the  enemy  be  pressed  in  order  to  ascertain  the  facts. 
A  similar  dispatch  was  sent  on  the  3ist.  They  both  reached 
Harrison's  Landing  on  the  ist  of  August.  On  the  3d  Mc 
Clellan  drove  the  rebels  from  Coggins  Point,  on  the  North 
bank  of  the  James.  On  the  2d  a  movement  had  been  started 
to  reoccupy  Malvern  Hill,  but  from  want  of  knowledge  of 
the  roads  it  was  deferred.  On  the  4th  this  design  was  car 
ried  out  by  General  Hooker,  as  we  have  stated. 

On  the  4th  came  the  prime  iniquity  of  the  war :  the  order 
for  the  withdrawal  of  the  army, — dated  August  3,  1862,  7 145 


M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  N  323 

p.  M.  The  vital  part  of  that  order  is  this:  "It  is  determined 
to  withdraw  your  army  from  the  Peninsula  to  Acquia  Creek. 
You  will  take  immediate  measures  to  effect  this,  covering 
the  movement  the  best  you  can."  1 

McClellan's  telegram  in  response  to  this  is  so  splendid, 
forceful,  and  patriotic  as  to  compel  the  applause  even  of  his 


"HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  O'F  THE  POTOMAC, 

"BERKELEY,  Aug.  4,  1862, — 12  M. 

"Your  telegram  of  last  evening  is  received.  I  must  con 
fess  that  it  has  caused  me  the  greatest  pain  I  ever  experi 
enced,  for  I  am  convinced  that  the  order  to  withdraw  this 
army  to  Acquia  Creek  will  prove  disastrous  to  our  cause.  I 
fear  it  will  be  a  fatal  blow.  Several  days  are  necessary  to 
complete  the  preparations  for  so  important  a  movement  as  this, 
and  while  they  are  in  progress  I  beg  that  careful  consideration 
may  be  given  to  my  statements. 

"This  army  is  now  in  excellent  discipline  and  condition. 
We  hold  a  debouche  on  both  banks  of  the  James  River,  so 
that  we  are  free  to  act  in  any  direction;  and  with  the  assist 
ance  of  the  gunboats  I  consider  our  communications  as  now 
secure. 

"We  are  25  miles  from  Richmond,  and  are  not  likely  to 
meet  the  enemy  in  force  sufficient  to  fight  a  battle  until  we 
have  marched  15  to  18  miles,  which  brings  us  practically 
within  10  miles  of  Richmond.  Our  longest  line  of  land  trans 
portation  would  be  from  this  point  25  miles,  but  with  the  aid 
of  the  gunboats  we  can  supply  the  army  by  water  during  its 
advance  certainly  to  within  12  miles  of  Richmond.  At  Acquia 
Creek  we  would  be  75  miles  from  Richmond,  with  land  trans 
portation  all  the  way. 

"From  here  to  Fort  Monroe  is  a  march  of  about  70  miles, 
for  I  regard  it  as  impracticable  to  withdraw  this  army  and 
its  material  except  by  land. 

"The  result  of  the  movement  would  thus  be  a  march  of 


1  Official  Record,  XT,  i,  80. 

2  Ibid.,  81,  82. 


324  McCLELLAN 

145  miles  to  reach  a  point  now  only  25  miles  distant,  and  to 
deprive  ourselves  entirely  of  the  powerful  aid  of  the  gunboats 
and  water  transportation.  Add  to  this  the  certain  demoraliza 
tion  of  this  army  which  would  ensue,  the  terribly  depressing 
effect  upon  the  people  of  the  North,  and  the  strong  probability 
that  it  would  influence  foreign  powers  to  recognize  our  ad 
versaries,  and  these  appear  to  me  sufficient  reasons  to  make 
it  my  imperative  duty  to  urge  in  the  strongest  terms  afforded 
by  our  language  that  this  order  may  be  rescinded,  and  that  far 
from  recalling  this  army,  it  may  be  promptly  reinforced  to  en 
able  it  to  resume  the  offensive. 

"It  may  be  said  that  there  are  no  reinforcements  avail 
able.  I  point  to  Burnside's  force;  to  that  of  Pope,  not  neces 
sary  to  maintain  a  strict  defensive  in  front  of  Washington  and 
Harper's  Ferry;  to  those  portions  of  the  Army  of  the  West 
not  required  for  a  strict  defensive  there.  Here,  directly  in 
front  of  this  army,  is  the  heart  of  the  rebellion.  It  is  here 
that  all  our  resources  should  be  collected  to  strike  the  blow 
which  will  determine  the  fate  of  the  nation.  All  points  of 
secondary  importance  elsewhere  should  be  abandoned,  and 
every  available  man  brought  here ;  a  decided  victory  here  and 
the  military  strength  of  the  rebellion  is  crushed.  It  matters 
not  what  partial  reverses  we  may  meet  with  elsewhere.  Here 
is  the  true  defense  of  Washington.  It  is  here,  on  the  banks 
of  the  James,  that  the  fate  of  the  Union  should  be  decided. 

"Clear  in  my  convictions  of  right,  strong  in  the  conscious 
ness  that  I  have  ever  been,  and  still  am,  actuated  solely  by  the 
love  of  my  country,  knowing  that  no  ambitious  or  selfish  mo 
tives  have  influenced  me  from  the  commencement  of  this  war, 
I  do  now  what  I  never  did  in  my  life  before,  I  entreat  that  this 
order  be  rescinded. 

"If  my  counsel  does  not  prevail,  I  will  with  a  sad  heart 
obey  your  orders  to  the  utmost  of  my  power,  directing  to  the 
movement,  which  I  clearly  foresee  will  be  one  of  the  utmost 
delicacy  and  difficulty,  whatever  skill  I  may  possess.  What 
ever  the  result  may  be — and  may  God  grant  that  I  am  mis 
taken  in  my  forebodings — I  shall  at  least  have  the  internal 
satisfaction  that  I  have  written  and  spoken  frankly,  and  have 


McCLELLAN  325 

sought  to  do  the  best  in  my  power  to  avert  disaster  from 
my  country. 

"GEO.   B.   McCLELLAN, 

"Major-General  Commanding. 
"MAJ.-GEN.  H.  W.  HALLECK, 

"Commanding  U.  S.  Army." 

This  appeal  reflects  the  highest  credit  upon  its  author,  and 
proves  that  with  his  apt  diction  and  vivid  manner  of  presenta 
tion  he  would  have  won  fame  as  a  public  speaker,  if  he  had 
devoted  attention  to  the  art  of  oratory.  The  following  pas 
sages  are  forceful  and  eloquent :  "It  may  be  said  that  there 
are  no  reinforcements  available.  I  point  to  Burnside's  force ; 
to  that  of  Pope,  not  necessary  to  maintain  a  strict  defensive 
in  front  of  Washington  and  Harper's  Ferry ;  to  those  portions 
of  the  Army  of  the  West  not  required  for  a  strict  defensive 
there.  Here,  directly  in  front  of  this  army,  is  the  heart  of 
the  rebellion.  It  is  here  that  all  our  resources  should  be  col 
lected  to  strike  the  blow  which  will  determine  the  fate  of  the 
nation.  All  points  of  secondary  importance  elsewhere  should 
be  abandoned,  and  every  available  man  brought  here;  a  de 
cided  victory  here  and  the  military  strength  of  the  rebellion 
is  crushed.  It  matters  not  what  partial  reverses  we  may  meet 
with  elsewhere.  Here  is  the  true  defense  of  Washington.  It 
is  here,  on  the  banks  of  the  James,  that  the  fate  of  the  Union 
should  be  decided." 

When  he  learned  of  the  order  of  withdrawal  it  is  said  that 
General  Hooker  urged  McClellan  to  disregard  it  and  to  push 
on  to  Richmond  from  Malvern  Hill.  On  August  the  nth  the 
following  letter  was  sent  to  the  commander,  and  it  shows 
clearly  the  spirit  of  the  army.3 

"HAXALL'S,  August  u,  1862. 
"GENERAL  R.  B.  MARCY, 

"Chief  of  Staff: 

"GENERAL:     Your  note  of  this  date  received.     There  are 
moments  when  the  most  decided  action  is  necessary  to  save  us 
from  great  disasters.     I  think  such  a  moment  has  arrived. 
8  Official  Record,  XI,  m,  369. 


326  McCLELLAN 

"The  enemy  before  us  is  weak.  A  crushing  blow  by  this 
army  at  this  time  would  be  invaluable  to  disconcert  the  troops 
of  the  enemy  to  the  north  of  us.  That  blow  can  be  made  in 
forty-eight  hours.  Two  corps  would  do  it,  and  be  in  position 
to  go  wherever  else  they  may  be  ordered  by  that  time. 

"From  all  I  can  learn  there  are  not  36,000  men  between 
this  and  Richmond,  nor  do  I  believe  they  [can]  get  more  be 
fore  we  can  whip  them.  I  have  guides  ready,  and  know  the 
roads  sufficiently  well  to  accomplish  anything  the  general 
wants. 

"I  write  this  as  a  friend.  I  shall  willingly  carry  out  the 
general's  orders,  be  they  what  they  may,  but  I  think  he  has 
an  opportunity  at  this  time  few  men  ever  attain. 

"Destroy  this,  and  whatever  I  have  said  shall  not  be  re 
peated  by  me. 

"Very  truly  yours, 

"A.  PLEASONTON." 

On  receipt  of  this  letter,  the  Commander,  being  heartily  in 
accord  with  General  Pleasonton's  views,  hurried  the  following 
message  to  the  General-in-Chief  :4 

"BERKELEY,  VA.,  August  12,  1862 — 4  p.  M. 

(Received  n  :8  P.  M.) 
"MAJ.-GEN.  H.  W.  HALLECK: 

"Information  from  various  sources  received  within  a  few 
days  past  goes  to  corroborate  the  evidence  you  have  received 
that  the  rebel  army  at  Richmond  has  been  much  weakened  by 
detachment  sent  to  Gordonsville,  and  that  the  remaining  forces 
have  been  so  much  dispersed  between  Richmond  and  this  place 
on  both  sides  of  the  James  River  as  to  render  it  doubtful  if 
they  can  be  concentrated  again  rapidly.  D.  H.  Hill,  with  a 
division  or  more,  is  in  the  vicinity  of  Petersburg;  others  are 
along  the  south  bank  of  James  River  back  of  Fort  Darling, 
and  I  am  quite  certain  that  Longstreet,  with  about  18,000  men, 
now  occupies  an  intrenched  position,  which  can  probably  be 
turned,  and  is  about  3  miles  above  Malvern  Hill.  I  can  in  for- 

4  Official  Record,  XI,  in,  372. 


M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  N  327 

ty-eight  hours  advance  on  him  and  either  drive  him  into  the 
works  around  Richmond  or  defeat  and  capture  his  force. 
Should  I  succeed  in  accomplishing  the  latter  I  see  but  little 
difficulty,  if  my  information  prove  correct,  in  pushing  rapidly 
forward  into  Richmond. 

"CEO.   B.   McCLELLAN, 

"Major-General." 

No  notice  was  taken,  it  seems,  of  this  suggestion.  If  the 
permission  had  been  granted,  the  second  battle  of  Bull  Run 
would  never  have  taken  place,  for  it  is  now  asserted  that  there 
were  actually  only  20,000  men  in  the  vicinity  of  Richmond 
at  that  time;  and  the  city  would  have  been  captured  probably 
before  Jackson  could  return. 

The  order  of  withdrawal  was  made,  and  there  was  evi 
dently  great  anxiety  at  Washington  to  know  if  it  would  be 
executed ;  the  time  no  doubt  went  on  leaden  feet,  as  it  seemed 
to  Mr.  Stanton.  For  a  while  there  was  frequent  goading,  cen 
suring,  and  menacing  from  Mr.  Stanton's  mouthpiece,  and 
there  were  also  explanations  and  remonstrances  from  Mc- 
Clellan. 

On  August  the  gth  Halleck  telegraphed :  "Considering 
the  amount  of  transportation  at  your  disposal,  your  delay  is 
not  satisfactory.  You  must  move  with  all  possible  celerity."  5 

On  the  loth  he  says :  "The  enemy  is  crossing  the  Rapidan 
in  large  force.  They  are  fighting  General  Pope  to-day;  there 
must  be  no  further  delay  in  your  movement.  That  which  has 
already  occurred  was  entirely  unexpected  and  must  be  satis 
factorily  explained.  Let  not  a  moment's  time  be  lost,  and  tele 
graph  me  daily  what  progress  you  have  made  in  executing  the 
order  to  transfer  your  troops."  6 

On  the  other  hand  we  may  well  surmise  that,  to  the  Secre 
tary's  intense  relief  and  delight,  McClellan's  replies  were  mild 
expostulations  and  explanations.  They  negatived  all  thought  of 
resistance.  This  course  mollified  his  superiors  to  some  extent, 

5  Ibid.,  85. 

"McClellan,  Own  Story,  501. 


328  McCLELLAN 

and  on  August  the  I2th  a  milder  letter  was  sent  to  him.  On 
the  same  day  McClellan  sent  further  explanations,  but 
added : 

"If  Washington  is  in  danger  now,  this  army  can  scarcely 
arrive  in  time  to  save  it ;  it  is  in  much  better  position  to  do  so 
from  here  than  from  Acquia." 

In  order  to  make  a  final  appeal,  McClellan  went  on  Au 
gust  1 3th  70  miles  to  Jamestown  Island,  and  not  succeeding  in 
communicating  with  Halleck,  went  on  to  Cherry  Stone  Inlet, 
opposite  Fortress  Monroe.  From  there  he  sent  a  despatch 
asking  General  Halleck  to  come  to  the  office  to  confer  with 
him.  No  answer  came,  and  an  hour  later  he  sent  a  second 
message.  At  1 140  A.  M.  of  the  i4th  came  the  following  tele 
gram : 7  "1:40  A.  M. — I  have  read  your  despatches.  There 
is  no  change  of  plans.  You  will  send  up  your  troops  as 
rapidly  as  possible.  There  is  no  difficulty  in  landing  them. 
According  to  your  own  accounts,  there  is  now  no  difficulty 
in  withdrawing  your  forces.  Do  so  with  all  possible  rapidity. 

"H.  W.  HALLECK, 

"Major-General." 

The  main  purpose  of  McClellan's  long  trip  was  lost,  for 
the  general-in-chief  left  the  office  at  once  after  sending  the 
despatch  and  so  made  the  desired  conference  impossible.  The 
struggle  was  over. 

"Attention  has  been  so  frequently  directed  to  McClellan's 
alleged  failure  to  seize  the  supreme  opportunity  that  it  is  a 
matter  of  ordinary  fairness  to  observe  that  the  plan  presented 
by  him  was  the  most  promising  strategy  of  this  whole  cam 
paign  both  for  security  to  Washington  and  for  positive  results. 
On  the  I4th  of  August  there  were  in  Richmond  and  the 
neighborhood  30,000  troops  at  the  outside;  and  the  bulk  of 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  was  in  Gordonsville  in  its 
vicinity.  It  was  on  this  very  day  that  McClellan  tried  to  have 
a  telegraphic  connection  with  Halleck,  when  he  intended  to 
beg  for  permission  to  throw  his  81,000  soldiers  upon  Rich 
mond.  Himself  thirsting  to  retrieve  his  failing  fortunes  by  a 

7  McClellan,  Own  Story,  504. 


McCLELLAN  329 

plan  of  his  own,  his  men  and  most  of  his  officers  devoted  to 
him,  Sumner  and  Hooker  full  of  the  purpose  and  eager  to 
fight,  Franklin  and  Porter  bound  to  him  by  hoops  of  steel, 
it  is  not  improbable  that  he  would  have  taken  Richmond  and 
held  it,  the  gunboats  maintaining  communication  until  the 
whole  energy  of  the  Government  had  been  turned  to  his  sup 
port.  .  .  .  But  Halleck  would  consent  to  no  alteration  of 
his  plan."  8 

"Rhodes,  History  of  the  United  States,  IV,  117. 


CHAPTER    LV 

VIEWS   OF   THE   ENEMY   AND   OTHERS 

Miss  Johnston,  the  brilliant  Southern  novelist-historian, 
in  The  Long  Roll  has  given  a  vivid  picture  of  this  period  of 
the  war  in  Virginia  and  of  the  acts  and  thoughts  of  the  peo 
ple  in  Richmond  at  that  time.  She  tells  us  that  "McClellan 
claimed  quite  rightly  that  here  and  now,  with  his  army  on 
both  sides  of  the  James,  he  held  the  key-position,  and  that  with 
sufficient  reinforcements  he  could  force  the  evacuation  of 
Richmond,"  and  she  also  tells  us,  with  equal  sureness,  that 
"the  desire  of  the  moment  most  at  the  heart  of  Robert  E.  Lee 
was  that  General  McClellan  should  be  recalled."  l  Mr.  Eg- 
gleston,  the  latest  Southern  historian,  corroborates  this  by  stat 
ing  that  Lee  at  that  time  sought  to  put  Washington  in  fear,  so 
that  McClellan  would  be  withdrawn,2  and  also  that  Lee  sent 
reinforcements  to  Jackson  as  rapidly  as  McClellan's  with 
drawal  rendered  it  prudent  for  him  to  deplete  the  army  that 
was  defending  Richmond. 

The  most  ardent  Southerner  of  them  all,  Mr.  Pollard,  bears 
evidence  that  "the  main  part  of  General  Lee's  army  waited 
at  Richmond  the  development  of  McClellan's  intentions."  3 

But  we  need  not  rest  our  conclusions  upon  the  Southern 
historians.  We  have  the  satisfaction  of  hearing  from  General 
Lee  directly.  On  August  the  I4th  he  writes  to  Gen.  G.  W. 
Smith:  "Should  you  be  able  to  ascertain  whether  General 
McClellan  is  diminishing  his  force  at  his  present  position, 
please  let  me  know,  and  to  what  point  they  are  being  sent. 
It  may  be  necessary  in  that  event  to  reduce  our  own  force 
correspondingly  or  to  withdraw  it  entirely.  I  wish  you  to 
keep  this  contingency  constantly  in  view.  Generals  D.  H. 
Hill  and  Hampton  have  instructions  to  keep  out  scouts  and 


1  The  Long  Roll,  446. 

2  History  of  the  Confederate  War,  I,  416. 
8  The  Lost  Cause,  302. 

330 


McCLELLAN  331 

to  use  every  means  in  their  power  to  ascertain  General  Mc- 
Clellan's  movements.  Lieut.-Col.  E.  R.  Alexander  has  under 
taken  measures  to  the  same  end."  4  A  similar  letter  was  sent 
to  General  D.  H.  Hill  on  August  the  I3th. 

Mr.  Swinton  pointedly  remarks :  "Now  it  is  a  curious 
circumstance  that  at  this  time  there  was  another  person  fully 
as  anxious  as  General  Halleck  to  have  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac  leave  the  Peninsula.  That  person  was  General  Lee."  5 

"The  misguided  advisers  of  the  President  and  the  Confed 
erate  commander  were  aiming  at  the  same  object."  ° 

"All  the  successes  and  sacrifices  of  the  army  were  now  to 
be  worse  than  lost.  They  were  to  be  thrown  away  by  the 
withdrawal  of  the  army  from  the  Peninsula  instead  of  rein 
forcing  it."  7 

General  Dodge  puts  the  matter  with  equal  cogency.8 

Long  after,  heartsick  over  the  Administration's  methods 
and  also  over  the  dwindling  away  of  the  army,  from  desertions 
even  more  than  from  battle,  Generals  Franklin  and  Smith,  on 
December  the  2ist,  1862,  felt  bound  to  write  a  letter  to  the 
President  urging  again  the  coast  route.  Probably  this  re- 
indorsement  of  the  coast  route,  and  impliedly  of  McClellan, 
was  a  factor  in  the  removal  of  these  generals  in  January,  1863. 

This  \vas  only  McClellan's  plan  over  again, — a  colossal 
force,  concentration,  and  getting  close  to  Richmond  without 
loss  of  strength.  And  the  answer  signed  by  the  President, 
but  doubtless  emanating  from  Stanton,  is  the  answer  of  the 
timid  hearts  again ;  and  the  pith  of  it  is  as  follows :  "But 
now,  as  heretofore,  if  you  go  to  the  James  River,  a  large 
part  of  the  army  must  remain  on  or  near  the  Fredericksburg 
line  to  protect  Washington.  It  is  the  old  difficulty." 

The  demonstration  of  the  advantages  of  the  James  came 
almost  three  years  later  when,  after  a  frightful  waste  of  life 
and  money,  the  army  of  General  Grant  established  itself  there 
and  there  gave  a  quietus  to  the  rebellion. 

*  Official  Record,  II,  in,  677. 

6  Army  of  the  Potomac,  171. 

8  Upton,  Military  Policies  of  the  United  States,  371. 

7  General  Averill,  Battles  and  Leaders,  11,  433. 

8  Bird's-Eye  View  of  the  Civil  War,  70. 


332  McCLELLAN 

Whether  an  act  so  detrimental  to  the  Union  cause  sprang 
solely  from  timidity  or  partly  from  fear  of  McClellan's  acquir 
ing  too  great  a  prestige,  or  from  a  mingling  of  both,  is  a  ques 
tion  which  need  not  now  detain  the  reader.  To  fix  the  exact 
responsibility  of  Mr.  Stanton,  and  of  those  whom  he  per 
suaded  or  coerced  into  compliance  with  his  desires,  is  not  the 
object  of  this  book.  My  purpose  is  to  make  it  clear  that  if 
he  had  not  been  torn  away  from  his  campaign  there  is  no 
reason  to  doubt  that  the  war  would  have  been  swiftly  ended 
by  McClellan. 

The  withdrawal  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  a  sur 
render  to  the  Confederates  of  the  most  valuable  position  in 
the  whole  domain  of  war;  but  it  was  still  worse  in  its  opera 
tion  in  that  it  interrupted  a  campaign  and  needlessly  forced 
it  to  a  close  when  it  was  only  midway  in  its  progress,  with 
every  prospect  of  full  success  directly  before  it.  It  has  been 
the  fashion,  even  with  General  McClellan's  friends,  to  say  that 
the  campaign  was  a  failure.  It  was  not  a  failure.  It  was 
fruitless :  it  had  gained  nothing  for  the  Union,  not  because  it 
had  failed,  but  because  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  com 
pelled  to  desist,  just  when  it  was  most  eager  to  continue,  and 
surest  of  success.  In  other  words,  it  was  prevented  from 
doing  what  it  could  have  done,  which  is  a  very  different  thing 
from  failure.  A  workman  set  to  do  a  task,  but  called  away 
before  it  is  quite  finished  to  do  something  else  which  his 
employer  deems  more  pressing,  has  not  failed.  He  has  merely 
been  prevented  from  finishing  his  job.  Stanton,  we  may 
assume,  started  the  report  that  the  campaign  had  failed;  but 
why  should  anyone  else  accept  that  absurd  and  illogical 
idea  ?  The  army  was  midway  in  its  campaign.  It  was  flushed 
with  hope  and  confident  of  success;  and  the  belief  is  now 
practically  universal  that  it  needed  only  the  cordial  support  of 
the  Government  to  crown  the  campaign  with  a  glorious  vic 
tory.  General  Upton  emphasizes  the  point  that  the  campaign 
had  not  failed,9  "40,000  men  could  have  been  given  to  McClel 
lan  at  once  and  100,000  a  month  later."  10 


9  Military  Policy  of  the  United  States,  324. 

10  Ibid.,  323- 


M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  N  333 

The  crafty  device  of  dubbing  the  campaign  a  failure  was 
conceived  to  divert  the  blame  from  those  to  whom  it  be 
longed,  and  to  destroy  a  supposedly  dangerous  political  rival. 

We  have  seen  the  noble  struggle  which  McClellan  made 
to  remain,  for  the  good  of  the  country  and  the  glory  of  the 
army;  yet  I  am  sure  that  in  spite  of  it  all  a  very  common  idea 
disseminated  by  the  wily  Secretary  of  War  was,  not  that  the 
army  which  was  like  a  hound  tugging  at  the  leash  had  been 
dragged  away  from  its  work  when  it  was  feverishly  eager  to 
pursue  it,  but  that  the  army  had  failed.  Stanton  tried  to 
create  the  impression  that  McClellan  had  failed  and  was  some 
way  in  disgrace ;  and  that  the  army,  not  being  of  the  slightest 
use  where  it  was,  had  been  brought  back  to  defend  the  Na 
tional  capital,  which  many  suppose  was  in  danger  of  attack 
by  the  whole  force  of  the  Confederacy. 

If  there  had  been  the  slightest  good  faith  in  the  assurance 
that  McClellan  on  his  return  would  command  all  the  Federal 
armies  in  Virginia,  he  should  have  been  given  that  command 
before  a  soldier  moved  from  the  James.  There  would  then 
in  all  probability  have  been  no  Bull  Run  No.  2,  for  General  Mc 
Clellan  would  have  taken  prudent  measures  to  ensure  the  union 
of  the  armies,  before  a  general  engagement  could  take  place. 

As  it  was,  General  Pope  was  left  to  his  own  devices  and 
was  quickly  confronted  with  greatly  superior  numbers  as  well 
as  greatly  superior  military  ability,  for  as  rapidly  as  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  set  out  from  the  James  just  so  rapidly  did 
General  Lee  swell  the  rebel  forces  in  front  of  Pope;  and  he 
soon  hurried  to  the  field  in  person. 

If  General  Lee  had  chosen  to  harass  the  withdrawing 
army,  there  would  have  been  great  difficulty  in  the  retreat  and 
the  safety  of  the  army  would  have  been  imperiled ;  but,  hav 
ing  a  choice  of  adversaries,  he  chose  Pope.  n  The  greater  part 
of  the  sick  having  been  already  forwarded,  two  corps  of  the 
army  were  started  off,  one  on  the  I4th  and  the  other  on  the 
1 5th  of  August,  and  the  rest  followed  promptly.  General 
Porter  led  the  van,  and  reached  Williamsburg  on  the  i6th. 
Here  he  was  to  wait  until  the  whole  army  had  gathered  there ; 
11  Rhodes,  History  of  the  United  States,  IV,  115,  116, 


334  McCLELLAN 

but  from  the  chance  capture  of  a  rebel  letter  he  learned  that 
Pope  was  in  danger,  and  on  his  own  responsibility  he  hastened 
on  to  Newport  News  and  took  the  first  transports  for  Acquia 
Creek.  The  other  corps  were  shipped  from  Yorktown,  Fort 
ress  Monroe,  and  Newport  News  as  fast  as  they  could  be  em 
barked. 

Having  carefully  supervised  the  whole  movement,  General 
McClellan  himself  left  the  Peninsula  on  the  evening  of  August 
23d  and  landed  at  Acquia  at  daylight  on  the  24th.  The  in 
famy  was  complete.  The  act  of  virtual  treason  was  consum 
mated.  Richmond  and  the  cause  of  the  Confederacy  were 
delivered  from  imminent  peril,  and  now  Washington  and  the 
Union  were  in  danger.  But  the  wings  of  a  dangerous  politi 
cal  rival  had  been  clipped,  and  the  glory  which  would  have 
come  to  him  from  a  swift  and  brilliant  extinction  of  the  rebel 
lion  had  been  wrested  from  him.  General  Upton  says :  "On 
August  3d  at  7 145  p.  M.  Halleck  sent  the  fatal  despatch 
which  to  the  joy  of  the  Confederates  relieved  them  of  all 
immediate  anxiety  as  to  the  safety  of  their  capital."  12  "There 
is  every  reason  to  believe  that  he  was  but  carrying  out  a 
program  suggested  by  the  Secretary  of  War."  13  The  civil 
ians  at  Washington,  who  were  at  the  same  time  the  supreme 
military  authorities,  had  backed  the  army  away  from  the  re 
doubts  of  Richmond  and  from  its  secure  base  on  the  James, 
forcing  it  to  fight  its  way  back  again  during  three  years  of 
fierce  struggle,  dyeing  the  red  soil  of  Virginia  to  a  deeper 
crimson  every  foot  of  the  way,  at  the  cost  altogether  of  more 
than  600,000  lives. 


™  Military  Policy  of  the  United  States,  324. 
13  Ibid.,  326. 


CHAPTER   LVI 

A  CRAFTY  SCHEME HOW  THE  PROMISE  WAS  KEPT DESPOILED 

OF  HIS  ARMY POPE'S  CAMPAIGN M'CLELLAN's  TORTURE 

Immediately  on  his  arrival  at  Acquia,  General  McClellan 
reported  to  Halleck  for  orders,  and  also  indicated  his  desire 
to  know  if  the  promise  to  put  him  in  command  was  to  be 
kept. 

"On  the  evening  of  Aug.  23,  I  sailed  with  my  staff  for 
Acquia  Creek,  where  I  arrived  at  daylight  on  the  following 
morning,  reporting  to  General  Halleck  as  follows :  'Acquia 
Creek,  Aug.  24,  1862. — I  have  reached  here,  and  respectfully 
report  for  orders.'  ...  I  also  telegraphed  as  follows  to 
General  Halleck:  'Morell's  scouts  report  Rappahannock  Sta 
tion  burned  and  abandoned  by  Pope  without  any  notice  to 
Morell  or  Sykes.  This  was  telegraphed  you  some  hours  ago. 
Reynolds,  Reno,  and  Stevens  are  supposed  to  be  with  Pope, 
as  nothing  can  be  heard  of  them  to-day.  Morell  and  Sykes 
are  near  Morrisville  Postoffice,  watching  the  lower  fords  of 
the  Rappahannock,  with  no  troops  between  there  and  Rappa 
hannock  Station,  which  is  reported  abandoned  by  Pope. 
Please  inform  me  immediately  exactly  where  Pope  is  and 
what  doing;  until  I  know  that,  I  cannot  regulate  Porter's 
movements.  He  is  much  exposed  now,  and  decided  measures 
should  be  taken  at  once.  Until  I  know  what  my  command 
and  my  position  are  to  be,  and  whether  you  still  intend  to  place 
me  in  the  command  indicated  in  your  first  letter  to  me,  and 
orally  through  General  Burnside  at  the  Chickahominy,  I  can 
not  decide  where  I  can  be  of  most  use.  If  your  determina 
tion  is  unchanged,  I  ought  to  go  to  Alexandria  at  once.  Please 
define  my  position  and  duties.'  "  1 

The  reply  ignores  the  most  vital  point, — the  command : 

1  McClellan,  Own  Story,  508. 

335 


336  M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  N 

"Aug.  24. — You  ask  me  for  information  which  I  cannot 
give.  I  do  not  know  where  either  General  Pope  is  or  where 
the  enemy  in  force  is.  These  are  matters  which  I  have  all  day 
been  most  anxious  to  ascertain."  2 

On  the  26th  General  Halleck  directed  him  to  go  to  Alex 
andria,  but  said  nothing  of  the  command.  McClellan  went 
to  Alexandria  at  once,  and  on  the  following  day  was  ordered 
to  "take  entire  direction  of  the  sending  out  of  the  troops  from 
Alexandria."  3  Here  was  the  commander  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  reduced  and  degraded  to  the  petty  function  of  for 
warding  troops,  and  in  command  of  nothing. 

Such  was  the  fulfilment  of  the  promise  that  he  should  have 
the  command  of  the  united  armies.  On  the  2/th  McClellan 
again  made  an  effort  to  get  an  answer  from  Halleck.  "Please 
inform  me  at  once  what  my  position  is.  I  do  not  wish  to  act 
in  the  dark."  The  reply  was — silence.  On  the  2Qth  the  Presi 
dent's  anxiety  caused  him  to  despatch  and  enquire  for  news 
directly  of  McClellan,  and  after  answering  the  inquiry  and 
making  certain  suggestions  the  General  seized  the  opportunity 
to  say :  "Tell  me  what  you  wish  me  to  do,  and  I  will  do  all 
in  my  power  to  accomplish  it.  I  wish  to  know  what  my  orders 
and  authority  are.  I  ask  for  nothing,  but  will  obey  whatever 
orders  you  will  give.  I  only  ask  a  prompt  decision,  that  I  may 
at  once  give  the  necessary  orders.  It  will  not  do  to  delay 
longer."  4  But  the  President  thought  it  would  do,  and  did  not 
deem  that  the  appeal  demanded  the  civility  even  of  notice. 
Like  General  Halleck,  he  forgot  to  refer  to  it.  Surely,  the  man 
who  drew  upon  himself  this  almost  brutal  discourtesy  of  his 
superiors,  must  have  been  guilty  of  some  unspeakable  enor 
mity.  The  manner  of  meeting  the  appeal  was  so  perfectly 
identical  in  both  instances  as  to  indicate  the  same  governing 
mind, — that  of  Stanton.  His  design  clearly  was  to  humiliate 
McClellan  as  far  as  possible  by  forcing  him  to  discharge  almost 
menial  services  while  Pope  was  commanding  the  united  armies 
and,  as  the  Secretary  believed,  winning  a  glorious  and  decisive 


3  McClellan,  Own  Story,  508. 
•Ibid.,  95- 
.,  98. 


M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  N  337 

victory,  which  would  prove  to  the  nation  that  there  was  no 
further  need  for  McClellan.  As  rapidly  as  they  arrived  from 
the  Peninsula,  the  various  corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
hastened  forward  to  General  Pope.  Porter  and  Heintzelman 
were  the  first  to  join  him,  about  August  22d  and  23d.  Frank 
lin  reached  Acquia  on  the  23d,  Stunner  on  the  27th.  The 
troops  of  Franklin  and  Stunner  were  first  to  be  retained  for 
the  defense  of  Washington,  but  later,  August  the  29th,  Frank 
lin  was  sent  on,  and  on  the  next  morning  Stunner  followed. 
McClellan  exhorted  Franklin  to  uphold  the  honor  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  and  Franklin  vehemently  assured  McClellan 
that  he  would  do  so. 

On  August  the  3Oth  McClellan' s  command  was  fixed  by 
the  following  paragraph  in  an  order  from  the  Secretary  of 
War :  "General  McClellan  commands  that  portion  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  that  has  not  been  sent  forward  to 
General  Pope's  command."  5  The  grim  sarcasm  of  this  order 
is  manifest  only  after  reading  the  despatch  sent  to  the  Gen 
eral-in-Chief  by  McClellan  at  an  earlier  hour  on  the  same  day 
in  which  he  said :  "You  now  have  every  man  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  who  is  within  my  reach."  In  other  words,  to 
McClellan  this  facetious  order  meant :  "You  are  to  command 
—nothing." 

Meantime,  let  us  see  what  was  happening  at  the  front. 
On  the  Qth  of  August  the  Union  forces  of  Northern  Virginia, 
shrunk  in  some  amazing  way  from  80,000  or  more  to  50,000, 
was  at  Culpeper  under  General  Pope.  Finding  from  his  "In 
formation  Bureau"  that  the  removal  of  McClellan  was  irrev 
ocably  fixed  upon,  General  Lee  sent  Gen.  A.  P.  Hill  to  the 
aid  of  Jackson  to  attack  Pope.  Banks  met  him  with  such 
vigor  and  gallantry  at  Cedar  Mountain  that,  though  he  had 
but  10,000  against  25,000,  Jackson  retired  across  the  Rapidan. 
A  period  of  calm  followed,  until  the  actual  withdrawal  of  the 
army  from  the  James  made  it  safe  further  to  reduce  Lee's 
army  and  to  enlarge  that  of  Jackson.  Accordingly,  all  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  being  at  Fortress  Monroe  or  close  to 
it,  on  .August  20th  Longstreet  had  been  added  to  Jackson. 
•Ibid.,  103. 


338  M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  N 

Wiser  than  his  vaunting  words  on  taking  command,  which 
implied  that  he  could  never  retreat,  General  Pope  withdrew  to 
the  northeast  bank  of  the  Rappahannock.  We  are  told  that 
one-third  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  marching  to  meet 
him.  It  seems  obvious  that  he  should  have  continued  to  retire 
until  the  full  expected  strength  of  his  army  had  been  gained. 
Lee,  who  had  now  come  in  person,  did  not  try  to  force  the 
passage  of  the  river,  but  sent  Jackson  on  a  long  detour  to 
the  northwest  to  cross  the  river  higher  up,  pass  through 
Thoroughfare  Gap,  destroy  Pope's  communications,  and  fall 
upon  his  rear.  General  Pope  learned  of  the  departure  of  Jack 
son  and  formed  the  bold  plan  of  attacking  Lee  while  his  ad 
venturous  lieutenant  was  away;  but  a  flood  saved  him  from 
this  measure  of  rashness.  About  this  time  Stuart's  cavalry 
made  a  daring  raid  on  Catlett,  captured  General  Pope's  papers, 
made  the  few  camp  attaches  feel  that  the  whole  rebel  army 
was  upon  them,  and  threw  the  gentle  head  of  the  War  Depart 
ment  almost  into  a  spasm  of  panic.  The  swift  Jackson  was 
held  inactive  at  Waterloo.  All  this  was  most  providential,  if 
General  Pope  could  have  so  seen  it,  as  it  gave  him  abundant 
opportunity  to  march  toward  the  forces '  advancing  to  his 
support,  thus  hastening  the  union,  shortening  his  line  of  com 
munication,  and  bringing  himself,  if  necessary,  within  the 
aegis  of  the  river  fleet, — the  terror  of  Rebeldom.  But  he  had 
no  thought  of  this  kind.  Learning  of  Jackson's  further  move 
ment,  he  again  thought  of  crossing  the  river  and  attacking 
Lee. 

Jackson  crossed  at  Waterloo  early  on  the  25th,  marched 
fifty  miles  in  thirty-six  hours,  and  before  the  26th  ended  was 
wrecking  the  supplies  and  munitions  of  war  of  the  Union 
army  at  Bristoe  and  Manassas.  Pope  was  dazed  ;  Washington, 
in  a  frenzy  of  dread. 

Franklin,  who  was  now  at  Alexandria,  sent  out  a  brigade 
to  Bull  Run;  but  finding  Jackson's  force  too  great  to  contend 
with,  this  force  retired  to  Centreville.  Longstreet  pursued 
Jackson's  circuitous  path  to  reinforce  him.  On  the  28th,  Mc 
Dowell  occupied  Gainesville  and  Haymarket.  This  planted 
him  between  Longstreet  and  Jackson,  and  he  wished  to  advance 


McCLELLAN  339 

upon  Jackson.  He  had  Jackson  in  a  trap,  but  General  Pope 
set  Jackson  free  again  by  withdrawing  McDowell  to  Manassas, 
thus  throwing  away  a  great  opportunity.  However,  the  possi 
bility  of  retiring  beyond  Bull  Run  until  all  his  troops  should 
come  up  was  still  open  to  him. 

He  now  rashly  concluded  to  regain  the  advantage  seized  by 
McDowell  and  released  by  himself.  Pope  imagined  that  he 
had  only  Jackson  to  meet,  but  Longstreet  was  there  and 
formed  the  rebel  right  wing.  This  was  the  battle  of  Groveton. 
The  Federal  army  acquitted  itself  with  credit,  but  the  foe  was 
not  driven  away;  and  as  the  army  was  now  out  of  supplies 
General  Pope  should  at  last  have  retired.  It  is  reckless  to 
wage  warfare  with  hungry  soldiers.  Pope  could  have  avoided 
it,  but  he  did  not.  He  resumed  the  attack  on  the  3Oth,  only 
to  be  driven  back  at  every  point.  This  was  the  second  battle 
of  Bull  Run  and  came  very  near  being  a  fatal  defeat.  Pope 
now  withdrew  to  Centreville,  where  a  second  fatality  menaced 
him,  for  the  nimble  Jackson  would  have  intercepted  his  retreat 
to  Fairfax,  had  not  the  pluck  of  Reno  and  Kearney  balked 
the  intent.  In  these  last  operations  some  days  were  spent. 
The  fight  of  Chantilly  was  on  September  2d.  The  result  of  it 
all  was  a  speedy  and,  as  a  veracious  officer  of  the  Southern 
army  who  saw  it  described  it  to  me,  a  very  panicky  retreat 
of  the  Union  army  within  the  defenses  of  Washington.  Thet 
Army  of  the  Potomac  was  now  flying  from  the  same  enemy 
into  which  it  had  set  its  fangs  so  deeply  a  few  weeks  before 
along  the  Chickahominy  and  at  Malvern  Hill. 

On  the  morning  of  the  3Oth  McClellan  heard  the  heavy 
firing  at  the  second  battle  of  Bull  Run,  and  the  emotions  it 
awakened  in  this  patriotic  officer  may  be  easily  conjectured. 
Late  that  night  the  following  telegram  was  despatched  to  the 
general-in-chief :  "I  cannot  express  to  you  the  pain  and 
mortification  I  have  experienced  to-day  in  listening  to  the  dis 
tant  sound  of  the  firing  of  my  men.  As  I  can  be  of  no 
further  use  here,  I  respectfully  ask  that,  if  there  is  a  proba 
bility  of  the  conflict  being  renewed  to-morrow,  I  may  be  per 
mitted  to  go  to  the  scene  of  the  battle  with  my  staff,  merely 


340  McCLELLAN 

to  be  with  my  own  men,  if  nothing  more.  They  will  fight 
none  the  worse  for  my  being  with  them.  If  it  is  not  deemed 
best  to  entrust  me  with  the  command  of  my  own  army, 
I  simply  ask  to  be  permitted  to  share  their  fate  on  the  field  of 
battle.  Please  reply  to  this  to-night." 

To  this  feeling  request  General  Halleck  replied  the  next 
morning  in  effect  that  he  must  consult  the  President.  There 
was  never  any  further  reply.  As  the  President  expressed  it 
later,  with  more  force  than  feeling,  McClellan  was  left,  with 
out  men  or  orders,  "gnawing  a  file."  This-  was  a  critical 
period  in  which  the  cause  of  the  Union  needed  all  its  friends. 
Yet  here  was  a  general  who  had  just  met  Lee,  with  honor  to 
the  nation,  and  who  was  pleading  to  meet  him  again, — plead 
ing  in  vain.  He  was  "gnawing  a  file."  That  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  loved  him  beyond  all  other  men  was  recognized, 
and  from  this  the  natural  inference  flows  that  they  would  do 
more  for  him  than  for  any  other  man.  The  soldiers  loved 
him  not  merely  because  of  his  kind  and  thoughtful  care  of 
them,  but  equally  because  of  their  confidence  in  his  military 
genius.  They  felt  that  though  they  might  be  hurt,  the  enemy 
would  be  hurt  still  more.  It  is  probable  that  it  was  because 
of  these  very  considerations  that  he  was  not  sent. 

In  a  fierce  struggle  for  national  existence,  and  with  such  a 
potent  agency  to  promote  the  country's  cause  at  hand,  was 
there  no  responsibility  upon  the  part  of  those  who  stubbornly 
refused  to  use  it?  And,  above  all,  if  as  the  result  come  na 
tional  disgrace,  panic,  and  the  needless  slaughter  of  tens  of 
thousands  of  men,  is  there  no  moral  liability  for  that? 

On  the  joth  of  August  the  general  wrote  to  his  wife: 
"i  130  P.  M. — There  has  been  heavy  firing  going  on  all  day 
somewhere  beyond  Bull  Run.  .  .  .  It  is  dreadful  to  listen 
to  this  cannonading  and  not  be  able  to  take  any  part.  . 
But  such  is  my  fate.  .  .  .  9:15?.  M. — I  have  been  listen 
ing  to  the  sound  of  a  great  battle  in  the  distance.  My  men 
engaged  in  it  and  I  away!  I  never  felt  worse  in  my  life. 
.  .  .  10:45 — I  feel  m  tnat  state  °f  excitement  and  anxiety 
that  I  can  hardly  keep  still  for  a  moment.  I  learn  from  Hani- 


McCLELLAN  341 

merstein  that  the  men  in  front  are  all  anxious  for  me  to  be 
with  them.  It  is  too  cruel/'  6 

But  McClellan  was  not  merely  prevented  from  joining  his 
troops  and  doing  what  he  could  for  the  cause  of  the  Union, 
left  chafing  and  fretting  to  he  in  the  fight, — left  to  "gnaw 
a  file,"  as  Mr.  Lincoln  said, — but,  in  spite  of  all  the  abundant 
proof  of  his  eagerness  to  be  on  the  field  and  share  the  fate  of 
his  men,  he  was  charged  with  desiring  and  conniving  at  Pope's 
defeat, — a  defeat  which  would  of  necessity  mean  great  harm 
to  his  beloved  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

Mr.  Rhodes, — who  is  honest  but  greatly,  though  uncon 
sciously,  biased  because  of  his  faith  in  Mr.  Stanton,  and  who 
therefore  sees  only  something  to  regret  when  he  comes  upon 
an  indefensible  matter  like  the  Sherman  incident, — is  con 
vinced  by  McClellan's  parting  words  to  Franklin,  when  he 
set  out  to  join  !*ope,  that  McClellan  patriotically  and  earnestly 
desired  the  success  of  the  Union  army. 

The  non-partisan  student  seeking  only  the  truth  will  see  in 
the  honest  pages  of  General  Upton's  official  document,  though 
he  was  "an  abolitionist  and  the  son  of  an  abolitionist,"  the 
secret  of  the  strange  conditions  frequently  existing  during 
these  periods  of  mediaeval  plots.  He  will  see  that  the  political 
motto  on  wrhich  Mr.  Stanton  relied  to  destroy  McClellan  was : 
"Prevent  and  blame."  Cripple  him  beyond  any  possibility  of 
success ;  represent  through  the  press  that  he  had  every  element 
of  victory,  and  then  berate  him  indignantly  for  not  securing 
the  results  which  had  been  rendered  impossible, — that  was 
Stanton' s  plan.  So  it  was  that  McClellan  was  marooned  at 
Fortress  Monroe,  a  third  of  his  army  detained,  the  supreme 
command  taken  away  from  him,  the  indispensable  naval  aid 
withheld,  and  then  he  was  chided  and  urged  on  by  those  who 
caused  the  delay;  so  it  was  that  he  was  kept  waiting  for  six 
weeks  for  the  repeatedly  promised  coming  of  McDowell  and 
then  told  that  he  must  take  Richmond  alone  without  Mc 
Dowell,  or  give  up  the  job.  And  having  made  the  taking  of 
Richmond  impracticable,  the  War  Department  circulated  the 
report  throughout  the  North  that  Richmond  would  be  cap- 

8  McClellan,  Own  Story,  531. 


342  McCLELLAN 

tured  before  the  4th  of  July,  and  many  papers  got  ready  to 
celebrate  the  end  of  the  Rebellion.  Thus  it  was  that  when 
McClellan  asked  for  30,000  men  to  strengthen  his  army  on 
the  James,  he  was  told  that  only  20,000  could  be  furnished ; 
although,  as  General  Upton  says,  40,000  could  have  been  sup 
plied  at  once  and  100,000  within  a  month.  But  the  army  was 
withdrawn  and  the  campaign  dubbed  a  failure;  so  it  was  at 
Alexandria,  when  he  was  stripped  of  every  man  of  his  army 
and  yet  upbraided  for  not  aiding  Pope ;  and  so  it  was  at  Har 
per's  Ferry  after  Antietam,  when  indispensable  supplies  and 
equipments  were  withheld  and  McClellan  blamed  for  the  delay 
by  those  who  caused  it.  Speaking  of  the  political  peril  which 
Stanton  saw  in  McClellan' s  military  prestige,  General  Upton 
writes :  "It  is  not  surprising  if  the  Administration  determined 
to  remove  him,  but  to  accomplish  this  openly  was  impossible. 
He  had  extricated  his  army  from  a  position  which,  in  the 
calculations  of  the  Confederates,  doomed  it  to  destruction. 
To  have  removed  him  under  such  circumstances  would  have 
been  a  shock  to  the  country.  There  was  but  one  way  to  get 
rid  of  him  and  that  was  to  disintegrate  his  army."  7  This  was 
done  by  leaving  him  alone  "to  gnaw  a  file"  at  Alexandria.  It 
will  be  observed  that  on  various  occasions  during  his  war 
career  irritating,  fault-finding  letters  were  sent  to  McClellan. 
Stanton  always  had  the  President  or  Halleck  send  them.  His 
own  letters  were  letters  of  admiration  and  love!  It  will  be 
noted  by  the  careful  investigator  that  every  such  occasion  was 
an  occasion  where  the  Administration  was  doing  him,  and 
through  him  the  country,  a  gross  injury;  such  as  when  he  was 
left  stranded  and  hopelessly  crippled  at  Fortress  Monroe; 
when  he  was  kept  waiting  for  McDowell ;  when  his  army  was 
being  removed  from  the  James;  when  he  was  despoiled  of 
every  soldier  at  Alexandria;  and  when  he  was  waiting  for 
supplies  at  Harper's  Ferry.  At  all  these  times  he  was  made 
to  understand  that  his  conduct  was  highly  unsatisfactory. 
7  Military  Policy  of  the  United  States,  319. 


CHAPTER    LVII 

THE    DISCOMFITURE    OF    STANTON 

On  August  the  3ist  General  Halleck  repeated  to  McClel- 
lan  the  farcical  order  of  the  War  Department,  adding:  "I 
beg  of  you  to  assist  me  in  this  crisis  with  your  ability  and 
experience.  I  am  entirely  tired  out." 

On  the  same  night  McClellan  telegraphed  in  rejoinder :  "I 
am  ready  to  afford  you  any  assistance  in  my  power,  but  you 
will  readily  perceive  how  difficult  an  undefined  position  such 
as  I  now  hold  must  be.  At  what  hour  in  the  morning  can  I  see 
you  alone  at  your  own  house  or  the  office?"  This  too  was  met 
with  utter  and  contemptuous  silence.  Despite  this  treatment, 
in  the  hope  of  saving  the  army  as  far  as  possible,  McClellan 
near  midnight  wired  to  the  general-in-chief  many  wise  sug 
gestions  and  precautions  based  upon  his  information  that 
Pope  was  already  defeated  and  the  army  in  danger  even  of 
annihilation.  But  the  War  Department  seeking  to  conceal  its 
own  chagrin,  asserted  at  i  130  A.  M.  through  Halleck,  that 
from  news  received  at  4  p.  M.  Pope  was  then  all  right. 

On  the  same  day,  September  the  ist,  General  McClellan 
was  called  to  the  office  of  the  general-in-chief  and  put  in  com 
mand  of  the  city,  but  distinctly  forbidden  to  interfere  with 
General  Pope's  army.  Halleck  still  professed  to  believe  that 
Pope  was  secure.  McClellan  urged  him  to  go  and  learn  for 
himself  and  if  necessary  take  command.  He  refused,  but 
finally  consented  to  have  Colonel  Kelton  go  and  learn  the 
actual  state  of  affairs. 

On  the  return  of  Colonel  Kelton,  he  reported  that  there 
were  30,000  stragglers  on  the  roads  and  that  the  army  was 
falling  back  in  confusion  upon  Washington. 

Mr.  Stanton's  warmest  eulogist  tells  us  that,  although  ter 
ribly  punished,  Pope  was  nevertheless  expected  to  win,  and 

343 


344  M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  N 

it  was  Stanton's  purpose  to  relieve  McClellan  and  announce 
the  fact  to  the  country  at  the  moment  of  victory. 

The  full  meaning  of  this  may  not  strike  every  reader  in 
stantly.  It  means  in  the  first  place  that  McClellan's  humiliat 
ing  position  was  due  to  Stanton,  that  he  was  kept  from  the 
scene  of  war  that  he  might  have  no  share  in  the  glory  of  the 
expected  victory.  Not  only  was  he  to  have  no  share  in  it,  but 
he  was  to  be  charged  with  trying  to  prevent  it.  The  splendor 
of  the  victory  and  McClellan's  alleged  effort  to  thwart  it  would 
make  the  public  not  only  content  but  delighted  with  his  re 
moval.  But  the  fates  would  not  have  it  so.  On  the  morning 
of  the  30th  Stanton  brought  to  the  War  Office  a  petition 
"written  in  his  own  hand,  in  large  outline  on  both  sides  of 
the  sheet,  with  several  erasures  and  interlineations."  After 
it  was  copied,  he  persuaded  Chase  and  Smith  to  sign  it,  to 
gether  with  himself.  Welles  refused  to  sign,  and  his  opposi 
tion  could  not  be  overcome.  It  was  an  appeal,  almost  a  de 
mand,  for  the  removal  of  McClellan. 

Secretary  Welles  tells  us  in  his  Diary : 

"Reflection  had  more  fully  satisfied  me  that  this  method 
of  conspiring  to  influence  or  control  the  President  was  repug 
nant  to  my  feelings  and  was  not  right."  1  "It  was  evident  that 
there  was  a  fixed  determination  to  remove  and  if  possible  to 
disgrace  McClellan.  ...  It  appears  as  if  there  was  a 
combination  by  two  to  get  their  associates  committed  seriatim, 
by  a  skillful  ex-parte  movement  without  general  consultation.2 
.  The  introduction  of  Pope  here,  followed  by  Halleck, 
is  an  intrigue  of  Stanton's  and  Chase's  to  get  rid  of  McClel 
lan.  A  part  of  this  intrigue  has  been  the  withdrawal  of 
McClellan  and  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  from  before  Rich 
mond  and  turning  it  into  the  Army  of  Washington  under 
Pope."  3 

The  partly  signed  petition  was  presented  to  the  President 
in  Stanton's  private  office,  and  he  pondered  over  it  almost 
the  whole  day,  August  the  3Oth.  It  would  be  pleasing  to  re- 

1  Diary  of  Gideon  Welles,  I,  101. 
9  Ibid.,  102. 
8  Ibid.,  108, 


M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  N  345 

cord  that  his  hesitation  sprang  from  a  well-founded  fear  of 
doing  a  great  wrong ;  but  it  was  not  that.  His  fears  were 
political  fears  only, — fears  that  a  great  uproar  would  arise. 
And  so  he  thought  that  to  leave  McClellan  at  Alexandria 
without  anything  to  do,  with  no  men  or  orders,  there  "to  gnaw 
a  file,"  would  prove  the  more  judicious  course.  4 

It  was  Stanton  to  whom  Colonel  Kelton  first  reported  early 
on  the  morning  of  September  the  ist.  It  was  from  Stanton 
that  the  President  got  the  news.  The  plot  was  foiled ;  and 
hastening  to  the  War  Office  Stanton  gathered  up  the  McClel 
lan  protests  and  the  accompanying  papers  and  suppressed 
them;  and  they  were  not  revealed  until  all  the  chief  actors 
were  gone  from  the  earth.5  Too  much  significance  cannot 
be  given  to  this  action.  It  was  a  confession.  He  was  hiding 
the  evidence  of  a  conspiracy.  The  rout  of  Pope  was  a  con 
demnation  of  the  withdrawal  of  the  army  from  the  Peninsula. 
If  Pope  had  won,  all  would  have  been  lovely  for  Stanton's 
plans.  But  the  defeat  of  Pope  discredited  Stanton,  and  his 
trembling  heart  dreaded  a  public  outcry,  for  this  calamity 
would  be  charged  to  him  and  rightly  too,  as  Halleck  and  Pope 
were  but  the  instruments  of  his  hatred  of  McClellan. 

Anger  and  fear  contended  for  the  mastery  in  Stanton's 
breast.  His  clerk  says  that  he  never  saw  him  so  enraged  as 
when  the  news  came,  and  that  if  McClellan  had  been  there 
he  believes  Mr.  Stanton  would  have  assaulted  him.  What? 
Used  the  stiletto?  That  would  have  been  dramatic  indeed. 
But  Mr.  Stanton  never  assaulted  anyone.  The  gentle  and 
timid  heart  which  beat  beneath  that  rugged  exterior  forbade 
even  the  repelling  of  an  assault,  as  we  saw  when  he  was  at 
tacked  in  court. 

Soon  terror  overpowered  every  other  emotion.  Washing 
ton  would  be  a  rebel  prize  before  another  day  was  gone.  So 
the  valiant  Secretary  got  ready  for  flight.  General  Maynadier 
was  directed  to  move  all  military  stores  and  supplies  and  to  de 
stroy  what  he  could  not  move,  Stanton  gathered  his  office 
papers  into  bundles  to  be  carried  by  men  on  foot  or  horseback, 

*  Flower,  Edwin  Ale  Masters  Stanton,  177. 
5  Ibid.,  178. 


346  McCLELLAN 

and  arrangements  were  made  to  ship  off  the  contents  of  the 
arsenal. 

But  he  was  not  alone  in  his  apprehensions.  General  Meigs 
narrates  that  Mr.  Lincoln  dropped  into  his  room  on  his  way  to 
see  Stanton,  threw  himself  into  a  big  chair,  and,  with  a 
mingled  groan  and  sigh,  exclaimed :  "Chase  says  we  can't 
raise  any  more  money;  Pope  is  licked,  and  McClellan  has  the 
diarrhoea.  What  shall  I  do?  The  bottom  is  out  of  the  tub, 
the  bottom  is  out  of  the  tub !"  6  This  delicate  allusion  to  Gen 
eral  McClellan  meant  that  he  was  presumptively  resentful  and 
sulky  because  of  the  galling  treatment  he  had  received  from 
the  Government.  Pope  had  failed,  thought  Lincoln,  and  how 
could  he  now  again  turn  to  McClellan,  who  would  probably 
decline  to  act. 

6  Flower's  Stanton,  179. 


CHAPTER    LVIII 

STANTON  RESISTS  IN  VAIN TWO  DRAMATIC  SCENES 

On  the  2cl  of  September,  1862,  there  were  two  intensely 
dramatic  scenes.  After  the  events  already  described  and  while 
it  was  still  early  morning,  the  President  and  the  general-in- 
chief,  apparently  without  any  prior  conference  with  the  Sec 
retary  of  War,  called  at  General  McClellan's  house. 

The  President  recounted  Colonel  Kelton's  report,  and  both 
he  and  Halleck  repeatedly  expressed  their  conviction  that  the 
city  was  surely  lost.  The  President  asked  McClellan  if  he 
would  under  the  circumstances,  as  a  favor  to  him,  resume  com 
mand  and  do  the  best  that  could  be  done,  specifying  afterward 
that  he  wished  him  to  collect  the  stragglers,  put  the  works  in 
a  proper  state  of  defense,  and  take  command  of  the  army 
when  it  came  close  to  the  city.  On  occasions  like  this,  knowl 
edge  of  the  world  and  experience  with  men  of  politics  are  of 
almost  infinite  value,  and  there  were  probably  ten  thousand 
men  in  the  United  States  any  one  of  whom  could  have  given 
General  McClellan  at  this  critical  moment  of  his  career  very 
useful  and  much  needed  advice.  Had  he  been  properly  ad 
vised,  he  would  have  recognized  the  fact  that  the  President 
had  come  to  him,  not  in  penitence  or  remorse,  for  he  made 
no  apology  and  expressed  no  regret,  but  perforce  and  reluc 
tantly,  in  the  belief  that  in  McClellan's  military  capacity  and 
in  the  love  of  the  army  for  him  lay  the  only  hope  of  saving 
the  Capital.  He  would  also  have  recognized  that  the  Presi 
dent's  statement  verified  the  surmise  that  the  purpose  even 
now  was  not  to  carry  out  the  promise  of  putting  him  in  com 
mand  of  all  the  Eastern  forces,  with  full  authority  to  retrieve 
if  he  could  the  damaged  fortunes  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
but  to  use  him  only  momentarily  to  steer  the  ship  of  state 
past  the  reef  and  then  throw  him  over  again.  And  if  such 
an  adviser  could  have  convinced  McClellan  that  his  own  inter 
ests  and  the  interests  of  the  army  and  the  Union  were  bound 

347 


348  McCLELLAN 

together  in  this  emergency,   this   in  substance   should  have 
been  the  response : 

"Gentlemen,  I  am  satisfied  that  whether  the  situation  is  as 
hopeless  as  you  view  it  or  not  rests  solely  on  the  action  you 
take.  It  depends  upon  what  you  will  do  to  restore  the  spirit 
and  confidence  of  the  army.  The  officers  and  men  of  that 
army  are  fully  aware  of  the  circumstances  to  which  you  refer 
and  regard  those  circumstances  as  affecting  them  much  more 
than  they  affect  me.  They  know  that  their  lives  were  need 
lessly  exposed  when  they  were  sent  out  into  a  swampy  region 
during  a  season  of  flooding  rains.  They  know  that,  because  of 
the  failure  of  the  Government  to  use  the  navy  to  the  utmost 
in  cooperation  with  the  army,  time  was  given  the  enemy  to 
collect  a  great  force,  and  that  they  were  forced  to  offer  up 
15,000  of  their  number  to  gain  a  place  which  they  could  have 
reached  without  losing  a  man  if  they  had  been  properly  sup 
ported.  They  know  that  they  were  to  set  out  with  a  force  of 
156,000  men  when  they  should  have  had  200,000,  and  they 
know  that  when  two-thirds  of  that  insufficient  force  had 
reached  Fortress  Monroe  that  part  of  the  army  was  almost 
hopelessly  crippled  by  the  detention  of  the  other  third.  They 
know  that  instead  of  holding  this  enfeebled  force  quiet  at 
Fortress  Monroe  until  the  earth  and  the  elements  were  favor 
able  and  the  army  increased  to  a  hopeful  degree  of  strength, 
they  were  recklessly  prodded  on  at  once  through  dispiriting 
torrents  of  rain  and  reviled  because  they  could  not  rush  more 
swiftly  through  the  bogs.  They  know  that  McDowell  could 
have  been  waiting  for  them  at  West  Point  or  could  have  easily 
joined  them  later,  but  that  because  of  the  lethargy  or  hostility 
or  panic  of  the  government  he  never  came.  They  know  that 
if  McDowell  had  been  sent  with  them  or  had  joined  them, 
they  would  have  taken  Richmond  and  the  terrible  seven  days' 
fight  and  the  present  disgraceful  defeat  would  have  been 
avoided.  When  at  last  they  reached  an  impregnable  position 
and  the  end  of  the  Rebellion  was  within  their  easy  grasp 
they  know  that  all  they  had  fought  for  and  gained  at  the  price 
of  15,000  lives  was  thrown  away,  in  a  way  that  seemed  to 
them  closely  akin  to  treason.  And  they  were  sorely  tempted 


M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  N  349 

to  go  on  and  crush  the  Rebellion,  regardless  of  the  folly  of 
the  Government.  They  know  that  on  the  I4th  of  August  they 
could  have  taken  Richmond  and  that  I  could  not  secure  permis 
sion  to  strike  the  blow.  They  know  that  I  was  promised  the 
command  of  the  united  armies  and  that  the  promise  was  not 
only  not  kept,  but  that  even  my  own  army  was  taken  from  me. 
Now  they  are  crestfallen,  beaten,  dispirited ;  they  trust  neither 
the  wisdom  nor  the  good  faith  of  the  Government  as  all  these 
deadly  wrongs  are  still  fresh  in  their  minds.  To  make  them 
efficient  soldiers  again,  their  confidence  must  be  restored,  their 
morale  and  spirit  must  be  revived.  Now  you  come  to  me  with 
out  any  specific  order.  Suppose  the  army  were  here  and  I 
should  go  to  my  corps  commanders  with  what  you  have  said 
to  me.  They  are  suspicious ;  all  the  presumptions  are  against 
you,  because  of  the  treatment  they  have  received  from  the 
War  Department  since  the  ist  of  April.  The  avenue  to  their 
hearts  lies  in  the  assurance  that  they  will  have  an  opportunity 
under  trusted  leaders  of  meeting  the  foe  again  and  of  oblit 
erating  their  disgrace  of  yesterday  by  a  glorious  victory. 
Their  first  questions  will  be :  What  opportunity  will  we  have ; 
what  are  you  authorized  to  do;  where  is  your  commission? 
And  if  I  tell  them  of  oral  instructions,  they  will  simply 
say :  We  are  being  tricked  again ;  McClellan  is  being  put  in 
only  for  the  instant  and  will  be  thrown  out  the  moment  the 
panic  is  over.  There  is  the  situation,  gentlemen.  With  the 
confidence  of  the  army  restored  by  a  sincere  attitude  of  the 
Government,  I  am  sure  that  I  can  not  only  save  Washington, 
but  successfully  attack  Lee." 

Such  facts  should  have  been  hammered  home  into  the  mind 
of  the  President.  They  would  have  illumined  the  path  of 
duty  and  responsibility.  If  positions  had  been  reversed,  those 
past  masters  of  the  art  of  politics,  Mr.  Lincoln  and  Mr.  Stan- 
ton,  would  have  made  some  such  shrewd  response,  and  the  re 
sponse  would  have  been  for  the  public  good.  General  Upton 
evidently  wonders  why  McClellan  did  not  impose  conditions.1 

And  the  result?  No  one  can  doubt  what  it  would  have 
been.  It  was  only  because  they  could  not  be  safe  without 

*  Military  Policy  of  the  United  States,  377- 


350  McCLELLAN 

McClellan  that  Lincoln  and  Halleck  went  to  him.  He  would 
have  been  entirely  justifiable  in  considering  the  situation  from 
the  viewpoint  of  the  army  and  in  insisting  upon  unequivocal 
proof  of  good  faith.  In  view  of  the  terror  of  the  time  and 
the  justice  and  good  sense  of  the  requirement,  they  would  have 
yielded;  and  the  President  would  have  bound  himself  to  it 
beyond  any  thought  of  retraction.  Washington  was  so  im 
periled  that  Mr.  Lincoln  would  have  paid  almost  any  price 
to  save  it.  He  would  not  have  hesitated  to  accede  to  a  reason 
able  demand,  as  he  saw  no  other  haven  of  protection.  At 
the  same  time,  he  did  not  intend  to  pay  an  iota  more  than 
was  exacted  from  him. 

The  proof  of  this, — that  is,  that  the  President  designed 
to  have  McClellan  save  the  city  if  possible,  and  to  repay  him 
for  this  great  favor  with  nothing, — is  at  hand. 

On  September  the  5th  he  said  to  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy :  "I  must  have  McClellan  to  reorganize  the  army  and 
bring  it  out  of  chaos;  but  there  has  been  a  design,  a  purpose 
in  breaking  down  Pope,  without  regard  of  consequence  to 
the  country.  It  is  shocking  to  see  this  and  to  know  this ;  but 
there  is  no  remedy  at  present,  .  .  .  McClellan  has  the 
army  with  him."  2  In  this  connection  McClellan's  parting 
exhortation  to  Franklin  and  his  futile  appeal  to  be  allowed 
to  take  a  part  in  Pope's  battles  should  be  remembered. 

So 'it  was  that  the  President  came  to  McClellan  without 
any  written  commission,  and  even  without  any  explicit  au 
thority  to  confer.  He  came  to  impose  a  task  so  stupendous 
that  he  deemed  it  impossible ;  yet  on  the  same  principle  which 
led  him  to  give  offices  to  persons  indifferent  or  even  hostile  to 
him,  in  order  to  gain  their  support,  and  to  give  none  to  friends 
whose  support  he  was  sure  of,  he  secured  this  favor  from 
McClellan  at  the  very  lowest  price :  and  he  got  it — for  nothing, 
and  without  being  called  upon  to  make  clear  the  tiniest  bit  of 
authority  with  which  he  intended  to  invest  the  general.  Con 
fronting  this  veteran  adept  in  the  diplomacy  of  politics  was 
one  who,  though  a  military  genius  and  a  man  of  brilliant  ad 
ministrative  capacity,  as  the  greatest  commanders  have  always 

3  Diary  of  Gideon  Welles,  I,  113. 


McCLELLAN  351 

been,  was  like  a  babe  in  the  arms  when  it  came  to  matters 
involving  political  scheming.  He  instantly  forgot  all  the  in 
dignities  and  injuries  that  had  been  heaped  upon  him  by  the 
President  at  the  instigation  of  Stanton.  He  asked  no  ques 
tions  as  to  his  new  command  or  to  test  the  intentions  or  good 
faith  of  the  Chief  Executive.  His  kind  and  sympathetic  soul 
held  only  regret  for  Mr.  Lincoln's  gloomy  forebodings,  and 
he  longed  to  comfort  him.  One  impulse  moved  the  general: 
to  reassure  the  President;  to  revive  his  despondent  spirits. 
And  his  confidence  that  he  would  surely  save  the  city  threw 
a  ray  of  sunshine  into  the  darkened  heart  of  his  visitor. 

The  President  naturally  expected  that  the  reinstatement  of 
McClellan,  however  vague  or  narrowly  circumscribed  the 
terms  might  be,  or  how  brief  the  intended  use  of  him,  would 
awaken  the  strongest  remonstrance  and  even  the  fiercest  rage. 
He  was  not  mistaken. 

The  2d  of  September  was  one  of  those  rare  days  when  the 
Cabinet  met.  Mr.  Welles,  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  has 
given  an  account  of  the  meeting:  "At  the  stated  cabinet 
meeting  on  Tuesday,  the  2d  of  September,  while  the  whole 
community  was  stirred  up  and  in  confusion,  and  affairs  were 
growing  beyond  anything  that  had  previously  occurred,  Stan- 
ton  entered  the  council-room  a  few  minutes  ahead  of  Mr. 
Lincoln,  and  said,  with  great  excitement,  that  he  had  just 
learned  from  General  Halleck  that  the  President  had  placed 
McClellan  in  command  of  the  forces  in  Washington.  (The 
information  was  surprising,  and,  in  view  of  the  prevailing  ex 
citement  against  that  officer,  alarming.)  The  President  soon 
came  in,  and  in  answer  to  an  inquiry  from  Mr.  Chase,  con 
firmed  what  Stanton  had  said.  General  regret  was  expressed, 
and  Stanton,  with  some  feeling,  remarked  that  no  order  to 
that  effect  had  issued  from  the  War  Department.  The  Presi 
dent  calmly,  but  with  some  emphasis,  said  the  order  was  his, 
and  he  would  be  responsible  for  it  to  the  country.  .  .  . 
Before  separating,  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  expressed 
his  apprehension  that  the  reinstatement  of  McClellan  would 
prove  a  national  calamity."  3 

8  McClellan,  Own  Story,  545 ;  Lincoln  and  Seward,  194. 


352  McCLELLAN 

It  is  well  to  have  an  account  from  one  of  those  whom 
Mr.  Welles  says  were  conspiring  against  McClellan.  "The 
Secretary  of  War  came  in.  In  answer  to  some  inquiry  the 
fact  was  stated  by  the  President  or  the  Secretary  that  Mc 
Clellan  had  been  placed  in  command  of  the  forces  to  defend 
the  capital — or  rather,  to  use  the  President's  own  words,  'He 
had  set  him  to  putting  these  troops  into  the  fortifications  about 
Washington,  believing  that  he  could  do  that  thing  better  than 
any  other  man.'  I  remarked  that  this  could  be  done  equally 
well  by  the  engineer  who  constructed  the  forts.  .  .  .  The 
Secretary  of  War  said  that  no  one  was  now  responsible  for  the 
defense  of  the  capital;  that  the  order  to  McClellan  was  given 
by  the  President  direct  to  McClellan,  and  that  General  Halleck 
considered  himself  relieved  from  responsibility,  although  he 
acquiesced  and  approved  of  the  order,  that  McClellan  could 
now  shield  himself,  should  anything  go  wrong,  under  Halleck, 
while  Halleck  would  and  could  disclaim  all  responsibility  for 
the  order  given.  The  President  thought  Gen.  Halleck  as  much 
responsible  as  before,  and  repeated  that  the  whole  scope  of 
the  order  was  simply  to  direct  McClellan  to  put  the  troops  into 
the  fortifications  and  command  them  for  the  defense  of  Wash 
ington.  I  remarked  .  .  .  that  I  could  not  but  feel  that 
giving  command  to  him  was  equivalent  to  giving  Washington 
to  the  rebels.  This  and  more  I  said.  .  .  .  The  President 
said  it  distressed  him  exceedingly  to  find  himself  differing 
on  such  a  point  from  the  Secretary  of  War  and  the  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury;  that  he  would  gladly  resign  his  place;  but  that 
he  could  not  see  who  could  do  the  work  wanted  as  well  as 
McClellan.  I  named  Hooker,  or  Sumner,  or  Burnside,  either 
of  whom  would  do  the  work  better."  4 

Mr.  Montgomery  Blair,  the  Postmaster-General,  under 
date  April  22,  1870,  says: 

"The  bitterness  of  Stanton  on  the  reinstatement  of  Mc 
Clellan  you  can  scarcely  conceive.  He  preferred  to  see  the 
capital  fall.  .  .  .  McClellan  was  bound  to  go  when  the 
emergency  was  past,  and  Halleck  and  Stanton  were  furnished 
a  pretense." 

*  McClellan,  Own  Story,  544,  545. 


McCLELLAN  353 

Again,  under  date  April  3,  1879,  Mr.  Blair  says:  'The 
folly  and  disregard  of  public  interests  thus  exhibited  would 
be  incredible  but  that  the  authors  of  this  intrigue,  Messrs. 
Stanton  and  Chase,  when  the  result  of  it  came,  and  I  proposed 
the  restoration  of  McClellan  to  command  to  prevent  the  com 
pletion  of  ruin  by  the  fall  of  the  capital,  actually  declared 
that  they  would  prefer  the  loss  of  the  capital  to  the  restoration 
of  McClellan  to  command.  Yet  these  are  the  men  who  have 
been  accounted  by  a  large  portion  of  our  countrymen  as  the 
civil  heroes  of  the  war,  whilst  McClellan,  who  saved  the  capi 
tal,  was  dismissed."  5 

I  regret  that  Mr.  Stanton  did  not  keep  a  diary.  He  left 
no  account  of  this  meeting,  and  Mr.  Flower,  his  biographer, 
gives  none.  I  fear  that  it  would  not  have  been  at  all  proper 
for  any  lady  to  listen  to  the  expression  of  his  views  on  the 
general  situation. 

'The  defeat  of  Pope  and  placing  McC(lellan)  in  command 
of  the  retreating  and  disorganized  forces  after  the  second 
disaster  at  Bull  Run,  interrupted  the  intrigue  which  had  been 
planned  for  the  dismissal  of  McClellan,  and  was  not  only  a 
triumph  for  him  but  a  severe  mortification  and  disappoint 
ment  for  both  Stanton  and  Chase."  6 

On  this  day,  September  2d,  Pope  telegraphed :  "Unless 
something  can  be  done  to  restore  tone  to  this  army,  it  will 
melt  away  before  you  know  it." 

The  significance  of  the  reinstatement  of  the  commander 
cannot  easily  be  overestimated.  Like  Stanton's  destruction 
of  papers,  it  was  a  confession.  The  Administration  wished 
the  nation  to  believe  that  McClellan  as  a  commander  was  an 
utter  failure ;  that  he  had  no  military  capacity  whatever ;  that 
he  was  slow,  hesitating,  weak,  timorous,  inefficient ;  yet  in  this 
hour  of  imminent  peril  and  supreme  Terror,  with  the  routed 
army  flying  back  to  the  Capital,  the  President  and  the  General- 
in-Chief  knew  of  no  one  else,  thought  of  no  one  else,  who 
could  save  it. 


'McClellan,  Own  Story,  545. 
•  Diary  of  Gideon  Welles,  I,  109. 


CHAPTER    LIX 

THE  ARMY  AND  ITS  IDOL A  SCENE  WHICH   HAS  NO  PARALLEL 

—THE    MAGIC    WAND THE    RESCUED    CITY 

Many  commanders  have  been  loved  in  varying  degrees 
by  their  soldiers,  but  in  all  the  history  of  the  world  never  did 
any  other  leader  receive  such  proof  of  affection  as  that  which 
was  offered  to  McClellan  on  the  night  of  September  2d,  1862. 
The  following  graphic  description  is  given  by  an  eye-witness : 
"About  four  o'clock  on  the  next  afternoon,  from  a  prominent 
point,  we  descried  in  the  distance  the  dome  of  the  Capitol. 
We  would  be  there  at  least  in  time  to  defend  it!  Darkness 
came  upon  us  and  still  we  marched.  As  the  night  wore  on, 
we  found  at  each  halt  that  it  was  more  and  more  difficult  to 
arouse  the  men  from  the  sleep  into  which  they  would  appar 
ently  fall  as  soon  as  they  touched  the  ground.  During  one 
of  these  halts,  while  Colonel  Buchanan,  the  brigade  comman 
der,  was  resting  a  little  off  the  road,  some  distance  in  advance 
of  the  head  of  the  column,  it  being  starlight,  two  horsemen 
came  down  the  road  toward  us.  I  thought  I  observed  a  famil 
iar  form,  and  turning  to  Colonel  Buchanan,  said :  'Colonel, 
if  I  did  not  know  that  General  McClellan  had  been  relieved  of 
all  command,  I  should  say  that  he  was  one  of  that  party,1 
adding  immediately,  T  do  really  believe  it  is  he!'  'Nonsense,' 
said  the  Colonel.  'What  would  General  McClellan  be  doing 
out  in  this  lonely  place,  at  this  time  of  night,  without  an  es 
cort?'  The  two  horsemen  passed  on  to  where  the  men  were 
lying,  standing,  or  sitting,  and  were  soon  lost  in  the  shadowy 
gloom.  But  a  few  moments  had  elapsed,  however,  when  Cap 
tain  John  D.  Wilkins,  of  the  3d  Infantry  (now  Colonel  of 
the  5th)  came  running  toward  Colonel  Buchanan,  crying  out: 
'Colonel,  Colonel,  General  McClellan  is  here.'  The  enlisted 
men  caught  the  sound !  Whoever  was  awake  awoke  his  neigh- 

354 


McCLELLAN  355 

bor.  Eyes  were  rubbed  and  those  tired  fellows,  as  the  news 
passed  down  the  column,  jumped  to  their  feet,  and  sent  up 
such  a  hurrah  as  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  never  heard 
before.  Shout  upon  shout  went  out  upon  the  stillness  of  the 
night;  and  as  it  was  taken  up  on  the  road  and  repeated  by 
regiment,  brigade,  division,  and  corps,  we  could  hear  the  roar 
dying  away  in  the  distance.  The  effect  of  this  man's  pres 
ence  upon  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, — in  sunshine  or  rain,  in 
darkness  or  daylight,  in  victory  or  defeat, — was  electrical, 
and  too  wonderful  to  make  it  worth  while  attempting  to  give 
a  reason  for  it.  Just  two  weeks  from  this  time,  this  defeated 
army,  under  the  leadership  of  McClellan,  won  the  battles  of 
South  Mountain  and  Antietam,  having  marched  ten  days  out 
of  the  two  weeks  in  order  to  do  it."  * 

Nor  was  this  merely  a  momentary  or  impulsive  outburst 
of  affection.  McClellan  always  had  the  hearts  of  his  men. 
Another  observer  gives  the  warmest  testimony:  'Though  a 
quarter  of  a  century  has  passed  since  those  darkest  days  of 
the  war,  I  still  retain  a  vivid  memory  of  the  sudden  and  com 
plete  change  which  came  upon  the  face  of  affairs  when  Gen 
eral  McClellan  was  restored  to  command.  At  the  time  I  was 
serving  in  Company  A,  I2th  Massachusetts  Volunteers,  at 
tached  to  Rickett's  division  of  the  First  Army  corps.  The 
announcement  of  McClellan's  restoration  came  to  us  in  the 
early  evening  of  the  2d  of  September,  1862,  just  after  reach 
ing  Hall's  Hill,  weary  from  long  marching  and  well-nigh  dis 
heartened  by  recent  reverses.  The  men  were  scattered  about 
in  groups,  discussing  the  events  of  their  ill-starred  campaign, 
and  indulging  in  comments  that  were  decidedly  uncompli 
mentary  to  those  who  had  been  responsible  for  its  mismanage 
ment.  We  did  not  know,  of  course,  the  exact  significance  of 
all  that  had  happened,  as  we  afterward  learned  it,  but  being 
mainly  thinking  men,  we  were  able  to  form  pretty  shrewd 
guesses  as  to  where  the  real  difficulty  lay.  Suddenly  while 
these  mournful  consultations  were  in  full  blast,  a  mounted 
officer,  dashing  past  our  bivouac,  reined  up  enough  to  shout, 
'Little  Mac  is  back  here  on  the  road,  boys!'  The  scene  that 

1  Battles  and  Leaders,  490,  note. 


356  McCLELLAN 

followed  can  be  more  easily  imagined  than  described.  From 
extreme  sadness  we  passed  in  a  twinkling  to  a  delirium  of 
delight.  A  deliverer  had  come.  A  real  'rainbow  of  promise' 
had  appeared  suddenly  in  the  dark  political  sky.  The  feeling 
in  our  division  upon  the  return  of  General  McClellan  had  its 
counterpart  in  all  the  others,  for  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
loved  him  as  it  never  loved  any  other  leader.  In  a  few  days 
we  started  upon  that  long  march  to  Maryland,  and  whenever 
General  McClellan  appeared  among  his  troops,  from  the  cross 
ing  of  the  Potomac  at  Washington  to  the  grapple  of  Lee  at 
Antietam,  it  was  the  signal  for  the  most  spontaneous  and 
enthusiastic  cheering  I  ever  listened  to  or  participated  in. 
Men  threw  their  caps  high  in  the  air,  and  danced  and  frolicked 
like  schoolboys,  so  glad  were  they  to  get  their  old  commander 
back  again.  It  is  true  that  McClellan  had  always  been  fortu 
nate  in  being  able  to  excite  enthusiasm  in  his  troops,  but 
demonstrations  at  this  time  took  on  an  added  and  noticeable 
emphasis  from  the  fact  that  he  had  been  recalled  to  command 
after  what  the  army  had  believed  to  be  an  unwise  and  unjust 
suspension."  2 

Is  it  not  plainly  obvious  that  because  of  this  enthusiastic 
affection  these  men  would  accomplish  more  for  McClellan 
than  for  any  other  leader.  His  civilian  superiors  knew  this 
well,  and  still,  when  the  best  efforts  of  the  army  were  needed, 
kept  him  away  from  it.  Surely  somewhere,  at  some  time, 
there  must  be  an  accounting  for  acts  like  this,  for  if  they  be 
not  treason,  they  have  all  the  semblance  and  evil  effect  of  it. 
He  was  not  kept  away  because  he  could  be  of  no  use,  but 
because  it  was  feared  that  he  would  win  glory  and  outshine 
the  Favorite,  General  Pope.  This  man,  whom  the  Romans 
would  have  crowned  with  laurel  for  his  brave  and  skilful  fight 
ing  in  the  Peninsula  and  who  was  pulled  away  in  the  midst 
of  his  work,  was  snubbed  and  humiliated,  because  he  dared  to 
protest  against  quitting  when  success  was  close  at  hand  and 
the  end  of  the  Rebellion  was  about  to  reward  his  efforts. 

The  effect  of  the  reinstatement  was  instantaneous,  for,  ex 
hausted  though  they  were,  the  revived  courage  of  the  troops 

2  Battles  and  Leaders,  550,  551,  note. 


M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  N  357 

dispelled  all  symptoms  of  panic  forthwith,  and  a  feeling  of 
security  filled  the  city.  Notwithstanding  his  hatred  of  Mc- 
Clellan,  the  Secretary  of  War  was  now  seized  with  a  sense 
of  freedom  from  danger,  which  no  doubt  annoyed  him  ex 
ceedingly,  as  it  was  an  involuntary  tribute  to  the  General ; 
and  he  must  have  had  qualms  of  uneasiness  whenever  he 
thought  that  but  for  McClellan  he  would  have  been  an  exile 
from  the  seat  of  government.  Stanton's  fear-inspired  orders, 
made  with  a  view  to  flight,  were  now  of  course  countermanded 
by  McClellan,  who  went  to  work  with  his  accustomed  energy, 
animating  the  troops,  and  assigning  their  various  posts  for 
the  defense  of  the  city.  The  whole  night  of  the  2d  of  Sep 
tember  was  spent  in  such  work,  and  when  morning  dawned 
the  city  was  safe. 

How  pleased  the  President  must -have  been  at  this  vin 
dication  of  his  sagacity  and  how  grateful  to  the  man  whose 
splendid  capacity  had,  as  with  a  magic  wand,  turned  darkest 
gloom  into  brightest  cheer  and  sunshine !  It  is  lamentable  to 
have  only  this  species  of  gratitude  to  record.  "McClellan  is 
working  like  a  beaver,"  quoth  the  President.  "He  seems  to 
be  aroused  to  doing  something  by  the  sort  of  snubbing  he  got 
last  week."  Ah!  then  the  treatment  of  McClellan  at  Alex 
andria  was  not  mere  oversight  or  negligence.  It  was  delib 
erate  and  malicious.  He  was  being  snubbed.  And  for  what, 
pray?  He  was  the  only  commander  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac  who  ever  had  cause  to  boast  of  his  struggles  with  Gen 
eral  Lee,  and  he  had  secured,  in  spite  of  the  best  opposition 
Lee  could  make  with  superior  forces,  a  base  of  operation  from 
which  all  now  admit  he  would  quickly  have  throttled  the 
Rebellion  if  the  Government  had  supported  him;  and  as  the 
reward  for  all  this  he  was  snubbed.  He  was  left  chafing  and 
inactive,  when  the  full  knowledge  of  what  he  had  done,  and 
what  he  cguld  do,  made  it  a  sacred  duty  of  those  in  authority 
to  employ  his  rare  talents  in  behalf  of  the  national  cause. 

As  there  was  a  great  panic  in  the  army,  of  which  General 
Pope's  despatch  of  September  2d  is  sufficient  proof,  how  is  it 
that  General  Lee  did  not  follow  the  beaten  Federals  closely 

8  Rhodes,  History  of  the  United  States,  136. 


358  McCLELLAN 

and  attack  Washington?  There  is  no  doubt  at  all  as  to  the 
reason.  It  was  because  McClellan  was  there.  General  Lee's 
wise  rule  of  action  was  always  to  seek  the  path  of  least  re 
sistance.  Between  attacking  McClellan's  forces  retiring  from 
the  James  or  striking  at  Pope  he  chose  Pope ;  and  now  between 
the  alternatives  of  advancing  upon  the  ramparts  of  the  Capi 
tal  City  with  McClellan  in  charge  of  it  or  invading  the  North, 
he  remembered  Malvern  Hill,  ignored  Washington,  and  chose 
to  invade  the  North. 

While  the  Confederate  commander  naturally  assumed  that 
McClellan's  services  would  be  used  in  the  defense  of  Wash 
ington,  it  is  evident  that  he  at  first  supposed  that  McClellan's 
powerful  enemies  would  shut  him  out  from  any  direction  of 
forces  in  the  field,  and  when  he  learned  that  McClellan  had 
assumed  command  he  still  felt  that  the  time  necessary  to  put 
any  courage  into  the  disheartened  troops  would  enable  him  to 
get  an  invaluable  start.  Speaking  to  General  Walker,  he  ex 
plained  his  intention  of  taking  Harrisburg  and,  a  little  later, 
Philadelphia,  Baltimore,  or  Washington,  and  of  destroying 
all  traffic  on  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  and  the  Pennsylvania 
Railways.  Replying  to  a  misgiving  that  McClellan  would 
interrupt)  his  communications,  he  added :  "He  is  an  able  gen 
eral,  but  a  very  cautious  one.  His  enemies  among  his  own 
people  think  him  too  much  so.  His  army  is  in  a  very  de 
moralized  and  chaotic  condition,  and  will  not  be  prepared  for 
offensive  operations — or  he  will  not  think  it  so — for  three 
or  four  weeks.  Before  that  time  I  hope  to  be  on  the  Susque- 
hanna."  4 

*  Battles  and  Leaders,  606. 


CHAPTER    LX 

THE  PURSUIT  OF  LEE — CRAFTY  PLOTTING SORE  NEED  OF  TIME 

The  chief  factor  to  be  kept  constantly  in  mind  in  weighing 
the  events  of  the  fall  of  1862  is  the  condition  of  the  army 
as  the  result  of  its  defeat.  It  needed  reconstruction,  reorgani 
zation,  rest. 

Above  all,  time  was  needed  for  the  army  to  regain  its 
excellent  morale  and  the  confidence  it  had  had  the  preceding 
spring.  It  was  badly  demoralized ;  only  a  little  less  so,  as  a 
whole,  than  it  was  after  the  first  Bull  Run.  A  few  weeks 
before  resuming  active  service  would  be  of  the  greatest  value; 
but  practically  no  time  at  all  was  available.  Exhausted  from 
a  fortnight  of  incessant  marching,  going  for  long  periods  at 
a  time  without  food,  yet  forced  to  fight  in  that  hungry  con 
dition,  the  soldiers  sorely  needed  time  to  recuperate. 

The  same  kind,  unsparing  attention  to  his  soldiers'  inter 
ests  and  wants  which  had  always  deserved  and  held  their 
love  was  now  again  exhibited.  In  a  letter  to  his  wife,  dated 
September  5th,  the  General  reveals  the  tender  feeling  for  his 
men  which  attached  them  so  strongly  to  him. 

"Sept.  5,  4  p.  M.—  ...  It  makes  my  heart  bleed  to 
see  the  poor,  shattered  remnants  of  my  noble  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  poor  fellows !  and  to  see  how  they  love  me  even  now. 
I  hear  them  calling  out  to  me  as  I  ride  among  them,  'George, 
don't  leave  us  again!'  'They  sha'n't  take  you  away  from  us 
again,'  etc.,  etc.  I  can  hardly  restrain  myself  when  I  see  how 
fearfully  they  are  reduced  in  numbers,  and  realize  how  many 
of  them  lie  unburied  on  the  field  of  battle,  where  they  were 
uselessly  sacrificed.  It  is  the  most  terrible  trial  I  ever  expe 
rienced."  * 

Referring  to  the  condition  of  the  army,  he  says:  "You 
don't  know  what  a  task  has  been  imposed  upon  me.  I  have 

1  McClellan,  Own  Story,  567. 

359 


360  McCLELLAN 

been  obliged  to  do  the  best  I  can  with  the  broken  and  dis 
couraged  fragments  of  two  defeated  armies,  by  no  fault  of 
mine."  2 

If  General  McClellan, — in  view  of  Stanton's  venomous 
hostility,  the  wrongs  done  because  of  it  to  him  and  to  the 
nation,  and  Mr.  Lincoln's  furtherance  of  the  Secretary's 
wishes,  a  furtherance  which  was  at  first  reluctant,  but  at  last 
willing  if  not  eager, — if,  I  say,  in  view  of  all  this,  General 
McClellan  had  formed  an  ineradicable  dislike  and  distrust 
of  both  the  Secretary  and  the  President,  no  one  could  severely 
blame  him.  He  had  great  and  oft  repeated  cause  to  suspect 
them  and  even  to  hate  them. 

His  sweet  and  forgiving  disposition  cannot  be  better  shown 
than  by  his  own  relation  of  his  feelings  at  this  time  in  a  letter 
to  his  wife. 

"Telegram — Washington,  Sept.  7,  2.50  p.  M. — We  are  all 
well  and  the  entire  army  is  now  united,  cheerful,  and  confi 
dent.  You  need  not  fear  the  result,  for  I  believe  that  God 
will  give  us  the  victory.  I  leave  here  this  afternoon  to  take 
command  of  the  troops  in  the  field.  The  feeling  of  the  gov 
ernment  towards  me,  I  am  sure,  is  kind  and  trusting.  I  hope, 
with  God's  blessing,  to  justify  the  great  confidence  they  now 
repose  in  me,  and  will  bury  the  past  in  oblivion."  3 

At  the  urgent  request  of  the  President,  General  McClellan, 
before  setting  out  from  Washington,  called  upon  Mr.  Stanton, 
who  expressed  his  regard  in  exuberant  terms  of  affection.  He 
had  always  been  McClellan's  best  friend,  he  assured  him,  but 
bad  men  had  made  mischief  between  them.  He  would  always 
continue  to  support  him  cordially.  On  parting,  he  embraced 
the  General  tenderly  and  bade  him  "Godspeed."  4 

Deluded  man!  This  was  but  another  instance  of  his  in 
experience  with  men,  for  at  that  very  moment  the  conspirators 
were  actively  at  work  again,  scheming  for  his  downfall. 

Outside  of  momentarily  taking  charge  in  Washington,  his 
authority  was  very  vague  as  to  time  and  extent.  Apparently, 


2  McClellan,  Own  Story,  568. 

3  Ibid.,  567. 

*  McClellan's  Last  Service,  48,  49. 


McCLELLAN  361 

it  was  purposely  conferred  in  this  manner,  so  that  in  case  of 
failure  he  could  be  charged  with  lack  of  authority.  I  can 
discover  no  other  reason  for  a  course  so  unusual  in  a  matter  of 
such  paramount  importance. 

On  the  2d  and  3d  of  September  the  enemy  in  small  force 
was  seen  in  front  of  Washington;  then  it  vanished  entirely, 
and  the  rumor  reached  McClellan  that  General  Lee  intended 
to  invade  Maryland.  Three  corps  were  sent  out  to  various 
points  northwest  of  Washington  to  oppose  the  crossing  of 
the  Potomac  by  the  enemy.5 

On  the  5th,  the  2d  and  the  i2th  corps  were  sent  to  Rock- 
ville;  on  the  6th,  the  ist  and  the  Qth  corps  were  sent  to 
Leesburg,  and  on  the  7th  the  6th  corps  reached  Rockville. 
On  the  afternoon  of  the  /th  tne  commander  himself  started 
out  to  assume  command  and  conduct  the  campaign. 

Argument  is  not  needed  to  convince  anyone  that  the  order 
giving  McClellan  command  at  Washington  did  not  entitle  him 
to  conduct  a  campaign ;  and  it  is  equally  clear  that,  as  the 
victorious  Southern  army  was  now  invading  the  North,  it  was 
gross  negligence  of  the  Administration  not  to  direct  someone 
to  take  command  of  the  army  and  start  after  the  invaders. 
This  is  the  testimony  of  the  general : 

"As  is  well  known,  the  result  of  General  Pope's  opera 
tions  had  not  been  favorable,  and  when  I  finally  resumed  com 
mand  of  the  troops  in  and  around  Washington  they  were 
weary,  disheartened,  their  organization  impaired,  and  their 
clothing,  ammunition,  and  supplies  in  a  pitiable  condition. 
The  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  thoroughly  exhausted  and 
depleted  by  its  desperate  fighting  and  severe  marches  in  the 
unhealthy  regions  of  the  Chickahominy  and  afterwards  during 
the  second  Bull  Run  campaign.  Its  trains,  administration 
service,  and  supplies  were  disorganized  or  lacking,  in  conse- 
quence  of  the  rapidity  and  manner  of  its  removal  from  the 
Peninsula,  as  well  as  from  the  nature  of  its  operations  during 
the  second  Bull  Run  campaign.  In  the  departure  from  the 
Peninsula,  trains,  supplies,  cavalry,  and  artillery  were  often 
necessarily  left  at  Fort  Monroe  and  Yorktown  for  lack  of 

6  McClellan,  Own  Story,  546. 


362  McCLELLAN 

vessels,  as  the  important  point  was  to  move  the  infantry  di 
visions  as  rapidly  as  possible  to  the  support  of  General  Pope. 
The  divisions  of  the  Army  of  Virginia  were  also  exhausted 
and  weakened,  and  their  trains  and  supplies  disorganized  and 
deficient  by  the  movements  in  which  they  had  been  engaged. 
Had  General  Lee  remained  in  front  of  Washington, 
it  would  have  been  the  part  of  wisdom  to  hold  our  own  army 
quiet  until  its  pressing  wants  were  fully  supplied,  its  organiza 
tion  restored,  and  its  ranks  filled  with  recruits, — in  brief,  pre 
pared  for  a  campaign.  But  as  the  enemy  maintained  the  of 
fensive  and  crossed  the  upper  Potomac  to  threaten  or  invade 
Pennsylvania,  it  became  necessary  to  meet  him  at  any  cost, 
notwithstanding  the  condition  of  the  troops;  to  put  a  stop 
to  the  invasion,  save  Baltimore  and  Washington,  and  throw 
him  back  across  the  Potomac.  Nothing  but  sheer  necessity 
justified  the  advance  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  South 
Mountain  and  Antietam  in  its  then  condition,  and  it  is  to  the 
eternal  honor  of  the  brave  men  who  composed  it  that  under 
such  adverse  circumstances  they  gained  those  victories;  for 
the  work  of  supply  and  reorganization  was  continued  as  best 
we  might  while  on  the  march,  and  after  the  close  of  the  battles 
so  much  remained  to  be  done  to  place  the  army  in  condition 
for  a  campaign  that  the  delay  which  ensued  was  absolutely 
unavoidable,  and  the  army  could  not  have  entered  upon  a  new 
campaign  one  day  earlier  than  it  did.  The  purpose  of  ad 
vancing  from  Washington  was  simply  to  meet  the  necessities 
of  the  moment  by  frustrating  Lee's  invasion  of  the  Northern 
States  and,  when  that  was  accomplished,  it  was  essential  to 
push  with  the  utmost  rapidity  the  work  of  reorganization  and 
supply,  so  that  a  new  campaign  might  be  promptly  inaugurated 
with  the  army  in  condition  to  prosecute  it  to  a  successful 
termination  without  intermission."  6 

The  "Army  of  Virginia,"  which  had  been  under  the 
command  of  General  Pope,  ceased  to  exist  on  the  2d  of  Sep 
tember,  1862,  by  force  of  circumstances,  and,  so  far  as  ap 
pears,  without  an  order  issued.  The  following  correspond 
ence  is  the  only  known  record : 
6  McClellan,  Own  Story,  552. 


McCLELLAN  363 

"ARLINGTON,  Sept.  5,  12:05  p-  M- 
"MAJ.-GEN.  HALLECK,  Gen.-in-chief : 

"I  have  just  received  an  order  from  Gen.  McClellan  to 
have  my  command  in  readiness  to  march  with  three  days' 
rations,  and  further  details  of  the  march.  What  is  my  com 
mand,  and  where  is  it?  McClellan  has  scattered  it  about  in 
all  directions,  and  has  not  informed  me  of  the  position  of  a 
single  regiment.  Am  I  to  take  the  field,  and  under  Gen. 
McClellan's  orders  ? 

"JNO.  POPE, 

"Maj.-Gen." 

"WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  Sept.  5,  1862. 
"MAJ.-GEN.  POPE,  Arlington: 

"The  armies  of  the  Potomac  and  Virginia  being  consoli 
dated,  you  will  report  for  orders  to  the  Secretary  of  War. 

"H.  W.  HALLECK, 

"Gen.-in-chief." 

Halleck  afterward  claimed  that  on  September  3d  an  order 
was  issued  to  McClellan  to  pursue  the  enemy.  It  is  rather 
peculiar,  isn't  it,  that  McClellan  knew  nothing  of  such  an 
order  ?  It  was  evidently  a  nunc  pro  time  order,  as  the  lawyers 
say, — made  later  as  if  made  before. 

The  course  taken  and  the  total  absence  of  serious  com 
plaint  about  it  demonstrate  that  General  McClellan  should 
have  pursued  his  own  way  on  the  James,  and  also  that  he 
should  have  availed  himself  of  this  experience  with  his  supe 
riors  on  the  ensuing  7th  of  November,  for  the  benefit  of  the 
army  and  the  good  of  the  country. 

The  fond  farewell  of  Mr.  Stanton  should  have  enlightened 
General  McClellan  as  to  the  proper  manner  of  dealing  with 
the  astute  but  timorous  Secretary,  but  the  General's  own  frank 
character  blinded  him  as  to  the  meaning  of  the  object  lesson 
given  to  him. 

Progress  was  not  swift,  yet  it  was  too  swift  for  General 
Halleck,  or  for  those  for  whom  he  spoke,  for  they  feared  that 
the  rebels  would  dodge  behind  McClellan  to  the  southward  and 


364  McCLELLAN 

rush  in  upon  Washington.  So  despatch  after  despatch  came  to 
him,  expressing  fear  that  he  was  moving  too  fast  and  even 
censuring  him  for  his  reckless  speed.  "The  uncertainty  at  first 
overhanging  Lee's  intentions  caused  the  advance  from  Wash 
ington  to  be  made  with  much  circumspection;  and  it  might, 
perhaps,  be  fairly  chargeable  with  tardiness,  were  there  not 
on  record  repeated  despatches  of  the  time  from  the  General- 
in-chief,  charging  McClellan  with  too  great  a  precipitancy  of 
movement  for  the  safety  of  the  Capital."  7 

On  the  1 2th  news  reached  the  Capital  that  Lee  was  re- 
crossing  the  Potomac  and  retiring  toward  Richmond.  This 
was  fully  credited,  and  the  President  urged  McClellan  not  "to 
let  him  get  off  without  being  hurt."  8 

The  generals  of  the  Army  of  Virginia,  knowing  well  the 
condition  of  the  Union  army  and  McClellan's  appreciation 
of  it,  were  amazed  at  his  rapid  progress,  as  we  shall  see;  yet 
later,  with  marked  disingenuousness,  the  Government,  having 
charged  him  with  imprudent  haste,  now  charged  him  with 
needless  slowness  and  delay  in  his  march. 

Mr.  Prime,  the  editor  of  McClellan's  Ozvn  Story,  follows 
the  prevailing  fashion  in  taking  a  lenient  view  of  the  Presi 
dent's  attitude  toward  the  general.  But  the  purpose  of  history 
should  be  the  eliciting  of  truth;  and  all  who  are  free  from 
bias  will  readily  agree  that  the  recorded  expressions  of  Mr. 
Lincoln  concerning  General  McClellan  indicate  that  at  this 
time  he  entertained  from  some  cause  (probably  due  to  Mr. 
Stanton's  quiet  activities)  an  intense  personal  dislike  for  the 
general,  viewing  him  probably  as  a  formidable  political  rival. 
It  was  his  evident  intention  to  sacrifice  him,  at  Mr.  Stanton's 
suggestion,  as  soon  as  an  excuse  could  be  found  after  the  im 
pending  peril  was  over.  If  General  Lee  had  retired  to  Rich 
mond  after  Second  Bull  Run,  McClellan  would  have  been 
relieved  then;  doubtless  because  of  incompetency  in  letting 
him  get  away.  But  the  swift  invasion  created  a  continuing 
peril,  which  made  it  impossible  at  that  time  to  dispense  with 
him.  Yet  the  President  disavowed  the  selection  of  McClellan 


7  Swinton,  Campaigns  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  i< 

8  McClellan,  Own  Story,  555. 


McCLELLAN  365 

to  command  in  the  field  and  charged  the  crime  upon  Halleck ! 
"I  could  not  have  done  it,"  said  the  President,  as  if  speaking 
of  some  act  of  great  moral  turpitude.9 

When  the  first  order  in  writing  for  McClellan  to  take 
charge  in  Washington  was  issued,  it  read,  "By  direction  of 
the  President,"  and  was  signed,  "By  order  of  the  Secretary 
of  War";  but,  as  Mr.  Stanton  hotly  repudiated  the  atrocity, 
a  later  one  was  issued  from  which  it  seemed  that  the  Presi 
dent  also  repudiated  it  and  the  presumptive  villainy  of  giving 
General  McClellan  a  command  was  at  last  saddled  upon  the 
general-in-chief,  for  President  and  Secretary  were  both 
omitted,  and  it  stood,  "By  order  of  Maj.-Gen.  Halleck." 

The  course  determined  upon  as  to  McClellan  seemed  to  be 
this:  if  he  should  fail,  he  would  be  charged  with  usurping 
military  authority,  and,  with  the  fanatical  frenzy  of  his  foes 
fully  aroused,  he  would  perhaps  be  executed.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  he  should  save  the  North  from  the  terror  and  disaster  of 
being  overrun  and  ravaged  by  a  triumphant  rebel  host,  one 
would  suppose  that  even  his  enemies  would  have  been  willing 
to  concede  that  no  honor  and  no  praise  could  be  too  great  for 
him.  But  not  at  all,  not  at  all.  No  victor's  crown  awaited  him, 
even  for  the  highest  measure  of  success ;  if  he  saved  the  North, 
he  would  not  be  executed ;  he  would  merely  be  dismissed 
quietly  at  the  first  convenient  moment.  His  reluctance  to  leave 
the  James,  the  defeat  of  Pope,  and  the  present  unauthorized 
leadership  of  the  army  to  repel  a  dangerous  invasion  would  all 
be  generously  ignored  or  forgiven,  and  he  would  be  allowed  to 
vanish  into  obscurity  unpunished. 

Such  are  the  natural  fruits  of  fanaticism.  But  Edwin  M. 
Stanton,  in  my  opinion,  was  not  a  fanatic.  He  was  a  subtle 
diplomat,  who  found  in  the  fanaticism  about  him  a  most  use 
ful  instrument  for  the  accomplishment  of  his  plans.  The  ultra 
radical  fervor  and  intensity  of  the  time  was  a  harp  from 
which  his  deft  fingers  evoked  the  strains  which  were  most 
pleasing  to  him. 

9  Diary  of  Gideon  Welles,  I,  116. 


CHAPTER   LXI 
HARPER'S  FERRY — HALLECK'S  BLUNDER 

At  this  time  Mr.  Stanton  was  apparently  taking  no  part 
in  the  conduct  of  the  war.  Throughout  the  whole  month  of 
September  the  President  never  went  to  his  office.  General 
Halleck  was  directing  military  operations  without  a  sugges 
tion  from  anyone.  But  whether  one  views  the  Secretary  in 
deifying  pages  of  Mr.  Flower  or  Mr.  Gorham  or  in  the  dark 
colors  in  which  his  co-secretary  Mr.  Welles  paints  him,  the 
conclusion  is  equally  irresistible  that  General  Halleck  had  no 
views  of  his  own  and  that  he  was  merely  the  mouthpiece  of 
the  head  of  the  War  Department. 

The  story  of  the  capture  of  Harper's  Ferry  is  interesting, 
amusing,  and  exasperating.  Mr.  Stanton' s  ingenuity  has  so 
withdrawn  attention  from  the  real  issue  that  the  writers  who 
reek  with  the  Stantonian  virus  sincerely  believe  that  McClel- 
lan,  by  failing  to  hurry  on  more  rapidly,  was  somehow 
greatly  at  fault,  indeed  responsible  for  a  national  disaster; 
yet  these  writers  all  know,  not  only  that  the  condition  of  the 
army  made  speed  impracticable,  but  that  the  Administration 
itself  was  a  leaden  weight  upon  the  commander's  feet,  because 
of  its  panicky  fear  that  he  was  going  too  fast  for  the  safety  of 
Washington,  a  fear  that  made  it  send  hourly  orders  to  him 
to  proceed  slowly  and  cautiously.  Even  the  friends  of  Mc- 
Clellan  have  not  given  the  subject  sufficient  consideration  to 
discover  that  when  all  the  facts  are  known  there  is  no  longer 
any  room  for  cavil. 

In  outline,  the  facts  are  as  follows : 

At  the  outset  General  Lee  had  no  intention  of  going  to 
Harper's  Ferry.  That  place  was  not  in  his  itinerary,  accord 
ing  to  Colonel  Henry  Kyd  Douglas,  C.  S.  A.  But  having 
passed  north  of  it  and  reached  Frederick,  he  learned  that  it 

366 


McCLELLAN  367 

had  not  been  evacuated  by  its  garrison  of  12,520  men;  he 
then  sent  Jackson  to  recross  the  Potomac  much  higher  up 
and  follow  the  Virginia  shore  down  to  Harper's  Ferry  and 
capture  the  garrison.  General  McClellan,  before  leaving 
Washington,  advised  the  evacuation  of  the  place,  though  it 
was  not  then  within  his  command.  He  also  advised  that  if  it 
was  to  be  held,  the  garrison  should  occupy  Maryland  Heights. 
These  suggestions  were  repeated  on  the  loth.  If  either  advice 
had  been  taken,  General  Lee's  purpose  would  have  been  foiled. 
As  it  was,  the  garrison  was  captured  and  the  place  was  then 
immediately  abandoned,  showing  that  the  garrison  was  the 
sole  prize  sought  for,  and  that  if  it  had  not  been  there,  Lee 
would  not  have  disturbed  the  place.  This  statement,  if  true, 
shows  simply  that  the  loss  of  the  garrison  was  due  solely  to 
the  fact  that  McClellan's  advice  was  not  taken;  but  through 
the  machinations  of  the  War  Department,  the  whole  discus 
sion  has  been  whether  McClellan  rushed  Franklin's  corps 
ahead  fast  enough. 

Before  leaving  Washington,  McClellan  went  with  Seward 
to  General  Halleck.  He  advised  that  the  troops  in  Harper's 
Ferry  should  abandon  it  and  join  the  main  army,  that  if  it  was 
determined  to  hold  the  place  the  enemy  could  easily  surround 
and  capture  the  garrison,  and  that  the  garrison  should  be  lo 
cated  on  Maryland  Heights,  where  it  could  defend  itself  until 
relieved.  These  statements  were  listened  to  with  ill-concealed 
contempt  by  the  General-in-Chief,  who  said  everything  was 
right  as  it  was,  that  the  news  given  was  entirely  erroneous. 
McClellan  says :  "Harper's  Ferry  was  not  at  that  time  in  any 
sense  under  my  control,  but  I  told  Mr.  Seward  that  I  regarded 
the  arrangements  there  as  exceedingly  dangerous;  that  in  my 
opinion  the  proper  course  was  to  abandon  the  position  and 
unite  the  garrison  (ten  thousand  men,  about)  to  the  main 
army  of  operations,  for  the  reason  that  its  presence  at  Har 
per's  Ferry  would  not  hinder  the  enemy  from  crossing  the 
Potomac;  that  if  we  were  not  successful  in  the  approaching 
battle  Harper's  Ferry  would  be  of  no  use  to  us,  and  its  garri 
son  necessarily  lost;  that  if  we  were  successful  we  would 
immediately  recover  the  post  without  any  difficulty,  while  the 


368  M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  N 

addition  of  ten  thousand  men  to  the  active  army  would  be  an 
important  factor  in  insuring  success.  I  added  that  if  it  were 
determined  to  hold  the  position  the  existing  arrangements 
were  all  wrong,  as  it  would  be  easy  for  the  enemy  to  surround 
and  capture  the  garrison,  and  that  the  garrison  ought  at  least 
to  be  drawn  to  the  Maryland  Heights,  where  they  could  resist 
attack  until  relieved."  a 

On  September  the  loth  the  following  despatch  was  sent 
to  General  Halleck :  "Sept.  10,  9:45  A.  M. — Colonel  Miles  is 
at  or  near  Harper's  Ferry,  as  I  understand,  with  9,000  troops. 
He  can  do  nothing  where  he  is,  but  could  be  of  great  service  if 
ordered  to  join  me.  I  suggest  that  he  be  ordered  to  join  me 
by  the  most  practicable  route."  2 

And  this  answer  came :  "There  is  no  way  for  Colonel 
Miles  to  join  you  at  present;  his  only  chance  is  to  defend  his 
works  till  you  can  open  communications  with  him."  3 

But  on  the  I4th  Colonel  Davis  marched  out  of  Harper's 
Ferry  with  the  cavalry  and  had  no  trouble  in  escaping  to 
Hagerstown. 

On  the  1 2th  McClellan  was  directed  to  take  command  of 
the  garrison  at  Harper's  Ferry  as  soon  as  he  could  establish 
communication  with  it.  Communication  had  then  been  cut 
off.  The  Rebel  forces  were  then  already  blocking  the  way. 
As  the  situation  at  Harper's  Ferry  at  that  time  was  wholly 
due  to  the  fact  that  McClellan's  advice  had  been  ignored,  the 
practical  answer  to  this  direction,  if  military  usages  had  per 
mitted  it,  would  have  been:  "You  are  too  late.  If  I  make 
the  effort  with  this  tired  and  disheartened  army,  I  cannot  ar 
rive  in  time.  You  are  entirely  responsible  for  the  loss  of  the 
place  and  could  easily  have  prevented  it  by  following  the  ad 
vice  I  gave  a  week  ago."  But  military  etiquette  would  not  per 
mit  this. 

Before  showing  the  steps  that  were  taken  to  relieve  the 
beleaguered  town,  we  will  see  more  exactly  how  it  came  to  be 

1  McClellan,  Own  Story,  55°- 

2  Ibid.,  558. 
8  Ibid.,  559- 


McCLELLAN  369 

invested.    We  know  this  fully  now  from  the  accounts  of  Con 
federate  officers. 

On  the  5th  of  September  the  Confederates  crossed  the  Po 
tomac  near  Leesburg,  about  half  way  between  Washington 
and  Harper's  Ferry,  and  proceeded  to  Frederick,  in  Mary 
land.    While  in  camp  near  that  city  five  days  later  Lee  learned, 
to  his  great  surprise,  that  Harper's  Ferry  had  not  been  evacu 
ated.    The  high  esteem  which  Lee  entertained  for  McClellan's 
military  capacity  led  him  to  suppose  that  the  wisest  thing  to 
be  done  would  surely  be  done;  but,  as  Colonel  Douglas  says, 
General  Lee  did  not  then  know  that  this  blunder  was  Hal- 
leek's.    Jackson,  McLaws,  and  Walker  were  at  once  started  off 
to  capture  and  hold  Harper's   Ferry,   for  which  Lee  cared 
nothing;  but  he  wished  "to  capture  the  garrison  and  stores" 
which  had  been  so  foolishly  left  by  Halleck  for  him  to  seize, 
against  the  earnest  advice  of  McClellan.     On  September  I3th 
the  attacking  forces  arrived;  early  on  the  I4th  General  Mc 
Laws  took  possession  (unopposed)  of  Maryland  Heights  and 
General  Walker  with  equal  ease  of  Loudoun  Heights.   Colonel 
Miles  with  the  garrison,  to  the  amazement  of  the  Confeder 
ates,  was  on  Bolivar  Heights,  the  weakest  of  the  three  promi 
nences.     General  Jackson  was  not  yet  there,  but  soon  after 
ward  came.    General  Walker  assures  us  that  the  commanding 
general  intended  to  summon  Colonel  Miles  to  surrender;  if 
he  refused  twenty- four  hours  were  to  be  given  to  remove  the 
non-combatants,  and  the  place  was  then  to  be  carried  by  as 
sault.     General  Walker  was  ordered  not  to  fire  unless  he  was 
forced  to.     This  course  alarmed  General  Walker,  who  felt 
that  General  Lee  would  be  in  fearful  peril  if  the  capture  of 
Harper's  Ferry  were  not  swiftly  effected.     But  General  Jack 
son  could  not  be  persuaded  that  the  whole  Federal  army  was 
near,  even  when  the  heavy  booming  of  artillery  toward  South 
Mountain  was  heard  growing  louder  and  louder  every  mo 
ment.     Evidently  he  did  not  believe  that  with  such  an  army 
McClellan  could  make  such  speed.     And  a  few  days  later  he 
said :    "I  thought  I  knew  McClellan  [they  were  classmates  at 
West  Point],  but  this  movement  of  his  puzzles  me."    General 
Walker  felt  the  danger  from  McClellan's  unexpected  approach 


370  McCLELLAN 

so  much  that  he  successfully  tempted  the  Union  batteries  to 
fire  upon  a  couple  of  his  regiments,  and  this  gave  the  eagerly 
desired  excuse  to  begin  a  bombardment,  which  continued  all 
the  afternoon  of  the  i4th.  His  batteries  were  1,000  feet 
higher  than  the  Union  batteries,  and  so  had  a  vast  advantage ; 
and  the  end  seemed  near  when  night  came  and  granted  a  re 
prieve.  At  daybreak  on  the  I5th  the  Confederates  had  se 
lected  excellent  positions  of  superior  elevation.  Although  for 
an  hour  the  Federal  guns  made  gallant  response,  the  return 
then  grew  weaker  and  weaker;  at  8  A.  M.  Colonel  Miles  gave 
up  the  contest,  and  12,520  men,  73  pieces  of  ordnance,  13,000 
muskets,  and  many  hundred  wagons  rewarded  the  victors  for 
their  efforts.  The  statement  that  Jackson  intended  to  delay 
24  hours  is  very  seriously  attacked.  Yet  it  seems  to  be 
strongly  supported  by  many  considerations.  The  difficulty  of 
making  progress  with  such  a  crestfallen  and  disorganized  mass 
of  men  was  so  fully  understood  and  appreciated  by  the  South 
ern  generals  that  McClellan's  advance,  under  such  conditions 
and  with  such  an  army,  was  amazing. 

Upon  no  other  theory  can  be  explained  the  long,  circuitous 
route  taken  by  General  Jackson,  under  General  Lee's  order, 
nor  the  leisurely  pursuit  of  it,  nor  the  otherwise  strange  fact 
that  General  Jackson  himself  was  the  last  to  appear  at  Har 
per's  Ferry.  It  was  all  upon  the  theory  that  there  was  plenty 
of  time.  Moreover,  the  statements  of  General  Jackson  and 
General  Lee,  already  given,  indicate  this.  The  great  military 
capacity  of  General  Lee  is  now  universally  admitted;  yet  we 
cannot  acquit  him  of  a  gross  blunder  and  of  recklessly  ex 
posing  himself  to  a  disaster  which  would  have  been  practically 
fatal  to  his  plans  unless  we  conclude  that  he  felt  sure  That 
McClellan  could  not  possibly  reach  either  wing  of  his  army 
while  apart,  and  that  the  impediments  in  the  way  of  requisite 
reconstruction  put  it  entirely  out  of  the  bounds  of  accomplish 
ment.  This  view,  which  alone  can  preserve  General  Lee's 
well-founded  reputation  for  sagacity,  when  taken  in  connec 
tion  with  the  surprise  at  McClellan's  arrival,  proves  that  Mc 
Clellan's  march  was  marvelously  speedy,  everything  consid- 


M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  N  371 

ered,  and  at  the  same  time  fortifies  the  very  positive  state 
ment  of  General  Walker. 

There  is  also  another  factor  in  the  consideration.  General 
Johnson  and  Colonel  Douglas,  fellow-officers,  have  written 
articles  asserting  that  General  Walker  must  be  in  error;  yet 
this  seems  incredible  when  we  consider,  first,  that  neither 
General  Johnson  nor  Colonel  Douglas  knew  anything  of  the 
matter  personally,  that  they  both  show  plainly  their  high  opin 
ion  of  General  Walker's  probity  and  honor,  and,  second,  that 
General  Walker  makes  it  clear  either  that  he  is  right  or  that 
he  lies.  Not  only  does  he  tell  of  the  signal  to  him  not  to  fire 
and  of  the  intended  24  hours  of  grace,  but  also  of  his  inef 
fective  attempt  to  persuade  Jackson  that  the  guns  heard  meant 
the  nearness  of  the  whole  Union  army.  The  steps  taken  by 
him  to  force  the  fight  is  a  practical  proof  of  his  understanding 
then,  and  the  fact  that  his  firing  long  preceded  that  of  Hill, 
Lawton,  and  McLaws,  also  corroborates  his  accuracy.  But, 
above  all,  Jackson  and  he  rode  away  to  Antietam  together  at 
2  A.  M.  on  the  1 6th;  he  then  excused  himself  to  Jackson  for 
forcing  the  fight,  and  Jackson's  reply  leaves  no  room  for  mis 
take.  He  said:  "It  was  just  as  well  as  it  was;  but  I  could 
not  believe  that  the  fire  you  reported  indicated  the  advance 
of  McClellan  in  force." 

All  these  matters  being  considered,  the  case  in  favor  of 
General  Walker's  contention  is  very  strongly  supported  by  the 
evidence.  Moreover,  General  Walker's  account  seems  highly 
plausible  in  itself,  as  General  Jackson's  kind  and  pious  nature 
made  him  loath  to  injure  non-combatants.  If  the  intended  ac 
tion  had  been  taken  "General  Lee  would  undoubtedly  have  been 
driven  into  the  Potomac  before  any  portion  of  the  Confed 
erate  force  around  Harper's  Ferry  could  have  reinforced 
him."  4  It  is  absolutely  clear  from  General  Walker's  account 
that  if  Colonel  Miles  had  assembled  all  his  forces  on  Maryland 
Heights  before  the  7th,  when  McClellan  first  recommended  it, 
or  on  the  loth,  when  he  urged  it,  the  forces  of  Jackson,  Mc 
Laws  and  Walker  would  have  been  held  in  check  longer  than 

4  Battles  and  Leaders,  609,  611. 


372  M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  N 

the  24  hours  necessary  to  relieve  Colonel  Miles  and  to  crush 
thev  isolated  forces  of  General  Lee. 

Colonel  Douglas  notes  that  the  plans  of  McClellan  "were 
quickly  and  skilfully  made.  Had  they  been  executed  more 
rapidly,  or  had  Jackson  been  slower  and  less  sure,  the  result 
must  have  been  a  disastrous  one  to  us.  But  military  critics 
disposed  to  censure  General  McClellan  for  not  being  equal  to 
his  opportunities  should  credit  him  with  the  embarrassment  of 
his  position.  He  had  not  been  in  command  of  this  army  two 
weeks.  It  was  a  large  army,  but  a  heterogeneous  one,  with 
many  old  troops  dispirited  by  recent  defeat,  and  many  new 
troops  who  had  never  been  under  fire.  With  such  an  army 
a  general  as  cautious  as  McClellan  does  not  take  great  risks, 
nor  put  the  safety  of  his  army  rashly  'to  the  touch  to  win  or 
lose  it  all.'  General  McClellan  was  inclined  by  nature  to 
magnify  the  forces  of  the  enemy,  and  had  he  known  General 
Lee's  weakness  he  would  have  ventured  more.  Yet,  when  we 
remember  what  Pope  had  done  and  suffered  just  before,  and 
what  happened  to  Burnside  and  Hooker  not  long  after,  their 
friends  can  hardly  sit  in  judgment  upon  McClellan."  5 

The  most  vital  factor  of  all  is  not  noted  here.  The  hos 
tility  of  the  Washington  authorities,  together  with  the  un 
reliable  condition  of  the  army,  made  caution  imperative  and 
any  departure  from  it  foolhardiness.  Moreover,  Colonel 
Douglas  evidently  did  not  know  that  McClellan  was  ordered 
not  to  go  swiftly. 

5  Battles  and  Leaders,  624. 


CHAPTER    LXII 
HARPER'S  FERRY   CONTINUED — FRANKLIN'S  ADVANCE 

General  Longstreet  assures  us  that  the  Confederate  move 
ment  upon  Harper's  Ferry  was  a  fatal  error.  That  the  situa 
tion  was  a  very  serious  one.  "McClellan  was  close  upon  us. 
As  we  moved  out  of  Frederick  he  came  on  and  occupied  that 
place."  Between  the  opinion  of  James  Longstreet  and  that 
of  Robert  E.  Lee  I  do  not  hesitate  to  prefer  the  latter.  Lee's 
judgment  was  that  McClellan,  in  force  sufficient  to  warrant 
an  attack,  could  not  reach  him  before  Jackson's  return.  He 
was  right.  He  thought  he  would  have  still  more  time,  but 
that  does  not  affect  the  question. 

On  the  1 2th  of  September,  as  we  have  seen,  General  Mc 
Clellan  was  directed  to  take  charge  of  Harper's  Ferry  as  soon 
as  he  was  in  communication  with  it.  There  was  no  rumor  of 
any  serious  attack  upon  it  then,  but  at  the  same  time  it  was 
known  that  some  force  of  the  enemy  intervened  and  that  com 
munication  was  cut  off.  On  the  I3th  he  entered  Frederick, 
and  then  it  was  that  a  most  interesting  document  was  found 
wrapped  about  two  cigars,  and  brought  to  him.  It  read  as 
follows  i1 

''HEADQUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA, 

"Sept.  9,  1862. 
"SPECIAL  ORDERS,  No.  191. 

"The  army  will  resume  its  march  to-morrow,  taking  the 
Hagerstown  road.  General  Jackson's  command  will  form  the 
advance,  and  after  passing  Middletown,  with  such  portion  as 
he  may  select,  will  take  the  route  towards  Sharpsburg,  cross 
the  Potomac  at  the  most  convenient  point,  and  by  Friday 
night  take  possession  of  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad,  cap 
ture  such  of  the  enemy  as  may  be  at  Martinsburg,  and  inter 
cept  such  as  may  attempt  to  escape  from  Harper's  Ferry. 
1  McClellan,  Own  Story,  573- 

373 


374  McCLELLAN 

"General  Longstreet's  command  will  pursue  the  same  road 
as  far  as  Boonsborough,  where  it  will  halt  with  the  reserve, 
supply,  and  baggage  trains  of  the  army. 

"General  McLaws,  with  his  own  division  and  that  of  Gen. 
R.  H.  Anderson,  will  follow  General  Longstreet;  on  reaching 
Middletown  he  \vill  take  the  route  to  Harper's  Ferry,  and  by 
Friday  morning  possess  himself  of  the  Maryland  Heights, 
and  endeavor  to  capture  the  enemy  at  Harper's  Ferry  and 
vicinity. 

"General  Walker  with  his  division,  after  accomplishing  the 
object  in  which  he  is  now  engaged,  will  cross  the  Potomac 
at  Cheek's  Ford,  ascend  its  right  bank  to  Lovettsville,  take 
possession  of  Loudon  Heights,  if  practicable,  by  Friday  morn 
ing;  Key's  Ford  on  his  left,  and  the  road  between  the  end  of 
the  mountain  and  the  Potomac  on  his  right.  He  will,  as  far 
as  practicable,  cooperate  with  General  McLaws  and  General 
Jackson  in  intercepting  the  retreat  of  the  enemy. 

"General  D.  H.  Hill's  division  will  form  the  rear-guard 
of  the  army,  pursuing  the  road  taken  by  the  main  body.  The 
reserve  artillery,  ordnance,  and  supply-trains,  etc.,  will  precede 
General  Hill. 

"General  Stuart  will  detach  a  squadron  of  cavalry  to  ac 
company  the  commands  of  Generals  Longstreet,  Jackson,  and 
McLaws,  and,  with  the  main  body  of  the  cavalry,  will  cover 
the  route  of  the  army  and  bring  up  all  the  stragglers  that  may 
have  been  left  behind. 

"The  commands  of  Generals  Jackson,  McLaws,  and  Wal 
ker,  after  accomplishing  the  objects  for  which  they  have  been 
detached,  will  join  the  main  body  of  the  army  at  Boonsbor 
ough  or  Hagerstown. 

"Each  regiment  on  the  march  will  habitually  carry  its 
axes  in  the  regimental  ordnance-wagons,  for  the  use  of  the 
men  in  their  encampments,  to  procure  wood,  etc. 

"By  command  of  Gen.  R.  E.  Lee. 

"R.  H.  CHILTON, 

"Assist.  Adj. -Gen. 
"MAJ.-GEN.  D.  H.  HILL, 

"Commanding  Division." 


McCLELLAN  375 

Longstreet  is  of  the  opinion  that  such  an  order  would 
usually  be  taken  as  a  snare,  and  he  shows  that  in  fact  this 
one  did  mislead,  but  it  informed  McClellan  of  the  attack  on 
Harper's  Ferry,  and  he  at  once  sent  the  following  letter  to 
General  Franklin  :2 

"HEADQUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 
"Camp  near  Frederick, 

"Sept.  1 3th,  1862,  6:20  p.  M. 

"GENERAL  :  I  have  now  information  as  to  movement  and 
intentions  of  the  enemy.  Jackson  has  crossed  the  upper  Poto 
mac  to  capture  the  garrison  at  Martinsburg  and  cut  off  Miles' s 
retreat  towards  the  West.  A  division  on  the  South  side  of  the 
Potomac  was  to  carry  Loudon  Heights  and  cut  off  his  retreat 
in  that  direction.  McLaws  with  his  own  command  and  the 
division  of  R.  H.  Anderson  was  to  move  by  Boonsborough 
and  Rohrersville  to  carry  the  Maryland  Heights.  The  signal 
officers  inform  me  that  he  is  now  in  Pleasant  Valley.  The 
firing  shows  that  Miles  still  holds  out.  Longstreet  was  to 
move  to  Boonsborough,  and  then  there  halt  with  the  reserve 
corps;  D.  H.  Hill  to  form  the  rear-guard;  Stuart's  cavalry  to 
bring  up  the  stragglers,  etc.  We  have  cleared  out  all  the  cav 
alry  this  side  of  the  mountains  and  north  of  us.  The  last  I 
heard  from  Pleasanton  he  occupied  Middletown  after  several 
sharp  skirmishes.  A  division  of  Burnside's  command,  in 
cluding  Hooker's  corps,  march  this  evening  and  early  to-mor 
row  morning,  followed  by  the  corps  of  Sumner  and  Banks, 
and  Sykes's  division,  upon  Boonsborough  to  carry  that  posi 
tion.  Couch  has  been  ordered  to  concentrate  his  division  and 
join  you  as  rapidly  as  possible.  Without  waiting  for  the 
whole  of  that  division  to  join,  you  will  move  at  daybreak  in 
the  morning  by  Jefferson  and  Burkittsville  upon  the  road  to 
Rohrersville.  I  have  reliable  information  that  the  mountain- 
pass  by  this  road  is  practicable  for  artillery  and  wagons.  If 
this  pass  is  not  occupied  by  the  enemy  in  force,  seize  it  as  soon 
as  practicable  and  debouch  upon  Rohrersville,  in  order  to  cut 
off  the  retreat  of  or  destroy  McLaws's  command.  If  you  find 

2  McClellan,  Own  Story,  561. 


376  McCLELLAN 

this  pass  held  by  the  enemy  in  large  force,  make  all  your  dis 
positions  for  the  attack  and  commence  it  about  half  an  hour 
after  you  hear  severe  firing  at  the  pass  on  the  Hagerstown 
pike,  where  the  main  body  will  attack.  Having  gained  the 
pass,  your  duty  will  be  first  to  cut  off,  destroy,  or  capture 
McLaws's  command  and  relieve  Colonel  Miles.  If  you  effect 
this,  you  will  order  him  to  join  you  at  once  with  all  his  dis 
posable  troops,  first  destroying  the  bridges  over  the  Potomac, 
if  not  already  done;  and,  leaving  a  sufficient  garrison  to  pre 
vent  the  enemy  from  passing  the  ford,  you  will  return  by 
Rohrersville  on  the  direct  road  to  Boonsborough,  if  the  main 
column  has  not  succeeded  in  its  attack.  If  it  has  succeeded, 
take  the  road  to  Rohrersville,  to  Sharpsburg,  and  Williams- 
port,  in  order  either  to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  Hill  and  Long- 
street  towards  the  Potomac,  or  prevent  the  repassage  of  Jack 
son.  I  believe  I  have  sufficiently  explained  my  intentions.  I 
ask  of  you  at  this  important  moment  all  your  intellect  and  the 
utmost  activity  that  a  general  can  exercise. 

"CEO.    B.    McCLELLAN, 

"Maj.-Gen.  Commanding. 
"MAJ.-GEN.  W.  B.  FRANKLIN, 

"Commanding  6th  Corps." 

Two  things  are  obvious  on  the  face  of  this  letter.  The 
closing  sentence  proves  beyond  all  power  of  questioning  it 
that  General  McClellan  'was  making  an  appeal  to  this  brave, 
patriotic,  and  capable  officer  not  merely  to  be  quick  but  to  ex 
haust  every  effort  to  reach  the  goal  at  the  earliest  moment 
possible.  To  fancy  after  that  that  McClellan  could  have  used 
greater  energy  seems  either  unfair  or  irrational.  But  certain 
critics  say :  "Why  wait  until  morning  ?  Why  did  he  not  start 
Franklin  off  that  very  evening?  For  if  he  had  started  at  once 
he  would  have  arrived  in  time."  The  letter  shows  why,  and 
shows  the  condition  of  things  in  this  conglomeration  of  an 
army.  Franklin  with  his  staff  could  have  mounted  swift 
horses  the  instant  the  order  came,  and  never  drawing  rein,  if 
nothing  stayed  them,  might  have  been  at  Harper's  Ferry  on 
the  night  before  the  surrender.  But  this  is  clearly  nonsense. 


McCLELLAN  377 

The  staff  could  not  have  reached  there  at  all.  This  is  the 
blunder  these  critics  make,  of  taking  for  granted  what  was 
not  true, — namely,  that  Franklin  could  have  started  at  once 
with  ample  force  for  the  object  in  view.  It  seems  to  me  that 
it  is  only  an  intensely  biased  mind  which  cannot  see  that  this 
is  absolutely  and  plainly  negatived  by  the  very  terms  of  the 
letter  itself.  Consider  these  two  sentences :  "Couch  has  been 
ordered  to  concentrate  his  division  and  join  you  as  rapidly  as 
possible.  Without  waiting  for  the  whole  of  that  division  to 
join  you,  you  will  move  at  daybreak  in  the  morning  by  Jef 
ferson  and  Burkittsville  upon  the  road  to  Rohrersville."  This 
means :  "Your  force  at  present  is  too  small,  so  I  am  sending 
Couch  to  you.  All  his  troops  cannot  reach  you  by  daybreak, 
but  haste  is  imperative,  so  go  ahead  at  that  time  with  what 
ever  you  have."  Why  did  he  not  detach  more  troops  from 
the  main  army?  *  Couch  was  sent  because  he  was  most  avail 
able — to  send  others  would  have  meant  still  more  delay.  The 
way  was  not  clear  to  Harper's  Ferry.  A  part  of  it  ran 
through  a  narrow,  heavily-wooded  gorge  known  as  Cramp- 
ton's  Gap,  five  miles  from  Maryland  Heights ;  and  here  Frank 
lin  had  to  fight  his  way  against  the  fierce  opposition  of  a  force 
of  2,200  men  under  General  Cobb.  At  7  A.  M.  on  September 
the  1 5th  Franklin  was  in  sight  of  Maryland  Heights;  and  if 
Colonel  Miles  had  held  this  eminence  his  rescue  was  assured. 
But  Maryland  Heights  was  occupied  by  the  Confederates ; 
it  was  now  clear  that  if  Franklin  had  arrived  twelve  hours 
earlier  it  could  have  made  no  difference,  for  the  rebel  forces 
seemed  to  him  double  his  own,  and  their  great  advantage  of 
position  made  an  attack  too  rash  to  be  seriously  considered. 
Later,  on  the  same  day,  long  before  Franklin's  army  could 
have  gathered  strength  enough  to  make  an  attack  hopeful, 
Jackson  and  his  comrades  were  off  for  Antietam. 

On  the  1 4th  McClellan  received  an  oral  message  from  Col 
onel  Miles  that  he  had  abandoned  all  the  heights, — Maryland, 
Bolivar,  and  Loudon, — that  they  were  all  occupied  by  the 
enemy,  that  his  force  was  in  Harper's  Ferry,  and  that  he 
could  hold  out  for  two  days  longer.  The  messenger  was  in 
structed  to  get  back  with  the  news  that  aid  was  coming  rapidly. 


378  M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  N 

A  little  later,  on  the  same  day,  three  different  couriers  were 
sent  to  Colonel  Miles  by  three  different  routes,  each  bearing 
a  copy  of  the  following  letter:3 

"MlDDLETOWN, 

"Sept.  14,  1862. 

"COLONEL:  The  army  is  being  rapidly  concentrated  here. 
We  are  now  attacking  the  pass  on  the  Hagerstown  road  over 
the  Blue  Ridge.  A  column  is  about  attacking  the  Burkittsville 
and  Boonsborough  Pass.  You  may  count  on  our  making  every 
effort  to  relieve  you.  You  may  rely  on  my  speedily  accom 
plishing  that  object.  Hold  out  to  the  last  extremity.  If  it  is 
possible,  reoccupy  the  Maryland  Heights  with  your  whole 
force.  If  you  can  do  that,  I  will  certainly  be  able  to  relieve 
you.  As  the  Catoctin  valley  is  in  our  possession,  you  can 
safely  cross  the  river  at  Berlin  or  its  vicinity  so  far  as  opposi 
tion  on  this  side  of  the  river  is  concerned.  Hold  out  to  the 
last. 

"GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN, 

"Ma j. -Gen.  Commanding. 
"CoL.  D.  S.  MILES." 

It  does  not  appear  that  any  of  the  couriers  succeeded  in 
his  mission. 

General  Upton,  in  his  Military  Policy  of  the  United  States, 
demonstrates  that  McClellan  was  not  open  to  any  criticism 
as  to  the  capture  of  Harper's  Ferry,  and  that  if  McClellan  had 
been  given  command  of  it  in  time,  it  would  not  have  been 
captured. 

8  McClellan,  Own  Story,  560,  561. 


CHAPTER    LXIII 

THE    LOST    ORDER SOUTH    MOUNTAIN 

Many  Northern  authors  believe  that  the  possession  of  Gen 
eral  Lee's  lost  order,  the  famous  Special  Order  No.  191,  was 
such  an  immense  advantage  that  it  should  have  brought  about 
the  immediate  overthrow  of  the  Rebellion. 

But  that  brave  and  able  Confederate  leader  and  most  en 
gaging,  frank,  and  lovable  gentleman,  Gen.  Daniel  H.  Hill, 
makes  it  evident  that  the  prize  was  an  injury,  not  a  benefit,  for 
it  convinced  the  Federal  general  that  Longstreet's  corps  was 
at  South  Mountain  when  it  was  actually  at  Hagerstown.  Gen 
eral  Hill  says  that  two  important  statements  were  contained 
in  the  order :  one  the  Federal  commander  knew  already, — that 
Jackson  had  gone  to  Harper's  Ferry;  the  other  deceived 
him, — namely,  that  Longstreet  was  at  Boonsboro  (South 
Mountain).  General  Hill  adds:  "But  for  the  resulting  mis 
take  about  the  position  of  our  forces,  McClellan  could  have 
captured  Lee's  trains  and  artillery  and  interposed  between 
Jackson  and  Longstreet  before  noon  on  that  I4th  of  Septem 
ber.  The  losing  of  the  despatch  was  the  saving  of  Lee's 
army.'* 

While  Franklin  was  fighting  his  way  through  Crampton's 
Gap,  another  column  of  the  Union  army  was  forcing  its  way 
through  Turner's  Gap.  The  conflict  here  is  generally  known  as 
the  battle  of  South  Mountain.  In  the  Maryland  campaign  the 
Ninth  Corps  (Burnside's)  seemed  always  to  thwart  the  hopes 
of  the  commander.  At  South  Mountain,  as  General  Hill  tells 
us,  if  General  Cox  of  that  corps  had  pressed  Hill's  compara 
tively  weak  force,  it  would  have  been  routed  hours  before 
Longstreet  came  to  his  aid.  With  respect  to  the  blocking  of 
this  mountain  pass  General  Lee's  report  states:  "Learning 
that  Harper's  Ferry  had  not  surrendered  and  that  the  enemy 

379 


380  M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  N 

was  advancing  more  rapidly  than  was  convenient  from  Fred- 
ericktown,  I  determined  to  return  with  Longstreet's  command 
to  strengthen  D.  H.  Hill's  and  Stuart's  divisions  engaging  in 
holding  the  passes  of  the  mountains  lest  the  enemy  should  fall 
upon  McLaws's  rear,  drive  him  from  the  Maryland  Heights, 
and  thus  relieve  the  garrison  at  Harper's  Ferry." 

But  Stuart  was  not  there  on  the  I4th.  He  had  gone  to 
Crampton's  Gap.  Early  that  morning  the  artillery  at  Cramp- 
ton's  Gap  could  be  distinctly  heard  even  at  Frederick;  it  was 
therefore  surmised  that  McClellan's  whole  army  was  crossing 
the  Blue  Ridge  at  that  point,  and  Stuart  hurried  there. 

General  Hill  believes  that  "if  McClellan  had  thrown  his 
whole  force  upon  Crampton's  Gap,  Jackson  could  have  es 
caped  across  the  Potomac,  but  the  force  under  Lee  in  person 
(Longstreet's  and  Hill's  division)  must  have  been  caught. 
But  McClellan  was  too  cautious  for  so  daring  a  venture."  He 
thinks  that  Frederick  the  Great  would  have  done  it,  but  "the 
American  soldier  preferred  to  do  sure  work  rather  than  bril 
liant  work,  his  natural  caution  being  increased  by  the  carping- 
criticism  of  his  enemies."  1  The  justice  of  this  view  on  the 
part  of  a  foeman  might  well  be  imitated  by  certain  Northern 
critics,  but  unfortunately  politics  makes  fiercer  enemies  than 
war. 

General  Hill's  account  of  the  struggle  at  South  Mountain, 
however,  makes  it  evident  that  if  General  Franklin  had  not 
been  dragged  away  uselessly,  because  of  the  War  Depart 
ment's  senseless  attitude  as  to  Harper's  Ferry,  or  if  General 
Cox  had  recognized  a  fact  which  actual  contact  should  have 
made  apparent, — namely,  that  the  force  which  opposed  him 
was  far  too  light  to  hold  its  ground  against  him, — the  pass 
would  have  been  swiftly  cleared.  Garland  had  only  1,000 
men  on  the  rebel  right.  Cox's  force  is  claimed  to  have  been 
3,000.  General  Garland  was  soon  killed;  this  created  a  panic, 
and  his  troops  flew  in  confusion  behind  the  mountain,  leaving 
200  prisoners.  The  way  was  now  clear  for  the  Union  army. 
Only  a  pretense  of  opposition  was  made  by  running  a  couple 
of  guns  into  position;  and  staff  officers,  couriers,  teamsters, 

1  Battles  and  Leaders,  II,  565,  5<56. 


McCLELLAN  381 

and  cooks  were  gathered  to  make  a  show  of  support  for  the 
guns.  General  Hill  says  he  never  felt  lonelier.  But  a  brisk 
fire  was  opened,  and  the  victorious  Federals,  thanks  to  the 
Lost  Despatch  which  filled  the  woods  with  imaginary  foes, 
retreated  to  their  first  position  and  remained  there  all  day, — 
that  is,  until  5  o'clock.  And  at  3  130  Longstreet  arrived  from 
Hagerstown  with  8  brigades.  About  5  p.  M.  the  battle  was  re 
newed,  and  this  time  by  the  Union  right  wing,  composed  of 
the  brigades  of  Meade,  Ricketts,  and  Hatch,  to  dislodge  the 
brigades  of  Rodes,  Garnett,  and  Kemper  from  the  crest  of 
the  mountain.  The  defense  was  gallant  and  stubborn,  the 
attack  equally  so,  and  the  Rebels  were  finally  driven  from  the 
crest  largely  through  the  persistence  of  General  Meade  (Gen 
eral  Hill  praises  him  warmly),  who  succeeded  in  turning  the 
left  flank  of  Rodes's  command.  Before  night  closed  in,  the 
Union  army  held  the  mountain  top.  In  the  morning  the  foe 
had  vanished.  At  this  battle  in  the  evening  the  available 
Union  force  numbered  23,778,  the  available  Rebel  force  15,- 
ooo.  The  Union  losses  were  1,813,  the  Confederate  losses 
7,321.  If  General  Cox  had  pressed  ahead  about  9  in  the 
morning,  the  mountain  would  have  been  swept  of  foes.  Gen 
eral  Lee's  trains  then  moving  along  the  western  side  would 
have  been  captured,  the  two  wings  of  his  army  hopelessly 
separated,  and  his  own  portion  of  it  inextricably  ensnared. 

It  was  General  Hill  who  held  the  attacking  force  in  check 
from  early  morning  until  5  p.  M.  On  the  Northern  side,  and 
prominent  in  the  evening  assault,  was  Gen.  John  Gibbon.  John 
Gibbon  and  Lardner  Gibbon  were  groomsmen  at  General 
Hill's  wedding.  John  fought  for  the  North  and  Lardner  for 
the  South. 

The  critic  of  The  Dial 2  assures  us  that  "the  forcing  of 
Turner's  Pass  was  most  skilfully  and  successfully  done,  and 
caused  Lee  to  prepare  for  and  consider  an  immediate  retire 
ment  to  Virginia.  Considering  the  circumstances,  the  forcing 
of  the  mountain  pass  was  promptly  done.  Lee's  'lost  orders/ 
which  came  to  McClellan's  possession,  placed  at  the  pass  a 
Confederate  force  sufficient  to  hold  it  against  a  host.  As  a 

'XXXI,  321. 


382  McCLELLAN 

matter  of  fact,  a  large  part  of  this  force  had  gone  toward 
Hagerstown;  but  of  this,  McClellan  could  have  no  knowl 
edge.  Even  as  it  was,  the  Confederate  force  left  at  the  pass 
was  sufficient  to  prevent  Cox  from  gaining  the  crest  to  the 
south  of  the  pass,  and  Gibbon  from  making  any  headway 
in  front  of  the  pass.  Meade's  successful  gaming  of  the  crest 
by  assault  on  the  right  compelled  Lee  to  abandon  the  positior 
At  Fairfield  Pass,  in  July,  1863,  a  small  Confederate  rear 
guard  was  sufficient  to  make  so  capable  a  corps  commander 
as  Sedgwick,  with  so  large  a  force  as  the  Sixth  Corps,  think 
that  the  pass  could  only  be  forced  after  long  delay;  and 
Sedgwick's  decision  had  never  been  questioned.  In  the  ensu 
ing  battle  of  Antietam, — a  wasteful  engagement  on  Lee's 
part,  and  one  fought  after  he  had  seen  that  his  campaign  of 
invasion  had  come  to  grief, — McClellan  only  failed  of  a  de 
cisive  tactical  success  because  of  the  well-meaning  Burnside's 
shortcomings  as  a  corps  commander.  But  even  then,  all  the 
substantial  results  were  with  McClellan.  Lee's  scheme  of 
invading  Pennsylvania  had  been  abandoned  before.  From 
being  the  aggressor,  he  had  from  South  Mountain  onward 
been  upon  the  defensive ;  and  he  now  abandoned  the  battlefield 
and  returned  to  Virginia." 

In  the  battle  of  South  Mountain,  General  Reno,  a  resolute 
and  gallant  leader,  was  lost  to  the  Union. 

When  on  the  morning  of  the  I5th  it  was  found  that  the 
enemy  had  decamped,  McClellan  hoped  to  overtake  him  and 
resume  the  attack  that  day;  and  he  could  have  done  so  but 
for  the  lethargy  of  Burnside  and  his  corps.  That  lethargy 
was  to  harm  the  Commander  infinitely  more  at  Antietam. 


CHAPTER  LXIV 

ANTIETAM 

After  "the  discomfiture"  at  South  Mountain,  as  he  calls 
it,  General  Longstreet  thought  that  General  Lee  should  imme 
diately  have  retired  into  Virginia.  The  invasion  was  really 
at  an  end.  General  Lee  may  have  had  the  same  thought,  but 
he  could  not  yield  to  it.  He  probably  did  not  believe  that 
the  demoralized  mob  he  had  lately  seen  rushing  in  terror  from 
his  veterans  could  have  been  sufficiently  divested  of  their 
fright  to  withstand  him  in  a  general  engagement,  where  he 
could  select  the  field;  and  if  he  could  rout  them  again,  the 
whole  North  would  be  open  to  him.  The  Antietam,  a  large 
creek,  runs  almost  due  south  (a  little  southwest)  into  the 
Potomac.  About  a  mile  to  the  west  of  it  and  two  miles  from 
the  Potomac  is  the  town  of  Sharpsburg.  A  ridge  extends 
along  the  west  bank  a  short  distance  away,  with  undulations 
in  its  summit,  supplying  an  excellent  shelter  for  both  infantry 
and  artillery.  It  is  a  long  natural  redoubt,  an  excellent  posi 
tion;  but  if  a  rout  should  come,  then  the  field  would  be  danger 
ous,  for  close  behind  flows  the  Potomac.  General  Lee  felt 
sure  that  there  would  be  no  rout.  In  this  vicinity  the  creek  is 
crossed  by  four  stone  bridges.  By  avoiding  detail  which  would 
only  obscure  the  description,  the  main  features  of  the  struggle 
can  be  made  clear. 

Hooker  and  Mansfield  held  the  Union  right  wing,  Sumner 
the  center,  and  Burnside  the  left. 

McClellan's  plan  of  battle,  it  is  said,  was  simple  and  should 
have  been  successful.  If  McClellan's  enemies  were  right  in 
asserting  that  he  was  weak  and  non-aggressive  he  would  have 
merely  planted  himself  in  Lee's  path,  fortified  his  position, 
and  let  Lee  attack  or  retire  as  he  deemed  best.  That  is  what 
General  Meade  did  at  Gettysburg,  and  both  Federals  and  Con- 

383 


384  McCLELLAN 

federates  agree  that  he  was  a  determined  and  aggressive  man. 
Very  few  generals  would  have  taken  the  initiative,  in  Mc- 
Clellan's  position  and  with  such  a  heterogeneous  mass  of  men. 
If  the  reader  will  consult  all  the  accounts  of  this  battle,  he  will 
find  nowhere  any  intimation  that  the  idea  of  acting  on  the 
defensive  ever  occurred  to  McClellan.  No  word  of  it  appears 
anywhere.  This  was  the  plan:  the  battle  was  to  begin  with 
an  attack  by  the  Union  right,  under  Generals  Hooker  and 
Mansfield,  to  be  followed  swiftly  by  an  attack  by  Burnside 
on  the  enemy's  right;  on  the  appearance  of  the  success  of 
either  wing,  the  Union  center  was  to  advance  under  General 
Porter. 

As  to  the  enemy's  position,  General  McClellan  observes : 
"Their  left  and  center  were  upon  and  in  front  of  the  Sharps- 
burg  and  Hagerstown  turnpike,  hidden  by  woods  and  irregu 
larities  of  the  ground;  their  extreme  left  resting  upon  a 
wooded  eminence  near  the  cross-roads  to  the  north  of  J. 
Miller's  farm,  and  extending  to  the  Potomac.  Their  line  ex 
tended  south,  the  right  resting  upon  the  hills  to  the  south  of 
Sharpsburg,  near  Snavely's  farm.  The  bridge  over  the  Antie- 
tam  near  this  point  was  strongly  covered  by  riflemen  pro 
tected  by  rifle-pits,  stone  fences,  etc.,  and  enfiladed  by  artil 
lery.  The  ground  in  front  of  this  line  consisted  of  undulating 
hills,  their  crests  in  turn  commanded  by  others  in  their  rear. 
On  all  favorable  points  the  enemy's  artillery  was  posted,  and 
their  reserves,  hidden  from  view  by  the  hills  on  which  their 
line  of  battle  was  formed,  could  manoeuvre  unobserved  by  our 
army,  and  from  the  shortness  of  their  line  could  rapidly  rein 
force  any  point  threatened  by  our  attack.  Their  position, 
stretching  across  the  angle  formed  by  the  Potomac  and  An- 
tietam,  their  flanks  and  rear  protected  by  these  streams,  was 
one  of  the  strongest  to  be  found  in  this  region  of  the  country, 
which  is  well  adapted  to  defensive  warfare."  l  It  was  "a 
natural  Gibraltar/'  2 

A  preliminary  advance  of  the  right,  which  McClellan  him 
self  led  to  the  top  of  the  ridge  on  the  west  of  the  Antietam, 

1  McClellan,  Own  Story,  587,  588. 
8  Stine,  Army  of  the  Potomac,  217. 


McCLELLAN  385 

was  made  on  the  afternoon  of  September  the  i6th.  There  was 
a  sharp  contest  and  the  Union  troops  remained  in  possession 
of  the  ground  first  taken,  and  there  spent  the  night.  The  bat 
tle  was  resumed  at  this  point  as  soon  as  daylight  came  and 
Vaged  for  many  hours,  the  enemy's  left  being  forced  back  a 
great  distance  to  the  Dunker  Church.  During  the  noon  hour, 
General  Franklin  came  upon  the  field  from  Crampton's  Gap; 
a  part  of  his  force  went  immediately  into  action  and  drove  the 
now  advancing  enemy  back  to  the  Dunker  Church.  General 
Franklin  was  eager  to  throw  all  his  corps  into  this  fight  on  the 
right,  but  it  was  now  the  middle  of  the  afternoon,  and  Sum- 
ner's  corps  were  so  badly  shaken  up  by  the  hot  fighting  of 
the  day  that  even  that  fierce  old  bulldog  felt  that  it  would 
be  reckless  to  risk  another  assault,  as  it  would  rest  entirely 
on  General  Franklin's  force.  Between  the  brave  eagerness  of 
Franklin  to  attack  and  the  prudent  anxiety  of  General  Sumner 
as  to  the  result,  General  McClellan  decided,  in  view  of  the 
condition  of  the  troops,  to  risk  nothing  further. 

A  factor  in  this  decision  no  doubt  was  the  fact  that  15,000 
fresh  troops  were  expected  to  arrive  in  the  morning.  Another 
factor,  equally  potent  no  doubt,  was  the  balking  of  his  inten 
tions  through  the  incapacity  of  Burnside.  Not  only  did  Burn- 
side  fail  to  get  the  direct  advantage  expected,  but  his  impo- 
tency  allowed  the  Confederates  to  concentrate  practically  their 
whole  strength  in  resisting  Hooker,  Mansfield,  and  Sumner. 
If  he  had  only  made  a  respectable  showing  toward  carrying 
out  the  commander's  wishes,  the  right  wing  would  not  have 
been  held  at  bay.  Let  us  see  how  this  occurred.  In  the  fore 
noon  of  the  1 6th  General  Burnside  was  directed  to  take  a  po 
sition  beside  the  bridge  now  known  as  the  Burnside  Bridge. 
It  was  nearly  night  when  this  was  accomplished.  He  was 
also  informed  on  the  i6th  that  he  would  be  expected  to  at 
tack  on  the  next  morning  at  daybreak.3  In  the  morning 
many  successive  orders  were  sent  to  him  to  carry  Bridge  No. 
3  and  clear  the  heights  beyond.  The  work  was  done  gallantly 
by  his  troops  at  a  time  when  it  was  most  difficult  as  there 
was  no  fighting  at  any  other  point  and  the  rebels  could  devote 

8  Curtis,  McClellan  s  Last  Service,  84. 


386  M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  N 

their  sole  attention  to  him.  But  it  was  too  late  after  3  p.  M., 
and  when  his  troops  were  in  the  full  tide  of  success  Gen. 
A.  P.  Hill's  force  of  2,500  arrived  from  Harper's  Ferry  and 
blocked  his  further  progress.  There  were  hot  discussions 
as  to  when  he  received  the  first  order.  General  McClellan  says 
he  sent  the  first  order  at  8  A.  M.  General  Sackett  states  that 
at  about  9  o'clock  he  went  to  General  Burnside  as  fast  as  his 
horse  could  carry  him,  with  a  more  insistent  order,  and  the 
latter  said:  "You  are  the  third  or  fourth  one  who  has  been 
to  me  with  similar  orders."  4  On  the  other  hand,  General  Cox 
stoutly  contends  that  the  first  order  came  at  ten. 

While  General  Sackett  was  with  Burnside,  Colonel  Key 
came  to  urge  carrying  the  bridge  and  heights  at  all  costs,  and 
Burnside  ordered  assaults,  which  were  for  a  long  time  unsuc 
cessful.  After  carrying  the  bridge  and  heights  there  was 
another  halt,  and  Colonel  Key  came  again  from  McClellan. 
They  had  hardly  got  started  again  when  General  A.  P.  Hill 
came  and  checked  their  progress.  As  the  carrying  of  the 
bridge  and  heights  about  one  o'clock  proves  the  feasibility 
of  the  plan,  General  Burnside  is  far  from  being  excused  upon 
the  assumption  that  the  order  reached  him  first  at  ten.  If  the 
successful  attack  which  was  made  at  one  had  been  made  at 
ten,  this  would  have  removed  the  pressure  from  the  right 
wing;  and  there  is  no  reason  to  doubt  that  both  wings  would 
have  been  successful  and  that  Porter's  troops  could  then  have 
completed  the  disruption  of  the  Rebel  host.  It  will  be  seen 
that  McClellan's  method  was  not  to  attack  the  Rebel  left  and 
right  together,  but  to  begin  on  the  rebel  left  and  to  throw  such 
vigor  into  this  attack  that  General  Lee  would  be  tempted  to 
weaken  his  right,  which  was  yet  unharassed,  to  defend  his  left; 
and  so  it  happened.  In  fact,  before  the  battle  began,  General 
Lee  had  already  somewhat  weakened  his  right  to  strengthen 
his  left  by  taking  from  the  right  Hood's  two  brigades ;  and 
when  the  actual  fighting  was  in  full  progress,  seeing  how  easy 
it  was  to  hold  Burnside  beyond  the  bridge,  he  took  away  two 
whole  divisions, — McLaws's  and  Walker's,  two-thirds  of  his 
force  confronting  Burnside, — to  support  his  imperiled  left. 
4  McClellan,  Own  Story,  609. 


McCLELLAN  387 

Here  was  Burnside's  opportunity,  for  there  remained  but 
400  at  the  bridge  and  2,500  in  all  against  Burnside's  14,000. 
And  it  was  not  until  then,  when  the  opposing  force  was  so 
depleted,  that  Burnside's  order  came  to  pass  beyond  the  bridge 
toward  Sharpsburg.  The  evidence  is  strong  that  this  was  at 
8  o'clock.  As  the  plan  of  McClellan  is  known  beyond  any 
doubt,  and  as  both  the  Confederate  and  the  Northern  officers 
tell  us  that  McClellan  supervised  the  battle  from  a  splendid 
position  to  oversee  the  whole  field  of  operations,  it  is  reason 
able  to  believe  that  he  sent  the  order  just  when  the  fight  on 
the  enemy's  left  was  hottest  and  when  he  thought  that  the 
force  in  front  of  Burnside  had  been  most  weakened.  Of  the 
dereliction  of  General  Burnside,  Colonel  Powell  says:  "Burn- 
side  was  ordered  the  night  before  to  be  ready  to  attack  early, 
that  the  enemy  might  be  kept  from  concentrating  on  our  right, 
and  ordered  at  8  o'clock  to  carry  the  bridge  with  a  dash  and 
to  storm  the  bluff  beyond  it.  Aide  after  aide  was  sent  to  find 
why  it  wasn't  done,  and  with  the  same  order  more  urgent; 
and  at  9  o'clock  Colonel  Sackett  was  sent  with  the  same  order, 
that  it  positively  must  be  done  and  a  strong  movement  made 
towards  Sharpsburg.  Colonel  Sackett  was  to  stay  there  and 
help  to  do  it.  Three  hours  later,  Colonel  Key,  Senior  Aide, 
went  with  the  same  order,  imperative  not  to  stop  at  any  sacri 
fice  of  life,  for  the  day  depended  on  it;  and  at  last  at  one 
o'clock  the  bridge  and  bluff  were  carried,  and  then  another 
stop ;  and  meanwhile  a  heavy  concentration  was  made  against 
our  right,  its  splendidly  successful  attack  checked  with  great 
carnage,  and  the  very  thing  Burnside  was  ordered  and  in 
tended  to  prevent  was  permitted  by  his  astounding  incapacity. 
Oh !  for  two  hours  of  Reno,  or  Kearney,  or  Reynolds,  or  Han 
cock,  or  old  Sumner,  instead  of  a  whole  day  of  this  man,  who 
could  neither  see  the  great  need  nor  his  own  glorious  oppor 
tunity." 

Let  us  hear  another  author  on  this  vitally  important  point : 
"It  is  now  necessary  to  look  to  the  other  end  of  the  Union 
line  held  by  the  Ninth  Corps  under  Burnside.  This  force  lay 
massed  behind  the  heights  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Antietam, 
and  opposite  the  Confederate  right,  which  it  was  designed  he 


388  McCLELLAN 

should  assail  after  forcing  the  passage  of  the  Antietam  by  the 
lower  stone-bridge.  The  part  assigned  to  General  Burnside 
was  of  the  greatest  importance,  for  a  successful  attack  by  him 
upon  the  Confederate  right  would,  by  carrying  the  Sharps- 
burg  crest,  force  Lee  from  his  line  of  retreat  by  way  of 
Shepherdstown.  General  McClellan,  appreciating  the  full  effect 
of  an  attack  by  his  left,  directed  Burnside  early  in  the  morning 
to  hold  his  troops  in  readiness  to  assault  the  bridge  in  his 
front.  Then,  at  8  o'clock,  on  learning  how  much  opposition 
had  been  developed  by  Hooker,  he  ordered  Burnside  to  carry 
the  bridge,  gain  possession  of  the  heights,  and  advance  along 
their  crest  upon  Sharpsburg,  as  a  diversion  in  favor  of  the 
right.  Burnside's  tentatives  were  frivolous  in  their  character ; 
and  hour  after  hour  went  by,  during  which  the  need  of  his  as 
sistance  became  more  and  more  imperative,  and  McClellan' s 
commands  more  and  more  urgent.  Five  hours,  in  fact,  passed, 
and  the  action  on  the  right  had  been  concluded  in  such  man 
ner  as  has  been  seen,  before  the  work  that  should  have  been 
done  in  the  morning  had  been  accomplished.  Encouraged  by 
the  ease  with  which  the  left  of  the  Union  force  was  held  in 
check,  Lee  was  free  to  remove  two-thirds  of  the  right  wing 
under  Longstreet, — namely,  the  divisions  of  McLaws  and 
Walker, — and  this  force  he  applied  at  the  point  of  actual 
conflict  on  his  left,  where,  as  has  already  been  seen,  the  arrival 
of  these  divisions  served  to  check  Sumner  in  his  career  of 
victory,  and  hurl  back  Sedgwick.  This  step  the  Confederate 
commander  would  never  have  ventured  on,  had  there  been 
any  vigor  displayed  on  the  part  of  the  confronting  force  on  his 
right;  yet  this  heavy  detachment,  having  been  made  from  the 
hostile  right,  should  have  rendered  the  task  assigned  to  Gen 
eral  Burnside  one  of  comparative  ease,  for  it  left  on  that  en 
tire  wing  but  a  single  hostile  division  of  2,500  men  under  Gen 
eral  Jones,  and  the  force  actually  present  to  dispute  the  pas 
sage  of  the  bridge  did  not  exceed  400  men.  Nevertheless,  it 
was  one  o'clock,  and  after  the  action  on  the  right  had  been 
determined,  before  a  passage  was  effected;  and  this  being 
done,  two  hours  passed  before  the  attack  on  the  crest  was 
made.  This  was  successfully  executed  at  three  o'clock,  the 


McCLELLAN  389 

Sharpsburg  bridge  being  carried  and  a  Confederate  battery, 
that  had  been  delivering  an  annoying  fire,  captured.  It  was 
one  of  the  many  unfortunate  results  of  the  long  delay  in  this 
operation  on  the  left  that  just  as  this  success  was  gained  the 
division  of  A.  P.  Hill,  which  Jackson  had  left  behind  to  re 
ceive  the  surrender  of  Harper's  Ferry,  reached  the  field  from 
that  place  by  way  of  Shepherdstown.  Uniting  his  own  rein 
forcement  with  the  troops  of  Jones  that  had  been  broken 
through  the  attack,  he  assumed  the  offensive,  recaptured  the 
battery,  and  drove  Burnside  back  over  all  the  ground  gained, 
and  to  the  shelter  of  the  bluff  bordering  the  Antietam."  5 

Colonel  Powell  points  out  four  circumstances  which  con 
spired  to  rob  McClellan  of  a  decisive  and  glorious  victory,  and 
shows  that  if  any  one  of  them  had  transpired  as  the  General 
intended,  the  destruction  of  Lee's  army  would  have  been  se 
cured. 

First.  Burnside  was  ordered  to  pursue  Lee  after  the 
struggle  at  South  Mountain.  He  failed  to  do  so,  and  the 
failure  was  discovered  too  late.  If  he  had  followed  up  ac 
tively,  Lee's  own  division  of  the  army  would  have  been  over 
whelmed  before  Jackson,  McLaws,  and  Walker,  who  did  the 
greater  part  of  the  fighting  at  Antietam,  could  have  joined  it, 
for  he  would  then  have  had  no  opportunity  to  secure  "an  ex 
ceedingly  strong  position,  probably  the  strongest  in  that  sec 
tion  of  the  country." 

Second.  If  General  Burnside  had  attacked  promptly  and 
energetically  at  8  or  9,  or  even  at  10,  instead  of  spending  at 
least  three  hours  in  futile  attempts  to  do  what  was  subse 
quently  accomplished  in  from  ten  to  fifteen  minutes,  he  would 
have  found  that  there  was  only  a  trivial  force  in  front  of  him ; 
and,  having  swept  this  away  and  fallen  upon  the  enemy's  right 
flank  and  rear,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  he  would  have 
gained  a  decisive  victory,  as  he  might  also  have  done  if,  when 
he  did  at  last  cross,  he  had  rushed  on  swiftly  instead  of  delay 
ing  for  two  hours,  making  his  full  delay  amount  to  from  five 
to  seven  hours. 

Third.     If  Mansfield  had  advanced  with  Hooker,  as  Gen- 

5  Swinton,  Army  of  the  Potomac,  219,  221. 


390  McCLELLAN 

eral  McClellan  had  ordered,  success  would  have  attended  the 
Union  arms  early  in  the  day,  despite  the  fact  that  because  of 
Burnside's  failure  the  Rebels  were  massing  their  fighting- 
strength  against  Hooker,  for  Hooker  had  actually  turned  the 
Rebel  left,  but  the  absence  of  Mansfield  left  a  gap  and  Hooker 
was  forced  to  retire. 

Fourth.  If  General  A.  A.  Humphreys  had  been  at  Antie- 
tam  with  his  troops,  he  could  have  broken  Lee's  center  when 
it  was  thinned  to  resist  Hooker.  But  by  orders  from  Wash 
ington  he  was  detained  a  day  (the  1 7th)  at  Fredericksburg, 
and  so  was  not  present  at  the  battle. 

But  there  is  a  fifth, — namely,  Burnside's  failure  to  clear 
away  Garland's  little  force  at  South  Mountain. 

It  was  most  unfortunate  for  General  McClellan  that  he 
ever  met  Burnside.  His  kindness  to  Burnside  when  the  latter 
was  in  the  sorest  need  in  Cincinnati  will  be  remembered. 
Having  been  rescued  from  destitution  and  made  comfortable 
and  happy  by  the  friendship  of  McClellan,  a  man  of  nobler 
character  would  have  felt  to  the  last  moment  of  his  life  the 
warmest  glow  of  gratitude.  I  surmise  that  Burnside's  feel 
ings  were  of  jealousy  rather  than  of  gratitude.  When  di 
rected  to  reinforce  McClellan  on  the  James  he  halted  at  For 
tress  Monroe  and  requested  a  secret  conference  with  Mr.  Stan- 
ton.  Even  cipher  telegrams  were  not  secure  enough  for  him. 
This  leads  me  to  suspect  him,  especially  as  his  army  never  got 
any  farther.  If  there  was  any  evidence  that  he  urged  the 
civil  authorities  to  support  McClellan,  it  would  be  gratifying 
to  learn  of  it,  but  no  hint  of  such  action  appears.  There  is 
no  basis  for  believing  that  he  ever  played  the  role  of  the  faith 
ful  friend.  Having  been  reinstated  after  Pope's  defeat,  Mc 
Clellan  found  Burnside  one  of  his  lieutenants ;  he  favored  him, 
trusted  him,  relied  upon  him  constantly.  Burnside  was  placed 
in  a  position  to  win  glory  at  South  Mountain;  he  won  none, 
but  lost  a  good  opportunity  in  failing  to  follow  up  the  rout 
of  Garland's  Brigade,  in  failing  to  obey  McClellan' s  command 
to  pursue  after  the  Confederates  had  abandoned  the  field.  But 
his  crowning  act  of  delinquency  and  faithlessness  was  at  An- 
tietam,  as  we  have  seen.  If  Porter  or  Franklin  or  Meade  or 


McCLELLAN  391 

Sykes  had  had  charge  of  the  left  wing,  how  different  the  tale 
would  have  been. 

Writers  descant  upon  tire  disparity  of  numbers  at  Antie- 
tam ;  but  whoever  studies  the  battle  will  find  that,  eliminating 
the  feeble  and  worthless  movement  of  Burnside,  the  battle  of 
Antietam  was  a  struggle  of  all  the  best  fighting  material  of  the 
Confederate  army  concentrated  upon  their  left  wing  against 
the  troops  of  Hooker,  Mansfield,  and  Sumner.  And  the  dis 
parity  at  first  asserted  in  order  to  lessen  the  credit  disappears 
in  the  light  of  better  information. 

At  5  P.  M.  Lee  concentrated  his  artillery  upon  the  Union 
right,  intending  to  advance,  turn  that  wing  of  the  Federal 
army,  and  force  McClellan  to  retire  toward  Harper's  Ferry, 
leaving  the  whole  North  open  to  him.  A  terrible  artillery 
duel  ensued,  but  the  superior  efficiency  of  McClellan's  guns 
was  quickly  evident,  and  the  design  was  abandoned.  Jack 
son  says,  "I  found  his  numerous  artillery  so  judiciously 
placed  as  to  render  it  inexpedient  to  hazard  the  attempt." 

In  waiting  for  fresh  troops  the  i8th  passed  away,  and 
that  night  saw  the  soldiers  of  Dixie  hurrying  back  into  Vir 
ginia.  The  sanguinary  fight  was  over ;  and  the  army,  not  yet 
recovered  from  its  reverses  under  Pope,  now  learned  again 
that  it  could  hold  its  own  under  competent  leaders. 

Some  critics  blame  McClellan  for  not  resuming  the  attack 
on  the  1 8th,  but  his  action  was  dictated  by  the  wisest  pru 
dence.  Probably  none  who  censure  would  have  done  differ 
ently,  had  they  been  in  McClellan's  position.  The  question  is 
not  whether  we  now  believe  he  would  have  probably  succeeded, 
but  whether,  considering  the  condition  of  his  army,  it  was 
prudent  to  make  the  attempt.  With  powerful  enemies  at  the 
head  of  the  government  seeking  his  ruin,  with  soldiers  not 
yet  restored  to  their  full  spirit  and  efficiency,  it  behooved  him 
to  be  prudent,  for  defeat  would  have  been  fraught  with  re 
sults  appalling  to  the  country  as  well  as  to  himself.  Surely 
the  road  of  prudence  was  in  this  instance  also  the  highway  of 
wisdom.  General  Meade  followed  the  same  wise  course  at 
Gettysburg. 

Upon  the  question  of  resuming  the  battle  on  the   i8th 


392  McCLELLAN 

McClellan  speaks  convincingly:  'The  night  brought  with  it 
grave  responsibilities.  Whether  to  renew  the  attack  on  the 
1 8th,  or  to  defer  it,  even  with  the  risk  of  the  enemy's  retire 
ment,  was  the  question  before  me.  After  a  night  of  anxious 
deliberation  and  a  full  and  careful  survey  of  the  situation  and 
condition  of  our  army,  and  the  strength  and  position  of  the 
enemy,  I  concluded  that  the  success  of  an  attack  on  the  i8th 
was  not  certain.  I  am  aware  of  the  fact,  that  under  ordinary 
circumstances,  a  general  is  expected  to  risk  a  battle  if  he  has  a 
reasonable  prospect  of  success;  but  at  this  critical  juncture  I 
should  have  had  a  narrow  view  of  the  condition  of  the  coun 
try,  had  I  been  willing  to  hazard  another  battle  with  less 
than  an  absolute  assurance  of  success.  At  that  moment, — 
Virginia  lost,  Washington  menaced,  Maryland  invaded, — the 
national  cause  could  afford  no  risk  of  defeat.  One  battle  lost, 
and  almost  all  would  have  been  lost.  Lee's  army  might  then 
have  marched  as  it  pleased  on  Washington,  Baltimore,  Phila 
delphia,  or  New  York.  It  could  have  levied  its  supplies  from 
a  fertile  and  devastated  country ;  extorted  tribute  from  wealthy 
and  populous  cities,  and  nowhere  east  of  the  Alleghenies  was 
there  another  force  able  to  arrest  its  march.  The  following 
are  among  the  considerations  which  led  me  to  doubt  the  cer 
tainty  of  success  in  attacking  before  the  iQth: 

"The  troops  were  greatly  overcome  by  the  fatigue  and 
exhaustion  attendant  upon  the  long-continued  and  severely 
contested  battle  of  the  i7th,  together  with  the  long  day-and- 
night  marches  to  which  they  had  been  subjected  during  the 
previous  three  days. 

'The  supply  trains  were  in  the  rear,  and  many  of  the 
troops  had  suffered  from  hunger.  They  required  rest  and 
refreshment. 

"One  division  of  Sumner's  and  all  of  Hooker's  corps  on 
the  right  had,  after  fighting  most  valiantly  for  several  hours, 
been  overpowered  by  numbers,  driven  back  in  great  disorder, 
and  much  scattered,  so  that  they  were  for  the  time  somewhat 
demoralized. 

"In  Hooker's  corps,  according  to  the  return  made  by  Gen 
eral  Meade  commanding,  there  were  but  6,729  men  present 


McCLELLAN  393 

on  the  i8th;  whereas  on  the  morning  of  the  22d  there  were 
13,093  men  present  for  duty  in  the  same  corps,  showing  that 
previous  to  and  during  the  battle  6,364  men  were  separated 
from  their  command."  6 

There  was  some  effort  at  pursuit  by  Porter's  corps,  but  the 
Potomac  lay  between  the  two  armies  and  afforded  so  much 
advantage  to  the  Confederates  that  the  attempt  to  harass  them 
further  was  soon  abandoned. 

The  army  needed  rest,  reorganization,  reequipment.  Of 
the  end  of  the  campaign  General  Franklin  writes :  "History 
will  one  day  tell  why  the  Confederate  army  was  not  driven 
into  the  Potomac  instead  of  across  it.  It  will  show  that  its 
escape  was  not  due  to  want  of  generalship  of  the  commanding 
general,  nor  to  the  absence  of  necessary  orders  to  subordi 
nates/' 

The  losses  at  Antietam  were:  Union,  12,410;  Confeder 
ate,  25,899.  The  forces  engaged  were:  Lee,  179  regiments 
of  infantry,  14^  regiments  of  cavalry,  and  71  batteries;  Mc- 
Clellan,  184  regiments  of  infantry,  15  regiments  of  cavalry, 
and  50  batteries. 

Twenty-one  regiments  of  the  above  184  were  raw  recruits, 
and  27  others  were  in  Franklin's  corps,  with  7  of  the  50  bat 
teries,  and  did  not  arrive  until  between  noon  and  one  o'clock, 
while  the  battle,  it  will  be  remembered,  began  on  the  afternoon' 
of  the  1 6th  and  was  resumed  at  daylight  on  the  i7th.  The 
above  figures  are  taken  from  Captain  Heipinger's  Antietam 
and  will  be  a  surprise  to  those  who  have  believed  from  false 
statements  that  McClellan  had  an  overwhelming  superiority 
of  force. 

General  Upton  tells  us  that  at  this  time  there  were  71,210 
men  at  Washington,  and  that  "50,000  of  these  could  have 
been  at  Antietam,  and  if  they  had  been,  it  is  fair  to  infer 
that  little  would  have  been  heard  of  the  Confederacy  after 
the  Maryland  campaign/'7 

The  repulse  of  the  army  of  invasion  was  not  a  rout  of  it. 
If  Burnside  had  not  failed  and  the  Southern  army  had  been 

6  McClellan,  Own  Story,  618,  619. 

1  Military  Policy  of  the  United  States,  383. 


v 

394  McCLELLAN 

overwhelmed,  naturally  a  pursuit  would  have  followed.  But 
Burnside's  defection  caused  the  Union  army  too  great  a  sacri 
fice  of  men  to  leave  any  keen  spirit  of  fight  in  it.  Lee's  pur 
pose  was  foiled.  The  North  was  saved.  Surely,  thought  they, 
that  was  enough  to  expect  of  this  army,  considering  its  recent 
experiences.  It  came  wearied  to  Antietam.  It  was  more 
weary  now.  It  needed  a  long  rest  after  Bull  Run.  It  needed 
that  rest  still  more  now.  All  the  army  needed  reorganizing — 
many  of  the  soldiers  were  raw  recruits,  novices  in  drill  and 
discipline.  Above  all,  because  of  the  calamity  of  Bull  Run  No. 
2,  the  army  needed  to  be  reequipped.  It  was  woefully  desti 
tute  of  the  necessaries  of  life. 


CHAPTER    LXV 

REORGANIZATION     OF    THE    ARMY ILLUSIVE     PROMISES THE 

CONSPIRACY  IN   FULL  BLAST 

With  the  invasion  of  Maryland,  an  emergency  arose  which 
had  to  be  met  instantly;  no  choice  of  action  was  left.  Ready 
or  not  ready,  organized  or  not,  fit  or  unfit,  the  army  had  to 
start  out  at  once  to  block  the  advance  of  Lee  into  the  North. 
But  for  this  condition,  the  army  should  have  had  a  couple  of 
months'  rest  (as  it  had  before  Gettysburg)  to  restore  its  nerve, 
to  revive  its  morale.  General  McClellan  makes  all  this  clear, 
as  we  have  shown. 

Accordingly,  the  army  was  now  gathered  about  the  vicin 
ity  of  Harper's  Ferry,  and  requisitions  for  clothes,  camp  uten 
sils,  and  so  on  were  hurried  to  Washington.  As  the  articles 
came  slowly  and  in  insufficient  quantity,  General  McClellan 
kept  urging  the  authorities  to  hasten,  and  they  in  turn  insisted 
that  the  orders  had  been  filled,  which  was  literally  true  but 
meant  nothing,  as  a  large  portion  had  not  yet  arrived.  It 
speaks  badly  for  the  administrative  functions  of  the  commis 
sary  general's  office  that,  weeks  later,  train  loads  of  these 
supplies  were  found  on  the  tracks  in  Washington — forgotten. 
The  waiting  was  no  damage  in  itself,  as  the  troops  needed 
the  rest.  Then  also,  as  Mr.  Swinton  observes,  while  the  Poto 
mac  was  low  there  was  danger  that  Lee  would  cross  again  and 
hurry  into  the  North;  but  the  season  of  high  water  was  now 
near,  and  when  it  came  this  danger  would  pass.  This  Mc 
Clellan  had  in  view.1 

For  a  few  days  after  Antietam  the  powers  seemed  grate 
ful  ;  and  then,  without  any  earnest  inquiry  as  to  the  facts  and 
the  necessities  of  the  situation,  the  goading  to  move  on  was 
resumed.  On  the  first  of  October,  1862,  the  President  came 

1  McClellan,  Own  Story,  643. 

395 


396  McCLELLAN 

to  Harper's  Ferry.  He  was  most  affable,  and  he  repeatedly 
assured  McClellan  that  he  was  satisfied  with  his  whole  course 
from  the  beginning ;  that  the  only  fault  that  he  could  possibly 
find  was  that  he  was  perhaps  too  careful  about  being  sure  that 
everything  was  ready  before  acting,  but  that  his  actions  were 
all  right  when  he  started.  McClellan  replied  that  he  thought  a 
few  experiments  with  those  who  started  before  they  were 
ready  would  probably  convince  the  President  that  in  the  end 
he  consumed  less  time  than  they.  Mr.  Lincoln  said  that  he 
regarded  McClellan  as  the  only  general  in  the  service  capable 
of  organizing  and  commanding  a  large  army,  and  that  he 
would  stand  by  him.  At  South  Mountain  he  said  he  did  not 
see  how  Lee  had  gained  that  field,  and  that  he  was  sure  that 
if  McClellan  had  defended  it  Lee  could  not  have  taken  it. 
He  again  said  that  he  would  stand  by  the  general,  that  he 
wished  him  to  continue  his  preparations  and  not  to  stir  an 
inch  until  he  was  ready.  He  again  said  that  he  was  fully 
satisfied  with  McClellan;  that  the  General  should  be  let  alone, 
and  that  he  would  stand  by  him.  They  never  met  again.2 
It  is  hard  to  believe  that  in  saying  this  the  President  was  ab 
solutely  insincere.  I  prefer  to  believe  that  he  was  expressing 
his  actual  feelings,  but,  taking  that  view,  it  is  almost  as  pain 
ful  to  observe  how  completely  he  must  have  been  in  the  sin 
ister  power  of  the  Secretary  of  War. 

He  had  scarcely  reached  the  Capital  again  when  an  order 
came  removing  General  Cox's  division,  5,000  men,  from  Mc- 
Clellan's  command;  and  on  the  heels  of  that  order  came  the 
following  telegram :  "Oct.  6. — I  am  instructed  to  telegraph 
you  as  follows :  The  President  directs  that  you  cross  the 
Potomac  and  give  battle  to  the  enemy  and  drive  him  south. 
Your  army  must  move  now  while  the  roads  are  good.  If  you 
cross  the  river  between  the  enemy  and  Washington,  and  cover 
the  latter  by  your  operations,  you  can  be  reinforced  with 
30,000  men.  If  you  move  up  the  valley  of  the  Shenandoah, 
not  more  than  12,000  or  15,000  can  be  sent  to  you.  The  Presi 
dent  advises  the  interior  line  between  Washington  and -the 
enemy,  but  does  not  order  it.  He  is  very  desirous  that  your 

*  McClellan,  Own  Story,  627,  628. 


M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  N  397 

army  move  as  soon  as  possible.  You  will  immediately  report 
what  line  you  adopt  and  when  you  intend  to  cross  the  river; 
also  to  what  point  the  reinforcements  are  to  be  sent.  It  is 
necessary  that  the  plan  of  your  operations  be  positively  de 
termined  on  before  orders  are  given  for  building  bridges  and 
repairing  railroads.  I  am  directed  to  add  that  the  Secretary 
of  War  and  the  General-in-Chief  fully  concur  with  the  Presi 
dent  in  these  instructions."  3 

Upon  the  receipt  of  this  peculiar  order,  after  such  em 
phatic  assurances  from  the  President  of  his  appreciation  of 
the  existing  condition  and  of  his  hearty  support,  General  Mc- 
Clellan  pressed  his  own  officers  to  urge  to  the  utmost  speed  all 
those  from  whom  the  supplies  had  to  be  obtained.  In  spite 
of  every  effort,  General  Franklin's  corps  was  not  supplied 
until  the  army  had  started  off  into  Virginia  at  the  end  of 
October.  General  Reynolds  was  detained  a  day  at  Berlin  for 
a  similar  reason,  and  General  Porter  completed  his  equip 
ment  only  as  he  was  about  to  cross  the  Potomac.  Many 
soldiers  marched  to  Warrenton  with  bare  and  bleeding  feet.4 

In  his  Own  Story,  General  McClellan,  as  we  might  expect 
from  one  with  his  wonderful  talent  for  administrative  work 
and  detail,  presents  overwhelming  proof  of  the  necessity  for 
the  reequipment  of  the  army.  He  also  shows  the  inexcusable 
negligence  and  incapacity  of  the  authorities  in  complying  with 
the  requisitions.  Those  who  find  such  matters  interesting 
should  read  pages  633  and  635  of  his  Own  Story,  where  tables 
are  given  showing  exactly  how  many  caps  and  other  specific 
articles  of  clothing  were  supplied,  when  they  were  supplied, 
and  the  constant  efforts  that  were  made  to  quicken  the  move 
ments  of  the  Washington  authorities  from  whom  these  neces 
saries  were  to  be  secured.  Mr.  Flower  tells  us  that,  as  the 
result  of  the  reinstatement  of  General  McClellan,  Mr.  Lincoln, 
knowing  how  distasteful  it  was  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  kept 
away  from  the  War  Department  for  a  month.  There  is  ex 
trinsic  evidence  of  this  in  the  fact  that  until  the  beginning  of 
October  General  McClellan  had  a  respite  from  annoyance. 

8  McClellan,  Own  Story,  628. 

*  Curtis,  McClellan 's  Last  Service,  82. 


398  McCLELLAN 

But  just  at  the  very  time  when  he  had  received  the  warmest 
and  most  earnest  assurances  of  the  cordial  cooperation  of  the 
President,  and  the  prospect  seemed  very  hopeful,  the  proofs 
came  flooding  upon  him  that  Svengali  had  reappeared  upon 
the  scene,  for  the  President's  communications  became  sud 
denly  and  without  cause  bitter,  unreasonable,  senseless.  There 
was  urgent  need  of  horses.  There  was  a  scanty  supply,  and 
of  those  on  hand  a  very  large  number  were  incapacitated  by 
a  strange  disease  that  was  caused  no  doubt  by  overwork.  An 
allusion  to  this  brought  forth  the  following  Stanton-inspired 
response,  written  without  the  slightest  knowledge  of  the  facts, 
and  without  effort  to  ascertain  them.5 

"To  MAJ.-GEN.  MCCLELLAN  : 

"I  have  just  received  your  despatch  about  sore-tongued 
and  fatigued  horses.  Will  you  pardon  me  for  asking  what 
the  horses  of  your  army  have  done  since  the  battle  of  Antie- 
tam  that  fatigues  anything? 

"A.   LINCOLN." 

Such  a  caustic,  undignified  letter,  so  out  of  accord  with 
the  generally  accepted  idea  of  the  patience,  wisdom,  and  kind 
ness  of  the  President,  makes  one  not  only  marvel,  but  also 
look  for  the  malign  inspiration  which  produced  it.  And  we 
seem  to  find  it  in  the  fact  that  Mr.  Stanton  was  again  the 
private  counsellor  of  the  President. 

In  reply,  McClellan  pointed  out  the  arduous  work  of  the 
cavalry  in  making  reconnoissances,  in  scouting  and  picketing, 
and  in  pursuing  Stuart's  cavalry.  He  concludes  by  saying: 
"If  any  instance  can  be  found  \vhere  overworked  cavalry  has 
performed  more  labor  than  mine  since  the  battle  of  Antietam, 
I  am  not  conscious  of  it." 

5  McClellan,  Own  Story,  634, 


CHAPTER   LXVI 

A  SWIFT  MARCH THE  REBELS  ASTONISHED LEE  IN  DANGER 

THE   CLOSING   SCENE THE   TRIUMPH   OF   THE 

CONSPIRACY 

On  the  26th  of  October,  1862,  the  crossing  of  the  Potomac 
began,  and  was  delayed  by  heavy  rains. 

Once  over  the  river  and  supplied  as  far  as  could  be  ex 
pected  at  that  time,  the  army  pushed  ahead  vigorously.  Jeffer 
son  Davis  expressed  his  surprise  at  the  speed  of  it.  On  the 
7th  of  November  the  army  was  massed  at  and  about  Warren- 
ton.  Lee  and  Longstreet,  with  half  the  Rebel  army,  were  at 
Culpeper,  only  six  miles  away  from  McClellan's  advance 
guard.  Jackson,  with  the  other  half,  was  beyond  the  Blue 
Ridge,  at  least  125  miles  away.  Mr.  Swinton  speaks  of  this 
movement  with  warm  praise.  "Advancing  due  southward 
toward  Warrenton,  he  masked  the  movement  by  guarding  the 
passes  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  and  by  threatening  to  issue  through 
these,  he  compelled  Lee  to  retain  Jackson  in  the  valley.  With 
such  success  was  this  movement  managed  that  on  reaching 
Warrenton  on  the  Qth,  while  Lee  had  sent  half  of  his  army 
forward  to  Culpeper  to  oppose  McClellan's  advance  in  that 
direction,  the  other  half  was  still  west  of  the  Blue  Ridge, 
scattered  up  and  down  the  valley,  and  separated  from  the 
other  moiety  by  at  least  two  days'  march.  McClellan's  next 
projected  move  was  to  strike  across  obliquely  westward  and 
interpose  between  the  severed  divisions  of  the  Confederate 
forces."  1 

From  another  authority  we  learn  that  Jackson  was  at 
Winchester,  one  hundred  and  twenty-five  miles  away,  with 
half  of  the  Rebel  forces.  General  McClellan's  advance  force 
was  but  six  miles  from  Longstreet.  An  engagement  bringing 

1  Swinton,  Army  of  the  Potomac,  226,  227. 

399 


400  McCLELLAN 

glory  to  the  Union  cause  was  impending.  The  sun  of  good 
fortune  was  again  beaming  upon  McClellan.  The  army  was 
never  more  tit  for  a  great  fight.  And  as  it  was  full  of  love 
for  him,  and  of  confidence  in  him,  there  was  no  doubt  in  his 
mind  of  success  against  the  divided  armies  of  Dixie,  if  those 
far  behind  did  not  prevent.  Colonel  Dodge  tells  us  that  "there 
was  good  ground  for  thinking  the  prospect  brighter  than 
ever  before."  2 

The  Confederate  forces  were  split  in  twain.  Jackson  was 
at  Winchester,  125  miles  away,  and  all  the  available  gaps  of 
the  Blue  Ridge  by  which  Jackson  might  otherwise  join  Lee, — 
namely,  Snicker's,  Ashby's,  Chester,  and  Thornton's, — were 
all  "corked  up"  and  held  in  strong  force,  so  that  Jackson 
could  bring  no  aid  to  Lee  for  the  approaching  battle. 

Lee  was  therefore  isolated,  and  the  preponderance  of  Mc- 
Clellan's  forces  left  no  doubt  as  to  the  result  of  the  coming 
battle.  McClellan  had  268  regiments  of  infantry,  18  regi 
ments  of  cavalry,  and  73  batteries;  while  Lee  had  only  89^/2 
regiments  of  infantry,  15  regiments  of  cavalry,  and  45  bat 
teries. 

This  made  the  proportions  of  the  two  armies  about  3  to  i, 
and  left  no  doubt  that  McClellan  would  overwhelm  Lee's 
weakened  force. 

Jackson  had  at  Winchester  91  regiments  of  infantry,  3 
regiments  and  2  battalions  of  cavalry,  and  23  batteries. 

The  peril  to  his  army  was  so  imminent,  the  chance  of  es 
cape  so  slight,  that  it  is  said  Lee  for  the  only  time  in  the  war 
was  bewildered.  And  his  despatches  of  November  the  7th, 
the  8th,  and  the  9th  seem  to  show  that  he  was. 

It  will  be  seen,  therefore,  that  there  was  every  likelihood 
that  McClellan's  now  powerful  army,  confident  of  its  leader 
and  full  of  courage  because  of  that  confidence,  would  quickly 
fall  with  irresistible  force  on  the  isolated  half  of  the  Rebel 
army  under  Lee.  A  complete  Union  victory  was  promised 
by  every  existing  condition.  Nothing  more  desirable  than 
the  broad  wall  between  the  two  parts  of  the  Confederate 
forces  can  be  imagined.  Yet  it  was  made  a  pretext  for  Mc- 

2  Bird's-eye  View,  109. 


McCLELLAN  401 

Clellan's  removal,  and  we  are  earnestly  and  gravely  assured  by 
one  of  the  President's  biographers  that  he  had  determined 
that  if  McClellan  should  permit  Lee  to  cross  the  Blue  Ridge 
and  place  himself  between  Richmond  and  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  (a  movement  to  be  prayed  for,  not  prevented)  he 
would  remove  him  from  command.  The  folly  of  such  a  reso 
lution, — oblivious  as  Lincoln  must  have  been  of  the  ad 
vantage  to  the  Union  of  the  very  movement  which  he  decided 
in  advance  would  be  a  calamity, — is  too  evident  to  warrant 
any  commentary.  Another  story  reflects  almost  equally  upon 
the  capacity  of  the  President  to  judge  properly  of  the  military 
situation  at  this  time  and  of  the  favorable  opportunity  pre 
sented  for  a  great  Union  victory.  Some  one  said  to  him, 
''What  do  you  think  of  your  general  now?"  The  President 
replied:  "We  had  a  game  when  I  was  a  boy  called  'Three 
Times  Round  and  Out.'  Stuart  has  been  round  the  Union 
army  a  second  time,  and  if  he  goes  around  again,  it  will  be 
three  times  around  and  out  for  General  McClellan."  Still  an 
other  tale :  When  Mr.  Stanton  heard  that  Lee  and  Longstreet 
were  at  Culpeper,  he  asked  the  oft  repeated  question :  "Well, 
what  do  you  think  of  your  general  now?"  "As  you  do,"  was 
the  President's  astonishing  response.  And  it  is  said  that  an 
undated  order  was  issued  at  once  for  McClellan's  removal. 

But  it  is  more  probable  that  as  soon  as  the  danger  of  an 
invasion  of  the  North  passed  over  it  was  determined  to  put 
Burnside  in  command.  When  McClellan  was  reinstated,  it 
was  merely  for  the  moment  and  to  meet  an  exigency.  It 
may  be  surmised  that  when  Burnside  refused  the  command, 
just  after  the  defeat  of  Pope,  it  was  understood  that  the  offer 
would  be  repeated  and  not  declined ;  and  it  was  rumored  later 
that  the  echoes  of  the  fierce  cannonading  at  Antietam  had 
hardly  died  away  when  an  undated  order  was  issued  reliev 
ing  McClellan  and  Porter  and  putting  Burnside  and  Hooker  in 
their  places. 

Regardless  of  the  ingratitude  and  injustice  shown  to  Mc 
Clellan,  no  more  unfit  selection  could  possibly  have  been  made. 
It  betrayed  absolute  ignorance  or  disregard  of  Burnside's 
derelictions  at  South  Mountain  and  Antietam.  It  was  like 


402  McCLELLAN 

a  reward  for  gross  incompetency.  Why  was  not  the  plan 
carried  out  at  the  time  indicated  ?  Because  the  state  elections 
were  near,  and  its  effect  upon  them  was  dreaded.  This  is 
made  evident  from  the  fact  that  the  moment  the  elections 
were  over  the  infamy  was  perpetrated. 

In  view  of  his  recent  successes,  of  the  condition  and  spirits 
of  his  army,  of  the  situation  of  the  enemy,  and  of  the  apparent 
certainty  of  victory,  the  heart  of  General  McClellan  would 
naturally  have  been  filled  with  pleasing  anticipations  as  he 
sat  in  his  tent,  late  on  the  evening  of  that  7th  of  November, 
writing  to  his  wife.  His  constant  faithfulness  in  this  occupa 
tion  throughout  his  military  career  marks  the  man,  and  his 
letters  so  fully  reveal  his  thoughts  and  feelings  that  they 
serve  as  an  impenetrable  shield  against  the  malice  of  his 
enemies.  The  letter  of  that  night  has  no  trace  of  joy  because 
of  the  apparently  bright  prospects  before  him.  The  gloom  of 
the  actual  situation  was  upon  him,  for,  though  the  letter  says 
nothing  of  it,  he  had  learned  that  General  Buckingham  had 
arrived  that  day  from  Washington  on  a  special  train.  The 
train  had  stopped  a  short  distance  from  the  commander's 
camp,  and  without  paying  his  respects  to  the  commander, 
Buckingham  had  gone  several  miles  at  once  through  a  heavy 
snow  storm  to  General  Burnside's  camp.  McClellan  instantly 
knew  what  this  meant.  He  was  to  be  superseded.  But  the 
consummation  of  the  purpose  was  long  delayed,  and  it  was 
late  that  night  as  he  sat  still  writing  when  a  knock  was  heard. 
Invited  to  enter,  in  came  Burnside  and  Buckingham ;  and  after 
a  few  minutes  of  pleasant  conversation  General  Buckingham 
handed  to  General  McClellan  these  two  orders.3 

"HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY, 

"WASHINGTON,  Nov.  5,  1862. 
"MAJ.-GEN.  MCCLELLAN,  Commanding,  etc. : 

"GENERAL:     On  receipt  of  the  order  of  the  President, 
sent  herewith,  you  will  immediately  turn  over  your  command 
to  Maj.-Gen.  Burnside,  and  repair  to  Trenton,  N.  J.,  reporting 
3  McClellan,  Own  Story,  651,  652. 


McCLELLAN  403 

on  your  arrival  at  that  place,  by  telegraph,  for  further  orders. 
"Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"H.  W.  HALLECK, 

"Gen.-in-Chief." 

"General  Orders,  No.  182. 

"WAR  DEPARTMENT, 

"ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S   OFFICE, 

"WASHINGTON,  Nov.  5,  1862. 

"By  direction  of  the  President  of  the  United  States,  it  is 
ordered  that  Maj.-Gen.  McClellan  be  relieved  from  the  com 
mand  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  that  Maj.-Gen.  Burn- 
side  take  the  command  of  that  army. 
"By  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War, 

"E.  D.  TOWNSEND, 

"Assist.   Adj. -Gen." 

After  the  death  of  General  Halleck  the  following  order 
was  found  by  his  widow  :4 

"EXECUTIVE  MANSION,  WASHINGTON,  186  . 

"By  direction  of  the  President,  it  is  ordered  that  Maj.- 
Gen.  McClellan  be  relieved  from  the  command  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  and  that  Maj.-Gen.  Burnside  take  the  com 
mand  of  that  army.  Also,  that  Maj.-Gen.  Hunter  take  com 
mand  of  the  corps  in  said  army  which  is  now  commanded  by 
Gen.  Burnside. 

"That  Maj.-Gen.  Fitz-John  Porter  be  relieved  from  the 
command  of  the  corps  he  now  commands  in  said  army,  and 
that  Maj.-Gen.  Hooker  take  command  of  said  corps. 

"The  General-in-Chief  is  authorized,  in  his  discretion,  to 
issue  an  order  substantially  as  above,  forthwith  or  so  soon 
as  he  may  deem  proper. 

"A.  LINCOLN." 

"Nov.  5,  1862." 

This  last  order  is  probably  the  one  first  referred  to.     The 
absence  of  a  date  at  the  head  of  it  together  with  the  report 
*  McClellan,  Own  Story,  650,  651. 


404  McCLELLAN 

leads  one  to  surmise  that  the  date  at  the  end  was  not  inserted 
when  the  order  was  issued,  but  later.  If  it  was  issued  when 
the  others  were,  why  was  it  issued  at  all?  Was  there  any 
special  reason  for  selecting  the  5th  of  November?  There 
was.  It  was  the  day  after  the  elections,  and  there  would  not 
be  another  election  for  two  years.  The  reason  which  forbade 
similar  action  directly  after  the  retreat  of  Lee  into  Virginia 
no  longer  existed. 

There  is  a  circumstance  which  unmistakably  stamps  the 
animus  of  the  removal.  McClellan  was  a  very  useful  man 
to  the  cause  of  the  Union,  even  if  one  is  willing  to  believe 
that  he  lacked  some  quality  of  a  great  leader.  It  may  be  clearly 
gathered,  even  from  the  works  of  hostile  critics,  that  he  was  a 
great  organizer  and  that  he  had  a  rare  faculty  of  instilling 
courage  into  men.  Yet  for  two  years  and  a  half  the  country 
was  robbed  of  his  services.  So  it  was  not  merely  to  seek  a 
leader  thought  to  be  more  aggressive  that  he  was  removed ;  it 
was  to  get  rid  of  him  altogether,  and  this  shows  the  malice  and 
bad  faith  of  the  removal.  The  action  was  not  military,  it  was 
political  and  personal;  it  sprang  out  of  the  hatred  of  Edwin 
M.  Stanton. 


CHAPTER   LXVII 

SHOULD    HE    HAVE   RESISTED? 

If  in  the  midst  of  a  battle  conducted  upon  plans  fully 
known  only  to  himself  a  general  should  receive  an  order  re 
lieving  him  from  command,  and  if  he  should  be  aware  that 
the  conditions  were  unknown  to  his  superiors,  the  necessity 
of  the  situation  would  justify  his  disregarding  the  order  and 
finishing  what  he  had  begun.  If  McClellan  had  attacked  and 
destroyed  Lee's  army,  or  if  he  had  merely  driven  it  back,  the 
revival  of  hope  throughout  the  country,  the  delight  at  his 
success,  would  have  been  so  great  that  the  conspirators  would 
not  have  dared  to  persecute  him.  The  same  principle  which 
he  applied  in  the  Maryland  campaign  he  should  have  applied 
once  more  here.  For  the  good  of  the  country,  he  assumed 
command  and  won  the  battles  of  Crampton's  Gap,  South 
Mountain,  and  Antietam.  If  he  had  failed,  they  would  have 
hanged  him.  As  he  succeeded,  they  dared  not  touch  him. 
The  interests  of  the  National  cause  now  required  that  he 
should  complete  the  movement  he  had  begun;  and  so  the  rea 
sons  for  such  action  were  not  essentially  different  from  those 
which  led  him  to  ignore  Halleck's  repeated  statement  that  his 
command  was  confined  to  Washington  1  and  march  against 
Lee.  That  was  an  example  of  the  highest  and  wisest  patriot 
ism.  Here  was  another  occasion  for  the  protection  of  the 
public  good  in  a  similar  way.  Insubordination  is,  generally 
speaking,  reprehensible.  But  insubordination  sometimes  be 
comes  a  duty  and  is  laudable.  If  McClellan  had  ignored  Hal- 
leek  and  captured  Richmond  on  the  I4th  of  August,  as  he 
could  have  done  and  as  he  wished  to  do,  the  Administration 
would  have  unwillingly  joined  in  the  country's  applause.  The 

1  McClellan,  Own  Story,  548. 

405 


406  McCLELLAN 

Declaration  of  Independence  of  the  American  Colonies  was 
an  act  of  insubordination  of  the  highest  order. 

It  is  interesting  to  me,  and  I  trust  to  the  reader,  to  con 
jecture  what  a  more  primitive  man  would  have  done  in  Mc- 
Clellan's  place, — one  who  fully  appreciated  the  weakness  and 
the  timidity  of  the  civilian  authorities  and  the  extent  to  which 
they  were  endangering  the  existence  of  the  nation  in  order 
to  further  their  personal  ambitions.  There  was  an  excellent 
reason  for  resistance.  Hostilities  had  actually  begun. 

A  Cromwell  would  probably  have  arrested  both  Buck 
ingham  and  Burnside,  would  have  had  the  orders  sealed  with 
out  reading  them,  and,  keeping  both  officers  in  detention, 
would  have  tranquilly  pursued  his  campaign.  A  Napoleon 
would  have  had  a  subtler  program  arranged.  He  would  doubt 
less  have  arrested  both  generals  at  Burnside's  camp;  he  would 
have  prevented  them  from  getting  near  him  personally,  and 
he  would  have  forced  them  to  trust  the  orders  to  a  member  of 
his  staff;  the  papers  would  never  have  reached  him,  and  the 
officer  who  received  them  and  read  them  would  have  of  his 
own  volition  put  both  Buckingham  and  Burnside  under  arrest, 
though  he  would  have  failed  to  communicate  the  fact  to  the 
commander. 

A  victory  being  won,  the  amazed  conspirators  would  at 
once  have  flown  to  cover  by  joining  in  the  nation's  plaudits. 
They  would  have  revoked  the  orders,  destroyed  all  evidence 
of  them,  and  sought  McClellan's  friendship.  Then  he  would 
have  discovered  the  plight  of  his  dear  friends  Buckingham 
and  Burnside,  he  would  have  been  most  profuse  in  his  apolo 
gies  and  expressions  of  regret,  and  he  would  have  threatened 
to  punish  the  officious  underling,  who  of  course  would  have 
been  missing.  We  are  told  that  Stanton  had  the  possibility 
of  resistance  in  mind,  and  feared  it.  General  Buckingham 
says  that  the  Secretary  expressed  some  fear  that  McClellan 
would  not  give  up  the  command. 

General  McClellan  never  entertained  the  thought  of  re 
sistance;  yet  the  feelings  of  the  army  invited  and  encouraged 
it.  There  is  no  question  that  the  army  as  a  body  would  have 


M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  N  407 

stood  with  him  in  ignoring  Stanton's  command  or  even  in 
punishing  Stanton,  if  he  had  so  desired, 

The  manner  of  the  removal  betrays  a  malign  motive. 
The  courteous  method  would  have  been  for  General  Bucking 
ham  to  go  directly  to  McClellan  and  permit  him  to  make  all 
the  necessary  arrangements  for  the  substitution  of  comman 
ders.  To  come  into  McClellan's  camp  and  spend  hours  with 
Burnside  before  waiting  upon  the  commander  gave  the  whole 
matter  the  air  of  a  conspiracy.  Undoubtedly  General  Buck 
ingham  followed  his  instructions. 


CHAPTER    LXVIII 

THE  DISMISSAL  CONDEMNED 

Misled  by  Stanton's  machinations,  many  writers  have  fan 
cied  that  McClellan  was  open  to  censure  at  certain  points  of 
his  military  career,  when  in  fact  he  was  not  only  blameless 
but  praiseworthy;  yet  even  such  writers,  almost  without  ex 
ception,  have  had  sufficient  discernment  and  honesty  to  ex 
press  disapproval  of  McClellan's  removal  and  to  characterize 
it  as  an  act  detrimental  to  the  National  cause. 

The  verdict  of  his  friends  is  far  more  strongly  stated,  and 
should  be  presented  here. 

The  picture  which  Colonel  Powell  gives  of  the  end  of 
General  McClellan's  military  career  is  vivid  and  interesting. 
1  'Upon  arriving  at  Warrenton,  officers  and  men  were  in  joy 
ous  spirits  and  General  McClellan  says  in  his  final  report : 
'I  doubt  whether  during  the  whole  period  that  I  had  the  honor 
of  commanding  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  it  was  in  such  ex 
cellent  condition  to  fight  a  great  battle.'  But  like  a  bolt  from 
an  unclouded  sky  came  the  intelligence  that  Generals  McClel 
lan  and  Porter  had  both  been  relieved  of  their  commands. 
Why,  was  the  question  on  every  lip?  Some  believed  but 
many  doubted  the  report.  Chase  in  his  diary  of  September 
7th  mentions  Burnside  as  Chief.  Had  such  a  promise  been 
made  to  Mr.  Chase?  It  certainly  has  that  appearance.  Why 
was  not  Burnside  given  command  of  the  Maryland  campaign  ? 
The  answer  is,  because  even  though  it  may  have  been  prom 
ised,  his  foes  in  power  did  not  dare  to  take  the  risk  at  that 
critical  period.  There  was  only  one  man  in  whom  the  Presi 
dent  had  the  confidence  to  entrust  the  protection  of  the  Capital 
in  this  emergency.  That  man  was  George  B.  McClellan  and 
he  sought  him." 

408 


McGLELLAN  409 

The  Administration  was  not  content  with  the  removal  of 
McClellan.  General  Porter  was  also  removed,  because  he  was 
McClellan's  right-hand  man,  as  Jackson  was  Lee's.  "Mc- 
Clellan's  parting  letter  was  read  Nov.  roth  to  the  troops  who 
were  at  Warrenton  along  the  Alexandria  and  Warrenton 
turnpike.  Cheer  after  cheer  was  spontaneously  given  by  the 
different  organizations.  The  regulars  were  silent,  but  some 
of  them  wept.  What  would  have  been  the  result,  we  ask, 
with  such  an  army  at  his  back  had  he  chosen  to  have  rebelled 
against  the  powers  at  Washington?  The  army  was  being  be 
reft  of  a  man  who  was  to  it  the  embodiment  of  loyalty;  one 
who  possessed  all  the  traits  which  rendered  him  beloved  by  his 
officers  as  well  as  by  the  rank  and  file.  His  nobility  of  char 
acter,  his  kindness  and  solicitude  for  the  welfare  of  his  men 
as  a  father,  his  unflinching  courage  as  a  soldier,  in  the  face 
of  his  enemies  whether  political  or  military  could  not  help 
endearing  him  to  the  army  which  he  undoubtedly  created. 
No  desolate  widow,  no  fatherless  child,  no  despairing  sister 
can  point  to  the  grave  of  a  needless  sacrifice  you  caused  or 
with  justice  raise  a  pitying  appeal  to  Heaven  for  vengeance." 

If  through  some  gross  blunder  of  General  McClellan,  Lee 
had  annihilated  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  at  Antietam  and  had 
ravaged  the  North,  the  dismissal  of  McClellan  could  have 
hardly  been  more  curt  and  contemptuous  than  it  was. 

When  the  special  train  was  about  to  start  away  on  the 
return  to  Washington  a  crowd  of  soldiers  uncoupled  the  gen 
eral's  car  and  ran  it  for  some  distance.  If  he  had  but  lifted 
a  finger  to  sanction  it,  they  would  have  held  the  train  and 
Buckingham,  too,  until  the  impending  battle  was  over.  An 
other  author,  speaking  of  the  farewell,  says : 

"Every  heart  of  the  30,000  men  was  filled  with  love  and 
grief;  every  voice  was  raised  in  shouts  expressing  at  once 
sorrow,  devotion,  and  indignation,  and  when  the  chief  had 
passed  out  of  sight  the  romance  of  war  was  over  for  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac.  No  other  commander  ever  aroused 
the  same  enthusiasm  in  the  troops,  whether  in  degree  or  kind. 
The  soldiers  fairly  idolized  him  and  were  never  tired  of  look- 


410  McCLELLAN 

ing  at  him.  The  sight  of  him  would  bring  cheers  spontane 
ously  from  every  lip.  His  voice  was  music  to  every  ear. 
How  sweet  to  him  as  he  passed  up  the  road  in  his 
banishment  and  under  disgrace  were  the  cheers  of  those  30,- 
ooo  comrades  rising  and  swelling  upon  the  air.  Himself  the 
very  soul  of  manly  gentleness,  courtesy,  and  kindness,  the  ac 
claim  which  drowned  even  the  roar  of  the  artillery  and  which 
followed  him  far  out  of  sight  was  a  farewell  which  no  heart 
could  more  appreciate  or  more  fondly  cherish."  x 

At  the  time  of  the  removal  one  of  two  things  was  certain : 
either  that  Lee's  inferior  force  would  be  defeated  or  that,  to 
escape  the  unequal  conflict  Lee  would  retire  to  Gordonsville, 
leaving  the  way  to  Richmond  open.  But  a  battle  was  prob 
ably  inevitable. 

Under  such  circumstances,  why  should  this  general  who 
had  always  met  Lee  with  credit  to  the  Union  cause  be  re 
moved?  Most  of  the  reasons  given  are  too  trivial  and  puerile 
to  be  seriously  discussed.  Some  believe  "that  the  Administra 
tion  feared  that  McClellan,  if  left  a  few  weeks  longer,  would 
crush  Lee,  annihilate  his  army,  and  end  the  rebellion,  leaving 
slavery  intact ;  and  they  preferred  that  the  war  continue  rather 
than  that  it  should  end  with  the  cause  of  it  left  over  to  disturb 
the  country  in  future."  "There  is  no  proof  that  this  was 
the  motive,"  says  Mr.  Elson;  "but  if  it  were  so  we  cannot 
hesitate  to  give  it  our  approval."  This  expression  indicates 
the  fanaticism  of  the  radical  faction.  However,  he  admits 
"that  from  a  military  standpoint  the  removal  of  McClellan 
was  a  serious  mistake."  2  "But  those  in  power  decreed  that 
at  least  the  war  must  go  on  until  the  effect  of  the  emancipation 
proclamation  could  be  known."  3 

This  view  is  corroborated  by  the  immediate  abandonment 
by  General  Burnside,  with  the  sanction  of  the  Administration, 
of  the  advantage  gained,  and  the  retreat  of  a  large  Union  army 
from  a  small  Rebel  army,  to  be  followed  a  little  later  by  an 
ignominious  defeat. 

1Cole,  Under  Five  Commanders,  98,  99. 
2  Elson,  History  of  the  United  States,  711. 
8  Curtis,  McClellan  s  Last  Service,  127. 


McCLELLAN  411 

Here  for  the  second  time  the  Government  directly  inter 
vened  and  pulled  the  army  away  from  an  impending  triumph, 
as  if  to  prevent  the  ending  of  the  war;  and  politics  prevailed 
over  patriotism  once  more. 


CHAPTER    LXIX 

RESULT    OF    THE    DISMISSAL 

Gloom  and  discouragement  filled  the  army,  and  deser 
tions  ran  into  hundreds  daily.  The  soldiers,  knowing  Burn- 
side's  failure  at  South  Mountain  and  Antietam,  had  no  con 
fidence  in  him.  He  immediately  proved  that  their  distrust  was 
not  unfounded  by  staying  the  advance  upon  Lee  and  retiring 
eastward  toward  Fredericksburg,  where,  being  followed  up 
by  the  Rebels  thus  allowed  to  unite,  he  delayed  attack  until 
they  had  secured  the  most  invulnerable  position  in  the  neigh 
borhood  with  one  hundred  thousand  men  to  defend  it,  and 
then  he  assaulted  the  position  and  was  repulsed  with  terrific 
slaughter.  This  was  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg.  A  clamor 
arose  for  the  restoration  of  McClellan,  but  Stanton  gave  no 
heed  to  it.  Up  to  this  time  there  had  been  no  difficulty  in 
getting  volunteers,  but  patriotism  was  chilled  by  the  conduct 
of  the  Administration.  Enlistments  stopped  and  soldiers  could 
be  secured  only  by  being  drafted. 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  on  the  point  of  revolt. 
Winner,  a  famous  song  writer  of  the  period,  composed  a  song 
about  this  time  entitled  "Give  Us  Back  Our  Old  Comman 
der."  This  song  became  so  popular  in  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac  and  was  so  enthusiastically  sung  by  the  soldiers  that  the 
Government  suppressed  both  the  singing  and  the  song,  and 
imprisoned  the  composer;  and  no  copy  of  it  can  now  be 
found  anywhere,  except  in  the  Library  of  Congress.  The 
various  collections  of  Civil  War  songs  do  not  mention  it. 

The  first  stanza  ran  as  follows : 

"Give  us  back  our  old  Commander,  Little  Mac,  the  people's  pride, 
Let  the  army  and  the  nation  in  their  choice  be  satisfied. 
With  McClellan  as  our  leader,  let  us  strike  the  blow  anew, 
Give  us  back  our  old  Commander,  he  will  see  the  battle  through." 

412 


McCLELLAN  413 

Hooker  succeeded  Burnside;  but  Burnside  was  not  sent 
home  as  McClellan  was.  He  was  still  utilized,  as  McClellan 
should  have  been.  Then  in  the  spring  came  the  battle  of 
Chancellorsville,  where  65,000  Rebels  overmatched  130,000 
Union  men.  Again  the  cry  for  McClellan  rang  over  the  land. 
But  Stanton  pointed  out  to  the  President  that  this  was  a  clear 
proof  of  the  political  prestige  of  McClellan  and  of  the  peril 
of  giving  him  a  chance  to  achieve  military  renown. 

Meade  succeeded  Hooker,  but  Hooker  was  not  sent  home 
on  this  account.  He  was  utilized  to  the  utmost;  idleness  was 
enforced  only  on  McClellan.  Two  months  after  Chancellors 
ville  came  Gettysburg,  July  1-2-3,  1863.  Here  Lee,  less  cau 
tious  than  at  Antietam,  attacked  the  Union  army  well  placed 
and  entrenched,  and  the  result  was  a  repulse  and  an  unpur- 
sued  retreat. 

From  Antietam  to  Culpeper  was  less  than  two  months,  and 
McClellan  was  close  to  the  foe  and  about  to  strike.  Nothing 
of  importance  occurred  between  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  on 
the  first  three  days  of  July,  1863,  and  the  battle  of  the  Wilder 
ness,  ten  months  later,  in  May,  1864;  yet  Meade  retained  his 
place  until  the  end  of  the  war. 

In  March,  1864,  General  Grant  became  Commander-in- 
Chief  of  all  the  armies  of  the  nation.  He  was  given  full 
discretion,  and  supplied  with  all  the  troops  he  wanted.  He 
was  not  asked  to  reveal  his  plans.  He  took  the  field ;  yet  this 
was  not,  as  in  McClellan's  case,  made  an  excuse  for  relieving 
him  of  the  chief  command.  General  Grant's  plan  was  attri 
tion.  The  greater  will  in  time  consume  the  less.  "I  propose 
to  fight  it  out  on  this  line,  if  it  takes  all  summer,"  he  an 
nounced  ;  but  it  took  more  than  all  summer.  It  lasted  eleven 
and  one  half  months, — from  May  the  4th,  1864,  to  April, 
1865, — and  was  attended  by  a  fearful  cost  in  men  and  money. 

The  Administration  persuaded  many  people  that  the  Na 
tional  capital  was  in  danger  when  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
under  McClellan  was  on  the  James;  that  it  was  necessary 
for  that  army  to  be  placed  between  Lee  and  Washington. 
But  when  General  Grant  "tried  out"  the  overland  route  for 


4H  McCLELLAN 

which  Mr.  Stanton  clamored,  and  lost  20,000  men  in  the  first 
three  days'  march  and  in  all  that  year  88,389  men,  and  estab 
lished  his  base  like  McClellan  on  the  south  bank  of  the  James, 
twenty  miles  below  Richmond,  not  between  Washington  on 
one  hand  and  Lee  or  Richmond  on  the  other,  not  a  word  of 
complaint  was  uttered  either  by  the  President  or  his  "Great 
War  Secretary" ;  nor  was  ever  the  slightest  hint  given  that 
"he  must  act"  during  all  that  long  halt  from  June,  1864,  to 
April,  1865,  though  now  there  was  a  ground  of  fear.  There 
was  now  no  force  at  all  save  Sigel's  small  command  between 
Washington  and  Richmond;  and  Richmond  was  not  men 
aced  by  the  Army  on  the  James.  The  Army  of  the  Potomac 
was  well  nigh  annihilated  by  its  losses.  "So  gloomy  was  the 
military  outlook  after  the  action  on  the  Chickahominy,  and  to 
such  a  degree  by  consequence  had  the  moral  spring  of  the 
public  mind  become  relaxed,  that  there  was  at  this  time  great 
danger  of  a  collapse  of  the  war.  The  history  of  this  conflict 
truthfully  written  will  show  this.  Had  not  success  elsewhere 
come  to  brighten  the  horizon,  it  would  have  been  difficult  to 
raise  new  forces  to  recruit  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  which, 
shaken  in  its  structure,  its  valor  quenched  in  blood,  and  thou 
sands  of  its  ablest  officers  killed  and  wounded,  was  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  no  more."  l 

As  a  result,  the  struggle  for  the  Union  was  at  this  time 
woefully  near  an  end.  As  if  to  demonstrate  how  futile  was 
the  scheme  of  the  overland  route,  now,  when  it  was  finally 
put  into  operation,  Washington  was  at  the  mercy  of  the 
Rebels.  Early  was  at  its  gates  on  the  I2th  of  July,  1864;  and 
it  is  admitted  by  all  that  he  could  have  taken  it  at  once,  as  it 
had  been  stripped  of  troops  to  reinforce  General  Grant,  40,000 
men  having  been  sent  to  him  on  his  march,  making,  with  the 
169,000  at  first  given,  in  all  over  209,000  men  supplied  for 
the  campaign  against  a  fighting  force  of  56,000. 

Had  the  Administration  given  the  same  hearty  and  un 
limited  support  to  General  McClellan  that  was  given  to  Gen 
eral  Grant,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  Rebellion  would 
have  been  crushed  in  1862.  The  bloodshed  of  the  three  last 

1  Swinton,  Army  of  the  Potomac,  495. 


McCLELLAN  415 

years  of  the  war,  the  slaughter  of  Fredericksburg,  Chancel- 
lorsville,  Gettysburg,  the  Wilderness,  Spotsylvania,  Cold  Har 
bor,  and  Petersburg  would  have  been  saved,  if  McClellan  had 
been  treated  like  Grant.  And  why  was  he  not?  Did  the 
battle  of  the  Wilderness,  where  20,000  Union  men  were  slain, 
or  the  great  host  of  dead  that  strewed  the  overland  route  to 
the  James,  inspire  more  confidence  than  Malvern  Hill?  To 
be  justly  chargeable  with  all  that  \vorse  than  needless  loss  of 
life  is  an  appalling  responsibility. 

Through  his  unpatriotic  hatred  of  McClellan,  Stanton 
built  two  great  pyramids,  one  of  brave  men's  bones  and  the 
other  of  debt,  all  to  satisfy  his  desire  for  revenge.  And  in 
trying  to  crush  a  political  adversary  he  nearly  wrecked  the 
Union. 

In  the  summer  of  1864  the  popular  dissatisfaction  was  so 
great  and  the  clamor  for  McClellan  so  general  that  if  there 
had  been  a  national  power  of  recall  at  that  time  the  admin 
istration  would  have  been  changed  at  once. 

Through  the  failure  of  the  Government  to  support  Mc 
Clellan  the  war  was  prolonged  for  three  years,  and  as  the 
result  General  Grant  tells  us  the  Confederacy  came  within  a 
hair's  breadth  of  being  successful.2 

The  nation  was  on  the  verge  of  bankruptcy,  and  if  Lee 
had  united  with  Johnston  as,  by  abandoning  Richmond  earlier, 
he  could  have  done,  any  further  struggle  to  coerce  the  South 
would  have  been  probably  futile.  At  the  same  time  Hood's 
army  of  6o,oco  veteran  soldiers  might  have  left  General 
Thomas  with  his  weak  Union  army  in  Nashville,  invaded  the 
North  without  any  serious  opposition,  and  terrorized  the 
Government  into  acknowledging  the  Confederacy.  Hood 
might  have  marched  through  Illinois,  Indiana,  Ohio,  Pennsyl 
vania,  and  the  North.  He  might  have  captured  Washington 
on  the  way ;  or  he  might  have  joined  Lee, — and  later  John 
ston, — and  overwhelmed  Sherman  first  and  Grant  later.  Gen 
eral  Grant  saw  the  possibilities  which  would  naturally  spring 
from  Hood's  aggressive  action,  and  for  a  time  was  very 
anxious  about  it. 

'Around  the  World  ivith  General  Grant,  II,  460. 


CHAPTER  LXX 

A    GREAT    COMMANDER 

Many  lines  of  argument  conspire  to  fortify  and  vindicate 
the  eminent  ability  of  General  McClellan  as  a  commander. 

The  first  of  these  is  the  otherwise  unaccountable  amount 
of  space  and  time  given  to  McClellan' s  campaigns.  If  Mr. 
Stanton's  view  of  them  is  well  founded,  General  McClellan 
merely  wasted  the  time  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  de 
pleted  its  ranks,  and  poured  out  the  money  of  the  nation 
fruitlessly.  The  less  said  about  such  campaigns  and  such  a 
leader  the  better;  but  no  part  of  the  Civil  War  has  received 
anywhere  near  so  much  attention  as  that  part  in  which  Mc 
Clellan  figured.  Not  only  is  McClellan's  military  career  given 
great  prominence  in  the  histories  of  the  nation,  in  the  general 
histories  of  the  war,  in  the  histories  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac,  and  in  the  histories  of  sections  of  that  army,  but  to  no 
other  campaigns  of  the  war,  however  successful,  have  so  many 
specific  works  been  devoted.  A  partial  list  may  be  of  interest : 
Webb's  The  Peninsula;  McMahon's  Peninsular  Campaign; 
Barnard's  Peninsular  Campaign;  Walker's  Second  Army 
Corps;  Powell's  Fifth  Army  Corps;  Swinton's  Army  of  the 
Potomac ;  French's  Army  of  the  Potomac;  Stine's  Army  of 
the  Potomac;  Dejoinville's  Army  of  the  Potomac;  Hilliard's 
McClellan  and  His  Campaigns;  McClellan's  Own  Story; 
Michie's  General  McClellan;  Michie's  Life  of  General  Emory 
Upton;  Giants  of  the  Republic;  Headley's  Great  Rebellion; 
General  Humphreys'  Peninsular  Campaign ;  Cole's  Under  Five 
Commanders;  General  Naglee's  McClellan  vs.  Lincoln;  Curtis's 
McClellan's  Last  Service  to  the  Republic;  Captain  Heysinger's 
Antietam;  Palfrey's  The  Antietam  and  Fredericksburg  ;  Up 
ton's  Military  Policy  of  the  United  States;  Ropes'  Story  of 

416 


McCLELLAN  417 

the  Civil  War;  Le  Compte's  Guerre  des  Etats  Unis;  Comte 
de  Paris's  History  of  the  Civil  War;  Battles  and  Leaders; 
Nicolay  and  Hay's  Lincoln;  History  of  the  United  States 
from  1850  to  1877,  by  James  Ford  Rhodes;  Abbott's  His 
tory  of  the  Civil  War;  Schmucker's  History  of  the  Civil  II' ar; 
Dodge's  Bird's-Eye  Viciv  of  the  War;  Pollard's  Lost  Cause; 
Eggleston's  History  of  the  War  in  the  Confederate  States; 
Allen's  Civil  War. 

This  is  far  from  being  a  complete  list,  but  even  as  it  stands 
no  other  list  can  be  presented  that  gives  as  much  importance 
lo  any  other  feature  of  that  great  struggle  for  national  in 
tegrity.  This  extraordinary  attention  of  itself  makes  a  dis 
interested  investigator  suspect  the  good  faith  of  Mr.  Stanton 
and  his  faction  in  disparaging  General  McClellan,  and  in  un 
derrating  his  work.  They  do  "protest  too  much,  methinks." 

There  is  another  line  of  argument  which  seems  to  me 
conclusive  in  support  of  the  claim  that  General  McClellan  was 
a  great  commander.  It  is  this:  many  of  the  authors  above 
mentioned  give  unstinted  and  unqualified  praise  to  McClellan's 
military  operations;  others  praise  in  part  and  with  amazing 
inconsistency  blame  in  part,  though  the  praise  is  a  flat  contra 
diction  of  the  blame;  a  very  few  others,  probably  and  appar 
ently  from  the  virulence  of  politics  at  the  time  when  they 
wrote,  are  absolutely  blind  to  any  merit  in  McClellan's  mili 
tary  career.  Nothing  can  illustrate  better  the  intensity  of  the 
political  fervor  of  the  time  than  a  comparison  of  General 
Swinton's  Army  of  the  Potomac  with  the  political  work  which 
he  published  in  1864,  or  General  Barnard's  letters  during  the 
Peninsular  Campaign  with  his  later  history  of  the  campaign, 
or  General  Michie's  Life  of  General  Upton  with  General 
Michie's  Life  of  General  McClellan. 

Any  reader  capable  of  analyzing  can  gather  from  the  pages 
of  the  least  friendly  author  abundant  facts  to  refute  the  stric 
tures  made  by  that  same  author.  The  hostile  and  irritating 
attitude  of  the  Administration;  the  premature  beginning  of 
military  operations ;  the  revocation  of  McClellan's  authority 
when  supreme  control  was,  as  was  conceded  in  1864,  neces- 


4*8  McCLELLAN 

sary  to  success;  the  reduction  by  one-third  of  an  army  that 
was  not  anywhere  near  large  enough  at  its  full  original 
strength,  judging  from  the  practical  confessions  of  1864; 
the  false  maps  of  the  Warwick  River;  the  lack  of  naval  co 
operation  to  capture  Yorktown  and  clear  the  James  promptly 
and  the  resulting  delay;  the  enforced  straddling  of  the  Chicka- 
hominy  and  consequent  dangerous  extension  of  McClellan's 
line  of  entrenchment;  the  detention  of  the  army  for  two 
months  in  miasmatic  swamps  awaiting  the  ever  promised  but 
never  arriving  McDowell's  corps;  the  disheartening  obstacles 
interposed  by  the  severity  of  the  weather;  the  stoppage  of 
enlistments  and  resulting  failure  to  keep  up  the  strength  of 
the  army;  the  splendid  lighting  of  the  seven  days  in  which 
there  can  be  no  question,  even  from  the  pages  of  the  most 
biased  political  writer,  that  McClellan  more  than  held  his 
own  against  the  greatest  military  genius  of  the  South;  the 
removal  of  the  army  from  the  James  just  after  that  display  of 
generalship  had  made  it  obvious  that  with  an  increase  of 
strength,  which  could  have  been  easily  supplied,  the  swift 
capture  of  Richmond  was  certain;  the  degrading  position  of 
McClellan  during  Pope's  campaign,  when  the  interest  of  the 
nation  required  that  he  should  be  sent  to  lead  his  men  to  the 
aid  of  General  Pope;  the  defeat  of  Lee  by  Pope's  disorgan 
ized  mob  at  Antietam;  and  finally  the  permanent  removal  of 
McClellan  on  November  the  7th,  1862,  without  cause,  when 
the  prospect  of  a  successful  attack  on  Lee's  army  was  very 
bright, — all,  or  nearly  all,  these  facts  appear  in  the  pages  of 
the  most  adverse  critics,  and  if  any  of  them  is  omitted  by 
one  of  these  writers  it  is  sure  to  be  supplied  by  another,  even 
though  he  be  no  more  friendly.  These  facts  properly  weighed 
and  considered,  refute  every  adverse  criticism,  and  supply 
the  highest  praise  of  General  McClellan.  That  under  such 
conditions  he  could  have  repeatedly  met  Robert  E.  Lee  with 
out  discredit,  and  could  have  had  at  the  close  of  his  career 
a  better  army  than  ever  before,  is  of  itself  the  best  encomium 
of  his  military  capacity;  and  our  admiration  for  his  ability 
is  greatly  heightened  when  we  compare  his  campaigns  against 


McCLELLAN  419 

Lee  with  those  of  any  other  leader  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac,  especially  as  to  the  relative  losses  of  the  contending 
armies  and  their  condition  when  the  struggle  was  over. 

But  the  most  satisfying  meed  of  praise  comes  not  from 
indirect  tributes  to  McClellan's  genius  but  from  the  hearty 
endorsement  of  those  most  competent  to  judge. 

By  common  consent,  the  foremost  military  genius  of  Eu 
rope  in  the  iQth  century  was  Von  Moltke.  Long  after  the 
war  an  American  said  to  him:  "Some  of  us  in  America  do 
not  esteem  McClellan  as  highly  as  some  of  our  other  gen 
erals."  "It  may  be  so,"  retorted  Von  Moltke;  "but  let  me 
tell  you  that  if  your  government  had  supported  General  Mc 
Clellan  in  the  field  as  it  should  have  done,  your  war  would 
have  been  ended  two  years  sooner  than  it  was." 

Upon  a  vote  of  all  the  military  experts  of  to-day,  among 
the  leaders  of  the  war  Robert  E.  Lee  would  be  awarded  the 
first  place;  and  if  it  had  been  left  to  General  Lee  to  assign 
the  order  of  military  merit  among  the  Federal  leaders,  Gen 
eral  McClellan  would  undoubtedly  stand  first,  with  no  one 
near  him. 

A  distant  relative  of  General  Lee  was  eager  to  get  his 
opinion  of  the  skill  of  the  various  commanders  who  had  been 
sent  against  him,  and  one  day  asked  him,  "Who  in  your  opin 
ion  was  the  ablest  Northern  general  of  the  war?"  General 
Lee  was  not  content  to  give  an  indifferent  and  hesitating  ex 
pression  of  his  judgment,  but,  doubtless  having  in  mind  the 
thoughtless  or  malicious  criticisms  of  McClellan  and  wishing 
to  resent  them,  he  sprang  from  his  chair  and  thumping  his 
fist  upon  the  table  replied  vehemently,  "McClellan  by  all 
odds." 

Nor  was  this  a  view  developed  after  the  war,  as  Mr. 
Rhodes  seems  to  fancy.  When  the  Southern  army  was  pass 
ing  into  Maryland  to  invade  the  North  a  despatch  was  handed 
to  General  Lee.  The  reading  of  it  cast  an  evident  shadow 
upon  his  spirits,  and  General  Longstreet  asked  anxiously, 
"What  is  the  news?"  "The  worst  in  the  world,"  was  the 
reply;  "McClellan  is  in  command  again."  No  finer  eulogy 


420  McCLELLAN 

than  this  can  be  imagined,  especially  when  it  came  in  such  a 
practical  way.  No  one  knows  the  prowess  of  a  wrestler  so 
well  as  he  who  has  struggled  with  him.  No  swordsman  from 
merely  looking  on  knows  the  adroitness  of  a  fencer  half  so 
well  as  he  who  has  felt  the  touch  of  his  steel.  This  gives 
General  Lee's  opinion  of  McClellan  a  tenfold  value.  He  was 
not  theorizing  about  McClellan.  He  had  battled  with  him 
and  measured  his  ability  in  actual  combat. 

In  his  article  in  Battles  and  Leaders,  General  Daniel  H. 
Hill  tells  us  that  "as  reunited  Americans,  we  should  be  proud 
of  both  of  our  great  commanders."  He  is  referring  to  Lee 
and  McClellan.  In  his  opinion  they  were  the  two  great 
leaders  of  the  war. 

Of  the  transfer  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  the  James 
the  President  of  the  Confederacy,  Jefferson  Davis,  expresses 
his  opinion  that  "with  the  exception  of  the  retreat  of  Moreau 
through  the  Black  Forest,  a  retreat  upon  which  more  than 
any  other  act  rests  his  great  fame  as  a  general,  the  operations 
of  McClellan  furnish  the  most  magnificent  example  which 
modern  history  presents  of  the  rescue  of  a  great  army  from 
apparent  ruin." 

The  high  praise,  direct  and  indirect,  of  Generals  Johnston, 
Jackson,  Imboden,  and  other  Southern  leaders  has  already 
been  given. 

Even  adverse  critics  feel  compelled  to  pay  tribute  to  the 
genius  of  McClellan. 

"There  are  strong  grounds  for  believing  that  he  was  the 
best  commander  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  ever  had.  .  . 
While  the  Confederacy  was  young,  and  fresh,  and  rich,  and 
its  armies  were  numerous,  McClellan  fought  a  good,  wary, 
damaging,  respectable  fight  against  it.  ...  Not  to  men 
tion  such  lamentable  failures  as  Fredericksburg  and  Chancel- 
lorsville.  it  is  easy  to  believe  that  with  him  in  command  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  would  never  have  seen  such  dark  days 
as  those  of  the  Wilderness  and  Cold  Harbor."  1  "Let  mili 
tary  critics  or  political  enemies  say  what  they  will,  he  who 
could  move  the  hearts  of  a  great  army  as  the  wind  sways  long 

1  Dodge,  Bird's-Eye  View  of  the  Civil  War,  109. 


McCLELLAN  421 

rows  of  standing  corn  was  no  ordinary  man;  nor  was  he 
who  took  such  heavy  toll  of  Joseph  E.  Johnston  and  Robert 
E.  Lee  an  ordinary  soldier."  2 

The  idolatry  of  the  officers  and  men  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  was  itself  a  eulogy. 

Many  of  the  officers,  such  as  Porter,  Franklin,  McMahon, 
Humphreys,  Powell,  Heysinger,  and  others,  have  perma 
nently  recorded  their  high  estimation  of  him  and  their  un 
limited  faith  in  his  capacity  as  a  military  leader,  and  General 
Upton's  conversion  to  that  view  gives  his  praise  special  force. 

But  above  all  such  praise  stands  the  fact  that  with  such 
virulent  and  implacable  enemies  behind  him,  with  an  army  in 
ferior  in  numbers  in  the  Peninsula  at  his  command,  so  great 
a  general  as  Lee  should  not  have  been  able  to  defeat  him  or 
even  seriously  hurt  him,  and  that  the  last  tribute  of  Lee  to 
McClellan,  somewhat  similar  to  his  chagrin  after  Frazier's 
Field,  was  his  furious  rage,  as  we  learn  from  his  friends,  on 
the  field  of  Antietam,  when  his  plans  were  thwarted  and  his 
invasion  of  the  North  was  blocked  by  a  crestfallen  mob 
aroused  by  the  inspiration  of  one  man, — McClellan. 

The  preeminent  fame  of  General  Lee  is  now  firmly  estab 
lished,  and  of  all  the  generals  who  became  prominent  in  the 
great  civil  struggle  none  were  so  much  alike  as  General  Mc 
Clellan  and  General  Lee  in  their  general  characteristics.  Both 
were  intensely  and  sincerely  religious,  and  they  conducted 
their  lives  on  the  highest  plane  of  honor  and  integrity.  Both 
possessed  fine  minds,  and  both  came  into  the  Civil  War  fully 
equipped  with  all  the  resources  of  military  science.  Both  were 
able  tacticians  and  strategists.  Both  were  cool,  and  self- 
possessed  and  absolutely  fearless  under  fire,  and  both  could 
reason  and  reflect  calmly  in  the  face  of  danger.  Both  were 
vigorously  aggressive,  not  in  a  fitful  or  spasmodic  way,  but 
continuously,  believing  that  aggression  was  a  vital  element 
of  success  in  the  business  in  which  they  were  engaged.  It 
was  natural,  it  may  be  said  inevitable,  that  each  of  them  should 
have  the  highest  esteem  for  the  character  and  military  ability 
of  the  other. 

*  Cole,  Under  Five  Commanders,  98. 


422  McCLELLAN 

When  the  Federal  army  occupied  the  country  about  White 
House,  on  the  Pamunkey,  General  Lee's  wife  and  children 
were  in  the  house.  General  McClellan,  on  learning  of  this, 
had  Mrs.  Lee  and  the  children  conveyed  in  her  own  carriage 
and  attended  by  her  own  servants  within  the  Confederate 
lines.  As  a  special  mark  of  respect,  they  were  escorted  by  a 
troop  of  Federal  cavalry  which  General  Lee  had  commanded 
before  the  war.  It  was  "a  day  off"  in  the  war,  and  the  Fed 
eral  troopers  were  cordially  and  hospitably  entertained  by  Gen 
eral  Lee  until  evening,  when  they  returned  to  their  own 
lines. 

While  on  the  James,  General  McClellan  sent  a  great  quan 
tity  of  hospital  supplies  to  General  Lee  for  the  benefit  of  the 
Union  wounded,  relying  upon  his  honor  to  use  them,  in  a 
large  measure  at  least,  as  requested,  but  also  for  the  hospital 
generally. 

At  another  time  General  McClellan  appealed  directly  to 
General  Lee  to  have  a  certain  kind  of  guerrilla  warfare  on 
the  James  discontinued.  The  response  was  a  letter  of  regret, 
and  the  warfare  was  stopped  at  once. 


CHAPTER   LXXI 

THE    TEST    OF    COMPARISON 

Nothing  can  better  assure  us  of  the  military  capacity  of 
General  McClellan  than  a  comparison  of  the  campaign  of  the 
spring  of  1864  with  that  of  the  spring  of  1862.  In  1864  the 
war  in  Virginia  was  conducted  by  two  men  whose  high  reputa 
tion  for  military  capacity  was  already  firmly  fixed.  General 
Meade,  the  hero  of  Gettysburg,  was  the  Commander  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  with  him,  supervising  his  work, 
was  General  Grant,  the  hero  of  Vicksburg  and  of  Forts  Henry 
and  Donelson, — the  General-in-Chief  of  all  the  armies  of 
the  nation. 

When  General  Grant  came  to  Washington  at  the  request 
of  the  President  in  March,  1864,  Mr.  Lincoln  told  him  of  his 
eagerness  to  capture  Richmond,  and  asked  him  if  he  thought 
he  could  accomplish  it.  "Yes,"  replied  General  Grant;  "if  I 
can  have  the  men."  The  President  warmly  rejoined,  "You 
can  have  all  the  men  you  want."  McClellan  in  1862  had  no 
such  assurance.  His  views  as  to  the  necessary  strength  of 
the  invading  army  were  ignored,  and  the  army  with  which  he 
was  to  start  was  not  half  so  great  as  General  Grant's,  com 
pared  to  the  army  of  Lee  when  the  time  of  battle  came.  He 
had  scarcely  lost  sight  of  Washington  and  all  his  army  had 
not  moved  when  one-third  of  this  already  insufficient  force 
was  taken  away  from  him.  General  Grant,  though  in  the 
field,  was  allowed  to  hold  his  control  as  General-in-Chief  of 
all  the  armies.  This  enabled  him  to  enlarge  his  own  army 
from  the  other  Union  armies  in  Virginia,  and  at  the  same 
time  prevent  Lee's  army  from  being  reinforced,  by  keeping 
the  other  Rebel  forces  busy  elsewhere.  McClellan,  on  the 
contrary,  was  deprived  of  the  control  of  any  army  except 
the  two-thirds  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  which  was  left 

423 


424  McCLELLAN 

with  him,  and  as  the  result,  reinforcements  poured  into  Rich 
mond  swiftly  from  all  the  South  and  from  the  West.  During 
General  Grant's  advance  the  enlisting  offices  were  kept  run 
ning  more  briskly  than  ever,  and  reinforcements  were  hurried 
to  him  until,  before  he  reached  the  James,  more  fresh  soldiers 
had  been  supplied  than  were  in  Lee's  army  at  the  outset. 
What  a  contrast  with  the  treatment  of  McClellan!  The  mo 
ment  his  campaign  began,  all  the  recruiting  offices  were  dis 
continued  without  consulting  him,  as  if  the  Government  wished 
to  leave  no  doubt  in  his  mind  of  its  hostile  attitude. 

The  Confederates  claimed  that  the  Union  army  narrowly 
escaped  destruction  at  the  passage  of  the  North  Anna;  that 
the  delinquency  of  General  Longstreet  alone  saved  it.  How, 
then,  would  it  have  been  saved  if,  as  with  McClellan,  a  third 
of  it  had  been  withdrawn  just  after  General  Grant  started 
forward?  We  are  told  that  if  General  Grant  had  been  in  the 
Peninsula  with  McClellan's  two-thirds  of  an  army  he  would 
have  pushed  boldly  across  the  Warwick,  in  spite  of  the  flooded 
river  and  the  intrenchments  beyond  it.  In  that  case  the  disas 
ter  suffered  by  him  under  circumstances  infinitely  more  favor 
able  convince  us  that  his  army  would  have  been  annihilated  in 
the  attempted  crossing  of  the  river.  The  idea  has  been  widely 
prevalent  that  General  Grant  despised  fortified  lines  and  had 
the  faculty  of  marching  an  army  over  them  as  if  they  were 
windrows  in  a  hay  field.  These  were  his  views  early  in  the 
war.  But  Vicksburg  made  him  suspect  that  he  might  be 
wrong;  and  his  ineffective  assaults  upon  Lee's  entrenched 
lines,  and  especially  his  terrible  losses  at  Spotsylvania,  Cold 
Harbor,  and  Petersburg,  completed  the  demonstration.  His 
official  despatches  to  Meade  of  July  12,  27,  30,  of  October  2 
and  24,  and  to  Butler  of  October  24,  forbidding  attacks  on 
entrenched  positions,  prove  how  absolutely  he  had  abandoned 
his  former  views. 

There  was  no  suggestion  as  to  when  General  Grant  should 
start.  That  was  left  entirely  to  him,  so  he  set  out  when  he 
pleased,  which  was  two  months  after  he  had  reached  Wash 
ington.  The  season  was  a  mild  one,  and  he  fixed  the  first 
week  of  May  for  the  advance,  because  it  seemed  to  him  that 


McCLELLAN  425 

the  rainy  season  would  then  be  over;  and  when  a  rain  did 
come  on  unexpectedly  a  few  days  later  all  operations  stopped 
until  Jove  smiled  again.  McClellan  was  forced  out  in  the 
midst  of  a  long  continued  season  of  unusual  rains.  The  mili 
tary  conferences  of  Mr.  Stanton  and  the  President  convinced 
them  that  the  way  to  end  the  war  immediately  was  for  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  to  hurl  itself  upon  the  army  of  General 
Lee  and  destroy  it.  But  General  Grant  thought  that  the  place 
which  the  Southern  Commander  had  selected  might  possibly 
not  be  the  best  place  for  him  to  go.  The  Union  army  was  at 
Culpeper;  the  Confederate  army  at  Orange,  20°  west  of  south, 
about  eighteen  miles  away.  Fredericksburg  lay  40°  south  of 
east,  thirty  miles  distant.  Instead  of  advancing  to  the  south 
west  directly  upon  Lee,  as  the  Secretary  of  War  or  the 
President  wished  him  to  do,  General  Grant  struck  out  to  the 
southeast  directly  toward  Fredericksburg,  crossing  the  Rapi- 
dan  at  Germanna  and  Ely  Fords.  This  was  surely  the  wiser 
course,  as  it  forced  General  Lee  to  abandon  his  entrench 
ments  and  his  picked  fighting  ground. 

No  one  pressed  General  Grant  to  disclose  his  plans.  On 
the  contrary,  the  President  said  to  him,  "I  do  not  wish  to 
know  your  plans."  But  McClellan's  plans  were  forced  from 
him  at  a  time  when  even  adverse  critics  admit  that  secrecy 
was  highly  desirable  and  when  it  was  specially  important  be 
cause  of  the  nature  of  the  movement,  in  order  that  McClellan 
might  get  between  Johnston  and  Richmond  before  his  designs 
became  known.  The  attitude  of  the  Government  toward  Gen 
eral  Grant  at  all  times,  even  when  he  suffered  the  most  terrible 
losses,  was  that  of  cordial  sympathy  and  cooperation;  toward 
McClellan  it  was  that  of  bitter  personal  enmity.  And  yet, 
with  all  these  favorable  conditions  in  1864, — of  good  weather, 
of  ample  forces,  of  unfettered  control, — what  wras  the  result? 
The  closest  the  army  got  to  Richmond  was  about  twelve  miles 
to  the  eastward,  and  when  it  reached  the  James  on  the  i6th 
of  June  it  had  lost  in  its  five  weeks'  march  no  less  than  3,000 
officers,  and  in  all  62,000  men.  "Shattered  in  its  structure,  its 
banners  drenched  in  blood,"  as  Mr.  Swinton  says,  "it  was  the 
Armv  of  the  Potomac  no  more."  A  series  of  semi-disasters 


426  McCLELLAN 

had  marked  its  progress.  The  Wilderness,  Spotsylvania,  Cold 
Harbor,  and  Petersburg  furnish  sad  chapters  in  our  history. 
No  assault  on  Petersburg  or  Richmond  met  with  anything  but 
repulse,  and  neither  city  was  ever  occupied  until  both  were 
abandoned  on  April  the  3d,  1865,  when  no  assault  was  being 
made  upon  them.  As  the  result  of  that  campaign,  we  are 
told  that  "the  war  was  in  danger  of  collapse  in  the  summer  of 
1864,"  and  Washington  was  at  the  mercy  of  the  enemy. 

Keeping  in  mind  the  disheartening  obstacles  placed  in  his 
way  by  the  unsympathetic  or  hostile  attitude  of  the  Govern 
ment,  and  McClellan's  comparative  weakness  of  force,  let  us 
contrast  Beaver  Dam  with  the  Wilderness,  Frazier's  Field 
with  Spotsylvania,  Malvern  Hill  with  Cold  Harbor,  and  Mc 
Clellan's  army  when  it  reached  the  James  with  General  Grant's 
army  when  it  reached  the  James.  McClellan's  army  nailed  Lee 
to  Richmond.  Lee  held  Grant's  army  on  the  James  in  such 
contempt  that  in  July  Early  was  terrorizing  Washington.  As 
Lee  routed  Pope  after  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  joined 
him,  it  is  obvious  that  if  Lee  wished  to  swap  Richmond  for 
Washington,  he  could  easily  have  destroyed  Pope's  army 
while  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  on  the  James,  and  fol 
lowed  the  flying  Union  troops  into  Washington.  So,  on  the 
other  hand,  it  is  evident  that  if  McDowell's  corps  had  been 
shipped  over  night  to  the  James,  Richmond's  doom  would 
have  been  sealed.  Even  as  it  was,  we  have  seen  that  McClel- 
lan  would  have  taken  Richmond  on  August  I4th,  1862,  if 
permission  had  been  given  to  him  by  Halleck. 

All  of  these  contrasting  facts  put  the  stamp  of  great  mili 
tary  ability  on  McClellan's  management  of  the  Peninsular 
Campaign. 

The  one  commander  of  the  war  whose  preeminent  ability 
is  recognized  with  almost  absolute  unanimity  is  General  Lee. 

That  just  reputation  is  not  founded  at  all  upon  his  military 
contests  with  McClellan.  No  one  can  say  that  he  showed  a 
superior  military  leadership  over  McClellan  or  won  any  re 
nown  from  his  campaigns  against  McClellan  anywhere, — in 
West  Virginia,  in  the  Peninsula,  or  in  the  Maryland  campaign. 
And  this  seems  a  cogent  argument  in  McClellan's  favor. 


McCLELLAN  427 

Next  to  Lee,  because  of  his  brilliant  campaigns,  was 
Thomas  J.  Jackson, — '"Stonewall"  Jackson.  Yet  the  name  of 
General  Jackson  would  be  an  obscure  one  in  the  history  of 
the  war,  if  he  were  judged  only  by  the  results  of  his  contacts 
with  McClellan, — keeping  in  mind  of  course  that  here  he  had 
not  supreme  command.  At  Frazier's  Field  he  and  Huger 
were  both  shut  out  from  the  fight,  as  we  have  seen,  by  Mc- 
Clellan's  wise  foresight  in  stationing  Franklin  at  the  dominant 
point. 

If  McClellan's  suggestion  had  been  followed,  or  if  he  had 
been  given  control  of  all  the  forces  in  Virginia  after  the  sec 
ond  disaster  of  Bull  Run,  General  Miles  would  have  taken 
possession  of  Maryland  Heights,  and  he  would  have  detained 
Jackson  so  long  that  it  would  have  been  impossible  for  him 
to  reach  Antietam  in  time  to  save  Lee's  army  from  destruc 
tion;  and  so  McClellan's  plan  would  have  shut  him  out  here 
again.  The  "shut  out"  of  Frazier's  Field  was  repeated  at 
Warrenton.  Jackson  was  125  miles  away,  beyond  the  Blue 
Ridge,  and  the  passes  were  blocked  by  McClellan.  The  dash 
ing  campaigner  of  the  Confederacy  was  again  bottled  up,  and 
could  have  taken  no  part  in  the  impending  battle. 

Antietam  saved  the  North  from  invasion  in  the  fall  of 
1862 ;  so  did  Gettysburg  in  the  summer  of  1863.  No  one  dis 
parages  the  significance  of  Gettysburg  or  attempts  to  rob  Gen 
eral  Meade  of  the  glory  of  the  victory.  A  comparison  of  An 
tietam  with  Gettysburg  may  therefore  be  fruitful.  In  these 
two  battles  the  situation  of  the  contending  armies  was  re 
versed.  At  Antietam  Lee  had  a  strong  defensive  position  and 
McClellan  was  the  aggressor;  at  Gettysburg  Meade  had  a 
strongly  defensive  position  and  Lee  was  the  aggressor.  So 
at  Antietam  the  advantage  of  location  and  conditions  was 
strongly  with  Lee ;  at  Gettysburg  it  was  strongly  with  Meade. 
It  was  a  disorganized  and  crestfallen  mob,  a  panicstricken 
army,  that  of  McClellan  after  the  second  battle  of  Bull  Run, 
with  which  he  was  to  fight  Lee's  victorious  Southerners  two 
weeks  later,  upon  ground  of  Lee's  selection.  Yet  this  army 
barely  allowed  Lee  to  cross  the  Potomac  before  it  was  upon 
him.  There  was  no  disorganized  mob  under  Meade  at  Gettys- 


428  McCLELLAN 

burg,  for  there  was  no  rout  at  Chancellorsville,  only  an  un 
successful  attack  by  vastly  superior  forces  on  the  Confeder 
ate  entrenchments  at  Marye's  Heights.  There  was  no  panic, 
no  disorganization,  and  two  months  elapsed  between  Chancel 
lorsville  and  Gettysburg,  while  only  two  weeks  intervened 
between  the  disaster  of  Bull  Run  No.  2  and  Antietam.  With 
an  army  of  uncertain  morale  like  McClellan's,  it  is  the  part 
of  prudence  to  select  a  strong  position  and  defend  it.  With 
an  army  of  assured  morale  like  Meade's,  a  general  may  more 
confidently  assume  the  offensive.  Yet  it  was  McClellan  who 
attacked  at  Antietam ;  it  was  Meade  who  defended  at  Gettys 
burg. 

At  Antietam  McClellan  had  for  battle  157  regiments  of 
infantry  (21  of  which  were  of  raw  recruits),  15  regiments  of 
cavalry,  and  43  batteries.  Franklin  came  at  noon  with  the 
Sixth  Corps,  consisting  of  27  infantry  regiments  and  7  bat 
teries,  but  he  took  no  part  in  the  battle.  Lee  at  Antietam  had 
179  regiments  of  infantry,  14^/2  regiments  of  cavalry,  and 
71  batteries. 

At  Gettysburg  the  Union  army  had  228  regiments  of  in 
fantry  (38  more  than  at  Antietam),  34^/2  regiments  of  cav 
alry  (19^/2  more  than  at  Antietam),  and  72  batteries  (22 
more  than  at  Antietam).  In  these  figures  we  have  counted  in 
the  Sixth  Corps. 

At  Gettysburg  Lee  had  168^/2  regiments  of  infantry  (ioj/2 
less  than  at  Antietam),  26^  regiments  of  cavalry  (12  more 
than  at  Antietam),  and  60  batteries  (n  less  than  at  Antie 
tam  ) . 

At  Antietam  the  full  fruition  of  McClellan's  plans  and 
orders  was  lost  through  the  dereliction  of  Burnside,  but  for 
which  Lee  would  have  suffered  a  disastrous  and  no  doubt  an 
irretrievable  defeat.  At  Gettysburg  the  Confederates  claim 
that  the  battle  would  have  been  won  by  them  beyond  any 
question  but  for  the  failure  of  Longstreet  to  carry  out  Lee's 
instructions.  McClellan  won  at  Antietam  in  spite  of  Burn- 
side's  defection;  Lee  lost  at  Gettysburg  because  of  Long- 
street's  defection. 

One  day  of  battle  was  enough  for  Lee  at  Antietam,  though 


McCLELLAN  429 

he  had  the  advantage  of  position;  but  he  was  able  to  fight 
for  three  days  at  Gettysburg,  though  Meade  had  the  ad 
vantage  of  position.  As  McClellan  attacked  at  Antietam  and 
Lee  at  Gettysburg,  we  would  expect  a  greater  proportional 
Union  loss  at  Antietam  and  Confederate  loss  at  Gettysburg, 
but  the  contrary  is  the  case.  The  Union  loss  at  Gettysburg 
was  about  double  that  at  Antietam.  Here  are  the  figures: 
Union  loss  at  Antietam  12,410,  at  Gettysburg  23,049; 
Confederate  loss  at  Antietam  28,899,  at  Gettysburg  20,- 
451.  The  Confederate  loss  wyas  two  and  a  half  times  as 
great  as  the  Union  loss  at  Antietam,  in  spite  of  Burnside ; 
at  Gettysburg  it  was  three  thousand  less,  in  spite  of  Long- 
street.  And  the  Confederates  lost  8,500  more  in  the  one 
day's  battle  of  Antietam  than  in  the  three  days'  battle  of 
Gettysburg.  This  was  largely  due  to  the  terrible  weapon  that 
McClellan  made  of  his  artillery.  The  Confederates  always 
called  Antietam  "Artillery  hell." 

These  comparisons  are  not  intended  to  detract  from  the 
just  reputation  of  General  Meade,  but  to  emphasize  the  fact 
that  it  must  be  an  intensely  prejudiced  mind  which,  knowing 
the  facts,  can  laud  General  Meade  and  be  blind  to  the  great 
military  capacity  of  General  McClellan. 


CHAPTER    LXXII 

THE  QUALITIES  OF  A  GREAT  COMMANDER 

By  the  practically  unanimous  verdict  of  military  authors 
General  McClellan  is  conceded  to  have  been  a  strategist  of 
rare  ability.  His  plans  for  the  Peninsular  Campaign,  the  An- 
tietam  Campaign,  and  the  final  campaign,  in  which  he  secured 
the  division  of  the  Southern  forces  and  was  apparently  about 
to  overwhelm  Lee  and  Longstreet  when  he  was  removed, 
were  all  ably  conceived. 

It  is  also  conceded  that  he  had  great  administrative  and 
executive  ability,  that  in  the  organization  of  an  army  and  in 
the  infusion  of  proper  morale  he  had  no  rival  in  the  Civil 
War,  and  that  he  had  a  wonderful  capacity  for  that  grasp  of 
details  which  Napoleon  claimed  was  the  surest  proof  of  a 
great  leader. 

All  agree  that  no  other  general  of  the  war  ever  inspired 
his  men  with  such  confidence,  admiration,  affection,  and  en 
thusiasm.  The  ovations  given  by  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
to  McClellan  constantly,  but  especially  on  his  reinstatement, 
at  South  Mountain  and  at  Antietam,  and  upon  his  withdrawal, 
have  been  seldom  equaled.  In  this  regard  even  Napoleon  was 
hardly  a  rival.  McClellan  saw  that  his  soldiers  were  properly 
cared  for,  and  they  believed  that  he  could  achieve  whatever  he 
undertook.  Such  a  leader  can  get  the  very  best  out  of  an 
army,  and  such  power  is  naturally  a  prime  element  of  mili 
tary  greatness.  Physical  courage  is  an  important  factor  in 
successful  generalship.  The  evidence  is  overwhelming  and 
conclusive  that  McClellan  was  absolutely  fearless  under  fire. 
Even  hostile  or  lukewarm  critics  usually  concede  this.  Such 
courage  when  combined  with  great  energy,  as  it  was  in  Mc- 
Clellan's  case,  constitutes  aggressiveness  of  the  highest  order. 
McClellan  was  full  of  vim  and  energy;  and,  having  an  excel 
lent  constitution  and  a  powerful  frame,  he  labored  incessantly 

430 


McCLELLAN  431 

for  the  good  of  the  army  and  the  accomplishment  of  its  ends. 
The  events  of  McClellan's  military  career  show  not  only  ag 
gressiveness  but  also  a  bulldog  tenacity  of  purpose.  Most 
generals,  even  among  those  of  eminent  ability,  finding  them 
selves  in  McClellan's  situation  on  the  Chickahominy, — unsup 
ported  by  the  government,  disappointed  in  the  hope  of  Mc 
Dowell's  arrival, — would  have  retired  to  \Vcst  Point,  the 
source  of  supplies;  and  McClellan  displayed  aggressiveness  of 
the  first  order  in  cutting  loose  from  his  supplies,  severing  his 
communications,  and  marching  resolutely  forward  to  the 
James,  in  spite  of  the  best  efforts  of  a  brave  army  much  supe 
rior  in  numbers  to  his  own.  His  aggressiveness  was  shown 
also  in  clearing  away  the  Confederate  force  between  him  and 
McDowell.  Not  only  did  he  force  his  way  to  the  James,  in 
spite  of  Lee's  splendid  army  and  all  the  obstacles  of  miry 
earth  and  stormy  weather,  but,  as  if  in  contempt  of  the  best 
efforts  of  the  enemy,  he  brought  safely  through  a  great  train 
of  wagons  and  2,500  cattle.  This  is  proof  paramount  of  ag 
gressiveness  and  tenacity  of  purpose. 

The  position  astride  the  Chickahominy  was  the  result  of 
McClellan's  aggressiveness  and  Stanton's  interference.  Mc 
Clellan  wished  to  make  straight  for  Richmond  from  West 
Point,  but  Stanton  wished  to  get  the  army  between  Richmond 
and  Washington.  So  he  ordered  McClellan  to  extend  his 
right  wing  to  the  north  of  Richmond.  To  hang  on  to  his 
own  plan  and  yet  obey  this  order  put  the  army,  as  none  knew 
so  well  nor  regretted  so  much  as  McClellan,  in  a  false  and 
weak  position ;  and  his  maintaining  that  position  for  six  weeks 
and  extricating  himself  from  it  without  injury  is  strong  proof 
of  a  confident  and  aggressive  spirit,  submitting  to  a  handi 
cap  which  it  knows  it  can  bear.  Speaking  of  Stanton's  con 
duct  during  this  period,  General  Michie,  in  his  Life  of  General 
Upton,  in  amazing  contrast  with  what  he  says  in  his  Life  of 
McClellan,  says,  "To  his  interference  all  our  military  disas 
ters  of  that  year  may  be  traced."  And  again  in  the  same 
work,  speaking  of  the  outset  of  McClellan's  Peninsular  Cam 
paign,  General  Michie  says :  "By  thus  assuming  the  direction 
of  military  affairs  both  the  Secretary  and  the  President  be- 


432  McCLELLAN 

came  from  this  moment  as  much  responsible  for  whatever  of 
disaster  might  befall  the  army  as  if  they  had  actually  taken 
command  in  the  field.  No  sooner  had  the  commander  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  sailed  for  Fortress  Monroe  than  the 
disintegration  of  the  forces  which  he  relied  upon  for  his  pur 
pose,  and  which  had  been  promised  him,  began  to  take  place.'' 

This  attitude  of  the  Government  gives  a  luminous  signifi 
cance  to  McClellan's  aggressiveness  under  such  disheartening 
circumstances.  What  superb  courage  inspired  the  heart  of 
this  man  when  he  dared  to  write  to  the  brusque  and  implacable 
Secretary  of  War,  "You  have  done  your  best  to  sacrifice  this 
army." 

The  twin  brother  of  aggressiveness  is  prudence.  This  is 
what  is  meant  by  the  wise  old  aphorism :  "The  better  part  of 
valor  is  discretion."  There  was  in  the  military  career  of  Mc- 
Clellan  no  Bull  Run;  no  "horror"  of  Fredericksburg ;  no 
slaughter  of  Union  soldiers  like  that  of  the  Wilderness,  Spot- 
sylvania,  Cold  Harbor,  or  Petersburg.  But  his  campaign 
would  have  supplied  such  parallels,  if  he  had  recklessly  dashed 
his  men  against  the  strong  defenses  of  Yorktown  immedi 
ately  on  arriving  in  the  Peninsula,  or  if  he  had  tried  to  force 
them  across  the  broad,  flooded  stretches  of  the  Warwick. 
If  the  whole  country  were  required  to  center  upon  one  man 
as  a  type  of  the  aggressive  officer  on  our  side  of  the  conflict, 
there  is  no  doubt  at  all  as  to  the  selection;  and  if  a  list  of 
ten  were  made  by  each  one  of  this  vast  jury,  the  same  man 
would  probably  be  first  on  every  list, — namely,  Sheridan.  It 
would  be  remembered  especially  how  at  Missionary  Ridge, 
though  ordered  to  stop  at  the  foot  of  the  hill,  he  pushed  the 
enemy  over  the  crest  and  down  the  other  side  and  was  still 
pursuing  when  pulled  back  like  a  hound  tugging  at  the  leash. 
But  Sheridan  was  prudent,  too.  The  press  of  the  country  in 
the  summer  of  1864  howled  at  his  inaction,  his  apparent  want 
of  energy  through  July  and  August  and  the  first  two  weeks 
of  September.  Conditions  were  not  favorable  until  then,  so 
he  waited,  as  prudence  demanded,  until  the  time  was  ripe 
for  action. 

Sagacity  and  foresight  are  so  allied  that  they  should  be 


M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  N  433 

considered  together.  Sagacity  is  merely  a  phase  of  foresight; 
it  enables  one  to  anticipate  events.  McClellan's  sagacity  was 
demonstrated  at  every  step  of  his  career  during  the  war.  The 
plan  of  a  swift  attack  on  Richmond  by  getting  close  without 
any  chance  of  opposition  is  now  seen  to  have  been  the  most 
sagacious ;  so  also  was  the  plan  of  making  the  James  the  base 
of  operations.  The  Secretary  of  War  and  the  President  in 
sisted  that  he  must  clear  all  the  enemy  from  the  Potomac 
before  setting  out  on  his  campaign.  His  foresight  assured 
him  that  there  was  no  need  of  a  separate  campaign  for  this 
purpose.  The  main  campaign  would  secure  it, — and  it  did. 
His  sagacity  caused  him  to  make  provision  in  advance  for 
the  march  to  the  James,  and  his  supplies  were  there  and  the 
gunboats  ready  to  aid  him  when  he  reached  there.  His  sa 
gacity  in  planting  Franklin  with  a  sufficient  force  at  the  right 
spot  shut  out  Huger  and  Jackson  from  the  hard  fight  at  Fra- 
zier's  Farm.  His  sagacity  caused  him  to  seize  Malvern"  Hill 
before  the  Rebels  could  get  there.  His  sagacious  advice  to 
Halleck,  if  followed,  would  not  only  have  saved  Harper's 
Ferry,  but  would  have  delayed  Jackson  until  the  destruction 
of  Lee's  army  at  Antietam  was  complete.  At  Warrenton  his 
sagacity  brought  about  a  separation  of  the  hostile  forces,  left 
a  chasm  of  125  miles  between  them,  and  made  their  union  in 
time  for  battle  absolutely  impossible. 

McClellan  was  the  king  of  artillery  during  the  Civil  War. 
No  other  general  ever  made  such  effective  use  of  it  as  he. 
And  those  who  came  nearest  to  doing  so,  like  Meade,  were  his 
pupils.  This  explains  how  it  was  that  the  Confederate  loss 
was  always  the  greater  by  far  wherever  he  fought.  Malvern 
Hill  and  Antietam  are  notable  instances.  Like  Napoleon,  he 
believed  in  the  potency  of  effective  ordnance,  and  verified  his 
belief  by  the  results. 

General  Grant,  in  his  splendid  tribute  to  Sheridan,  has 
pointed  out  the  attributes  of  a  great  military  leader.  "Sheri 
dan,"  he  said  to  Senator  Hoar,  "had  no  superior  as  a  general 
either  living  or  dead,  if  he  had  an  equal.  I  do  not  mean  in 
minor  movements,  but  in  all  the  elements  of  a  great  war.  He 
had  judgment,  prudence,  foresight,  and  the  capacity  of  always 


434  McCLELLAN 

knowing  the  right  thing  to  do,  and  the  courage  and  ability  to 
do  it." 

Celerity  of  movement  is  an  excellent  attribute  of  a  com 
mander.  The  enemies  of  McClellan  say  that  he  was  wanting 
in  this  quality.  But  celerity  is  a  relative  expression, — to  draw 
a  heavy  load  at  the  rate  of  four  miles  an  hour  may  be  speedy 
for  a  draft  horse,  though  slow  indeed  for  a  trotter  hitched  to 
a  light  vehicle.  Both  Jackson  and  Lee  were  astonished  at  the 
quickness  with  which  McClellan  advanced  in  the  Maryland 
campaign,  as  they  knew  he  had  to  reorganize  a  mob  as  he 
went.  All  the  Confederates,  from  the  President  down,  were 
surprised  at  the  speed  with  which  McClellan  advanced  upon 
Lee  and  Longstreet  in  November,  1862,  and  blocked  the 
passes  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  thus  preventing  a  union  of  the 
widely  separated  sections  of  the  Rebel  army.  He  was  only 
lacking  in  speed  in  seeking  a  Petersburg  by  recklessly  dashing 
his  beloved  soldiers  against  the  supposedly  impregnable  forti 
fications  of  Yorktown,  or  a  Cold  Harbor  by  forcing  them 
across  the  flooded  Warwick.  Let  it  not  be  forgotten  that 
by  this  method  Yorktown  was  occupied  and  the  Warwick 
crossed  without  losing  a  man. 

Because  of  the  delay  at  Fortress  Monroe  his  civilian  mili 
tary  superiors  charged  him  with  being  "afflicted  with  the 
slows."  But  the  delay  was  theirs,  not  his.  If  an  employer 
sends  a  man  to  repair  a  great  machine  at  a  distant  place, 
knowing  that  it  will  require  certain  tools  and  a  certain  number 
of  men  to  do  the  work,  yet  fails  to  send  the  requisite  tools  or 
the  requisite  number  of  men,  the  delay  inevitably  resulting  is 
the  delay  of  the  employer,  not  of  the  man  he  has  sent.  Mc 
Clellan  had  not  only  informed  the  War  Department  of  the 
necessity  of  naval  cooperation  but  also  did  everything  possible 
to  secure  this  cooperation,  on  the  express  ground  that  the  lack 
of  it  would  cause  great  delay.  The  naval  cooperation  was 
not  supplied,  and  when,  as  the  result,  the  inevitable  delay 
came,  the  authors  of  the  delay  charged  McClellan  with  it. 
They  further  enforced  the  delay  by  detaining  a  third  of  the 
army,  McDowell's  corps,  which  they  knew  was  to  be  used  for 
a  special  purpose,  a  flanking  movement.  Having  made  it  im- 


McCLELLAN  435 

possible  for  him  to  move,  they  then,  with  stupendous  inso 
lence,  berated  him  for  delaying,  as  if  he  had  been  a  misbe 
having  urchin,  and  told  him  peremptorily  that  he  must  act. 
As  to  this  delay  we  need  occupy  no  further  time,  for  Mc- 
.Clellan  has  been  absolutely  and  gloriously  vindicated  through 
the  action  of  the  Government  itself.  Senate  Document  No. 
25  is  a  splendid  tribute  to  and  appreciation  of  McClellan's 
course  at  this  special  time  and  throughout  the  Peninsular  Cam 
paign,  and  is  a  convincing  indictment  of  his  civil  superiors. 
This  work  is  entitled  "The  Military  Policy  of  the  United 
States,"  and  was  prepared  by  General  Emory  Upton  at  the 
request  of  the  Senate.  It  contains  an  exhaustive  review  of 
the  Peninsular  Campaign,  step  by  step,  and  its  praise  of  Mc- 
Clellan  is  the  more  notable  because  General  Upton,  as  he  says 
elsewhere,  was  "an  abolitionist  and  the  son  of  an  abolitionist" 
and  therefore  so  anti-McClellan  that  he  remained  cold  and 
silent  while  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  almost  made  the  earth 
quiver  with  their  cheers  at  the  retirement  of  their  beloved 
general.  McClellan  waited  on  the  Chickahominy  for  the 
promised  coming  of  McDowell.  He  waited  at  Harper's  Ferry 
after  Antietam  for  the  promised  supplies  of  necessary  clothes 
for  his  army.  These  delays  were  delays  of  the  Administra 
tion, — not  of  the  Commander.  Unfriendly  critics  say  he 
should  have  gone  on,  clothes  or  no  clothes,  but  such  a  man 
would  not  have  attached  his  men  to  him  as  McClellan  did  and 
would  not  have  been  able  to  accomplish  with  them  what  he 
did.  If  such  a  man  had  led  the  army  to  Antietam,  Lee  would 
have  destroyed  it  and  ravaged  the  North.  Under  McClellan 
the  army  was  invincible  because  of  their  confidence  in  him. 

General  Upton  points  out  that,  above  all,  the  Administra 
tion  was  responsible  for  the  delay  at  Fortress  Monroe,  be 
cause  that  was  its  plan,  not  McClellan's.  His  plan  of  landing 
at  Urbanna  would  have  avoided  the  Warwick  and  Yorktown 
entirely — and  held  Magruder  there  as  in  a  sack.  In  spite  of 
all  the  political  cavilers,  General  Upton  speaks  with  glowing 
praise  of  McClellan  and  "the  army  which  he  so  brilliantly  led 
to  the  enemy's  capital."  1 

1  Military  Policy  of  the  United  States,  363. 


CHAPTER  LXXIII 

THE    INCONSISTENCY    OF    THE    CRITICS 

There  are  three  classes  of  writers  on  General  McClellan's 
military  career. 

First,  those  who  see  in  him  a  commander  of  rare  ability 
whose  services  to  the  Union  were  astonishing,  in  view  of  the 
obstacles  placed  in  his  way  by  the  opposition  of  the  Govern 
ment.  In  this  class  are :  the  Comte  de  Paris,  History  of  the 
Civil  War;  Colonel  Powell,  The  Fifth  Army  Corps;  General 
McMahon,  The  Peninsular  Campaign;  General  A.  A.  Hum 
phreys,  Peninsular  Campaign;  Cole,  Under  Five  Commanders; 
the  Prince  De  Joinville,  The  Army  of  the  Potomac;  Hilliard, 
McClellan  and  His  Campaigns;  General  Michie,  Life  of  Up 
ton;  Le  Compte,  The  War  in  the  United  States;  Headley, 
The  Great  Rebellion;  Giants  of  the  Republic;  General  Upton, 
Military  Policy  of  the  United  States;  the  Confederate  com 
manders  in  solid  phalanx  and  nearly  all  the  chiefs  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac. 

Second,  those  who  give  some  credit  to  McClellan,  recog 
nizing  his  handicapped  situation,  yet  are  dissatisfied  with  him 
because  of  the  conditions  which  they  should  see  arose  inev 
itably  from  the  handicaps  which  they  record.  Among  these 
are  Rhodes,  History  of  the  United  States;  Swinton,  The 
Army  of  the  Potomac;  Palfrey,  The  Antietam;  Colonel 
Dodge,  Bird's-Eye  View  of  the  Civil  War;  and  General  Webb, 
The  Peninsula.  All  of  these  give  praise,  and  from  the  facts 
given  by  them  this  praise  should  be  cordial,  unstinted,  and 
boundless ;  but  they  impute  blame  also  in  special  instances,  and 
in  this  they  are  irrational,  for  their  own  statements  show 
that  the  conditions  complained  of  flowed  directly  and  solely 
from  the  frustrating  action  of  the  Administration.  Palfrey's 
commentary  upon  McClellan  is  devoted  entirely  to  the  Mary- 

436 


McCLELLAN  437 

land  campaign.  At  every  step  of  that  campaign,  though  he 
had  nothing  better  than  a  disorganized  mob,  McClellan  acted 
constantly  and  entirely  upon  the  offensive,  and  Lee  entirely 
upon  the  defensive,  as  General  Palfrey's  work  shows.  Was  it 
not  so  at  Crampton's  Gap,  South  Mountain,  and  Antietam? 
Yet  his  obvious  partisanship  was  so  intense  as  to  permit  him 
to  say,  "Lee  knew  that  McClellan  never  attacked."  What 
Palfrey  had  in  mind  was  the  period  wrhen  McClellan  was  wait 
ing,  expecting  McDowell  to  join  him. 

Third,  those  who  take  upon  their  shoulders  a  task  more 
difficult  than  any  of  the  fabulous  labors  of  Hercules, — that 
of  clearing  the  civilian  superiors  of  McClellan  from  all  blame. 
These  writers  are  subtle  and  unfair  in  the  highest  degree. 
The  great  body  of  writers  see  either  that  the  whole  or  a  large 
part  of  the  lack  of  more  glorious  results  was  due  to  the 
thwarting  of  McClellan' s  plans:  and  especially  to  the  failure 
of  Stanton  to  carry  out  the  promise  made  just  after  he  entered 
upon  the  duties  of  his  office  to  furnish  the  means  to  win  vic 
tories.  But  these  writers  in  their  intensely  offensive  partisan 
ship  defend  every  action  of  the  government.  General  Bar 
nard,  Peninsular  Campaign;  General  Michie,  General  McClel 
lan;  and  General  S.  L.  French,  Army  of  the  Potomac,  are 
probably  the  only  ones  that  belong  absolutely  in  this  list. 
Throughout  the  Peninsular  Campaign,  General  Barnard  was  a 
warm  and  enthusiastic  friend  of  General  McClellan,  as  his  let 
ters  given  in  this  book  show.  But  afterward,  through  some 
influence,  he  became  hostile,  and  advanced  peculiar  opinions, 
oblivious  of  the  fact  that  he  was  contradicting  his  own  letters. 
At  the  battle  of  Gaines's  Mill  his  failure  to  convey  the  mes 
sage  given  to  him  by  General  Porter  caused  the  partial  reverse 
of  that  day.  And  it  may  be  that  later  the  feeling  that  he  had 
done  McClellan  a  great  injury  grew  into  an  intense  hatred. 
It  is  a  human  trait  often  repeated. 

But  General  Michie  is  far  more  censurable.  The  publica 
tion  of  a  series  of  biographies  known  as  The  Great  Comman 
der  Series  was  in  progress.  Upon  the  list  was  General  Mc 
Clellan.  This  meant  that  the  publishers  believed  that  General 
McClellan,  like  General  Lee  and  General  Johnston,  was  a  great 


438  McCLELLAN 

commander.  General  Michie  was  invited  to  write  this  biog 
raphy.  He  should  have  declined;  for  though  the  injury  done 
to  McClellan  is  palliated  slightly  by  the  praise  of  his  character 
and  achievements  in  civil  life,  yet  his  book  is  a  most  subtle 
and  ingenious  brief  to  prove  that  McClellan  was  not  a  great 
commander;  that  he  was  unfit  to  command  at  all.  It  is 
absolutely  irreconcilable  with  General  Michie's  Life  of  Upton. 
He  gives  one  the  impression  constantly  of  an  attorney  working 
for  a  fee.  Among  all  the  authors  he  stands  alone  in  his  uni 
versal  condemnation  of  McClellan's  military  career;  and  one 
has  only  to  glance  over  the  histories  of  the  Civil  War  and  his 
own  biography  of  General  Emory  Upton  to  recognize  that  the 
commendations  of  his  impartiality  and  freedom  from  bias  in 
the  preface  to  his  Life  of  McClellan  are  sheer  nonsense. 
General  Michie  wrote  as  if  he  were  inoculated  with  the  Stan- 
tonian  virus.  He  professed  to  see  no  evil  in  the  Government's 
acts,  and  no  good  in  McClellan's  military  career;  yet  all  the 
facts  necessary  to  upset  his  conclusions  appear  in  his  book. 
And  we  may  be  thankful  that  we  have  his  own  evidence  to  the 
contrary  in  his  Life  of  General  Emory  Upton,  and  that  he 
was  at  least  able  to  see  in  his  amazing  life  of  McClellan  that 
in  character,  in  disposition,  in  achievements,  in  civil  life,  Mc 
Clellan  was  worthy  of  the  highest  eulogy.  His  description 
of  the  upright,  active,  efficient,  gifted  man  in  civil  life  con 
tradicts  the  view  of  the  man  he  depicts  in  martial  life.  The 
men  are  far  too  different  ever  to  have  been  united  in  the  same 
person  and  animated  by  the  same  soul. 

The  spirit  in  which  General  Michie  in  his  Life  of  McClel 
lan  approaches  the  subject  makes  it  impossible  for  him  to 
discern  the  truth.  The  fatal  obstacle  of  unconscious  prejudice 
cannot  be  better  illustrated  than  by  this  remark  of  Mr.  Brad 
ford,  an  amiable  gentleman  writing  with  good  intent,  in  the 
Atlantic  Monthly  for  October,  1914.  He  tells  us  that  certain 
admirers  of  McClellan  are  indiscreet  and  unfortunate  in  their 
commendation,  "exonerating  their  favorite  at  the  expense  of 
others  whom  we  do  not  care  to  have  abused."  Here  is  a  stu 
pendous  wall  across  the  path  of  truth.  Vindicate  McClellan 
if  yon  will,  provided  you  cast  no  blame  upon  Mr.  Stanton  or 


M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  N  439 

Mr.  Lincoln.  This  is  the  attitude  of  many  writers.  But  waiv 
ing  many  minor  corroborative  considerations,  three  unques 
tioned  facts  cast  great  blame  on  both  Mr.  Stanton  and  Mr. 
Lincoln,  blame  from  which  no  author  has  made  a  serious  at 
tempt  to  clear  them :  One,  withholding  the  third  of  an  army 
already  insufficient;  two,  withdrawing  the  army  from  the 
James,  the  final  base  of  operations;  and,  third,  the  removal  of 
McClellan  just  at  the  moment  when  the  destruction  of  Lee's 
army  seemed  imminent. 

General  Upton,  "An  abolitionist  and  the  son  of  an  abo 
litionist,"  and  therefore  at  first,  as  he  frankly  tells  us,  strongly 
prejudiced  against  McClellan,  candidly  points  out  in  his  ad 
mirable  work  1  and  elsewhere  the  cause  of  the  Government's 
hostile  attitude  toward  McClellan.  It  was  politics  solely :  the 
dread  of  the  prestige  which  military  success  would  surely  give 
McClellan. 

1  The  Military  Policy  of  the  United  States,  at  286,  364. 


CHAPTER    LXXIV 

THE    SOLDIER    AT    HOME CIVIC    HONORS THE    END 

Under  other  conditions,  the  soul  of  General  McClellan 
would  have  fretted  at  his  forced  abstention  from  military 
service;  but  his  longing  to  be  at  the  front  was  appeased  by 
the  tender  devotion  of  a  loving  wife  and  also  by  the  reflection 
that  his  military  services  could  never  bear  their  proper  fruit 
while  Mr.  Stanton  conducted  the  war. 

General  Michie  says  that  McClellan  was  left  at  home,  for 
gotten.1 

General  Michie  is  mistaken.  The  political  considerations 
and  the  personal  hatred  which  effected  the  removal  of  Gen 
eral  McClellan  also  prevented  his  reinstatement.  Moreover, 
reinstatement  would  have  been  a  confession.  But  the  ruling 
powers  could  not  forget  McClellan.  Events  thrust  him  con 
stantly  before  their  eyes.  The  appeals  of  individuals  and  of 
the  people,  the  terrible  slaughter  of  Union  soldiers  in  battle 
after  battle  and  year  after  year,  made  remorse  eat  into  the 
mind  of  the  President;  and  surely  more  than  all  else  created 
the  deep  melancholy  which  grew  steadily  upon  him.  The 
supersensitive  delicacy  of  character  of  General  McClellan  ap 
pears  preeminently  in  the  fact  that,  though  his  high  capacity 
made  him  desirous  of  administrative  employment  and  though 
multitudes  of  suitable  situations  were  offered  to  him,  they  were 
all  refused  because  they  came  from  a  majority  vote  and  not 
from  a  unanimous  vote  of  the  directors  of  corporations. 

So  he  remained  quietly  at  home  with  his  wife  and  his 
"Baby  Nell." 

In  1864  he  was  nominated  for  the  Presidency.  He  was 
not  a  candidate  for  the  nomination.  He  knew  nothing  of  the 
methods  of  practical  politicians,  and  would  not  have  used  them 

1  General  McClellan,  443. 

44° 


M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  N  441 

if  he  had  known  them.  And  yet, — with  all  the  Southern  states 
disfranchised,  with  the  immense  advantage  of  Federal  patron 
age  in  the  hands  of  the  Administration,  and  with  the  army  not 
permitted  to  vote, — if  the  vote  for  General  McClellan  had 
been  increased  a  little  more  than  five  per  cent,  he  would  have 
had  a  majority.  He  would  not  give  unqualified  approval  to 
the  platform  of  the  Democratic  Party,  and  in  his  letter  of  ac 
ceptance  set  forth  his  own  platform.  In  August  the  cause 
of  the  President  seemed  hopelessly  lost.  His  most  powerful 
friends  told  him  so,  and  he  believed  it.  What  turned  the  tide  ? 
The  coming  of  Philip  H.  Sheridan.  His  victories  of  the 
Opequan,  September  the  iQth;  Fisher's  Hill,  September  the 
22d;  and  Cedar  Creek,  October  the  iQth,  saved  the  day  for 
Lincoln. 

In  January,  1865,  McClellan  went  abroad  and  remained 
for  three  years.  On  his  return,  a  great  parade  in  the  city  of 
New  York  testified  to  the  esteem  in  which  he  continued  to 
be  held.  In  that  year  he  was  offered  the  Presidency  of  the 
University  of  California,  and  in  1869  that  of  Union  College, 
both  of  which  he  declined.  On  his  return,  he  was  placed  in 
charge  of  Steven's  Battery,  a  steam  war  vessel,  and  in  1870 
was  made  Chief  Engineer  of  the  Department  of  Docks  in  the 
city  of  New  York. 

In  1877  ne  was  elected  governor  of  New  Jersey.  This 
position  gave  full  scope  to  his  marvelous  administrative  and 
executive  ability,  and  his  career  of  four  years  in  that  office 
is  spoken  of  with  universal  applause.  He  declined  reelection, 
and  held  no  other  position  after  that  except  that  he  was  until 
his  death  a  member  of  the  Board  of  Managers  of  the  National 
Home  for  Disabled  Soldiers. 

He  spent  his  remaining  years  in  retirement,  the  winters 
being  passed  at  his  beautiful  home  at  Orange,  N.  J.,  with  his 
wife  and  two  children,  and  his  summers  at  St.  Moritz,  in  the 
Engadine. 

He  prepared  for  publication  an  account  of  his  military 
services,  but,  as  we  have  said,  like  Carlyle,  he  lost  his  manu 
script  by  fire,  and  it  is  a  public  calamity  that,  unlike  Carlyle, 
he  was  never  able  to  replace  it.  McClellan's  Oivn  Story  is 


442  McCLELLAN 

sadly  incomplete.     It  is  a  partial  collection  of  material  for  a 
work  rather  than  a  complete  and  elaborated  production. 

General  McClellan  died  on  the  29th  of  October,  1885,  at 
his  home  in  New  Jersey;  the  highest  honors  were  paid  in  his 
obsequies,  as  was  fitting,  for  he  was  surely  a  gifted,  efficient, 
exemplary  man,  in  every  period  and  in  every  function  of  his 
life,  and  a  military  leader  of  preeminent  ability. 


THE   END 


INDEX 


Abolition  of  slavery  without  com 
pensation,  19-20. 
Administration,  see  Army. 
Ancestry  of    McClellan,  9. 
Antietam,  battle  of,  383-394. 
Burnside's  inefficiency  balks  Mc 
Clellan' s  plans,  385-389. 
Five  conspiring  adverse  circum 
stances,  389-390- 

Burnside's  relations  with  McClel 
lan,  390. 
Wise   not   to   resume   the   attack 

on  the  1 8th,  391-393- 
Lee's  position  a  natural  Gibraltar, 

384. 

General  Franklin's  praise  of  Mc 
Clellan  at  Antietam,  393. 
Forces  engaged,  393. 
General    Upton's    commendation, 

393- 

Why  no  pursuit  of  Lee,  393-394. 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  birth  of,  9. 

Administration's  slowness  in  pro 
viding  men  and  equipments,  29. 

Great  administrative  faculty  of 
McClellan  shown  in  organizing, 
29. 

Necessity  for  a  large  army  ap 
parent  after  Bull  Run  No.  i, 

37- 

McClellan  urges  this,  37. 
Army   asked    for  proportionately 

less  than  that  given  to  Grant, 

38. 

American  way  of  overcoming  re 
sistance  inefficient,  38. 

Administration's  gross  slowness 
and  neglect,  64. 

McClellan  complains  of  it,  64. 

Helplessness  to  prevent,  64. 

McClellan's  success  in  discipline, 
66. 

Arguments  false  for  haste,  68. 

Blaming  the  wrong  man,  68. 

All  quiet  on  the  Potomac,  69. 

Southern  army  also  quiet,  69. 

Times'  opinion  of  the  situation, 
69. 

Ropes'  opinion  of,  70. 

Army  too  weak  to  advance  in 
1861,  72. 


Army  of  the  Potomac  (cont). 
McClellan's  remonstrance  against 

acting  with  a  weak  army,  72. 
Available  army  stated,  73  et  seq. 
Administration's     inefficiency     in 

collecting   troops,   77-78. 
Army  to   be  pushed  out  though 

inadequate  and  unready,  79. 
Lincoln's  letter,  79. 
Administration  suspends  its  urg 
ing,  80. 

Army  on  March  15,  1862,  89. 
Advance  ordered  by  Lincoln,  90. 
One-half     the     desired     number 

available,  92. 

Army  transports  ordered,  92,  119. 
The  forcing  out  was  premature, 

125. 
Not  so  early  under  General  Grant, 

125. 
Responsibility    for    such    action, 

125. 
Administration's      treatment      of 

McClellan  at  Fort  Monroe,  128, 

129,  141. 

A  third  of  army  detained,  141. 
Should   have   kept    McClellan   at 

Fort   Monroe  until   fully  rein 
forced,  154. 
But     Administration     goads     the 

weakened  army  on,  155. 
Political    weapons    necessary    to 

check  their  hostility,  155-156. 
Lincoln's  amazing  letter,   157. 
The  insolence  of  it,  157. 
The    Administration     treats     the 

conditions  as  ideal,  158. 
Motive  for  such  an  attitude,  158. 
How  McClellan  should  have  met 

it,  158-159. 
Artillery   delayed   after    repeated 

requests,   163. 
Army  united  again  after  Gaines's 

Mill,  217. 

Allen's   Field,   228-229. 
Savage  Station,  228. 
Administration  in  suspense — Mc 
Clellan  lost,  248. 
Letters  to  Seward,  248,  249,  250, 

251. 
To  General  Wool,  251,  252. 


443 


444 


INDEX 


Army  of  the  Potomac  (cont.). 
To  Halleck,  252,  253. 
To  McClellan,  254. 
Army  exhausted,  254,  268. 
When    rested    eager    for    action, 

269. 

In  excellent  spirits,  266. 
Col.  Ingalls  and  General  Dix  on 

the  favorable  status,  270. 
Anxiety  at  first  made  Government 

eager  to  reinforce,  270,  270. 
McClellan's  appeal,  270. 
Praise  and  promises  of  aid  from 

the  President  and  Stanton,  271, 

272. 

Steps  to  reinforce,  276. 
Dispatches  to  Halleck,  276. 
Orders  to  General  Burnside  and 

General  Hunter  to  hasten  with 

troops,  276. 
McClellan's  proclamation   to   the 

army,  277. 
The   army   on   the   true   base  of 

operations,  279. 
Pope's    army    should    have    been 

sent  to  the  James,  280. 
Burnside  halts   at  Fort   Monroe, 

July  7,  281. 
On  July  8  Lincoln  visits  the  army, 

262,  281,  292. 
A  change  of  tone,  282. 
Stanton's     second    thought,    282, 

283. 

General  Keyes  prays  for  tempo 
rary  removal,  283. 
His  intermeddling  letter,  283. 
Barnard  for  reinforcing,  285,  286. 
Keyes  writes  again,  286,  289. 
General    Wool's    hostile    letters, 

289-290. 

A  new  commander,  291. 
The  President's  visit  again,  292. 
Gathering  adverse  evidence,  292. 
But  it  was  against  removal,  294. 
Lincoln's   political  methods,  294- 

295- 

The  army  alarmed,  295-296. 

Administration's  first  showing  of 
renewed  hostility,  letter  of  July 
1 3th,  301. 

A  nagging  letter  from  Lincoln, 
301. 

The  patient  reply,  301. 

Rhodes  on  the  change  of  atti 
tude,  303. 

Gen.  Dix  protests  against  the  re 
moval,  311. 

Sumner  urges  reinforcement,  315. 

Only  fourteen  miles  from  Rich 
mond,  316. 


Army  of  the  Potomac  (cont.). 

McClellan  writes  to  Halleck,  316. 

The  curt  and  false  reply,  316. 

Halleck's  reasons  for  removal, 
3i8. 

Halleck's  letter,  317-319. 

Order  for  removal,  322. 

McClellan's  eloquent  remon 
strance,  323. 

Hooker  advises  to  ignore  it,  325. 

General  Pleasanton's  letter,  325- 
326. 

Supplies  a  sound  military  reason, 
325-326. 

McClellan  redoubles  efforts  with 
Halleck,  326-329. 

A  menacing  letter  to  hasten  re 
moval,  327. 

Mr.  Rhodes  condemns  Halleck, 
328,  329. 

Withdrawal  a  disaster  to  the 
Union ;  views  of  Miss  Johnston, 
Eggleston  Pollard  and  General 
Lee,  330. 

Of  Swinton,  Generals  Upton, 
Averill  and  Dodge,  331. 

The  army  had  not  failed,  332. 

Pulled  off  on  the  verge  of  suc 
cess,  332,  333- 

Ihe  army  starts  back,  333. 

McClellan   leaves   peninsula,   334. 

General  Upton  on  "the  fatal  dis 
patch"  of  removal,  334. 

Grand  ovation  to  McClellan,  354- 
356. 

The  panic  after  Bull  Run  No.  2, 

339;     . 

Condition  of  army,  359. 

Off   for  Antietam,  361. 

Progress  of  the  march,  363-364. 

Slow  advance  urged  from  Wash 
ington,  364. 

Army  at  Harper's  Ferry  needs 
rest,  reorganization  and  re- 
equipment,  395. 

Inefficiency  of  War  Department 
in  furnishing  indispensable  sup 
plies,  395. 

The  President's  visit,  395,  396. 

The  needs  of  the  army,  397. 

Marching  with  bleeding  feet,  397. 

The  swift  advance  to  Warrenton, 

399- 

The  Rebel  army  two  days'  march 
apart — the  Blue  Ridge  between, 

399- 

The  mountain  gaps  closed  by  Mc 
Clellan,  398. 

McClellan  confronting  Lee — with 
three  to  one,  400. 


INDEX 


445 


Army  of  the  Potomac  (cont.). 

Every  assurance  of  victory — Lee 
bewildered,  400. 

McClellan  removed,  402-403. 

Ovation  to  McClellan  at  his  fare 
well,  409-410. 

Gloom  at  the  dismissal,  412. 

Desertions,  412. 

Clamor  for  McClellan's  return, 
412. 

"Give  us  back  our  old  Command 
er,"  412. 

Army  on  the  edge  of  revolt,  412. 

Sketch  of  the  army's  later  his 
tory,  4I3-4I4 

Its  overland  march  of  1864,  413- 

4i5- 
Compared    with    the    Peninsular 

Campaign,  414-415- 
Extensive    bibliography    of    Mc 
Clellan's  campaigns,  416-417. 
Administration's  want  of  support 

prompted  solely  by  politics,  says 

General  Upton,  439. 
Artillery,  McClellan's  skill  with,  433 
Always  abundant  in  Lee's  army, 

215-217. 

Autocrat  of  the  War,  The,  100. 
His  measures  for  control,  100. 
The  war  administration  analyzed, 

107. 

Barnard,    General,    friendly   in   the 
peninsula,  285-286. 

Barnard's  neglect  to  supply  axes 
at  Gaines's  Mill,  213-214. 

Result,  217. 
Beaver  Dam,  210. 

McClellan  foresaw  attack  and 
urged  Porter  to  hold  enemy 
while  he  made  a  dash  on  Rich 
mond,  if  wise,  210-211. 

Battle  of  Beaver  Dam  set  Mc 
Clellan  free  to  go  to  James, 
213. 

He  withdrew  after  it  to  go  where 

he  wanted  to  go,  220. 
Birth  of  McClellan,  9. 

Boyhood,  9. 

Books  prepared  by  him,  12. 
Boer  War 

"Carrying  the  War  into  Africa," 

95- 
Bull  Run  No.   i,  would  have  been 

prevented,  24. 
Panic  at,  37 
Continues,  66. 
Burnside 

McClellan  aids,  18-19. 
At  Fort  Monroe,  281. 


Burnside    (cont.). 

Defection  at  South  Mountain,  380. 

And  in  pursuit  after  it,  389. 

His  gross  incapacity  and  want  of 
energy  at  Antietam  disrupts  the 
scheme  of  battle,  385-389. 

Appointed  Commander  of  the 
Army,  402-403. 

Retreats  at  once  to  Fredericks- 
burg,  411. 


Cabinet  conspiracy  against  McClel 
lan,  85. 

Demands  his  plans,  87. 
Cameron  goes  out,   Stanton  comes 

in,  81.; 
Casey's   Division  at  Fair  Oaks  or 

Seven  Pines,  187. 
Rain  handicaps  the  Union  Army, 

188. 
Cass  holds  up  the  Southern  Army. 

217-218. 
Chase    and    Seward    maneuver   for 

Stanton's  appointment,  84-85. 
Chickahominy  River,  187. 
Clearing  the  Potomac  of  the  enemy, 

98-99. 

Why  Stanton  wished  it,  99. 
A  needless  enterprise,  99,  107. 
Coast  route,  first  mention  of,  80. 
Now    universally    approved,    by 

Eggleston,  96. 
By  General  Johnston,  96. 
By  Wolsey,  96. 
By  Dodge,  96. 
By  Ropes,  96. 
By  Swinton,  96. 
By  Whittier,  approved,  97. 
By  the  Richmond  Whig,  97. 
By  Headley,  97. 
By  General  Fry,  97. 
By  General  Imboden,  97. 
Vindicated    by    the    slaughter    in 
General     Grant's     overland 
march,  98. 
Commander,    qualities   of    a    great, 

430. 
Commander-in-Chief,    a    new,    first 

orders,  89-90. 

Comparison,  the  test  of,  McClel 
lan's  campaigns  and  other  cam 
paigns,  423. 

Confederacy  close  to  success,  415. 
Conspiracy  to  oust  McClellan,  344- 

345- 

Corps  formed  and  commanders  ap 
pointed  without  consulting  Mc 
Clellan,  no. 
Adverse  generals  selected,  no, 


446 


INDEX 


Corps  formed  and  commanders  ap 
pointed,  etc.  (cont). 

Condemned  by  the  Dial,  no. 

Stanton  the  instigator,   no. 
Council  of  Generals,   107-108. 

Coast  Route  approved  by,  no. 

A  hazard  for  McClellan,  108. 

Stanton  urges  rejection  of  ap 
proval,  an  unscrupulous  plea, 
no. 

Council  of  Generals,  new,  120. 
Crampton's  Gap,  337. 
Crimea,  McClellan  in  the,  15. 

Crimean  reports,  16. 

Cincinnati  at,  23. 

Commander  at  Washington,  24. 

Davis,  Secretary,  praises  McClellan, 

14. 
Death  Knell  of  McClellan's  hopes, 

80. 
Defense  of  Washington,  133  et  seq. 

See  Washington. 
Delaware,  Fort,  13. 
Delay  not  McClellan's,  83. 

Delay  of  three  weeks  in  ordering 

transports,  107. 

Delay,  Stanton  still  impedes,  urg 
ing  movements,  to  clear  R.  R. 
and   Potomac,   107. 
Detail,   McClellan  a  master  of,  24. 
Dial,  The,  on  the  folly  of  a  winter 

campaign,  81. 
Also   on   the    Committee   on   the 

Conduct  of  the  War,  81. 
Dismissal  of   McClellan,  402-403. 

Result  of  it,  412. 

Dodge,  on  the  Southern  soldier,  35. 
Dramatic   scenes   on    September  2, 

1862,  347. 
Lincoln  appeals  to  McClellan  to 

save  Washington,  347. 
McClellan  loses  a  diplomatic  op 
portunity  to  tie  up  his  foes,  347- 
350. 
General  Upton's  apparent  surprise 

that  he  did  not,  349. 
Treacherous      attitude      towards 

McClellan,  350. 

McClellan's    misplaced    magnani 
mity,  351. 
Wrhat  he  should  have  demanded, 

351- 

Dummies  at  Manassas  and  at  York- 
town,  164-165. 

Duplicity  of  Stanton,  89,  104,  105. 
Yet  no  author  deceived,  104. 

Eggleston  praises  McClellan's  or 
ganization  of  the  army,  31. 


Eggleston     on   the     Southern   sol 
dier,  36. 
Eggleston     on   the     panic  at  Bull 

Run,  37. 
Elements,  The,  and  Grant,  70. 

Waterloo,  70. 

Elson  praises  McClellan's  organiza 
tion  of  the  army,  66. 
Approves  delaying  the  end  of  the 

war,  198. 

Emancipation,  19-20. 
Lincoln  against  it,  146. 
For  it,   147. 

McClellan's  letter  of  July  7,  1862, 
suggests    military    necessity   as 
a  ground,  263,  264. 
Stanton  claimed  to  be  the  father 

of  emancipation,  266. 
His  purpose  not  benevolent,  266. 
The  true  origin  of  it,   147,  265- 

266. 

Enlisting  men,  duty  of  the  Govern 
ment,  103. 

Gross    inefficiency    in    gathering 
troops,  103. 


Fair  Oaks,  187. 

The  second  day,  191. 
Fatal  resolution  of  Lincoln  to  force 

army  out,  80. 

Favorite,  The,  of  fortune,  25. 
Foe  behind,  The,   142. 
Fort  Delaware,  McClellan  at,  13. 
Franklin  .and    McDowell,    Lincoln 

consults,  83. 
Franklin     and     McCall's     troops 

asked  for,  160. 
Franklin's  sent,  160. 
Franklin    goes    to    West    Point, 

May  5th,  168. 
Franklin   at  White  Oak  Swamp, 

229. 

Jackson  shut  out  by  him,  229. 
At  Crampton's   Gap,  277. 
At  Antietam,  385. 
Frazier's  Field  or  Glendale,  229. 


Gaines's  Mill,  214-215. 
Barnard's  negligence,  213-214. 
Strong  forces  on  Richmond  side, 

218. 

Smith's  batteries  aid  Porter,  218. 
General-in-Chief,  McClellan,  31. 
Glendale  or  Frazier's  Field,  229. 
Gorham  on  Stanton's  ill-will  to  Mc 
Clellan,  85. 

Governor  of  New  Jersey,  McClel 
lan  is  made,  441. 


INDEX 


447 


Grant  sustained  by  the  Administra 
tion  constantly,  423. 

His  overland  campaign,  425. 

Did  not  ignore  the   weather,  70. 

Nor  intrenchments,  70. 

Allowed  to  keep  his  plans  secret, 
425-  . 

His  view  of  Lincoln's  plan  to 
coop  Lee  up,  103. 

Halleck  made  General-in-Chief,  291. 

Letters  to,  252-253. 

Dispatches  to,  276. 

Halleck's  friendly  letter  to  Mc- 
Clellan,  312. 

Halleck's  visit  to  McClellan,  306- 
309. 

Halleck  and  Pope,  363. 
Half  the  desired  army,  only,  avail 
able,  93. 
Hanover  Court  House,  182. 

Porter's  account,  182-183. 
Harper's    Ferry,    Halleck's    course 
which  lost  it,  366. 

Occupation  of  Maryland  Heights, 
367. 

Halleck  treats  the  suggestion  with 
scorn,  367. 

McClellan  given  authority  too 
late  over  Harper's  Ferry,  368. 

The  capture  by  Jackson,  369-370. 

A  narrow  escape  for  Lee,  370-371. 

Colonel  Douglas,  C.  S.  A.,  com 
mends  McClellan's  advance, 
372. 

Longstreet  saw  Lee's  danger  in 
the  Harper's  Ferry  movement, 

373- 

He  calls  it  a  "fatal  error,"  373. 

Going  out  of  Frederick,  McClel 
lan  was  at  their  heels,  373. 

Jackson  arrives  at  Harper's  Ferry 
September  I3th,  369. 

McClellan  learns  of  the  attack  on 
same  day,  375. 

Issues  order  at  once  to  Franklin 
appealing  to  him  to  use  the  ut 
most  activity  in  reaching  there, 
375-376. 

Franklin's  force  too  small,  must 
wait  for  Couch,  376. 

Had    to   fight   his    way   through, 

377- 

In  sight  on  morning  of  I5th,  377. 
Arrival    12    hours    earlier    would 

not  have  bettered  matters,  377. 
Rebels  hold  Maryland  Heights  in 

stronger  force  than  he  has,  377. 
Message    from,    Harper's    Ferry, 

and  McClellan's  reply,  377-378. 


Harper's   Ferry    (cont.). 
General  Upton  vindicates  McClel 
lan  as  to  Harper's  Ferry,  378. 
Harrison  Landing,  Union  army  ar 
rives,  234. 
Army  leaves,  333. 
Lincoln's  visit,  281. 
Haste   in   advancing   foolish    when 

unready,  68. 
Heintzelman's  error  at  Glendale  or 

Frazier's  Field,  229. 
Heintzelman  and  Sumner  hold  back 

Longstreet  and  A.  P.  Hill,  230. 
Hill,    Gen.    D.    H,    at   White    Oak 

Swamp,  230. 
Hospitality,   McClellan's,    18. 

Illness,     his,     favored     McClellan's 
foes,  81. 

Indian  Summer  of  1861,  66. 
False  argument  from  it,  66. 

Information,   the   Government   Bu 
reau,  33. 

All  departments  relied  upon  it, 
33- 

Invading  army,  by  order  of  March 
8th,    1862,   only  50,000,   111-112. 

Jackson's  raid,  178. 

Swinton  on  the  terror  of  the 
civil  authorities  in  Washington, 

17  I7\179', 
rormby  also,   179. 

Moore  also,  179-180. 

McDowell's  advance  suspended, 
178. 

All  thought  of  it  abandoned,  180. 

Jackson  flies  back  to  Lee,  184. 

Why  notfgwiftly  followed  by  all 
the  Union  forces,  184. 

Headley  on  Stanton's  fright,  184. 

Rebel  forces  united  at  Richmond ; 
Union  forces  scattered  over 
Northern  Virginia,  185. 

Panic  alone  explains  Federal  ac 
tion,  185. 

A  captured  letter  showed  Jack 
son's  object,  108. 

Jackson  shut  out  at  Glendale  by 
McCiellan,  231. 

Takes  Harper's  Ferry,  369-370. 

Shut  out  at  Warrenton  by  Mc 
Clellan,  398. 

James     River     should     have     been 
cleared  early,  169. 

Then  McClellan  could  have 
shipped  troops  directly  to  Har 
rison's  Landing,  169,  170. 

Cleared  at  last,  168. 


448 


INDEX 


James  River   (cont.). 

McClellan  would  have  gone  there 

then  but  for  order  of  May  i8th, 

169,  172. 
McClellan   sees   that   the    storms 

may  set  him  free  to  go  to  the 

James,  199. 
On  June  i8th  he  arranges  to  have 

his  supplies  sent  to  the  James, 

201. 

The  wonderful  march,  219. 
Lee  misled,  219. 
The  Dial  on  the  situation,  219. 
McClellan  going  where  he  wanted 

to  go,  220. 
General    Johnston    saw    that    the 

key   point   was   on   the   James, 

220. 
Johnston's  withdrawal  proves  Mc- 

Clellan's  sagacity,  113. 
Rage  of  Stanton,  113. 
Derision  at  the  dummy  guns,  114. 
Explanation  of  this,  114. 
Eggleston  and  Pollard  bear  testi 
mony,  114. 

Junction    of    McDowell    with    Mc 
Clellan  promised,  172. 
Easy  to  effect  it,  174-175- 
Junction  of  Butler  and  Grant  in 

1864,  175. 

Keyes,  General,  on  the  situation  at 
Fort  Monroe  on  April  7,  1862, 
149. 

Keyes  prays  for  temporary  re 
moval  of  the  army,  283. 

His  insubordinate  letters,  283, 
286. 

Lee  outwitted,  226. 

So  says  Pollard,  226. 

And  Eggleston,  226. 
Letters  :    McClellan  to  Lincoln,  Au 
gust  2,  1861,  37. 

Unfair  use  of  McClellan's,  42. 
Lieutenant  and  Captain,  McClellan 

becomes,  n. 
Lincoln,  The,  of  1861,  44. 

Birth,  44. 

Biography  in  brief,  44. 

His  love  of  speaking,  44. 

Susceptibility,  44-45. 

Marriage,  45. 

Contests  with  Douglas,  45. 

Elected  president,  45. 

His   cabinet,   46. 

His  ideas  of  patronage,  46. 

His  habits,  46. 

His  letters,  46. 

Against  emancipation,  46. 


Lincoln   (cont.). 

For  emancipation,  47. 
influenced  by  cabinet,  47-48. 
A  government  by  department,  48. 
His  fatal  resolution  to  force  army 

out  in  winter,  80. 
Consultations  with  McClelian,  82. 
His  anxiety  when  McClellan  was 

ill,  83. 
Chagrined  when  not  admitted,  83- 

84. 
Has    consultation    with    Franklin 

and  McDowell,  84. 
McClellan's  letter  of  February  3, 

1862,  91. 

Coast  route  urged,  92. 
Lincoln  not  convinced,  but  yields, 

92. 
Lincoln's   weakness   in   the   War 

Department,  93-94. 
Lincoln  as  a  rival  strategist,  102. 
His  plan,  102. 

His  wiser  course  with  Grant,  102. 
Gives  Grant  a  plan,  103. 
Grant's  view  of  it,  103. 
Lincoln,    to   dissuade   McClellan, 

states  rumor  that  Coast  Route 

was   conceived   with  traitorous 

intent,  107,  108. 
Lincoln  and  Stanton  stand  aloof, 

112. 

Lincoln's  letter,  157. 
His    cordial    letter    of    May    24, 

1862,  179. 

Suspends  McDowell's  march,  178. 
Irritating  dispatch,  urging  attack 

on  Richmond,   179. 
Wolseley,  on  Stanton,  180. 
Moore,  on  the  situation,  180. 
Swinton  also,  180. 
Visits  the  army,  262,  281,  292. 
Receives  McClellan's  famous  let 
ter  of  July  7th,  1862,  262. 
The  origin  of  emancipation,  265- 

266. 
Lincoln's   political   methods,  294, 

295- 
A    nagging   letter   to    McClellan, 

301- 

Attitude  while  McClellan  is  at 
Alexandria,  340. 

Says  McClellan  is  "gnawing  a 
file,"  340. 

The  President  in  a  bad  light,  346. 

McClellan  "being  snubbed"  at 
Alexandria,  says  Lincoln,  357. 

Later  hostility  to  McClellan,  364. 

Intended  to  sacrifice  him,  364. 

Disavows  giving  McClellan  com 
mand  of  the  campaign,  364-365. 


INDEX 


449 


Lincoln    (cont.). 

Halleck  forced  to  father  the  atro 
city,  365. 

The  venomous  intent  of  McClel- 
lan's  political  foes,  365. 

Lincoln  visits  McClellan,  395,  396. 

Very  affable,  396. 

Promises  repeatedly  to  stand  by 
McClellan,  396. 

Instant  change  of  tone  when  he 
reaches  Washington,  396. 

Sends  a  goading  letter  through 
Stanton,  396-397. 

Lincoln's  misplaced  irony,  398. 

A  caustic,  undignified  and  foolish 
letter  to  McClellan,  398. 

The  spirited  and  manly  response, 
398. 

Resolves  to  remove  McClellan ; 
ridiculous  reasons,  401. 

In  despair  of  re-election,  441. 

Sheridan's     opportune     victories 

save  the  Administration,  441. 
Longstreet's  blunders  at  Fair  Oaks, 

190-191-193. 

Lost   Order,   Lee's,    found   by   Mc 
Clellan,  373. 

Not  a  benefit  to  McClellan,  379. 

Misled  McClellan  and  saved  Lee, 
379- 

General  D.  H.  Hill  explains  how, 
379-38i. 

Longstreet  thinks  Lee  should 
have  retired  after  South  Moun 
tain  ;  that  the  invasion  was 
foiled,  383. 

McClellan's  ancestry,  9. 

His  father,  10. 

His  birth,  10. 

School  days,  10. 

West  Point,  10. 

Michie's,  General,  strange  state 
ment,  10. 

Admitted  under  age,  10.- 

Graduates   second  in  rank,    10. 

In  the  Mexican  War,  11. 

Warm  praise,  n. 

A  captain,  n. 

Professor  at  West  Point,  11-12. 

Linguistic  studies  and  literary 
work,  12. 

At  Fort  Delaware,  13. 

Red    River  expedition,    13. 

In  Texas.  13. 

Explorations  for  Pacific  Rail 
ways,  13. 

Praised  by  Governor  Stevens  and 
Secretary  Davis,  14. 

Captain  of  cavalry,  15. 


McClellan    (cont). 

In  the  Crimea,  16. 

His  reports,  17. 

Civil  engineer,  18. 

Aids  Burnside,  18-19. 

His  marriage,  19. 

Railway  president,  19. 

Secession,  21. 

Call  to  arms,  23. 

Many  offers,  23. 

Commander  of  Ohio  troops,  23. 

The  West  Virginia  campaign,  24. 

High  praise,  24. 

In  command  at  Washington,  24. 

General-in-Chief,  25. 

The  railway  keeps  his  plan  open, 
27. 

Organizing  an  army,  28. 

McClellan's  capacity,  29. 

The  highest  credit  given,  30. 

Robust  physique,  31. 

McClellan  on  the  Northern  sol 
dier,  36. 

Typhoid  fever,  32. 

McClellan's  character,  40. 

Averse  to  politics,  41. 

His  piety,  42. 

Meets  Stanton,  55. 

Stanton  courts  him,  57. 

Administration  slow  in  gathering 
troops,  64. 

McClellan  eager,  64. 

His  diligence,  69. 

His  letter  of  August  2,  1861,  71. 

Letter  of  November,  1861,  72. 

Lincoln's  memorandum,  79, 

A  new  plan  of  campaign,  80. 

His  heavy  labors,  82. 

McClellan  and  Lincoln,  82. 

His  illness,  83. 

Convalescent,  86. 

Pressed  to  reveal  his  plan,  87. 

Resists,  87. 

Necessity  for  secrecy,  87. 

Reveals  his  plan,  91. 

McClellan  in  effect  despoiled  of 
command  by  first  war  orders, 

92-93- 

McClellan  avoided  by  Lincoln  and 
Stanton,  112. 

The  Coast  Route,  the  best  route, 
96. 

Stanton  changes,  105. 

The  plan  submitted  to  the  gener 
als,  108. 

The  result,  no. 

Adverse  corps  commanders  ap 
pointed,  in. 

Secret  opposition  of  Stanton,  116, 

Despoiled  of  power,  116. 


450 


INDEX 


McClellan  (cent). 

An  absurd  reason  given,  118. 

Office  closed  up  and  papers  ap 
propriated  in  his  absence,  119. 

The  expedition  starts  for  Fort 
Monroe,  120. 

Letter  of   March  I4th,   122. 

Urges  naval  aid,  123,  124. 

Lack  of  it,  127. 

Blenker  withdrawn,  128. 

Fort  Monroe  withdrawn,   128. 

McDowell  withdrawn,  129. 

Enlistments  stopped,  129. 

Washington  amply  protected,  133. 

Stanton's  pretext,  134. 

Its  obvious  falsity,  135. 

McClellan's  handicaps,  141. 

The  unfordable  Warwick,  143. 

The  opposing  forces,  145. 

Keyes'  letter,  149. 

Exasperating  treatment,  154. 

Yorktown  evacuated,  164. 

Williamstown,  170. 

Stanton's  fatal  order,  172. 

Straddling  the  Chickahominy,  173. 

Waiting  for  McDowell,  175. 

McClellan  clears  the  way,  182. 

Fair  Oaks,  187. 

Ready  to  strike,  193. 

Oak  Grove,  203. 

Beaver  Dam,  210. 

Gaines's  Mill,  215. 

Prepares  to  go  to  the  James,  220. 

McClellan's  indignant  letter  to 
Stanton,  222. 

Allen's  Field,  228. 

Savage  Station,  229. 

Glendale,  or  Frazier's  Field,  229. 

McClellan's  Handicaps. 

The  Peninsula  a  mire,  and  rain 
still  coming,  126. 

Indispensable  naval  co-operation 
withheld,  126,  127. 

Indispensable  co-operation  of  all 
U.  S.  forces  destroyed  by  re 
lieving  him  of  supreme  com 
mand,  126. 

McClellan's  diligent  efforts  to  se 
cure  naval  aid,  127. 

Withdrawal  of  Blenker's  10,000 
men,  128. 

Withdrawal  of  Fort  Monroe  and 
10,000  more,  128. 

Recruiting  offices  discontinued, 
128. 

But  kept  diligently  at  work  to  aid 
General  Grant  later,  128. 

Headley  on  this  situation,  129. 

A  third  of  his  army  next  cut  off, 
129,  130- 


McClellan   (cont). 

Though  ample  forces  in  Northern 
Virginia,  130. 

Retention  of  McDowell's  corps 
condemned:  By  Headley,  130. 

By  Swinton,  131. 

Retention  unnecessary,  133. 

Ample  forces  about  Washington, 
133- 

McClellan's  obstacles  restated, 
141. 

Promise  that  McDowell  would 
join  him  later  overland,  143. 

Charged  with  habitually  overesti 
mating  Rebel  forces,  147. 

Never  estimated;  relied  on  offi 
cial  reports ;  so  did  Stanton  and 
Lincoln,  147. 

General  Webb  admits  McClellan 
was  bound  to  do  so,  148. 

Pinkerton  defends  their  accu 
racy,  147-148. 

McClellan  on  the  situation  at 
Fort  Monroe,  154. 

Writes  to  Stanton  on  April  2oth, 
160. 

McClellan  assured  that  McDow 
ell  is  coming,  179. 

McDowell's  advance  suspended, 
178. 

And  abandoned,  180. 

McClellan's  sure  success  if  Mc 
Dowell  had  joined  him,  179-180. 

Moore's  opinion,  179,  180. 

McClellan  again  told  May  26th 
that  McDowell  is  coming,  182. 

Sends  Porter  to  clear  the  way, 
182. 

Which  Porter  accomplishes,  182- 
183. 

McClellan's  disheartening  situa 
tion  resulting  from  the  boggy 
soil,  wet  weather,  and  McDow 
ell's  failure  to  arrive,  185. 

McClellan's  intent  to  strike  when 
the  rain  ceased,  regardless  of 
McDowell,  193. 

Could  not  attack  if  McDowell 
there  while  it  rained,  193-194. 

McDowell  should  have  been  sent 
by  water,  194. 

Mr.   Ellis  on  the  situation,   194- 

McClellan  on  June  4th  urges  re 
inforcements,  109. 

McDowell  to  start  June  26th; 
why  didn't  he?  209. 

Never  explained,  209. 

McGellan's  straddling  position 
awaiting  McDowell  drew  on  the 
week  of  battle,  224. 


INDEX 


451 


McClellan    (cont.). 

McClellan's    indignant    letter    to 

Stanton,  222. 
Charges  the  Government  with  not 

sustaining  the  army,  222. 
The  letter  discussed,  223. 
The    wiser    course,    a    suggested 

despatch,  224-225. 
McClellan  outwits  Lee,  226. 
His     wonderful     supervision     of 

everything,  228. 

His  brilliant  generalship  at  Glen- 
dale,  231. 
Discussion  of  seven  days'  battle, 

Eggleston's  tribute,  235. 
Swinton's    warm    commendation, 

231.  .  . 
His  military  sagacity  at  Frazier's 

Farm,  242-243. 
Comte  de  Paris  praises  the  march 

to  the  James,  243. 
Wolseley  also,  243. 
Porter  also,  244. 
List  of  others,  244. 
Moore,  Eggleston,  General  Whit 
ing,    General    Imboden.    agree 

that    if    McDowell    had    come 

McClellan    would    have    taken 

Richmond,  245. 
His     diplomacy    to    get    to    the 

James,  246. 

McClellan,  letter  to,  254. 
His  famous  letter  to  Lincoln,  262. 
Invited  by  Lincoln,  261. 
The  origin  of  emancipation,  265- 

266. 

Pollard's  praise  of  it,  262. 
McClellan  on  the   exhaustion  .of 

the  soldiers,  268. 
Praise  and  promises  of  aii'from 

the  President  and  Stanjfc,  271, 

272.  M 

Steps  to  reinforce,  276^ 
Change   of   heart   ea^y   in   July, 

282.  W 

Halleck's      visit      iw     Harrison's 

landing,  308. 
His  account  of  it  and   Swinton's 

refutation  of  his  views,  308,  309. 
McClellan  appeals  to  Halleck  for 

troops,  309-310. 
Stanton  and  Chase  advise  Lincoln 

to  remove  McClellan,  310,  311. 
Halleck's  letter,  312. 
The  reply.  313-315. 
McClellan  appeals  to  Halleck,  316. 
The  curt  reply,  316. 
McClellan  loses  faith.  316. 
Misled  by  Halleck,  317. 
Halleck's  alluring  letter,  317,  318. 


lYcClellan    (cont.). 

Promised  command  of  the  United 

Armies,  318. 
Halleck  had  promised  this  on  his 

visit  to  Harrison's  landing,  318. 
Gives  the  pretended  reasons  for 

removal,  318. 
Promise  of  command  a  bait  only, 

319- 
McClellan    should   have    resisted, 

320. 

The  sure  result  if  he  did,  321-323. 
The  order  of  removal,  322-323. 
McClellan's  eloquent  protest,  323, 

,,324; 

Convincing  reasons  against  re 
moval,  323-324- 

General  Upton's  strong  condem 
nation,  334. 

McClellan  seeks  his  promised 
command,  335-336. 

Met  with  evasion,  335-336. 

Robbed  of  his  army,  336-337. 

Pope's  campaign,  337-339. 

McClellan's   agony,  339-341. 

The  nation  deprived  of  his  ser 
vices,  340. 

Mr.  Lincoln  said  McClellan  was 
"gnawing  a  file,"  340. 

And  yet  charged  with  aiding  in 
Pope's  defeat,  341. 

General  Upton's  unbiased  explan 
ation  of  the  attitude  towards 
McClellan,  241-342. 

A  galling  and  despicable  course 
pursued  toward  him,  341-342. 

McClellan  still  seeking  to  have 
his  position  defined.  343. 

Undignified  attitude  of  the  Gov 
ernment,  343. 

Put  in  command  of  Washington, 
343- 

Rumors  of  Pope's  defeat,  343. 

Urges  Halleck  to  go  and  investi 
gate — Col.  Kelton  sent,  343. 

Stanton  still  hopes  for  Pope's 
success,  343-344- 

If  Pope  was  victorious  McClellan 
to  be  dismissed  at  once,  344. 

Stanton's  conspiracy  to  oust  him, 

344-345- 

Welles  opposes  it,  345. 

The  plot  foiled.  345. 

Kelton's  report  of  defeat — Stan- 
ton  destroys  all  evidence  of  his 
conspiracy,  345. 

Influence  of  Pope's  defeat  on 
McClellan's  situation,  345. 

A  triumph  for  McClellan.  345. 


452 


INDEX 


McClellan    (cont). 

Stanton's    fearful   rage   at   being 

thwarted,  345. 
His  panic — Gets  ready  to  fly  from 

^Washington,  345-346. 
Lincoln    collapses — An    unsavory 

story,  346. 
Lincoln     appeals     to     McClellan, 

347- 

McClellan  should  have  imposed 
conditions,  347-350. 

General  Upton  surprised  that  he 
did  not,  350. 

The  rage  of  McClellan's  foes  at 
his  reinstatement,  351-353. 

McClellan  meets  the  army,  354- 
356. 

An  unparalleled  ovation,  354-356. 

The  idol  of  the  army,  354-356. 

Responsibility  for  keeping  such  a 
man  inactive  at  Alexandria, 
356. 

He  was  being  snubbed,  explains 
Lincoln,  357. 

For  splendid  services,  357. 

Effect  of  his  reinstatement,  357- 
358. 

Why  Lee  did  not  attack  Wash 
ington  after  Bull  Run  No.  2, 
358. 

The  pursuit  of  Lee,  360-361. 

A  call  upon  Stanton,  360. 

The  army  starts,  361. 

A  general  without  orders,  361. 

Ungrateful  attitude  towards  Mc 
Clellan,  361. 

McClellan  gets  Lee's  famous  lost 
order,  373. 

The  order,  373-374- 

A  misleading  order,  375. 

It  informs  McClellan  of  attack  on 
Harper's  Ferry,  375. 

Sends  very  urgent  letter  to 
Franklin,  375-376. 

An  appeal  for  the  utmost  activ 
ity,  376. 

Franklin's  own  force  too  small; 
he  must  wait  for  Couch,  376. 

Messa.fr*1  from  Harper's  Ferry, — 
McClellan's  reply,  377-378. 

General  Upton's  fine  vindication 
of  McClellan,  378. 

South   Mountain,  379. 

Burn  side's  defection,  380-382. 

Antietam,  383-392, 

Burnside' s  incapacity,  385-389. 

McClellan  is  visited  by  Lincoln 
who  is  affable  and  promises  re 
peatedly  to  stand  by  the  Gen 
eral,  395-396. 


McClellan    (cont.). 

Lincoln  changes  swiftly — a  goad 
ing  letter,  396-397- 

Condition  of  supplies  —  many 
without  shoes,  397. 

McClellan's  swift  advance  to 
Warrenton,  399. 

Closes  the  mountain  gaps,  shut 
ting  off  aid  from  Jackson,  398. 

Facing  Lee  six  miles  away,  with 
three  to  one,  400. 

Every  prospect  of  victory — Lee 
bewildered,  400. 

An  idiotic  argument — division  of 
Rebels  a  reason  for  removal, 
401. 

Puerility  of  the  President,  401. 

Strange  stories  of  him,  401. 

Burnside  to  be  rewarded  for  in 
capacity  and  unreliability,  401. 

A  secret  order  to  that  effect,  401. 

Delayed  because  of  approaching 
elections,  402. 

Then  made  public  instantly,  402. 

The  emissary  from  Washington, 
402. 

Goes  to  Burnside  first,  402. 

They  go  to  McClellan,  402. 

The  orders  of  removal,  402-403. 

McClellan  relegated  to  private 
life,  402-403. 

General  Porter  is  also  dismissed, 

403. 

Depriving  the  Union  of  a  highly 
useful  officer,  404. 

This  reveals  that  the  motive  was 
political,  not  military,  404. 

Should  he  have  resisted  ? — Rea 
sons  favoring  resistance  for 
national  good,  405. 

Insubordination  sometimes  a  su 
preme  duty,  405-406. 

What  a  Cromwell  or  Napoleon 
would  have  done,  406. 

Trie  manner  of  removal  shows  a 
malign  motive,  407. 

The  removal  is  strongly  censured 
by  Colonel  Powell,  408. 

The  farewell,  409-410. 

Fear  of  too  speedy  nn  end  of  the 
rebellion,  410. 

This  must  be  prevented  by  Mc 
Clellan's  removal,  410. 

Mr.  Flson  approves  of  this  mo 
tive,  410. 

Bnrnside  withdraws  the  army, 
411. 

No  other  Generals  sent  home 
when  relieved  except  McClellan 
and  Porter,  412. 


INDEX 


453 


McClellan   (cont.). 

Extensive  bibliography  of  his 
campaigns,  416,  417. 

McClellan  justly  called  a  great 
commander,  416-435. 

Von  Motke's  tribute,  419. 

General  Lee's  tribute,  419. 

General  Hill  and  other  Confed 
erate  officers,  420. 

Jefferson  Davis,  420. 

General  Dodge,  420-421. 

Tributes  of  his  officers, — Porter, 
Franklin,  McMahon  and  others, 
421. 

Lee's  indirect  tribute  at  Antietam, 
421. 

Lee  and  McClellan — their  cour 
age,  capacity  and  mutual  re 
spect,  421. 

"A  day  off"  near  White  House, 
422. 

McClellan  sends  hospital  supplies 
to  Richmond,  422. 

McClellan's  Virginia  campaigns 
compared  with  General  Grant's, 
423-42^. 

Cordial  co-operation  of  the  Gov 
ernment  with  General  Grant, 

423- 

Allowed  to  retain  supreme  com 
mand  of  all  armies  though  he 
had  taken  the  field,  423. 

Enlisting  offices  kept  open,  424. 

Reinforcements  supplied  without 
stint,  424. 

General  Grant  allowed  to  start 
when  he  pleased,  424. 

And  pursue  his  own  plans  and 
lines  of  action,  425. 

Lincoln  said  to  Grant,  "I  do  not 
wish  to  know  your  plans, 

425. 
The  result  of   Grant's   campaign 

an    awful    slaughter    of    Union 

troops,  425. 
The   war  in  danger  of  collapse, 

and    Washington    of     capture, 

426. 
Comparison  of  battles  and  of  the 

condition    of    the    army    under 

McClellan  and  under  Grant,  426. 
Comparison    of     McClellan    and 

Lee,  427. 
Comparison    of     McClellan    and 

Jackson,  427. 
Comparison     of     Antietam    with 

Gettysburg,  427-429. 
McClellan's  executive  and  admin 
istrative  ability,  430. 
His  aggressiveness,  430-432. 


McClellan    (cont). 

His  prudence,  432. 

His  sagacity  and  foresight,  433. 

His  unparalleled  skill  with  artil 
lery,  433. 

His  celerity  of  movement  under 
great  handicaps,  434-435. 

General  Upton's  splendid  defence, 

435- 

Though  prepared  as  a  govern 
ment  document,  435. 

The  actual  delays  were  always  the 
Government's  delays,  not  Mc 
Clellan's,  430. 

General  Upton  charges  the  penin 
sular  delays  on  the  administra 
tion,  435. 

And  attributes  the  administra 
tion's  attitude  solely  to  politics, 

439- 

McClellan  in  retirement,  440. 
A  candidate  for   the  presidency, 

440-441. 
Likely  to  be  elected — Lincoln  in 

despair,  441. 

Sheridan's  victories  save  the  ad 
ministration,  441. 
McClellan's  residence  abroad,  441. 
Honored  on  his  return  by  a  great 

parade,  441. 

Governor  of  New  Jersey,  441. 
His  remaining  life,  441. 
His    memoirs    once    written    and 

consumed,  441. 
Never  again  completed,  441. 
McClellan's    own    story    only    a 

very    incomplete    collection    of 

material,  442. 

His  death  and  obsequies,  442. 
McDowell    and    Franklin,    Lincoln 

consults,  83. 

McDowell  to  join  McClellan,  172. 
To    command    his    troops    after 

junction,   173. 
Eager   to    join   and   could   easily 

have  joined  McClellan,  174-175. 
Stanton's  duty  to  secure  this  by 

the  time  Franklin  reached  West 

Point,  I74-I75. 
McDowell's    corps    no    protection 

if   Lee   wished   to   advance   on 

Washington,   175. 
Malvern  Hill,  232. 
Lee's  great  army,  237,  238. 
The  lost  McClellan,  246. 
Malvern  Hill  described,  232,  233. 
Selected  by  McClellan  many  days 

before,  232. 

Porter  occupies  and  holds  it,  233. 
Disposition  of  .troops,  233. 


454 


INDEX 


Malvern  Hill    (cont.). 
General     D.     H.     Hill     advises 

against  attack,  233. 
Longstreet  urges  it,  233. 
Yet  Hill  makes  it,  234. 
The  battle,  234. 

Manassas,  McClellan  intends  to  at 
tack,  76. 
So  states  in  letter  of  November, 

1861,  76. 
Michie    on    Stanton's    hostility    to 

McClellan,  86. 

Michie,  General,  his  amazing  biog 
raphy  discussed,  438. 
Military  System  of  U.  S.  weak,  77. 
Military  Commander  has  no  part 

in  collecting  troops,  77. 
Ineffective  action  of  Stanton,  77- 
78. 

National  News  Agent,  100. 

Naval       Co-operation       repeatedly 

urged  by  McClellan,  123-124. 
Navy  derelict  in  not  clearing  James 

and  York  Rivers,  166. 
Stanton  to  blame,  166. 
The  Monitor  and  the  Merrimac, 

166. 
What  would  have  been  result  of 

early  naval  action,  167. 
Navy  clears  the  James,  168. 
Navy     co-operates     at     Malvern 

Hill,  232. 

Norfolk,  Attack  on,  urged  by  Bar 
nard,   165. 
Abandoned,  168. 

Occupation  by  Lincoln  and  Stan- 
ton,  1 68. 

North  unprepared  for  war,  28. 
Necessity  of  defences  and  organ 
ization,  33. 

Oak  Grove,  June  25th,  203. 
Only    5    miles    now    from    Rich 
mond,  203. 

About  to  strike,  203. 
Office,    McClellan's,    seized    in    ab 
sence,  and  papers  taken,  119. 
Orders   issued  by  Lincoln   without 
consulting    McClellan,    89,    90, 
no. 

Orders   of    War  Department   were 
at    first    to    move    only    50,000 
men,  119. 
Order,  Stanton's  fatal,  of  May  i8th, 

172. 

Never  revoked,  173. 
Its  malign  results,  173. 
Order,  Lee's,  Lost,  373. 

Misleads  McClellan,  375. 
Orders  of  Removal,  402,  403. 


Organization  and  preparation,  need 

of,  33- 
Overland      Route      favored      from 

timidity,  139-140. 
Condemned    by    General    Grant's 

experience,  97-98.     And  by  all 

authors,  see  Coast  Route. 

Pacific    Railways,    exploration    for, 

13- 

Palfrey  on  the  Southern  soldier,  35. 
Paris,  Comte  de,  describes  McClel 
lan,  24-25. 

Pepper  Box  Policy,  37,  38,  133. 
Persuasions  of  Stanton,  112. 
Pinkerton's   Secret  Service  Bureau 

of  Information,  33,  147. 
Government  relied  on  it,  33,  147. 
Plan  of  Campaign,  Lincoln's,  79. 
Army  to  be  forced  out  in  middle 

of  winter,  79. 
McClellan   resists,   and   intimates 

that  he  has  a  new  plan,  80. 
First  mentioned  October  6,  1861, 

80. 

Submitted,  91,  108. 
Letter  of  February  3rd,  80. 
Plan  of  the  Administration,  93. 
Born  of  fear,  93. 
Plan,  change  of,  necessary,  120. 
Policy,  Swinton  on  the  Pepper  Box 

Policy,  133-134. 
Confederates'  concentrated  forces, 

134. 
Panic  caused  by  Jackson's   raid, 

184-185. 

Peninsula,  up  the,  166. 
Policy  of  Stanton,  197. 
Political  Considerations  appear,  74. 
Political    propensities,    McClellan 

had  no,  41. 
Pope    suggests    retirement    toward 

York  River,  247. 
His  savage  orders,  and  Lincoln's 

attitude,  318,  319. 
His  plans  after  Bull  Run  No.  2, 

353- 

End  of  his  career,  363. 
Porter   at   Hanover    Court    House, 

182. 

At  Beaver  Dam,  210. 
At  Gaines's  Mill,  215. 
At  Malvern  Hill,  231,  232. 
Dismissed    with    McClellan,    402, 

403. 

Preparation  and  organization,  need 
of,  33- 

Radicals  urge  an  advance  about  De 
cember  i,  1861,  43. 


INDEX 


455 


Railway  Engineer;  and  Vice  Pres 
ident,  18. 
Railway    employees    attached    to 

him,  18. 

Railway  President,  19. 
Railway  holds  his  place  open,  27. 
Rain  would  have  stayed  operations 
even   if   McDowell   had   come, 

193- 

Incessant    deluge    of    November, 

1861,  to  July  2,  1862,  31. 
Raymond  says  Lincoln  was  not  con 
vinced   that   Coast   Route   was 
best,  92. 

Reinforcement,     the     wisdom     of, 

Porter's  opinion,  195. 
Letters  flow  in  urging  it,  195. 
Reinforcements,  ample  forces  in 

Northern     Virginia     in     June, 

1862,  to  send  to  McClellan,  207. 
General    Imboden    asserts    there 

were  90,000,  207. 

The  Editors  of  Battles  and  Lead 
ers  say  about  80,000,  208. 

Besides  Burnside's  troops  and 
those  at  Washington,  208. 

President  says  he  gives  all  he 
can,  247. 

Imaginary  inability,  247. 

Resume  of  the  June  situation,  and 
of  the  paltry  reinforcements 
sent,  208. 

Richmond,   exchanging   for  Wash 
ington,  94. 

Rebels  retire  from  Peninsula,  168. 

Also  from  Norfolk,  168. 

Occupation  of  Norfolk,  168. 

The  intended  attack,  202. 

McClellan  only  5  miles  off  with  an 
intact  and  powerful  army,  204. 

No  other  Union  commander  so 
near  until  it  was  abandoned, 
204. 

Could  not  be  wisely  attacked,  255, 
256. 

The  weather  too  adverse,  255. 

Strong  force  between  Union 
army  and  Richmond,  255,  256. 

Johnston's  evidence  against  feasi 
bility  of  attack,  256. 

McClellan's  argument,  256. 

Paris  against  the  attack,  256. 

Eggleston,  Pollard  and  Davis 
show  no  opportunity,  257. 

General  Franklin,  General  Averill 
and  the  historian,  Mr.  Rhodes, 
against  it,  257. 

The  Pinkerton  bureau  report 
showed  great  intervening  force 
of  Rebels,  258. 


Richmond  exchanging  (cont.). 
Mr.     Moore     and     Mr.     Tenney 

against  attack,  258. 
General   Porter  and  Col.  Powell 

condemn  the  idea,  259,  260. 
Richmond  in  danger,  325-326. 
Richmond  Examiner  on  the  South 
ern  Soldier,  36. 

Reputation  very  high  in  1861,  43. 
Ropes  praises  McClellan's  organiza 
tion  of  the  army,  29. 
Russell  on  the  Southern  Soldier, 
36. 


San  Domingo,  McClellan's  mission 

to,   14. 

School  Days,  McClellan's,  10. 
Scott  and  the  Cabinet  praise  West 

Virginia  campaign,  24. 
Swinton  also,  24. 
Secession,  21. 

Federal  property  seized,  21. 
Sumter,  Fort,  21. 

Secrecy,  need  of  in  Washington,  34. 

Need  of,  Wolseley,  Powell,  Wood 

and     Edmunds,     Formby     and 

Dodge,  87. 

Seven  days  of  battle,  discussion  of, 

235- 

Eggleston's  splendid  tribute  to 
McClellan,  236. 

Surprise  of  the  enemy — Union 
men  so  different,  235-236. 

Strength  of  Lee's  army — Baseless 
errors,  236. 

Much  Stronger  than  McClellan's, 
237-238. 

"Gathering  of  the  clans,"  238. 

General  Johnston  makes  Lee's 
strength,  126,  129,  238. 

Comparative  strength  by  regi 
ments,  239. 

General  Dix's  message  on  the 
concentration  of  the  Confed 
erates,  239. 

Lee's  forces  all  available,  20,000 
of  McClellan's  needed  to  guard 
trains  and  supplies,  239. 

Comparative  strength  at  Freder- 
icksburg  and  Chancellorsville, 

239. 

Comparative  strength  of  Grant 
and  Lee,  239-240. 

The  seven  days'  struggle — com 
mendation  of  by  Col.  Powell, 
241. 

By  General  D.  H.  Hill,  241. 

Lee's  disappointment  at  Glendale, 
241-242. 


456 


INDEX 


Shenandoah,  McClellan  wishes  to 
occupy,  24. 

Sheridan's  victories  save  the  Ad 
ministration,  441. 

Size  of  the  Virginian  army,  34,  115, 
145-146,  236-238. 

Slavery  and  the  result  of  it,  19-20. 
Abolition  without  compensation, 
19-20. 

Snow,  November  25,  1861,  31. 

Soldiers,  of  the  South  and  North, 

34- 

South,  strength  of  in  1861-1862,  34. 
Readier  for  war,  33. 
Enthusiasm  of,  34. 
South  Mountain,  Battle  of,  379. 
General  Cox  deluded  by  a  trifling 

force,  380-381. 
This  allows  arrival  of  Longstreet, 

381. 
The  failure  of  General  Cox  saves 

Lee,  381. 
The   Dial's  praise   of  the  battle, 

381,  382. 
Burnside's    lethargy    in    pursuit, 

382. 

Stanton's  inefficiency  in  forward 
ing    supplies    after    Antietam, 

395- 
Southern  forces  transfer   of,   East 

and  West,  34-35- 
Stantpn,  character  of,  50. 

Object  of  hatred,  50-51. 

Thorpe  on  Stanton,  50-51. 

Biography,  51. 

Fame  at  the  bar,  51. 

Attorney  General,  51. 

His  machinations  begin,  52. 

His  letters  against  Lincoln's  ad 
ministration,  52. 

Stanton  and  Sumner,  52. 

Courts  McClellan,  55. 

Bitter  criticism  of  Lincoln,  55. 

His    first   meeting   with   Lincoln, 
55-56. 

Pretends  friendship  for  McClel 
lan,  57. 

His  good  will,  57. 

Adverse  testimony  of  friends,  57. 

Dawes  on  Stanton,  57. 

Rhodes  on  Stanton,  58. 

Grant  on  Stanton,  58-59. 

Ropes  on  Stanton,  59. 

Welles  on  Stanton,  60-61. 

Flower  on  Stanton,  61-62. 

New  York  Times  on  Stanton,  63. 

Stanton  admits  his  duty  to  supply 
troops,  65. 


Stanton   (cont). 

Stanton's  inefficiency  in  collecting 
troops,  77-78. 

Stanton  becomes  Secretary  of 
War,  81. 

Seward  and  Chase  maneuver  for 
Stanton's  appointment,  84-85.  ^ 

Stanton  plots  to  end  Cameron's 
office,  85. 

Hostility  to  McClellan,  Why?  85- 
86. 

Concealment  of  plan,  meant  oppo 
sition,  86, 

Always  inimical,  86. 

Michie's   statement,  86. 

His  love  of  power,  88. 

His  plan  to  get  supreme  military 
power,  88. 

Urges  President  to  assert  author 
ity  as  Commander  in  Chief,  88- 
89. 

Why  Stanton  wanted  the  Poto 
mac  cleared,  88-89. 

His  underground  methods,  89. 

How  he  tried  to  fasten  McClellan 
to  the  overland  route,  99. 

His  amazing  duplicity,  104-105. 

He  fears  the  army,   117. 

A  man  who  had  no  politics,  117. 

Intended  first  to  give  McClelian 
only  50,000  men,  119-120. 

Sad   setting  forth   of   McClellan, 

I2O-I2I. 

Contrast    with    Grant's     starting 

out,  121. 
Stanton  calls  for  a  report  on  the 

status  of  the  army,  122. 
McClellan  presents  it  on  i9th  of 

March,   122. 

Urges  naval  co-operation,.  123. 
Stanton's  fatal  order,   172. 
Promises     that     McDowell     will 

join  McClellan  later,  172. 
Straddling  of  the  Chickahominy 

thus  enforced,  172. 
Stanton's  timidity,  176. 
How  Lee  operated  upon  it,  176. 
The    "Pepper    Box    Policy"    aids 

him,  176. 
Sheridan's     campaigns,     contrast 

with,  176. 
McDowell  detained  by  misplaced 

piety,  177- 

Success  not  desired,  198-199. 
Pollard  on  this  attitude,  198. 
Elson  approves  it,  198. 
McClellan's  own  view,  199. 
One    good    to    come    from    the 

storms,  199. 


INDEX 


457 


Stanton   (cont). 

Stanton,  with  every  reason  to  ex 
pect  disaster,  circulates  the  re 
port  that  Richmond's  capture  is 
near — a  crafty  plot,  205. 

Comte  de  Paris  denounces  it, 
205-206. 

Stanton  conceals  news,  206. 

Receives  a  spirited  remonstrance 
from  McClellan,  206. 

His  enmity — fresh  proofs,  221. 

He  concentrated  army  in  North 
ern  Virginia — but  under  Pope, 
not  McClellan,  221. 

Stanton — McClellan's  indignant 
letter  to,  222. 

Wells  on  Stanton's  hostility;  be 
gan  when  he  took  his  office,  226. 

Letters  to  Seward,  248,  249,  250, 

251. 
Friendly     letters     to     McClellan, 

273- 

The  warm  response,  274. 

Stanton's  new  plan,  a  nominal 
commander;  Halleck  selected, 
291,  292. 

Stanton  still  hoping,  when  Pope 
was  already  routed,  343-344. 

His  plan  was  to  dismiss  McClel 
lan  at  the  instant  of  Pope's  vic 
tory,  344. 

Stanton's  conspiracy  to  oust  him, 

344-345- 

The  plot  foiled — Stanton  destroys 
the  evidence,  345. 

Pope's  defeat  returns  McClellan 
to  power,  345. 

Stanton's  fearful  rage,  345. 

His  panic — prepares  for  flight, 
345-346. 

He  embraces  McClellan,  360. 
Stevens,  Governor,  praises  McClel 
lan,  14. 

Struggle  to  remain  on  the  James, 
297. 

Commodore  Wilkes'  spirited  let 
ter,  297-300. 

No  cabinet  discussion,  300. 

Secretary  Welles  strongly  con 
demns  the  bringing  back  of  the 
army,  390. 

The  object  was  to  get  rid  of  Mc 
Clellan,  300. 
Summer.  Indian,  of  1861,  66. 

Simultaneous    movements    every 
where   in   spring  of    1862,   Mc 
Clellan  desired,  81. 
Swinton  praises  McClellan's  organ 
ization  of  the  army,  30. 


Telegraph,  McClellan's,  at  Gaines's 

Mill,    211-212. 

Transports  to  convey  army  ordered 

on  February  27,    1862,  92,    119. 
But  only  for  50,000  men,  120. 
Troops,     embarkation     of,     begins 

March  I7th,  ends  April  5th,  120. 
McClellan  starts  April  ist,  120. 
156,000  men  the  expected  force. 

124. 
Only    about    45,000    men    landed 

when  McClellan  arrived  at  Fort 

Monroe,  124. 
Gathering    of    Southern    troops, 

102. 

Upton,  General  Emory,  at  request 
of  the  Senate,  prepares  a  work 
on  the  military  policy  of  the 
United  States,  435. 

Begins  it  with  a  strong  prejudice 
in  favor  of  Stanton,  435. 

Becomes  a  warm  champion  of 
McClellan,  334,  350,  378,  439. 

Virginia's  right  to  secede,  21. 
Virginian  Armies,  34,  115,  145-146, 
236-238. 

Walker  on  the  Administration  and 

its  elements,   106. 

Warwick  River  unfordable,  errone 
ous  maps,  a  formidable  barrier, 
143- 

Barnard  so  states,  144. 

Yorktown  impregnable,  144. 

Ellis  and  Headley  on  the  obsta 
cles  to  an  advance,  144. 

The  forces  defending  the  War 
wick,  145. 

Some  put  them  as  low  as  5,000, 

147- 

The  absurdity  of  this,  147. 

Warwick,  Grant  and  the,  wild 
conjectures  that  it  could  not 
stay  his  course,  148. 

Williamsburg,  battle  of,  170. 

A  conflict  against  orders,  170. 

White  House  reached,  171. 
\Var  Orders,  the  first,  in  effect  re 
lieved    McClellan    of    supreme 
command,  92-93. 
Washington,  McClellan  at,  15. 

McClellan  called  to,  24. 

An  unfortified  city,  28. 

Washington  a  Southern  city,  34. 

News  leaked  out,  34. 

Made  so  strong  by  McClellan  that 
it  was  never  attacked,  133. 


458 


INDEX 


Washington  City   (cont,). 

No  excuse  for  retaining  McDow 
ell  to  defend  it,  133. 

A  false  pretense,  135  et  seq. 

None  of  McDowell's  corps  added 
to  garrison,  134-135. 

Stanton's  surprise  a  pretense,  135, 
146. 

All  records  in  his  office,  136. 

Makes  up  a  statement,  136. 

Knew  how  many  were  to  go ;  pro 
vided  transportation  for  them, 

137. 

Real  cause  of  retention,  138-139. 

Powell  condemns  it,  138. 

McClellan  did  not  need  McDow 
ell's  corps,  Stanton  asserts  later, 

139- 
Formby  condemns  retention,  139- 

140. 

McClellan  again  in  command,  343. 
Waste  of  time,  money  and  men  to 
clear    R.    R.    and    Potomac   by 
special  movement,  107. 
Weather    would    have    stayed    Mc 
Clellan  even  if  McDowell  had 
come,  194. 

The    resulting   condition    of    the 
roads,  the  river  and  the  coun 
try,  an  impassable  bog,  200-201. 
Not   ignored   by   Grant,   7°- 
Weather  and  Waterloo,  70. 
Webb,  General,  praises  McClellan's 

organization  of  the  army,  30. 
Week  of  battle  escaped  if  McDow 
ell  had  come,  221. 


Week  of  battle  escaped  if  McDow 
ell  had  come  (cont.). 
McClellan's     straddling     position 

drew  on  the  attack,  221. 
Letters  to  Wool,  250-251. 
West  Point,  student  at,  10. 
Professor  at,  11-12. 
Franklin  reaches  West  Point,  Va., 

168. 

West,  military  affairs  there  did  not 
warrant  Eastern  operations  in 
fall  of  1861,  67. 

White  House,  General  Lee's  prop 
erty,  422. 

Mrs.  Lee  and  family  there,  422. 
Conveyed    into    the    Confederate 

lines,  422. 

A  day  off  in  the  campaign,  422. 
Whittier,  on  the   Southern  soldier, 

36. 

Winter,  a  hard,  begins,  36. 
Wolseley    praises    McClellan's    or 
ganization  of  the  army,  29. 
Writers,  three  classes  of,  436,  437 
General  Michie's  amazing  biogra 
phy  discussed,  438. 

Yorktown  strongly  fortified  and  be 
lieved  to  be  impregnable,  144. 

Swift  siege  and  capture  of  it,  163- 
164. 

McClellan's  energy  in  the  opera 
tions,  164. 


LD  21A-50m-12  '60 
(B6-221slO)476B 


.General  Library 

University  of  California 

Berkeley 


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UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 


